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Zhengdao Ye and Helen Bromhead
This collective volume is dedicated to Anna Wierzbicka, one of the most 
influential and innovative linguists of her generation, and one of the 
most  prolific scholars in humanities and social sciences.1 Throughout 
her six-decade career, Anna has pursued a meaning-based approach to 
linguistics. Building on Leibniz’s idea of ‘the alphabet of human thoughts’, 
she has identified basic shared human concepts and words (see Table A1, 
Semantic primes, in Appendix). This research has formed the foundations 
of the internationally recognised Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) 
approach to meaning—a versatile tool for exploring ‘big questions’ 
concerning the diversity and universals of people’s experience in the world. 
Her work spans a number of disciplines, including anthropology, psychology, 
cognitive science, philosophy and religious studies, as well as her home base 
of linguistics. This research has inspired generations of scholars to explore 
the nexus between language, culture and cognition.
In this volume, Anna Wierzbicka’s former students, old and current 
colleagues and ‘kindred spirits’ engage with her ideas. They continue their 
engagement (including argument) with diverse aspects of Wierzbicka’s 
work, from ethnosyntax to cross-cultural pragmatics, and from social 
categories to reported speech. The deep humanistic perspective, wide-
ranking themes and interdisciplinary nature of Wierzbicka’s research are 
fully reflected in the contributions.
1  As of April 2019, Google Scholar tells us that Wierzbicka has 35,182 citations, and that her 
h-index is 76 and her i10-index 260. Anna Wierzbicka is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of 
Humanities and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Social Sciences. She is also a Fellow of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, and a Fellow of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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The volume is divided into two parts. Part  I focuses on the NSM 
approach. The contributors are either Anna Wierzbicka’s former PhD 
students, grand-students or those that have been mentored by Anna. They 
are currently working in universities across Australia, Europe and Asia.
The first two chapters of Part I focus on lexicogrammatical meaning: in 
Chapter 1, Cliff Goddard illustrates NSM’s approach to verb semantics 
by offering a detailed case analysis of the English verb climb; in Chapter 2, 
Felix Ameka and Deborah Hill compare the meanings of verbs describing 
‘opening’ events in two languages—Ewe, a Kwa language of Western 
Africa, and Longgu, an Oceanic language of Solomon Islands. The next 
three chapters illustrate the enduring interests of NSM scholars in cultural 
keywords and cross-cultural pragmatics. Bert Peeters unpacks the meaning 
of the Dutch cultural keyword gezellig, roughly translated as ‘convivial, 
cosy, fun’ (Chapter  3); Carsten Levisen takes on ‘royal semantics’ by 
offering an original analysis of ‘the Danish De’ (Chapter 4). His analysis 
shows how the NSM approach offers a tool for high-resolution semantic 
and discursive analysis of address terms and for understanding ‘relational 
grammars’; and in Chapter 5, Jock Wong extends his work on cultural 
keywords in the colloquial variety of Singaporean English (commonly 
known as Singlish) to a new expression that has become popular among 
young Singaporean, the interjection bojio (literally meaning ‘why am 
I not invited’). Chapters 6 and 7 are both concerned with the semantics of 
nouns in Australian English: while Helen Bromhead focuses on extreme 
weather and climate event words, in particular, bushfire, Zhengdao Ye 
undertakes a detailed, corpus-assisted analysis of the distinctive meaning 
of migrant in Australian English. Both of these chapters adopt a corpus-
assisted approach to meaning analysis. Chapter  8 by Anna Gladkova 
investigates the meanings of two Russian verbs expressing visual aesthetic 
appreciation—nagljadet’sja ‘to look at someone/something to complete 
satisfaction/feast one’s eyes on’ and ljubovat’sja, as a means to explore the 
Russian folk conceptions of aesthetics. The ensuing trio of chapters all 
concern Romance languages: in Chapter 9, Gian Marco Farese presents 
a semantic analysis of the Italian carità, roughly translated as ‘charity/act of 
love’, arguing for the influence of Christian values on Italian language and 
culture; in Chapter 10, Mónica Aznárez-Mauleón focuses on the semantics 
of two loanwords in Navarrese Spanish, the noun chirrinta and the verb 
ciriquiar, which possibly have their roots in the Basque language and which 
are specific to the Spanish variety spoken in Navarre and generally not 
included in dictionaries of the Spanish language; in Chapter 11, Zuzanna 
3
INTRODUCTION
Bułat Silva investigates how the category of time relates to the domain 
of emotion by exploring the meaning of the Portuguese culture-specific 
saudade, a rough equivalent of English longing, and comparing it with 
the meanings of their counterparts in Spanish, Polish and Chinese. In the 
final Chapter of Part I (Chapter 12), Yuko Asano-Cavanagh re-evaluates 
previous studies of the Japanese discourse particle no da, and offers new 
analysis to capture its meanings, which are often thought to be too elusive 
to pin down. Together with Jock Wong’s chapter on Singlish interjection, 
it not only attests to NSM researchers’ interest in lesser-studied word 
classes, but also demonstrates the effectiveness of NSM in elucidating the 
meanings of particles.
Anna Wierzbicka’s contributions to scholarship are also appreciated 
by those who work with diverse frameworks. Part II contains chapters by 
some of Wierzbicka’s former and present colleagues at The Australian 
National University, and selected scholars who have engaged (and argued) 
with Anna’s work continuously. The contributors explore diverse topics 
relating to meaning, life and culture, and directly connect with her work 
from their own intellectual perspectives. These perspectives include 
anthropological linguistics, syntax, cognitive linguistics, sociolinguistics, 
intercultural pragmatics and translation studies, as well as other approaches 
to semantics.
Part II opens with two chapters on Australian Indigenous languages. They 
engage with Wierzbicka’s work on personhood constructs, such as ‘mind’, 
and on kinship, respectively: while Frances Morphy and Howard Morphy’s 
chapter (Chapter  13) focuses on personhood terms in Yolngu Matha, 
Harold Koch, in Chapter 14, examines a largely unnoticed aspect of kinship 
terminology consistently appearing in widely separated regions of Indigenous 
Australia. In Chapter 15, John Haiman uses Wierzbicka’s work on direct 
and indirect speech as a springboard for a discussion of the iconicity of 
eye contact in sign languages. In Chapter 16, Annabelle Mooney examines 
semantic accounts of ‘game’ by comparing some of its uses in representations 
and discussions of economic and financial activity with Wierzbicka’s account 
of games. While pointing out the commonalities of Cognitive Linguistics 
and the NSM approach in their humanistic endeavour, John Newman, in 
Chapter 17, further argues for the individual to be more visible in linguistic 
analysis. In Chapter 18, Avery Andrews proposes NSM-based definitions 
of parts of speech (specifically, nouns, verbs and adjectives), and discusses 
their advantages and problems encountered. Both Chapters 19 and 20 are 
concerned with verb semantics: Ulrike Mosel’s chapter deals with cut-verbs 
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of the Oceanic language Teop, spoken in Papua New Guinea’s Bougainville, 
treating it to a critical study of collecting and analysing study of a language 
documentation project; Andrew Pawley’s chapter compares the way sensing 
events are depicted in English and in Kalam, a language of the Trans New 
Guinea family. The next two chapters engage with Anna’s work on meaning, 
culture and intercultural communication in Russian. In Chapter 21, Alexei 
Shmelev investigates language-specific words in Russian by using parallel 
corpora. Tatiana Larina’s chapter in Chapter 22 demonstrates how the values 
of a culture and its communicative styles are closely related, by contrasting 
the idea of ‘sense of privacy’ reflected in English and that of ‘sense of elbow’ 
reflected in Russian.
In the Acknowledgements of her book Imprisoned in English: The Hazards 
of English as a Default Language, Wierzbicka writes:
I am also indebted to some more distant interlocutors who over the 
years have engaged in controversy with me and thus pushed and 
provoked me to sharpen my ideas and arguments … We do need 
intellectual friends, but we also need our opponents, detractors, 
and bêtes noires. They can all fuel the fire of what philosopher 
Peter Goldie (editor of the Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of 
Emotions) calls ‘affect in intellectual activity’, and consequently 
increase our passion and motivation. (Wierzbicka 2014: ix–x)
The final two chapters engage with Wierzbicka’s work in that ‘controversial’ 
spirit which she values. In Chapter 23, the semanticist Keith Allan offers 
a detailed critique of her (1984) semantics for cup; and in Chapter 24, 
two anthropological linguists David Nash and David Wilkins critically 
respond to Wierzbicka and Goddard’s (2018) paper on ‘Talking about 
our bodies and their parts in Warlpiri’.
The topics of the volume are indeed diverse, from linguistics and 
anthropology to psychology. So are the languages covered. The common 
thread running through all the chapters in the volume is the primacy of 
meaning to the understanding of language and culture, and the diversity 
and universality in language and culture, the underlying themes that have 
informed Wierzbicka’s lifelong work. Her productivity is astonishing. 
Rather than offering a full list of her 400 or so publications, we list below 
a selection of the work that the contributors to this volume discuss.
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INTRODUCTION
Selection of Wierzbicka texts discussed
Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (eds) (1994). Semantic and Lexical 
Universals: Theory and Empirical Findings. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (eds) (2002). Meaning and Universal 
Grammar: Theory and Empirical Findings (2 vol.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (2009). Contrastive semantics of physical 
activity verbs: ‘Cutting’ and ‘chopping’ in English, Polish, and Japanese. 
Language Sciences 31: 60–96. doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2007.10.002.
Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (2014a). Words and Meanings: Lexical 
Semantics Across Domains, Languages and Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199668434.001.0001.
Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (2014b). Semantic fieldwork and lexical 
universals. Studies in Language 38 (1): 80–126. doi.org/10.1075/sl.38.1.03god.
Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (2016). Explicating the English lexicon 
of ‘doing and happening’. Functions of Language 23 (2): 214–56. doi.org/ 
10.1075/f ol.23.2.03god.
Goddard, Cliff, Anna Wierzbicka and Jock Wong (2016). ‘Walking’ and ‘running’ 
in English and German: The conceptual semantics of verbs of human 
locomotion. Review of Cognitive Linguistics 14 (2): 303–36. doi.org/ 10.1075/ 
rcl.14.2.03god.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1972). Semantic Primitives. Frankfurt: Athenäum.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1974). The semantics of direct and indirect discourse. 
Paper in Linguistics 7 (3): 267–307. doi.org/10.1080/08351817409370375.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1979). Ethno-syntax and the philosophy of grammar. 
Studies in Language 3 (3): 313–83. doi.org/10.1075/sl.3.3.03wie.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1980). Lingua Mentalis: The Semantics of Natural Language. 
Sydney: Academic Press.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1982). Why can you have a drink when you can’t *have an eat? 
Language 58 (4): 753–99. doi.org/10.2307/413956.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1984). Cups and mugs: Lexicography and conceptual 
analysis. Australian Journal of Linguistics 4: 257–81. doi.org/10.1080/ 
07268608408599326.
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Wierzbicka, Anna (1985a). Lexicography and Conceptual Analysis. Ann Arbor: 
Karoma.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1985b). Different cultures, different languages, different 
speech acts: Polish vs. English. Journal of Pragmatics 9 (2–3): 145–78. doi.org/ 
10.1016/0378-2166(85)90023-2.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1986). What’s in a noun? (Or: How do nouns differ in meaning 
from adjectives?). Studies in Language 10 (2): 353–89. doi.org/ 10.1075/ sl. 
10.2.05wie.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1988). The Semantics of Grammar. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1989a). Soul and mind: Linguistic evidence for 
ethnopsychology and cultural history. American Anthropologist 91 (1): 41–58. 
doi.org/10.1525/aa.1989.91.1.02a00030.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1989b). Baudouin de Courtenay and the theory of linguistic 
relativity. In Janusz Rieger, Mieczyslaw Szymczak and Stanislaw Urbanczyk 
(eds), Jan Niecisław Baudouin de Courtenay a lingwistyka światowa. 
Ossolineum: Wroclaw, 51–58.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1990). The semantics of color terms: Semantics, culture, and 
cognition. Cognitive Linguistics 1: 99–150. doi.org/10.1515/cogl.1990.1.1.99.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1991). Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics of Human 
Interaction. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1992a). Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human 
Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1992b). Defining emotion concepts. Cognitive Science 16 (4): 
539–81.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1992c). Personal names and expressive derivation. In Semantics, 
Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific 
Configurations. New York: Oxford University Press, 225–307.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1992d). Semantic primitives and semantic fields. In Eva 
Kittay and Adrienne Lehrer (eds), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts. Norwood, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 209–27.




Wierzbicka, Anna (1995). Everyday conceptions of emotion: A semantic 
perspective. In James A. Russell, José-Miguel Fernández-Dols, Antony S.R. 
Manstead and J.C. Wellenkamp (eds), Everyday Conceptions of Emotion. 
An Introduction to the Psychology, Anthropology, and Linguistics of Emotion. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 17–47. doi.org/10.1007/978-94-
015-8484-5_2.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1996). Semantics: Primes and Universals. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1997). Understanding Cultures through their Key Words: 
English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1999a). Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity 
and Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi.org/10.1017/
cbo9780511521256.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1999b). Semanticheskiye universalii I opisaniye yazykov 
[Semantic Universals and Description of Languages]. Translated from English 
by A. Shmelev. Moscow: Yazyki russskoi kul’tury [in Russian].
Wierzbicka, Anna (2002a). Russian cultural scripts: The theory of cultural 
scripts and its applications. Ethos 30 (4): 401–32. doi.org/10.1525/
eth.2002.30.4.401.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2002b). Russkie kul’turnye skripty i ix otraženie v jazyke 
[Russian cultural scripts and their reflection in language]. Russkij Jazyk v 
Naučnom Osveščenii [Russian Language and Linguistic Theory] 2 (4): 6–34.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2002c). Australian cultural scripts—bloody revisited. Journal 
of Pragmatics 34 (9): 1167–209. doi.org/10.1016/s0378-2166(01)00023-6.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2003a [1991]). Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics 
of Human Interaction (2nd edn). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2003b). Singapore English: A semantic and cultural 
perspective. Multilingua 22: 327–66. doi.org/10.1515/mult.2003.018.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2006a). English: Meaning and Culture. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2006b). Anglo scripts against ‘putting pressure’ on other people 
and their linguistic manifestations. In Cliff Goddard (ed.), Ethnopragmatics: 
Understanding Discourse in Cultural Context. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 
31–63. doi.org/10.1515/9783110911114.31.
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Wierzbicka, Anna (2006c). Preface. In Bert Peeters (ed.) Semantic Primes and 
Universal Grammar: Empirical Evidence from Romance Languages. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 1–6. doi.org/10.1075/slcs.81.05wie.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2006d). A conceptual basis for intercultural pragmatics and 
world-wide understanding. Paper presented at The 31st International LAUD 
Symposium, Landau, Germany.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2008). Why there are no ‘colour universals’ in language and 
thought. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 14 (2): 407–25. doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1467-9655.2008.00509.x.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2009). Language and metalanguage: Key issues in emotion 
research. Emotion Review 1 (1): 3–14. doi.org/10.1177/1754073908097175.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2010). Experience, Evidence, and Sense: The Hidden Cultural 
Legacy of English. New York: Oxford University Press. doi.org/10.1093/
acprof: oso/9780195368000.001.0001.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2013). Kinship and social cognition in Australian languages: 
Kayardild and Pitjantjatjara. Special Issue, ‘Semantics and/in social cognition’. 
Australian Journal of Linguistics 33 (3): 302–21. doi.org/10.1080/07268602
.2013.846458.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2014). Imprisoned in English: The Hazards of English as a Default 
Language. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2015). A whole cloud of culture condensed into a drop of 
semantics: The meaning of the German word ‘Herr’ as a term of address. 
International Journal of Language and Culture 2 (1). 1–37. doi.org/10.1075/
ijolc.2.1.01wie.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2016a). Making sense of terms of address in European 
languages through the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM). Intercultural 
Pragmatics 13 (4): 499–527
Wierzbicka, Anna (2016b). Terms of address in European languages: A study in 
cross-linguistic semantics and pragmatics. In Keith Allan, Alessandro Capone, 
Istvan Kecskes and Jacob Mey (eds), Pragmemes and Theories of Language Use. 
Springer, 209–38. doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43491-9_12.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2016c). Terms of address as keys to culture and society: 
German Herr vs. Polish Pan. Acta Philologica 49: 29–44.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2016d). Two levels of verbal communication, universal 
and culture-specific. In Andrea Rocci and Louis de Saussure (eds), Verbal 




Wierzbicka, Anna (2017). The meaning of kinship terms: A developmental and 
cross linguistic perspective. In Zhengdao Ye (ed.), The Semantics of Nouns. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19–62.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2019). What Christians Believe: The Story of God and People. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Appendix
Table A1 . Semantic primes (English exponents) .
i, you, someone, something~thing, people, body substantives
kinds, parts relational substantives
this, the same, other~else determiners 
one, two, some, all, much~many, little~few quantifiers
good, bad evaluators
big, small descriptors
know, think, want, don’t want, feel, see, hear mental predicates
say, words, true speech
do, happen, move actions, events, 
movement
be (somewhere), there is, be (someone/something) location, existence, 
specification
(is) mine possession
live, die life and death
when~time, now, before, after, a long time, a 
short time, for some time, moment
time
where~place, here, above, below, far, near, side, 
inside, touch
place
not, maybe, can, because, if logical concepts
very, more augmentor, intensifier
like similarity
Notes: Exponents of primes can be polysemous; that is, they can have other, additional 
meanings .
Exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes, or phrasemes .
They can be formally, that is, morphologically, complex .
They can have combinatorial variants or allolexes (indicated with ~) .
each prime has well-specified syntactic (combinatorial) properties.
Source: Goddard and Wierzbicka (2014a).

PART I
Meaning, life and culture: 





Prototypes, polysemy and 
constructional semantics: 
The lexicogrammar of the 
English verb climb
Cliff Goddard
1 . Anna Wierzbicka on prototypes, 
polysemy and constructional semantics
Three themes in the work of Anna Wierzbicka inform the present study 
and the predecessor work upon which it rests. The first is her long-term 
engagement with prototypes in semantics. Rejecting the conventional 
dichotomy between prototypes and semantic invariants, she has long 
insisted that a prototype can be ‘part of the semantic invariant itself ’ 
(Wierzbicka 1996: 167).
Second, Wierzbicka has always recognised that lexical polysemy is normal, 
indeed ubiquitous, in everyday language and that it is impossible to reach 
valid generalisations about words, meaning and grammar without taking 
polysemy seriously. This means not only adopting a rigorous methodology 
whereby one can reliably distinguish genuine polysemy from generality or 
vagueness of meaning, but being prepared to put in weeks or months 
of painstaking effort to disentangle complex polysemic networks of 
intertwined lexical, phraseological and grammatical meanings.
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Third, far from being narrowly focused on lexical meaning, Wierzbicka 
was one of the pioneers of what is now discussed under rubrics such as 
constructional semantics and lexicogrammar. In her seminal 1982 article 
‘Why can you have a drink when you can’t *have an eat?’ in the journal 
Language, she proposed a set of interrelated semantic schemas for ‘have 
a VP [verb phrase]’ constructions. Although the slots in these schemas 
were filled by items from specific semantic–lexical subclasses, each schema 
as a whole expressed a larger meaning that was not a simple compositional 
function of its individual parts.
Thirty years ago, in The Semantics of Grammar (1988), she wrote:
There is no such thing as ‘grammatical meaning’ or ‘lexical 
meaning’. There are only grammatical and lexical MEANS of 
conveying meaning—and even here no sharp line can be drawn 
between them. (Wierzbicka 1988: 8)
Underpinning Wierzbicka’s decades of semantic description and 
theoretical innovation, one goal has remained constant: the ‘sustained 
effort to establish, and verify, the basic stock of human concepts—universal 
semantic primitives—out of which thoughts and complex concepts are 
constructed’ (1996: 169). Though valuable in themselves, the hundreds 
of empirical studies conducted in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage 
(NSM) approach collectively bear on this overarching task. In 2020, 
NSM researchers believe that this task has essentially been accomplished.1
In past decade or so, there has been intensive NSM research on physical 
activity verbs (Sibly 2010; Ye 2010; Goddard 2012; Goddard and 
Wierzbicka 2016; Goddard, Wierzbicka and Wong 2016; Goddard 2018: 
Ch 5). In the present study, I draw on this body of work to explore the 
semantics and lexicogrammar of a single English verb: climb.
2 . The puzzle of English ‘climb’
Charles Fillmore (1982) influentially used English climb as an example 
of a verb whose meaning could not be described using a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. According to Fillmore, climb normally or 
1  Goddard (2018: Ch 3) gives a brief history of the NSM approach. Though certain aspects of the 
metalanguage syntax remain to be worked out fully, the last amendment to the inventory of primes 
itself—replacing have (something) with (is) mine—was implemented in 2016.
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prototypically signals two semantic components, roughly (i) moving 
upward, (ii) using a ‘clambering’ manner, but in extended uses either 
condition (but not both) can be set aside. For example, a person or 
a  monkey can readily be said to climb down a tree (i.e. without the 
upwards direction component), while a snail or a snake can be said climb 
(up) a tree (i.e. without the ‘clambering’ component). The same snail or 
snake, however, could not be said to climb down.
This is indeed a striking observation. However, as noted in Wierzbicka 
(1996) and in earlier works, if moving upwards is merely part of 
a prototype and not part of the invariant meaning, why can a sentence 
like The monkey climbed the flagpole not be interpreted as meaning that 
the monkey climbed down. How can we be so sure that, unless otherwise 
specified, the direction of movement is upwards? Wierzbicka also noted 
that there is more to it than just the two components mentioned by 
Fillmore. For example, an extended use of another kind, in the sentence 
The train climbed the mountain, implies more than simply upwards 
direction. Without any qualification to the contrary, this sentence would 
not be a good description if the train had sped quickly up the mountain.
Over the following years and decades, English climb continued to be 
revisited by linguists of different persuasions. Ray Jackendoff (1983, 
1985, 1990) formalised Fillmore’s observations using a ‘preference rule 
system’, and in a series of papers Beth Levin and Malka Rappaport Hovav 
(e.g. Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2010; Levin and  Rappaport Hovav 
2013) puzzled over climb as they sought to develop a simple schematics 
for verbs, according to which Manner and Result are (or ought to be) 
in a complementary relationship; that is, verbs or uses of verbs ought 
to be Manner-oriented or Result-oriented but not both. Verbs  like 
climb (and cut) seemed to challenge this idea and the debate shows little 
sign of reaching a conclusion, even after 30  years (cf. e.g. Chen and 
Husband 2019).
In my view, the reasons for the slow rate of progress come down to 
problems of method and approach. The lexical semantics of climb 
(and cut) in fact intertwine Manner and Result components. They also 
interact with grammatical aspect. It is all very semantically complex, 
very intricate; but conventional approaches are not greatly interested 
in semantic complexity (=  accuracy) for its own sake. Many linguists 
are concerned first and foremost with formal syntax and so the effort 
is always to schematise the semantics, to keep the fine semantic details 
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to a minimum. In the experience of NSM linguists, it is a false economy 
and a self-defeating strategy to stave off detailed work on semantics in the 
hope of reaching the big picture first. Deciding not to focus one’s lens is 
a formula for seeing a fuzzy picture.
I have two further observations about verb semantics in the mainstream 
‘syntax and semantics’ literature. First, there has been remarkably little 
interest in the details of Manner specifications. For decades there was no 
progress beyond Fillmore’s descriptor ‘clambering’ (itself a complex and 
highly English-specific term). Jackendoff (1990) mentioned ‘effortful 
grasping motions’ but went straight back to using ‘clambering’ as an 
abbreviation. Not until the new century did Geuder and Weisgerber 
(2006) contribute a new idea, namely, ‘force exertion against gravity’, 
and although this formulation can no doubt be improved, it conveys the 
idea that climbing involves effort, and hints, perhaps, at the possibility 
of falling.
My second observation concerns the stubborn persistence of the idea that 
so-called ‘syntactic alternations’ can be revealingly described with minimal 
reference to semantics. Already in 2000, David Dowty challenged this 
view, from within the generative fold, in an article whose title contains the 
phrase ‘the fallacy of argument alternation’. He wrote:2
[C]ontrary to the usual view … good reasons can be given to view 
it as a lexical derivation analogous to rules of word formation 
on the one hand, and to processes of lexical semantic 
extension … and metaphor on the other. (Dowty 2000: 121; 
emphasis in original)
The ‘main linguistic phenomenon that ought to be of interest’, Dowty 
said, is that alternate constructions ‘serve to convey significantly different 
meanings’ (2000: 110). To make good on this insight, however, depends 
on being able to capture meanings and meaning differences in a rigorous 
and cognitively plausible fashion.
2  Dowty was speaking of the so-called locative-subject construction; for example, The garden is 
swarming with bees, but his comments were intended to have broader implications.
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3 . Verb semantics, aspect and 
constructional semantics: The view 
from 2020
This is a thumbnail sketch of current NSM work with verb semantics, 
aspectual transposition and constructional semantics. To explicate verbs, 
one must first decide on a basic grammatical frame for the verb in 
question, which will include its core arguments and its inherent aspect. 
For English physical activity verbs like walk, run, cut, chop and grind, the 
basic frame is ‘activity-in-progress’, expressed with the present progressive. 
To anticipate, for climb we will start with the basic frame: Someone X 
is climbing something (e.g. a tree, a ladder, garden wall).
Verbs of a given semantic class are expected to follow the same semantic 
template, sometimes with minor variations. In their basic activity-in-
progress meanings, English physical activity verbs have a four-part 
semantic template. The section headings and some key points about each 
of them are given in Table 1.1.
Table 1 .1 . Semantic template for activity-in-progress, with key points .
lexicosyntactic frame. Very general. Hinged around primes do, happen 
and move. Identifies the main participants and other grammatically salient 
things such as inherent aspect (e.g. ‘for some time’ (durational)), and whether 
the activity is necessarily localised (i.e. done ‘in a place’).
prototypical scenario. Introduced by ‘often when someone does this, it is 
like this: …’. Includes the intention or mental state of the prototypical actor, 
which is always a pivotal component.3
how it happens (manner). Introduced by ‘often when someone does this, 
it happens like this’, plus, if iterative: ‘it happens like this many times’. 
May include an incremental effect.
potential outcome. Specifies that if done ‘for some time’, the activity can 
be effective in bringing about the desired result.
Source: Author’s summary .
As for the individual semantic components in NSM explications, they are 
chiefly written in semantic primes. Explications can also include complex 
lexical meanings, either as semantic molecules or as derivational bases. 
3  The explications in this chapter use ‘often’ as a portmanteau for ‘at many times’, as is now 
standard in recent NSM work.
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Both are relevant to the present study. Semantic molecules, marked as [m], 
are complex meanings that function as recurring units in the structure of 
many concepts across many domains (Goddard 2011: 375–84; Goddard 
and Wierzbicka 2014: Chs 2–4). The explications for climb will require the 
semantic molecules ‘hands [m]’, ‘legs [m]’, ‘ground [m]’, ‘at the top [m]’ 
and ‘at the bottom [m]’. Derivational bases, marked as [d], are complex 
lexical meanings that enter into explications in a much more limited and 
localised fashion; that is, in derivational processes, in quasi-derivational 
extensions from a basic lexical meaning to a more elaborated one, and 
in specialised lexicogrammatical constructions (Goddard 2018: 235–64).
The concept of [d] elements was originally developed to deal with 
‘visible’ derivational relationships, e.g. between the words ill and illness, 
or between the noun knife and the verb to knife (someone). The idea was 
that the simpler of the two meanings could appear inside the explication 
of the more complex one; for example, the explication of the noun illness 
could include ‘ill [d]’; the explication for the verb to knife could include 
‘knife [d]’. As will be shown in the present study, however, the idea of [d] 
elements has turned out to have far broader applications.
One of these applications is to allow a quasi-derivational treatment of 
grammatical aspect. This is relevant to the present study because many 
semantically specialised constructions, including for the verb climb, are 
found preferentially in perfective contexts; for example, in the English 
simple past. Briefly, the idea is that verbs like climb and cut can also appear 
in a perfective (e.g. simple past) template with three sections:
(i) lexicosyntactic frame: ‘someone X did something (to something) 
at this time’, that is, a temporally localised act without reference to 
its duration.
(ii) how it happened (manner): described using the activity-in-
progress meaning as a [d] element; for example, ‘someone ate 
something’ includes ‘this someone was eating [d] it for some time’.
(iii) outcome: the achievement of a particular goal envisaged by the 
actor.
This approach corresponds closely to standard descriptions of the 
perfective as viewing an event in its totality without attention to its 
internal temporal constituency (Comrie 1993).
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4 . Extended meanings and uses 
of English ‘climb’
We begin our exploration of climb not by explicating its semantically basic 
meaning, but from the other direction, as it were: by showing how various 
non-basic uses of climb can be accounted for, assuming that we have an 
explication for ‘is climbing’ and can use it as a [d] element. Consider the 
simple past of climb. It is explicated in [A].
[A] She climbed1 a tree (tree, ladder, wall) 
[i .e . simple past]
she (= this someone) did something in a place at this time lexiCosynTaCTiC 
frame
it happened like this: how iT happened 
(manner)a short time before, she thought like this about 
something in this place (a tree, ladder, wall):
‘I want to be at the top [m] of this something’
because of this, she was climbing [d] this tree 
(ladder, wall) for some time
because of this, after this, she was not in the place 
where she was before
ouTCome
she was at the top [m] of this tree (ladder, wall) as she 
wanted
Explication [A] involves literal ‘climbing [d]’, and as we will see when it is 
explicated (in section 5), ‘climbing [d]’ includes a semantic component of 
upwards motion. What about climb down then, or climb onto something?
Climb down is quite a high-frequency expression in the Collins Wordbanks 
Online corpus (hereafter: Wordbanks). It is explicated in [B]. Although 
the How It Happened section still uses ‘climbing [d]’, it is positioned 
inside in an ‘analogy of manner’ component: ‘he did something for some 
time like someone does when this someone is climbing [d] something’.
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[B] He climbed2 down the tree (ladder, wall)
he did something in a place at this time lexiCosynTaCTiC 
frame
it happened like this: how iT happened 
(manner)a short time before, he thought like this about 
something in this place (a tree, ladder, wall): 
‘I want to be at the bottom [m] of this something’
because of this, he did something for some time 
like someone does when this someone is climbing [d] 
something
because of this, after this, he was not in the place 
where he was before
ouTCome
he was at the bottom [m] of this tree (ladder, wall) as he 
wanted
Now let us consider examples when climb appears with other adverbial 
modifiers, especially prepositional phrases with into, off, onto, out onto, 
out from, out from under, etc. Such expressions are extremely common 
in English, helping to put climb into the 350 most frequent verbs in the 
English language, and, possibly, into the top 20 physical activity verbs.4
(1) a. He climbed into bed, into the passenger seat, etc.
b. She climbed onto the roof of the car.
c. He climbed out of the car (cabin, backseat, etc.)5
(2) a. He opened the window and climbed out onto the windowsill.
b. They climbed out from under the table.
4  These statements are based on word frequency figures taken from COCA (Corpus of 
Contemporary American English): www.wordfrequency.info/free.asp?s=y. ‘Climb’ appears in rank 
334 of verbs. Rather strikingly, however, a manual count shows that physical activity verbs constitute 
only about 10–15% of the top 350. Restricting ourselves only to physical activity verbs, climb comes 
after the following, given in order of frequency: go, come, play, run, hold, sit, stand, walk, build, cut, 
carry, eat, fight, laugh, sing, drink, cry, cook.
5  It seems worth noting that climbed out of has a very high frequency in Wordbanks, more than 
1,300 instances, nearly three times as many as climbed down.
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c. The 22-year-old New Zealand-born pilot actually climbed out onto 
the wing of his plane while it was at 13,000 feet …
d. a one-year-old boy who apparently was looking for his mother 
climbed out onto a window ledge …
Explication [C] is for sentences like He climbed onto the roof of the car 
or He climbed into bed.
[C] He climbed2 onto the roof of the car
he did something at this time in a place lexiCosynTaCTiC 
frame
it happened like this: how iT happened 
(manner)a short time before, he thought like this about 
something in this place (a car):
‘I want to be on the roof of this car’
because of this, he did something for some time 
like someone does when this someone is climbing [d] 
something
because of this, after this, he was not in the place  
where he was before
ouTCome
he was on the roof of the car as he wanted
I will now sketch how other extended uses of English climb can be 
accounted for in similar fashion, beginning with instances in which 
non-human creatures are said to climb. In the case of monkeys, who, as 
already mentioned, can be said to climb down as well as up, explication [B] 
will be appropriate with only minor adjustments, given that one thinks of 
monkeys as having similar bodies and mental capacities to humans. For 
creatures like snails and snakes, on the other hand, a version of the analogy 
mechanism shown in [C] will be needed. Sentences like the following 
(garnered from the internet) are not uncommon.
(3) a. Why do snails climb up walls when it rains?
b. Can snakes climb stairs?
c. I was staring at it for a while as it climbed up my shelving before 
it registered for me that it was a snake.
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In another phraseological cluster, prices, wages, temperatures, sales figures, 
ratings, population numbers and the like, which all involve numbers 
(numerical values), can be said to climb, implying that they move steadily 
upwards. For example:
(4) a. Facebook’s stock price continued to climb with few massive jumps in 
either direction, negative or positive.
b. The Australian Bureau of Statistics says wages climbed just 2.2 per 
cent …
c. These data show that temperatures have climbed to more than 1.8°F 
(1°C) above pre-industrial levels …
To explicate these uses, a third kind of [d]-mechanism is needed. It can 
be termed ‘analogy of effect’ (cf. Goddard 2015). Roughly and loosely, 
the idea is that ‘something happens to this number [m] like something 
happens to someone when this someone is climbing [d] something’—
that is, it moves steadily upwards. A similar approach can be used for the 
place-based phraseological cluster in which a road, trail, railway line or the 
like is said to climb through the mountains, etc.
5 . Climbing1 a tree (ladder, wall)
It is time now to address the semantically basic meaning of climb, that is, 
the meaning found in its ‘activity-in-progress’ frame, as in sentences such 
as the following.
(5) a. She was climbing a tree in the backyard.
b. He was climbing a ladder when he fell.
A note is in order here about English grammar. English puts the thing/
place being climbed in the direct object/accusative role, but quite 
a number of languages do otherwise, expressing it in a locational phrase 
marked by a locative (or other oblique) adposition or case: for example, 
Yankunytjatjara punu-ngka kalpanyi ‘climbing (on) a tree’. From an 
‘objective’ point of view, this would seem very natural, insofar as a tree 
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(ladder, wall, etc.) is not particularly affected by the climbing. After all, 
when one climbs a tree or ladder, one can hardly be said to be ‘doing 
something to it’.6
An explication for English climbing (a tree, ladder) is given in [D] 
below. Here are brief comments on each of its four main sections. The 
Lexicosyntactic Frame is the same as used for other verbs of locomotion 
(Goddard, Wierzbicka and Wong 2016).7 In the Prototypical Scenario, 
note the prior intention or a preparatory thought (‘a short time before, 
this someone thought about it like this: …’).8 This makes sense because 
climbing is not a routine everyday activity like walking: it requires an effort, 
and it requires something like a ‘commitment’. When someone sets out to 
climb something, they are aware of the possibility of physical harm to their 
bodies, associated with the possibility of falling. There is more discussion 
of the prototypical scenario after the explication. I would only add at this 
point that the actor’s cognitive focus on the thing being climbed may help 
explain why it appears (in English) in the direct object position.
The How it Happens (Manner) section includes an iterative structure—
that is, brief repeated episodes involving coordinated moving and touching 
with the hands and parts of the legs—followed by a whole-body action 
which brings about an incremental effect—that is, ‘this someone’s body is 
above the place where it was before’. If this iterated process carries on for 
long enough, the Potential Outcome is that the person ‘can be at the top 
[m] of this big thing as they wanted’.
Note that explication [D] uses the English-specific they (singular) 
as a ‘portmanteau of convenience’ for ‘this someone’.
6  Of the 36 languages surveyed in the ValPal project on valency frames (valpal.info/meanings/
climb), about 10 appear either to follow or to prefer the oblique pattern with climb: Ainu, Eastern 
Armenian, Evenki, Korean, Mandinka, Yucatek Maya, Zenzontepec Chatino, Sri Lanka Malay, 
Ojibwe and Japanese (Hartmann, Haspelmath and Taylor 2013).
7  Climb can be used intransitively, e.g. He was climbing, and, in this frame, it looks parallel on the 
surface to the verb crawl, whose Manner also involves coordinated movements and contact by hands 
and legs. There are also other intransitive motion verbs, like swim and fly, which have special Manners 
adapted to the challenges presented by bodily motion in places of different kinds. I experimented with 
using ‘intransitive climb’ as the basic frame, but my eventual conclusion was that it is a case of omitted 
object construction, with the ‘expected’ object being place-like.
8  A similar component appears in the explications for transitive physical activity verbs such as cut, 
chop and grind (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2016).
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[D] Someone is climbing1 something Y (e .g . a tree, 
a ladder, a wall)
someone is doing something for some time in a place lexiCosynTaCTiC 
framebecause of this, they are moving in this place during this 
time as they want
often when someone does this, it is like this: proToTypiCal 
sCenariothere is something big (of one kind) in the place where 
there this someone is
a short time before they thought about it like this:
‘I am far from the top [m] of this big thing now, 
I want to be at the top [m] of this big thing after 
some time
I can’t be there if I don’t do some things with my 
body for some time
I know that it is like this:
when I am doing it, I will be far above the 
ground [m] for some time
because of this, it can be bad for me if 
something happens not as I want
something bad can happen to my body’
when someone does this, their hands [m] touch this big 
thing in many places, parts of their legs [m] touch this 
big thing in many places
how iT happens 
(manner) inCl. 
inCremenTal 
effeCTit often happens like this:
for a short time they do something with one hand [m]
because of this, this hand [m] touches this something 
somewhere above where it touched it before
after this, they do something with one leg [m]
because of this, part of this leg [m] touches this 
something somewhere above where it touched it before
after this, they do something with the body
because of this, after this, the body is above  
the place where it was before
it happens like this many times
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if this someone does this for some time, after this they can 
be not in the place where they were before
poTenTial 
ouTCome
they can be at the top [m] of this big thing as they wanted
The most notable aspects of explication [D] are in its prototypical 
scenario section,9 so I will comment further on this. Most of the proposed 
prototypical scenario relates to the prior intention of the actor, including 
their awareness that to achieve the goal ‘to be at the top of this big 
thing after some time’ necessarily involves ‘doing some things with my 
body’, and being aware at the same time that there is an element of risk 
involved in being ‘far above the ground’; that is, ‘it can be bad for me 
if something happens not as I want, something bad can happen to my 
body’. This kind of mindset, I would argue, is intuitively plausible for 
climbing1, such as in ‘climbing a tree’.
The actor’s initial construal that ‘I am far from the top of this big thing’ 
helps explain why expressions like climb the ladder can sound appropriate 
even about a small stepladder, provided that the actor is a  toddler 
or young child. It is the subjective point of view that matters, not 
whether the distance to the top is or isn’t ‘far’ from the point of view of 
a disinterested observer. Notice also that the prospect of bodily harm does 
not hinge entirely on the climber making a mistake, such as slipping from 
a handhold or foothold. It could come about from other (unspecified) 
mishaps, such as a weaker-than-expected branch giving way or something 
falling from above.
These various elements of the prototypical actor’s mental state 
(the construal of a far distance to be covered and implied need for caution 
and concentration) help explain extended uses of climb in expressions 
like climb the stairs. Climb the stairs is a high-frequency expression, but it 
does not mean the same, nor is it used in the same range of contexts, as 
alternatives such as take the stairs or go upstairs. The expression climb the 
stairs implies effort, and for a physically fit person, this might imply (say) 
three or four flights of stairs. On the other hand, for a person who is weak 
from illness, injury or frailty, even going up a single flight of stairs can be 
described as climbing the stairs.
9  The Manner section may seem rather detailed in its ‘motor pattern’, but it is roughly comparable 
to the Manner sections of the explications for crawl and run (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2016; 
Goddard, Wierzbicka and Wong 2016).
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The same applies (even more so) to climb down the stairs. Given that going 
downwards is usually less physically demanding than ascending, it makes 
sense that the range of use of climb down the stairs is even more restricted. 
Climbing down the stairs only feels appropriate when speaking of someone 
who is weak or unsteady on their feet, or, alternatively, in situations where 
the stairs are perceived to be steep and dangerous.
The physical demands of climbing something, together with the need 
for caution, help explain why the default assumption is that climbing 
is normally done slowly and steadily, and this implication carries over 
when ‘climbing’ is used as a [d] element in analogy of manner or analogy 
of effect components, such as we saw in section 4. (In Wordbanks, the 
most typical manner adverbs to collocate with climb are steadily, slowly, 
cautiously, laboriously and unsteadily.)
6 . Climbing3 a mountain (cliff face, hill )
Object noun phrases such as mountain, cliff face and hill are not fully 
compatible with climb1 as explicated in [D] above: first, because mountains 
and the like are ‘places (of one kind)’, rather than things (in a place) 
(Bromhead 2018); and second, because the physical aspects and time 
frame of climbing a mountain, cliff face, etc. are significantly different—for 
example, it takes much longer and special equipment is often involved.
(6) a. Many people want to climb Mt Everest, Mt Cook, Mt Fuji, 
Mt Warning, etc.
b. Who has climbed the Dawn Wall [a famous cliff face]?
For these sentences, it is necessary to posit a third, polysemic meaning 
climb3. It is explicated in [E] below. The main differences are, first, that in 
the prototypical scenario the nature of the place is described: ‘this place is 
a big place (of one kind)’; second, that the preparatory thought is depicted 
as taking place ‘some time before’, rather than ‘a short time before’, as 
with climb1 (this is connected with the fact that climbing a  mountain, 
hill, cliff, etc. is a more substantial undertaking); and third, that in the 
How it Happens (Manner) section, the person is depicted as doing ‘some 
things in this place for some time like someone does when this someone 
is climbing [d] something’.
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[E] Someone is climbing3 a mountain (hill, cliff face)
someone is doing something for some time in a place lexiCosynTaCTiC 
framebecause of this, they are moving in this place during this 
time as they want
often when someone does this in a place, it is like this: proToTypiCal 
sCenariothis place is a big place of one kind
some time before, this someone thought like this 
about this place:
‘I am far from the top [m] of this big place now
I want to be at the top [m] of this big place after 
some time
I can’t be there if I don’t do some things with my 
body for some time
I know that it is like this:
when I am doing it, it can be bad for me 
if something happens not as I want
something bad can happen to my body 
because of it’
when someone does this, it happens like this: how iT happens 
(manner)this someone does some things in this place for some 
time like someone does when they are climbing [d] 
something
if this someone does this for some time, after this, they can 
be at the top [m] of this big place, as they wanted
poTenTial 
ouTCome
In connection with climb3, one should note the existence of a slew 
of specialised terms and phrases for mountain climbing and rock climbing.
(7) a. mountain climber, climbers
b. climbing gear, climbing ropes, climbing routes, the summit climb
c. mountain climbing, rock climbing, sports climbing, free climbing, 
indoor climbing
There are collocational facts to be mined as well; for example, the 
possibility of these meanings appearing in coordinate constructions with 
words such as hiking, trekking and canoeing.
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7 . She climbed4 the fence (gate): A covert 
alternation with ‘climb’
First, a bit of additional background is necessary. In the literature on 
syntactic alternations, a specialised ‘crossing an obstacle’ construction 
has been identified with intransitive English verbs of motion such as 
swim or jump, which imply significant bodily effort. In this specialised 
construction,  the verb appears in a transitive frame; however, as shown 
in (8) and (9), the transitive versions are roughly synonymous with 
intransitive sentences that include a prepositional phrase with across 
or over.
(8) He swam the river.
 ≈ He swam across the river.
(9) She jumped the puddle.
 ≈ She jumped over the puddle.
To the best of my knowledge, the ‘crossing an obstacle’ construction has 
not previously been recognised in the literature on the verb climb, because, 
English climb being already transitive in appearance, the construction does 
not show itself via a change in surface argument structure. But consider:
(10) a. He climbed the ladder/mountain.
≠ He climbed over the ladder/mountain.
b. He climbed the fence (gate, garden wall).
≈ He climbed over the fence (gate, garden wall).
c. *He climbed up/down the fence (gate, garden wall).
The examples in (10a) show that with canonical objects such as ladder 
and mountain, sentences with climb are not near-synonyms of agnate 
sentences with prepositional phrases using over—that is, to climb a ladder 
and to climb over a ladder mean something quite different to one another. 
However, when the object is something like a fence, a gate or a (garden) 
wall—a barrier that can be crossed—the equation goes through, as shown 
by the examples in (10b): to climb a fence and to climb over a fence do mean 
much the same.
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Another indication that we are dealing here with a separate construction 
is that, as shown by the examples in (10c), adverbs like up and down 
cannot normally be added to ‘crossing an obstacle’ sentences with climb. 
It may also be noted that ‘crossing an obstacle’ sentences with climb (like 
comparable sentences with swim and jump) usually sound much better in 
the simple past than in the progressive.
For these reasons, it is necessary to recognise an additional constructional 
schema, with a distinctive motivation (‘I want to be on the other side of 
this thing here’), as shown in [F].
[F] He climbed4 the fence (gate)
he did something in a place at this time lexiCosynTaCTiC 
frame
it happened like this: how iT happened 
(manner)a short time before, he thought like this about 
something in this place (a fence, gate):
‘I want to be on the other side of this thing here’
because of this, for a short time he did something in 
this place like someone does when this someone is 
climbing [d] something
because of this, after this, he was not in the place  
where he was before
ouTCome
he was on the other side of this thing as he wanted
This concludes the present study of the lexicogrammar of English climb.
8 . Concluding remarks
Given the complexity of the explications and wide range of uses I have 
endeavoured to cover in this short study, many improvements are 
no doubt possible. There is certainly scope for more detailed corpus-
analytical work. It would also be extremely valuable to bring comparisons 
with other languages into the picture. There are sure to be many subtle 
but significant differences between ‘climb words’ in different languages. 
Pinpointing these differences would help firm up the optimal phrasing 
of various components. It is entirely possible that some cross-linguistic 
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
30
differences will turn out to be related to different geographic environments 
and lifestyles of the speakers concerned. One would also expect that 
cross-linguistic differences in the basic meanings will have downstream 
effects so far as extended meanings are concerned.
It should be emphasised that much of the present study has been concerned 
not with the semantically basic meaning of English climb, but with how this 
core or basic meaning can be extended and enriched by being embedded 
into different constructional frames. In English, the favourite mechanisms 
for doing this are syntactic in character, principally involving alternative 
prepositional phrases. In other languages, comparable meanings may be 
expressed by devices such as derivational morphology, verb compounding 
or serial verb constructions.
To conclude on a general note, it should be clear that the verb climb 
provides a perfect example of lexis, morphology, phraseology and syntax 
all working together to express varied and subtle meanings.
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The comparative semantics 
of verbs of ‘opening’: 
West Africa vs Oceania
Felix K . Ameka and Deborah Hill
1 . Introduction
Separating things into parts or constituents using different means 
is  an everyday activity that humans everywhere undertake. The way in 
which humans categorise such events and label them in verbs varies 
considerably across languages and cultures. In a cross-linguistic study of 
the categorisation of separation events, Majid et al. (2007: 147) note that 
separation events such as opening, taking apart and peeling, which involve 
minimal destruction of the affected object and are mostly reversible, were 
distinguished from those involving cutting and breaking, which involve 
significant material destruction accompanied by non-reversible change in 
the integrity of the object.
‘Opening’ events are thus a subspecies of separation events. Many 
languages partition the ‘opening’ events in English among a number of 
different verbs, but the criteria used for this differ strikingly from one 
language to another. An English-like category of opening events does 
not seem to be inevitable to human cognition (Bowerman 2005: 229). 
For instance, Korean has about six verbs that cover the semantic range 
of opening events in English. As Bowerman put it:
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The conceptual glue that unifies for example ‘opening the mouth’, 
‘opening an envelope’, and ‘opening a book’ for speakers of 
English seems to be missing [in Korean FKA & DH] and the 
domain is parceled out among a number of crosscutting categories 
that emphasise different aspects of events. (Bowerman 2005: 228)
This chapter compares the way two languages, Ewe, a Kwa language of 
West Africa, and Longgu, an Oceanic language of Solomon Islands, carve 
up the semantic space of ‘opening’ and provides semantic explications 
for a small number of verbs in each language.1
In morpho-syntactic terms, Ewe and Longgu share some similarities and 
they both deploy serial verb constructions (SVCs). They both also use 
reduplication to express various meanings. There are some differences 
too. Longgu is a head marking language where arguments are marked 
on the verb following an SVO (subject–verb–object) pattern. However, 
constituent order in the clause is typically VS/VOA (verb–subject/verb–
object–transitive subject, Hill 2016a). The basic constituent order in Ewe 
by contrast is SV/AVO (subject–verb/transitive subject–verb–object). 
In addition, Longgu has verb transitivising suffixes, as we shall see. Ewe, 
on the other hand, is an isolating language with agglutinative features. 
It does not use verb derivational morphology to express transitivity and 
other valency changing processes. Rather, the verbs participate in multiple 
argument alternations. Ewe is also a tone language.
The lexicon of complex physical activities in different languages reveals 
differences related to culture, as well as similarities between cultures 
(Goddard and Wierzbicka 2009). This is reflected in verbs in the domain 
of ‘carrying’ (Hill 2016b; Ameka 2017) as well as in separation events 
of cutting and breaking (Ameka and Essegbey 2007; Goddard and 
Wierzbicka 2009). We shall demonstrate that the verbs of opening also 
1  Indulging in this comparative semantics of two languages spoken on continents apart allows us 
to reflect on and engage with the teaching and mentorship and friendship we have experienced with 
Anna for about three and a half decades. The authors first met in one of Anna’s classes in March 1984 
and have been on the quest for meaning with her since. We have enjoyed many debates with Anna 
not only in class but also during the first Semantics workshop in Adelaide in 1986 and subsequently. 
We are delighted to honour Anna on the occasion of her anniversary comparing verbs of opening in 
Ewe, the native language of the first author, and the first African language to have been studied within 
the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) framework, and Longgu, the field language specialisation 
of the second author who is a first-generation practitioner of NSM.
For us, the power of NSM semantic representations is the way in which it helps the analyst to allow 
the language to speak. Moreover, the semantic explications of signs in different languages can be easily 
compared and the similarities and differences become transparent even to the casual reader.
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show this diversity and cultural embeddedness. Examples of culturally 
relevant verbs of opening in Longgu are the verbs suvulia ‘open the eye of 
a coconut with an instrument (e.g. a stick or knife)’; and tuaa ‘open the 
side of a bamboo by putting a hole in it (with a knife)’. Objects that are 
opened with instruments tend to be lexically specific in Longgu (i.e. the 
verb refers to opening one object in a particular way). Where Longgu 
has at least 10 verbs that express opening events, Ewe has three. Opening 
events such as ‘peel something’ are expressed by a specific verb in Longgu 
(pagea ‘peel something (e.g. banana)’), whereas in Ewe one of three verbs 
expressing opening (klé̃), is also used to describe peeling.
While Ewe and Longgu carve up the semantic space of opening events 
differently, there are also shared properties of objects of physical actions 
of opening. These common properties reflect some of the properties of 
objects for physical action of opening events in English identified by 
Bowerman (2005) and include the six senses of English ‘open’ proposed 
by Levison (1993). Bowerman suggested that for English, ‘openable’ 
objects can be described as: (a) a unitary object, although it may have parts 
such as a pot with a lid; (b) an object that separates along predetermined 
lines not unpredictably (hence actions of opening are usually reversible; 
objects that can be opened can also be closed); and (c) separation affords 
access to something (e.g. a content, an interior space or a previously 
concealed part of the object with which you can do something). These 
characteristics suggest, prototypically, a container (as exemplified by the 
pot referred to). Levison (1993) also includes ‘containers’ (e.g. open the 
can/bottle/soda; open the house) and ‘conduits’ (channels and paths) 
as two of six suggested senses of English ‘open’. Both Ewe and Longgu 
have verbs (ʋu and tavangia) to refer to opening containers and conduits. 
However, when these verbs are used to describe the opening of ‘channels’ 
or ‘paths’, the languages differ in the range of objects that can be referred 
to; for example, while Ewe ʋu and Longgu tavangia can be used to refer 
to opening or turning on a radio, only Longgu tavangia is used to refer to 
turning on or opening a lamp or light.
For the interpretation of linguistic signs and utterances, we assume 
following Wilkins and Hill (1995) that there are three levels of meaning 
(see also e.g. Kecskes 2008; Levinson 2000). The first level, Semantics 1, 
concerns the stable, context-independent meaning values of signs. 
These are the structured ideas about signs (lexical items, constructions, 
gestures, prosodic patterns etc.) that speakers share which are stored in 
the mind. It  is these stable, intersubjective structured ideas about the 
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verbs in the two languages that we strive to represent in the semantic 
explications proposed. Combinatorial rules generate an output, the literal 
meaning. This feeds into level 2, which is a kind of fill-in, or a filter box 
(Pragmatics). At  this level, the literal meaning of an utterance interacts 
with neo-Gricean generalised Conversational Implicatures (Levinson 
2000), cultural scripts (e.g. Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004), semantic 
frames (e.g. Fillmore and Atkins 1992) and all kinds of world and 
encyclopedic knowledge. These processes of enrichment and filtering lead 
to the online contextual interpretation of utterances (for both speaker 
and hearer), the third level (Semantics 2) (Wilkins and Hill 1995). These 
contextual interpretations may be cycled back into Semantics 1, where 
they become more stable meaning values of signs. This is the way in which 
meaning change takes place.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows: we first introduce verbs of 
opening in Ewe (Section 2). Section 3 presents an overview of the Longgu 
verbs and discusses two that share semantic similarities with the Ewe 
verbs. In Section 4, we draw out parallels and differences between the two 
languages and discuss them in the context of the key characteristics of 
openable objects in English, suggested by Bowerman (2005), and propose 
explications for them based on the Natural Semantic Metalangauge 
(NSM) principles following the semantic template for verbs proposed by 
Goddard and Wierzbicka (2016). The explications couched in semantic 
primes allow for easy comparison of the meanings across the two languages.
2 . Opening events in Ewe
The verbs in Ewe are ke ‘open, end, spread out, etc.’, klé̃  ‘open, peel, 
remove outer covering; shine’, and ʋu ‘open’. The three verbs in Ewe that 
carve up the space of opening events have distinct semantics. Nevertheless, 
they may apply to the same entities revealing different construals of the 
opening events. Thus each of the verbs can take the body parts with two 
parts such as ŋkú ‘eye’, nu ‘mouth’, glã ‘jaw’ as object with different nuances 
of interpretation. Thus ke nu ‘open mouth’ implies that the two lips move 
apart because someone wants it; klé̃  nu ‘open mouth wide’ implies that 
the lips come apart as someone wants it, because of this one can see inside 
the mouth’ and ʋu nu ‘open mouth’ describes a situation where someone 
consciously and purposefully opens the mouth (e.g. to talk). It entails that 
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it was done purposefully. In the next subsection we summarise the uses 
and interpretations of ke ‘open’ as presented in Ameka (2019). We then 
turn attention to the other Ewe verb ʋu ‘open’.
2 .1 . The Ewe verb ke
Ameka (2019) provides a detailed analysis of the uses and meaning of 
the verb ke ‘open, open up, spread; stop, end, be finished’. For the sake 
of completeness and to allow for comparison with the Longgu data, we 
summarise that analysis here. As the glosses of the verb suggest, the verb 
at first sight may look to be polysemous. And, in fact, this is the stance 
taken by lexicographers like Westermann (1928) and Rongier (2015). 
However, Ameka argues for a monosemic account, and demonstrates 
how the various contextual interpretations can be generated from the 
interaction of the verb semantics with the semantics of the argument 
structure constructions in which it occurs as well as the semantics of the 
types of entities involved in the event.
The verb is primarily monovalent but has both transitive and intransitive 
uses. In its intransitive use, the event is construed as being internally 
caused. That is, the ‘opening’ happened not because someone did it. The 
verb is predicated of different classes of nominals. They can all be viewed 
as unitary objects which have parts. These parts could come apart along 
predetermined lines but without causing the disintegration of the entity 
into different entities. It is thus predicated of things that open naturally 
like séʄoʄo ‘flower’ as when in full bloom; or ɖetí ‘cotton (boll)’. When a gli 
‘wall’ or similar entity splits open by itself, the occurrence is described with 
the verb ke. The verb also collocates with the psychologised body part ŋu 
‘eye’ to express ‘day break’.2 When the verb occurs with event nominals 
that denote situations which have a negative effect on people, such as 
tsi ‘water, rain’, dɔ ‘hunger, famine’ and aʋa ‘war’, it is interpreted as the 
situation coming to an end. Adopting a three levels of semantics approach 
(Wilkins and Hill 1995), Ameka (2019) explains that when the verb ke is 
predicated of these event nominals with negative impact on people such 
as dzre ‘quarrel’ or dzo ‘fire’ to mean ‘The quarrel has ended.’ or ‘The fire 
2  Body part terms can either refer to a physical body part, such as the physical eye, or they may 
refer to parts of the body where things happen because of which one feels something (inside the 
body). The latter are termed psychologised body parts (Ameka 2002). The same linguistic form may 
refer to the physical and the psychologised part: for example, Ewe dzi refers to both the physical and 
psychologised heart. However, in some cases different words refer to the different aspects of the same 
part. In Ewe, for instance, the physical eye is ŋkú and the psychologised eye is ŋu.
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has subsided.’, the same semantics represented in [A] applies. The event 
nominals are seen as having parts and something happens at a point in 
time and these parts come apart, are scattered, leading to the situation 
being no more. All the situations characterised by the intransitive use of 
the verb are irreversible. Based on the discussion so far, we propose the 
explication in [A] for the Ewe verb ke ‘open’, which is a revised version of 
the one proposed in Ameka (2019).
[A] Something X ke (X = flower, nut, cotton etc.)
a . something happened to X (at this time) lexiCosynTaCTiC 
frameb . because of this, something happened in X in one 
moment, not because someone did something to it (X)
c . often when things like this happen, proToTypiCal 
sCenarioit happens like this:
before it happened:
this thing was like one thing
this thing has parts (inside it)
after it happened:
some parts move apart in places
some parts are in the same place as they 
were before
this thing is like one thing
it is not two things
d . because of this, after this, effeCT
some parts are on one side,
the other parts are on the other side
e . because of this, after this, (poTenTial) 
ouTComepeople can see things inside this thing
[people can do something with things
inside this thing, if they want]
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Furthermore, Ameka (2019) argues that the same meaning of the verb is at 
play when it is used transitively. In such cases, the two-place construction 
licenses an Effector, thus the component of ‘not because someone wants 
it/did it’ is cancelled out and the constructional meaning component 
of ‘someone did something to something else’ combines with the other 
components to generate the online interpretations.
In its transitive use also, there are different categories of objects that ke 
‘open’ can occur with. First are body parts that have two parts, such as 
ŋkú ‘eye’, nu ‘mouth’, atá ‘thigh’, así ‘(folded) hands’, glã ‘jaw’ and tó ‘ear’. 
These situations can be reversed and the antonym of ke that describes it 
is miá ‘tighten’.3 A second group is tools with parts that can be stretched 
out such as xéxí/sowuia ‘umbrella’. The spreading of other artefacts that 
are flexible and flat—for example, asabu ‘fishing net’, eɖo ‘cloth’ or tsítse 
‘sleeping mat’ are also described with the verb ke ‘open’. The reversal of 
this action is described by the verb ŋlɔ́ ‘fold’. Thus the opening events 
presented transitively with the verb ke ‘open’ are reversible. It will be 
shown in the next section that the opening events described by the verb ʋu 
‘open’ are also reversible or their closed state can be restored by covering 
the opening. A further difference between the two verbs lies partly in their 
force dynamics (cf. Talmy 2000).
2 .2 . The Ewe verb ʋu
Ewe lexicographers present the verb ʋu ‘open, be open’ as a polysemic word 
with at least five senses. Westermann (1928) gives ‘open, be open’ as the 
first sense. The verb is primarily bivalent and, in this sense, it participates 
in the causative/inchoative alternation as illustrated in (1), taken from 
Westermann (interlinear glosses added).
(1) a. ʋu ʋɔtrú lá
open door def
‘Open the door!’
b. ʋɔtrú lá ʋu
door def open
‘The door opened.’
3  The reversal of the opening of the body part tó ‘ear’ is expressed by the verb kú ‘die’: kú tó 
[die ear] ‘turn a deaf ear’, which refers to the ear losing its function.
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Westermann provides a further illustration of this sense with the 
collocation in (1c) involving an abstract object:
(1) c. ʋu nya me
open word containing.region
‘explain, admit, confess’
The focus in this chapter will be on this first sense. The other readings 
provided by Westermann are (ii) to move (house), leave a place, migrate, 
emigrate; (iii) to reach as far as, go up to/into, open on/in to; and (iv) to 
rise whirling, swirl up; shine; and burn. All these readings of the verb, we 
argue, can be motivated from the ‘physical opening of entities’ sense of 
the verb.
The verb ʋu ‘open’ occurs with different types of openable objects. The 
first group are the containers. Containers such as aɖáká ‘hinged box’ 
typically have a top that when opened remains attached to the whole. 
Other containers have removable parts that can be lifted from the objects 
in order to open them. Such containers are ze ‘pot’, atukpá ‘bottle’ or 
núgoe ‘tin’. In talking about the opening of such containers, one can either 
focus on the whole, as in (2a), or on the lid, (2c). One can use a dedicated 
construction involving a postpositional phrase where the thing that is 
covering the container that has to be taken apart is the dependent in such 
a phrase, as in (2b). In all these cases for the physical opening to occur, 
one does something to a part of the whole using one’s hands.
(2) a. ʋu ze-ɛ
open pot-def
‘Open the pot!’
b. ʋu nú le ze-ɛ nǔ
open thing loc pot-def mouth
‘Open the lid from the pot!’
c. ʋu ze-ɛ wó nu-tú-nú
open pot-def poss mouth-close-thing
‘Open the pot’s lid!’
One can also refer to the content of the container when talking about 
the physical opening of the container. Typically this involves applying 
an instrument such as a tin opener or it may just involve the twisting 
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of the openable part of the container. Such content can be aha ‘drink’, 
bisketi ‘biscuit’ or miliki ‘milk’, or timati ‘tomato puree’. The metonymic 
principle here is one wants the container whose content is X to be opened 
and the container is referred to by the content. A similar metonymy is 
involved in talking about releasing domestic animals from their enclosed 
spaces such as chicken coops or sheep or goat pens. In these cases, the 
object of the verb can be the whole or it can refer to the content, namely, 
the animals.
As shown in example (1a), the verb also applies to conduits that are like 
parts of a whole such as ʋɔ(trú)/hɔ ‘door’, agbǒ ‘gate’. The verb can also be 
applied to the whole entity to which the conduit gives access. For example, 
where one opens the door of the kitchen to gain access, one can just talk 
of opening the kitchen.
Similarly, the verb can be applied to the opening of institutions such as 
sukûu ‘school’ and stɔ̂ɔ ‘store’. In fact, with these nouns as object of the 
verb, the interpretation is vague including the physical opening  of 
the entity (i.e. the doors) and the commencement of activities of the 
institution. To unambiguously express the start of an activity, a dedicated 
construction is employed (see example 3).
(3) wo-ne-woe wó-á-ʋu stɔ-ɔ
time-q-time 3pl-fut-open store-def
‘When will the store be opened?’
The verb can also be used to characterise the undoing of things, especially 
zips, buttons and hems. One can also talk about expanding or loosening 
a garment or a shirt by undoing the sewing using the verb. In this case, the 
nominal is dependent on the postposition me ‘containing region’.
(4) ʋu awu-ɔ me
open garment-def containing region
‘Open up (i.e. undo the hem of ) the garment (to make it bigger)!’
The verb is also used to describe actions involving the opening of valves, 
pipes and taps, as well as switching on some appliances (perhaps by 
turning a knob) like radios and TV sets. While on a general level this use 
of the transitive ‘open’ verb in Ewe is similar to that of Longgu, in Ewe the 
verb is not used to talk about the turning on of lights and lamps, nor is 
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it used to describe the turning on of audio recorders. It appears that Ewe 
categorises the turning on of appliances (radio, TV) involving turning or 
twisting of a knob as separate from switching on other appliances such as 
fans or lights that involve pressing on a button. The former is described 
by ʋu ‘open’ while the latter are described by si ‘switch on, cut (on the 
body)’. Actually, radios and TVs that are switched on by pressing buttons 
can also be described by the verb si. This further suggests that the manner 
in which one’s hands are used to effect the change of state is a critical 
ingredient in the semantics of the verbs. When the verb ʋu is used to talk 
about the opening of valves and taps, the object of the verb can refer to 
the valve or tap or to the content that is released when the valve is turned, 
such as water.
As noted above, the spontaneous opening of body parts is described by ke 
‘open’. The opening of the same parts can also be described with the verb 
ʋu ‘open’, and in this case, the opening event is conceptualised as being 
purposeful and conscious. Consider the expressions in (5):
(5) ʋu ŋkú/ nu/ atá/ así
open eye/ mouth/ thigh/ hand
‘Open your eyes/mouth/thighs/hand!’
Some components of the meaning of the verb ʋu can be gleaned from the 
company it keeps as demonstrated in the preceding discussion: the objects 
it occurs with have parts and one does things to one of these parts leading to 
the part coming apart which allows one to gain access to the other parts of 
the entity. It was also indicated that the physical action of opening described 
by the verb entails the movement of the hands to bring about the change 
of state. We have also shown that the internal arguments can be expressed 
either as noun phrases (most examples) or as postpositional phrases.
When the verb enters in construction with a postpositional phrase object 
headed by nu ‘mouth’ the expression gets a specialised reading, namely, 
‘to start or begin something’.
(6) ʋu dɔ / stɔ nu
open stomach store mouth
‘open the womb; start child birth, i.e. have first child’/
‘open the shop for the first time (cut the sod to open business)’
43
2 . THe COMPARATive SeMANTiCS OF veRBS OF ‘OPeNiNG’
The beginning of temporal periods can also be expressed using the same 
structure as in (7):
(7) ʋu ʄe-ɛ / ŋkeke-ɛ nu
open year-def day-def mouth
‘start the year / the day’
Furthermore, the verb participates in the causative/inchoative alternation 
as illustrated in (1). The verb ʋu also participates in various kinds of SVCs 
(8b) and in a resultative construction, as in (8a).
(8) a. ehɔ-ɔ-wó pétéé le ʋu-ʋu …
door-def-pl all be.at:prs red-open
‘All the doors are opened (but there is nobody in the house) …’
b. ɖeví-ɛ́ kɔ́ hɛ̃ ʋu miliki-ɛ
child-def take knife open milk-def
‘The child used a knife to open the milk.’
The resultative construction involves the nominalisation of the action 
verb by reduplication and it is the complement of the locative verb le 
‘be.at:pres’. Litivinov and Agbodjo (1988) note that the construction is 
not very robust in colloquial Ewe; however, an utterance such as (8a) 
involving the verb ʋu is very frequent. The construction signifies a state 
resulting from a prior action. This result is visible. This suggests that the 
verb ʋu entails a realisation of the result of the entity being opened. Based 
on the discussion, we propose the explication in [B] to account for the 
meaning of the Ewe verb ʋu.
[B] Someone ʋu ‘opened’ something
a . someone (X) did something to something (Y) lexiCosynTaCTiC 
frame(at a time before now) 
b . because of this, something happened to this
something (Y) as this someone (X) wanted it
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c . often, when someone does something like this to 
something, it is like this:
proToTypiCal 
sCenario
this something is near this someone’s body
this someone thinks about this something like this:
it is (like) one thing, it has parts
someone can do something to one of these parts
when someone does this, this part can move (a little)
d . when this someone (X) does this to this something (Y), effeCT
it happens like this:
this someone (X) does something with the hands
to one part of this something (Y)
because of this, this someone’s hand moves
for a short time as this someone wants
because of this, one part of this something
moves as this someone wants
after this, this part is no longer in the same place 
as before
e . because of this, after this, people can see (poTenTial) 
ouTComewhat is inside this something
To sum up, the three verbs in Ewe that carve up the sematic space of 
opening events have distinct semantics. Nevertheless, they may apply to 
the same entities, revealing different construals of the opening events, as 
noted for body parts. Pairs of the verbs can also occur with the same 
referential objects and provide different perspectives on the opening event. 
Thus ke and ʋu can take agbalẽ ‘book’ as complement, suggesting flipping 
through a book versus purposeful and targeted opening. Similarly, ke 
and klé̃  can take sowuia ‘umbrella’. For ke it focuses on the coming apart 
of the blades of the umbrella while klé̃  describes the opening wide of 
the umbrella.
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3 . Opening events in Longgu
Longgu has at least 10 verbs to refer to opening events. Within this group, 
one verb tavangia ‘open something’ is semantically very similar to Ewe ʋu. 
It is used to refer to opening containers (e.g. a pot, a house), and is used to 
describe the opening of channels and conduits (Levison 1993) such as the 
action of turning on a tap or a radio. Like Ewe ʋu, Longgu tavangia is used 
when something is opened with the hands and can describe opening the 
whole (e.g. a house) or opening a part (e.g. door of the house). A second 
verb, the stative verb avure ‘be open’ is very similar to Ewe ke. Avure is 
used to refer to something that has opened naturally (e.g. flower), as well 
as something that is open as a result of someone doing something (e.g. an 
open hand, an open book). This section discusses these two verbs in detail. 
The discussion of avure ‘be open’ includes a discussion of its transitive 
counterpart vuresia ‘open something’.
Before discussing the two verbs that are semantically similar to two of the 
Ewe verbs, we present an overview of the domain of ‘opening’ in Longgu. 
In addition to the verbs tavangia, avure and vuresia, Longgu has specific 
verbs referring to opening events in relation to body parts, such as rara’i 
‘open eyes’. Lexically specific verbs refer to opening events that include 
use of an instrument (e.g. knife, stick). While the only ‘instrument’ that 
is lexicalised in the Ewe verbs is the hands, Longgu has specialised verbs 
with specific instruments co-lexicalised with it. This reflects a wider 
pattern of lexicalisation in Longgu, where manner is encoded in many 
lexically specific verbs (e.g. verbs of ‘carrying’ (Hill 2016b; see also Heath 
and McPherson 2009 for a discussion of Dogon)). An example is the verb 
vorasia ‘open out the mat/umbrella/hand’, which reflects the manner of 
opening.
3 .1 . The Longgu verbs avure ‘be open’ and vuresia 
‘open something’
The first two verbs to be discussed are morphologically related: avure ‘be 
open’, and vuresia ‘open something’. The intransitive verb avure ‘be open’ 
is formed by a stative prefix a- and the verb root vure-. In Longgu the 
stative prefix ma-, of which a- is a variant, is not productive.
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The verb avure ‘be open’ is used for things made of leaf or cloth, as well 
as an open hand, and an open book. It is used to describe the open bud 
in a flower, which occurs naturally, and to opened food parcels, which are 
wrapped in leaves. It is notable that avure is used to describe an open hand 
as the transitive counterpart is vorasia ‘open out, unfold’ and not vuresia 
‘open something’.
Longgu avure refers to the result of a person’s action (e.g. opening the 
hand or opening a book) as well as a naturally occurring action, such as 
the opening of a flower. In this respect, Longgu avure is similar to Ewe ke 
and the English verb ‘open’, which can refer to something independently 
open, i.e. in the condition of being open (e.g. the hand is open), it can 
open on its own, or it can be opened by someone (Talmy 2000: 85). 
Longgu differs from English in that it distinguishes the kind of object that 
is being opened (e.g. the intransitive form tavatavangi ‘be open’ refers to 
an open door, while avure refers to an open flower or food parcel). (See 
section 3.2 for a discussion of tavangia ‘open something’.)
The transitive form vuresia ‘open something’ is used to describe the same 
opening events that have been discussed for avure (with the exception of 
opening the hands). The action of opening is done with the hands. What 
seems to be essential here is that it is used with an object that ‘separates 
along predictable lines’ (Bowerman 2005) (as opposed to being used with 
an object that has visible parts). Longgu consultants noted that this verb 
is used when you want to see something inside. Whether to see something 
or do something with what is inside, this opening action ‘affords access to 
something’ (Bowerman 2005).
The verb vuresia ‘open something’ can describe the opening event involved 
in opening a food parcel—the cooked food within the parcel covered in 
leaves is opened by removing the outer covering (the leaves), giving access 
to the food inside. Longgu vuresia allows the object to be the container 
(the food parcel) or the food within it.
(9) a. ami vure-si-i buta-gi
1pl.excl.sbj open-trs-3pl.inan food parcel-pl
‘We opened the food parcels.’
b. ami vure-si-i vaŋa-gi
1pl.excl.sbj open-trs-3pl.inan food-pl
‘We opened the food (i.e. removed the leaves from the cooked 
food).’
47
2 . THe COMPARATive SeMANTiCS OF veRBS OF ‘OPeNiNG’
The stative verb avure ‘be open’ is similar to Ewe ke (in its intransitive use) 
in that it can refer to something that opens naturally, such as a flower, but 
different from it in that it can refer to something that has been opened by 
someone (e.g. a food parcel, book or hand). Like the Ewe ke, it is not used 
for objects such as doors, and pots, which have parts that can be separated 
and where the action can be reversed. Longgu avure ‘be open’ is vaguer 
than Ewe ke in delineating the kind of object that can ‘be open’, but it does 
not refer to opening objects that have clearly identifiable parts that can be 
removed from the whole object. While we can identify, for example, the 
outer part of a food parcel, the pages of a book and the fingers or palm 
of a hand, the object is perceived as a whole object rather than an ‘object 
with parts’ although there are predictable ways in which the object opens 
(see explication of avure in [C] below). A difference between intransitive 
Ewe ke and Longgu avure is in the other objects which it can be predicated 
of. Thus, Ewe ke, as noted, occurs with ‘eye’ to express ‘day break’ and 
with other entities as subject to yield a reading of ‘stop, finish’.
[C] Something X avure (X = flower, food parcel, 
book, hand)
a . something happened to X (at this time) lexiCosynTaCTiC 
frameb . because of this, something happened in X in one 
moment
c . often when things like this happen, proToTypiCal 
sCenarioit happens like this:
before it happened:
this thing was like one thing
after it happened:
some parts are not in the same place as they 
were before 
some parts are in the same place as they 
were before
this thing is like one thing
 it is not like two things
e . because of this, after this, effeCT
people can see all sides of this thing
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f . because of this, after this, (poTenTial) 
ouTComepeople can see things inside this thing
[people can do something with things inside this 
thing, if they want]
The transitive verb vuresia ‘open something’ is similar to the transitive 
use of Ewe ke in the objects that it can apply to: body parts, tools such as 
books and umbrellas, and it can also be used with soft and flexible objects 
such as cloth or leaves. A crucial difference between the two is that for 
vuresia opening events are done with the hands while for the transitive ke 
opening events need not involve the hands. The other Ewe verbs ʋu and 
klé̃  do entail the use of the hands just as vuresia and tavangia do.
3 .2 . The Longgu verb tavangia ‘open something’
Among Longgu verbs of ‘opening’, the transitive verb tavangia occurs 
most frequently in texts and combines productively with other verb forms 
as a serial verb or compound form. Tavangia is used to refer to opening 
containers, channels and paths (Levison 1993). Tavangia consists of the 
root tava, the transitive suffix (in this case -ngi; other consonants are also 
found in the transitive suffix e.g. the si of vuresia) and a pronominal object 
suffix -a (third person singular object suffix).
Tavangia ‘open something’ is used when the action of opening involves 
the hands (or body) and when the object being opened is one that 
can be described as having parts. It is used to describe the opening of 
‘containers’, such as a house or a pot. Tavangia can refer to opening the 
whole container (e.g. the house) or part of the container (e.g. door of 
the house), as exemplified below.
(10) Takule e tali tava-ngi-a maluma-na
Takule 3sg.sbj want open-trs-3sg.
obj
door-3sg.poss
pilu-i buri-na ara poso soko
fence-sg after-3sg.poss 3pl.sbj caught.fish finish
‘Takule wants to open the door of the fence [gate] after they have 
caught fish.’
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(11) La mai m-e tava-ngi-a luma girua-i
go hither conj-3sg.sbj open-trs-3sg.
obj
house 3du.poss-sg
‘[He] came and he opened their (two) house.’
The verb can form part of an SVC, as shown in example (12), where the 
verb oli ‘do again, return’ precedes the object pronoun (-a ‘3sg.obj’).
(12) Christopher Kaimali e tava-ngi-oli-a dingidingi.
Christopher Kaimali 3sg.sbj open-trs-again-3sg.obj door.
‘Christopher Kaimali opened the door again.’
An intransitive verb is formed by reduplicating the root. The object suffix 
is omitted, tavatavangi:
(13) tapwi e tavatavangi
tap 3sg.sbj open
‘The tap is on/open.’
Note that there are two possible antonyms for tavatavangi ‘be open/on’. The 
first is dingidingi ‘be closed’ (a reduplication of dingia ‘close something’), 
which also has a nominal meaning of ‘door’ (see example (12)).
(14) tapwi e dingidingi
tap 3sg.sbj closed
‘The tap is off.’
The alternative antonym is bono ‘be blocked’, which, if used in the context 
of the tap, could only mean the tap is blocked, not ‘off’. Similarly, if the 
door is closed it is dingidingi ‘be closed’, and if it is blocked it is bono 
‘blocked’. The use of the antonym bono reflects the meaning of tavangia 
to express open channels and paths (i.e. a path can be blocked).
Tavangia ‘open something’ is also used to refer to turning on audio 
recorders and lights or lamps, expressing that the object is a conduit or 
channel for something, such as sound or light. The notion of ‘path’ or 
‘channel’ as senses expressed by tavangia ‘open something’ is also found in 
compound verbs formed with tava.




‘enter; go through; e.g. bush, cloud, village’
b. isi-tava
bound morpheme-open
‘to go outside from inside’ (e.g. to out from the house)
c. ave-tava
bound morpheme (flood)-open
‘to be at low tide; ebb’
The semantic explication of tavangia ‘open something’ is given in [D]:
[D] Someone tavangia ‘opened’ something
a . someone (X) did something to something (Y)  
(at a time before now)
lexiCosynTaCTiC 
frame
b . because of this, something happened to this 
something (Y) as this someone wanted it




it is like this:
this something is near this someone’s body
this someone thinks about this something like this:
it is (like) one thing, it has parts
someone can do something to one of these 
parts
when someone does this, this part can move 
(a little)
d . when this someone (X) does this to this something (Y), 
it happens like this:
effeCT
this someone (X) does something with the hands 
to one part of this something (Y)
because of this, this someone’s hand moves for 
a short time as this someone wants
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because of this, one part of this something 
moves as this someone wants
after this, this part is no longer in the same place 
as before
e . because of this, after this, people can see (poTenTial) 
ouTComewhat is inside this something
something/someone can move from one place
to another after this
4 . Explications and discussion of ʋu and 
tavangia, and ke and avure
The discussion so far has shown that while Ewe and Longgu differ in the 
lexical density in the domain of verbs of opening events, there are several 
verbs in each language that express similar meanings. At the same time, 
the languages vary in the range of openable objects that are used with 
these verbs. In this section we propose shared explications for Ewe ke 
and Longgu avure (in [E]) and for Ewe ʋu and Longgu tavangia (in [F]). 
The explications proposed for ke and avure is an improved version of the 
one presented in Ameka (2019) for ke. We highlight where the differences 
between the languages lie in specific components.
[E] Something X ke (X = flower, nut, cotton etc.), 
something X avure (X = flower, food parcel, 
book, hand)
Ewe Longgu Semantic 
template
something happened to X 
(at this time)




because of this, something 
happened in X in one 
moment
because of this, something 
happened in X in one 
moment
not because someone 
did something to it (X)
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often when things like this 
happen,




it happens like this: it happens like this:
before it happened: before it happened:
this thing was like 
one thing
this thing was like 
one thing
this thing has parts 
(inside it)
after it happened: after it happened:
some parts move apart 
in places
some parts are not in 
the same place as they 
were before
some parts are in the 
same place as they 
were before
some parts are in the 
same place as they 
were before
this thing is like one 
thing
this thing is like one 
thing
it is not two things it is not like two things
because of this, after this, because of this, after this, effeCT
some parts are on one 
side, the other parts are 
on the other side
people can see all sides 
of this thing
because of this, after this, because of this, after this, (poTenTial) 
ouTComepeople can see things 
inside this thing
people can see things 
inside this thing
[people can do something 
with things 
[people can do something 
with things inside this 
thing, if they want]inside this thing, if they 
want]
The explication in [E] shows that the lexicosyntactic frame for ke and avure 
is shared, except that in Longgu something can be avure ‘be open’ both 
naturally and because someone did something, whereas intransitive ke is 
only used when the opening event happened naturally. For this reason, 
only Ewe includes the component ‘not because someone did something to 
it (X)’. A key difference between the two languages lies in the prototypical 
scenario. Ewe views the openable object as having parts (this thing was 
like one thing, this thing has parts (inside it)), whereas for Longgu it is 
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important that ‘this thing was like one thing’, but there is no mention of 
‘parts’. For both Ewe and Longgu the Effect and (Potential) Outcome are 
the same, or may be the same. That is, ke and avure are both verbs that 
express opening events (effect and outcome) but they differ in terms of 
which openable objects these verbs are used with.
Based on the discussion of the verbs so far, we propose explication [F] for 
the verbs ʋu and tavangia to account for all the uses related to the physical 
action of opening an entity. The explication in [F] shows that Ewe and 
Longgu share almost all of the semantic components, with the exception 
of the (Potential) Outcome.
The difference in the potential outcome accounts for the use of tavangia 
in Longgu to express ‘paths and channels’ (e.g. see the compound verbs 
listed in example (15)), and the discussion of tavangia as a verb to describe 
the ‘opening’ or turning on of lamps, lights, audio recorders, as well 
as opening a container (e.g. a door of a house). By contrast, Ewe ʋu is 
used with containers, and is more limited in its use to express paths and 
channels. The close semantic similarity between these two verbs suggests 
that the sense of ‘opening’ a container is cross-linguistically common. 
Not surprisingly, the use of verbs of ‘opening’ to express opening a 
meeting or opening a channel (e.g. sound, light) is more specific to a 
particular language.
[F] Someone ʋu ‘opened’ something, someone 
tavangia ‘opened’ something
Someone (X) did something to something (Y)
Ewe Longgu Semantic 
template
someone (X) did something 
to something (Y) (at a time 
before now)
someone (X) did something 




because of this, something 
happened to this something 
(Y) as this someone (X) 
wanted it
because of this, something 
happened to this something 
(Y) as this someone wanted it
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often, when someone 
does something like this to 
something, it is like this:
often, when someone 
does something like this to 
something, it is like this:
proToTypiCal 
sCenario
this something is near 
this someone’s body
this something is near this 
someone’s body
this someone thinks about 
this something like this:
this someone thinks about 
this something like this:
it is (like) one thing, 
it has parts
it is (like) one thing, 
it has parts
someone can do 
something to one of 
these parts
someone can do 
something to one of 
these parts
when someone does 
this, this part can move 
(a little)
when someone does 
this, this part can move 
(a little)
when this someone (X) does 
this to this something (Y), 
it happens like this:
when this someone (X) does 
this to this something (Y), 
it happens like this:
effeCT
this someone (X) does 
something with the 
hands to one part of this 
something (Y)
this someone (X) does 
something with the 
hands to one part of this 
something (Y)
because of this, this 
someone’s hand moves 
for a short time as this 
someone wants
because of this, this 
someone’s hand moves 
for a short time as this 
someone wants
because of this, one part 
of this something moves 
as this someone wants
because of this, one part 
of this something moves 
as this someone wants
after this, this part is no 
longer in the same place 
as before
after this, this part is no 
longer in the same place 
as before
because of this, after this, 
people can see what is inside 
this something
because of this, after this, 





move from one place to 
another after this
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4 .1 . Summary of the semantics of ‘opening’ 
events in Ewe and Longgu
A comparison of the semantics of verbs of ‘opening’ in Ewe and Longgu 
has provided further examples of languages that carve up the semantic 
space of ‘opening’ events differently. Where Ewe has three verbs, Longgu 
has over 10. Longgu has specific verbs to refer to opening of body parts, 
and specific verbs that refer to opening specific objects with instruments. 
At the same time, both Ewe and Longgu have verbs whose major senses 
involve the characteristics suggested for opening events in English: 
(a) a unitary object, although it may have parts such as a pot with a lid; 
(b) an object that separates along predetermined lines not unpredictably 
(hence actions of opening are usually reversible; objects that can be 
opened can also be closed); and (c) separation affords access to something 
(e.g.  a  content, an interior space or a previously concealed part of the 
object with which you can do something). In Longgu, opening events 
involve separation that affords access to something but it distinguishes 
opening events that involve objects that have clear parts (i.e. tavangia 
‘open’ e.g. the door), and opening events that involve objects that can be 
separated along predetermined lines, but which do not necessarily have 
clearly identifiable parts (i.e. vuresia ‘open’ e.g. the food parcel/food). 
Associated with this is the outcome of opening the openable object—
for the objects that have parts, this typically allows something to move 
through the object (e.g. a person through a door, water through a pipe, 
sound through a radio), whereas for the objects that do not clearly have 
parts, the action may simply allow someone to see something inside or do 
something with part of the object (e.g. food in the parcel).
One cultural object of Longgu that consists, in part, of leaves and can also 
be viewed as having parts is an umu ‘stone oven’. An umu is a place to cook 
food in the ground. The food is cooked by placing it on hot stones and 
covering the food with more hot stones, old leaves and cloth such as old 
hessian bags. The umu ‘stone oven’ can be partially opened, i.e. to check 
the food, or it can be completely uncovered to remove the food. Both 
verbs (tavangia and vuresia) can be used to refer to opening a stone oven. 
The use of the verbs depends on whether the speaker is perceiving the 
oven as having ‘parts’ and doing something with the food (e.g. removing 
it from the oven), in which case the verb tavangia ‘open something’ is 
used, or whether the speaker is checking the food, in which case the top 
leaves and hessian may be removed and the verb vuresia ‘open something’ 
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is used. Speakers describe the purpose of opening the oven, like opening 
the food parcels made of leaf, to see what is inside and to do something 
(e.g. eat the food from the food parcel, check when the food in the oven is 
ready). This analysis is supported by the antonym of vuresia, referring to 
opening an oven, which is kuvia ‘cover it’.
The key difference between tavangia and vuresia, we suggest, is that 
while tavangia is used when the object has visible ‘parts’, and these 
parts show where the object can be separated (e.g. the lid of a pot, the 
door of a house), vuresia is used when the object can be separated along 
predictable lines (e.g.  the leaves of a book, the cooked leaves covering 
food) but the object does not need to be perceived as having separate 
parts. For example, a woven basket can be ‘undone’ using the verb vuresia 
‘open something’. Note Ewe uses the verb ʋu for undoing buttons, hems 
and zips. The basket is made of leaves, and in addition it is not perceived 
of as having clearly separate parts. This analysis may also explain why 
‘moving through’ something isn’t part of the meaning of vuresia.
Ewe distinguishes opening events according to whether the opening event 
is natural or caused (ke and ʋu) and according to whether the opened 
object has an ‘inside part and outside part’ (klé̃), and according to whether 
the action is reversible or irreversible (the natural opening events of, for 
example, flowers or nuts are irreversible). Longgu does not pay attention 
to whether the opening event is natural or caused, but does pay attention 
to whether the action is reversible or irreversible (underlying this seems 
to be whether the object is made up of clear ‘parts’ or whether there is 
separation along predictable lines) and does pay attention to the kind of 
object being opened (and therefore the manner). In both languages, more 
than one verb can be used for the same opening event, but the perception 
is different. For example, in Ewe a different verb is used depending on 
whether something is perceived as opening naturally or is caused to be 
open (e.g. body parts), and in Longgu a different verb is used depending 
on whether something is perceived as having clear parts or just predictable 
lines of opening (e.g. a stone oven). We have shown that the Ewe verbs 
have some interpretations that are extensions of the physical action of 
opening something. Thus, ke in its internally caused and intransitive use 
is extended to talking about the ending of negative impact events. On the 
other hand, the verb ʋu, in specialised construction with postposition 
nu ‘mouth’, is used to talk about the commencement of situations or of 
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temporal periods. In the latter case, Ewe is similar to English where the 
English open is also used to talk about the start of events—for example, 
to open the meeting (see Levison 1993).
The comparison between verbs of opening in Ewe and Longgu has 
highlighted the complexity of verbs of opening cross-linguistically, using 
NSM to show where meaning differences between the two languages lie 
in a small number of semantically similar verbs.
The human experience of opening objects is both a universal experience 
and one that may reflect a specific culture, as both material culture and 
different ways of perceiving and construing objects are involved. 
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The term keyword (or key word ), used with or without the adjective 
cultural (which is always understood to be there), has been a staple of 
Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) semantics for the last 20-odd 
years; it figures prominently in the title of Wierzbicka’s trailblazing book 
Understanding Cultures through their Key Words (1997), and in that of 
Levisen and Waters’ collective volume Cultural Keywords in Discourse 
(2017). Cultural keywords are ‘highly salient and deeply culture-
laden words’ (Goddard and Wierzbicka 1995: 57) or, in a more recent 
definition, ‘culture-rich and translation-resistant words that occupy 
focal points in cultural ways of thinking, acting, feeling, and speaking’ 
(Goddard 2017: 9; see also Goddard 2015: 386). Cultural keywords 
exist in all languages but are rarely studied in a way that combines total 
transparency (for cultural insiders and outsiders alike) with the absence of 
any cultural bias. Transparency and bias avoidance can only be achieved 
with a sophisticated methodology such as the NSM approach, which 
relies on decades of empirical research into the true universals of meaning.
1  This chapter is dedicated to a mentor, colleague and friend I can’t thank enough for all she 
has meant and continues to mean to me. This is for you, Anna. Enjoy! The text has undergone 
a substantial rewrite, especially after the first peer review. I am grateful for all feedback received and 
am solely responsible for any inaccuracies remaining.
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Among the North and West Germanic languages, Dutch is, to the best 
of my knowledge, together with Faroese, the only one never to have 
been subjected to properly informed NSM analysis. The table of Dutch 
exponents of NSM primes in Appendix  3.1 is new: no such table has 
ever appeared in print. One Dutch cultural keyword that has been 
occasionally mentioned in the NSM literature is the adjective/adverb 
gezellig. Section 2 of this chapter provides some initial information on 
this elusive concept. Section 3 unpacks it in an intuitively intelligible and 
universally accessible way using NSM primes and syntax. Dutch versions 
of the various explications may be found in Appendix 3.2. Importantly, 
explications are experiments; none of them are final. Wierzbicka (1992: 
551) and Levisen and Waters (2017: 241) have described explications as 
‘hypotheses’. The explications in this chapter are no exception.
2 . Gezellig, a cultural keyword
The meaning of gezellig is anything but straightforward, as American 
philosophy professor Hilde Lindemann found out shortly after arriving 
from the USA on a European study trip:
Over dinner on my first night in the Netherlands, my hosts nodded 
when I told them how much I liked the restaurant. ‘Ja,’ they said, 
‘it’s gezellig, isn’t it?’ Aha, thought I, my first lesson in Dutch.
‘What’s gezellig?’ I asked.
‘It means—well, sociable,’ Enne explained.
‘But not exactly,’ Menno added. ‘More like cozy.’
‘Sort of like the German gemütlich?’
‘No, not really,’ said Marian. ‘A place could be gemütlich even when 
you’re the only person in it, but it wouldn’t be gezellig.’ The others 
agreed. Gezellig didn’t go with solitude. (Lindemann 2009: 40)
Or does it? Housing ads referring to gezellige éénpersoonskamers ‘gezellig 
single rooms’ are not semantically incoherent, and yet such rooms are not 
meant to be occupied by more than a single occupant, who will spend 
most of his/her time in them alone. Likewise, people who prefer to spend 
an evening gezellig alleen ‘gezellig alone’ at home do make sense. Phrases 
such as gezellige éénpersoonskamer and gezellig alleen demonstrate that, in 
contemporary Dutch, the adjective gezellig has meanings it didn’t have 
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in centuries past. Etymologically, gezellig is related to gezel, a noun that 
has had several meanings over time, all implying membership of a team 
or a group, and that now means ‘companion’ or ‘mate’. Another noun 
that derives from gezel is gezelschap ‘company’ (as in the phrase ‘be in 
good company’). Nowadays, the link between gezellig and gezelschap is 
more keenly felt than that between gezellig and gezel, which in its everyday 
use has lost some currency (except in compounds such as levensgezel ‘life 
companion’ and vrijgezel ‘bachelor [unmarried male]’). However, neither 
link is strong enough to make phrases such as gezellige éénpersoonskamer 
and gezellig alleen ungrammatical.
According to van Baalen (2003: 16), references to the ‘untranslatability’ 
of the word gezellig have become so much of a cliché that nobody goes 
to the trouble anymore of putting the claim to the test. The same author 
goes on to say that other languages don’t appear to have a word that covers 
its entire range of use—but this, she adds, holds true for many words 
in many languages. One source describes gezellig as covering ‘everything 
from cozy to friendly, from comfortable to relaxing, and from enjoyable 
to gregarious’.2 The noun gezelligheid ‘gezellig-ness’, on the other hand, 
derived from the adjective by adding the suffix -heid, ‘may be variously 
translated as sociability, conviviality, companionableness or snugness and 
cosiness’ (Pradhan 1990: 56). Instead of bringing clarity, statements such as 
these tend to muddy the waters; they may explain why a common strategy 
to clarify the meaning of the keyword gezellig involves exemplification, 
as illustrated in the same passage, which includes references to:
een gezellige man (a sociable man), een gezellig glaasje (a cheerful 
or sociable glass of wine or beer), een gezelIige avond (pleasant 
evening), een gezellig avondje (social evening), een gezellig hoekje 
of café (a cozy corner or cafe), gezellig weer (pleasant weather), etc. 
(Pradhan 1990: 56)
In his 99 Tips for Dealing with the Dutch, cross-cultural trainer Hans 
Kaldenbach comes up with a list of his own:
Drinking coffee can be gezellig. Visiting a friend can be gezellig. 
So  can an open fire. A neighborhood can have a gezellig feel 
to it; a  painting depicting a rustic setting can also be gezellig. 
If someone refers to you as gezellig, take this as a compliment. 
(Kaldenbach 1995: 22)
2  Available at: www.dutchamsterdam.nl/155-gezellig (published 20 April, 2007).
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Goddard (2017: 9) mentions gezellig, which he glosses as ‘convivial, 
cosy, fun’, as a prime example of a cultural keyword that has ‘rise[n] to 
the attention of a speech community and attain[ed] an iconic and often 
contested status’, something many other keywords don’t.3 The  iconic 
status of gezellig is beyond dispute: it is recognised at all levels of society 
(for  some impressions, see Dronkers 2013: 99) and it was further 
enhanced by former US president Barack Obama at the end of his 2014 
visit to the Netherlands, when he addressed a packed press conference 
in the following terms: ‘I’m told there’s a Dutch word that captures the 
spirit, which doesn’t translate exactly in English, but let me say that my 
first visit to the Netherlands has been truly gezellig’.4 Its status as a cultural 
keyword and an indicator of a cultural value (gezelligheid ‘gezellig-ness’)5 
has often been noted (see e.g. Gaston Durnez quoted in Driessen 1997: 
49–50; van Baalen 2003: 16, 19; Lindemann 2009: 40; Goddard 2017: 
9), even though there are dissenting voices—which is normal in debates 
about cultural values. As it turns out, the word gezellig is more (perhaps 
even much more) salient north of the border. Native speakers of Belgian 
Dutch (e.g. the Belgian writer Gaston Durnez, quoted in Driessen 1997: 
49–50) have been known to single out gezelligheid as something that 
typifies speakers of Netherlands Dutch much more than it does them. 
The internet corpus on which this chapter is based provides spectacular 
proof of this point: most of the examples it includes come from domain 
names ending in .nl or contain other indications that give them away 
as belonging to Netherlands Dutch. Even so, I would like to argue that 
gezellig is a cultural keyword of Belgian Dutch as well. There may be some 
minute differences in meaning, and Flemish people may not use the word 
as much, but they still attach a lot of importance to gezelligheid.6
3  Goddard (2015: 386) is a little more precise: he opposes keywords that ‘rise to the attention of 
a speech community (usually by way of contrast with outsiders) and attain an iconic, and therefore 
frequently contested status, in national identity discourses’ to those that for most speakers ‘stay below 
the horizon of consciousness’.
4  Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=rSClTFZ6xa8 (uploaded 25 March 2014).
5  Cultural keywords are by definition indicators of cultural values (Levisen and Waters 2017: 6, 
240).
6  A separate paper and a more targeted corpus of Flemish or Belgian Dutch data would be needed 
to prolong the current investigation and reach a more definitive view.
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3 . Gezellig unpacked
To get a better feel for the meaning(s) of the Dutch cultural keyword 
gezellig, I had a closer look at the first 250 occurrences of the corresponding 
lemma identified in a Sketch Engine (www.sketchengine.eu/) search 
carried out on 11 September 2018.7 The sheer number of place-oriented 
examples in the sample suggests that gezellig is first and foremost a quality 
attributed to places. Other examples show that periods of time, activities, 
events and features of a place, such as its atmosphere and bustle, are often 
called gezellig as well. Humans and other living beings like animals and 
plants can be gezellig, too, and so can inanimate objects. To account for 
this variety of uses, several NSM explications are required. The most 
important are presented in the subsections that follow.8
3 .1 . Gezellig + NPlace
Just over half of gezellig + N combinations in the Sketch Engine sample 
refer to a place (an individual room, the family home, an eatery, an open-
air market, an entire village or town, a hotel, etc.). A few examples are 
reproduced in (1) to (3).
(1) Kortom, ‘Huize Pruimtabak’ is hét meest gezellige bejaardentehuis 
van het land.
‘In short, “Huize Pruimtabak” is the most gezellig retirement home 
in the country.’
(2) Wie kan me een gezellige kroeg aanbevelen waar het Nederlands 
volk in New York onze jongens kan aanmoedigen?
‘Who can recommend a gezellig pub where Dutch people in New York 
can cheer on our boys?’
7  My thanks go to Patrick Dendale (Universiteit Antwerpen), who executed the search for me.
8  The use of gezellig with animals (een gezellige poes ‘a gezellig cat’), plants (een gezellige anemoon 
‘a gezellig anemone’) and inanimate objects (een gezellige borrel ‘a gezellig snifter’) had to be left out due 
to limitations of space. Search results were occasionally complemented with hits returned by more 
targeted Google searches and identified by means of a bracketed (G).
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(3) Het gezellige en kleinschalige complex bestaat uit 3 appartementen 
en 3 studio’s.
‘The gezellig and small-scale complex comprises 3 flats and 3 studios.’
Use of the adjective gezellig often goes hand in hand with diminutive 
suffixation on the place name, as in (4) to (6):
(4) Mocht u echter wel een keer uit eten willen in één van de vele gezellige 
restaurantjes die Harderwijk rijk is, dan zijn onze medewerkers u 
vanzelfsprekend graag van dienst.
‘If ever you fancied dining out for once in one of the many gezellige 
restaurantsDIM Harderwijk is rich in, our team members will obviously 
be happy to be of service.’
(5) Wat te denken van Alassio, dat vele oude kerken, groene parken met 
palmbomen, kleurrijke planten en gezellige pleintjes herbergt.
‘What to think of Alassio, which has plenty of old churches, green 
parks with palm trees, colourful plants and gezellig squaresDIM.’
(6) De kustlijn is maar liefst 960 km lang en er zijn heel wat gezellige 
vakantieplaatsjes met hotels van uitstekende kwaliteit.
‘The coast line is a whopping 960 km long and there are plenty of 
gezellig holiday spotsDIM with hotels of outstanding quality.’
Impersonal constructions relying on an indefinite pronoun (het ‘it’) and 
a copular verb (e.g. zijn ‘to be’) are common as well. They involve a place 
name embedded in a prepositional phrase, as in (7), or a locational adverb 
(hier ‘here’, daar ‘there’, er ‘there [unstressed]’) recalling a place that was 
mentioned before, as in (8), where daar refers to the stands, and (9), where 
er refers to a previously described English town:
(7) In Pipodorp is het altijd gezellig.
‘In Pipodorp it is always gezellig.’
(8) Gelukkig was de tribune groot genoeg om de ruim 750 supporters te 
herbergen en was het daar best gezellig.
‘Fortunately the stands were big enough to host the 750-odd 
supporters and it was really gezellig there.’
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(9) Het is een typisch Engels plaatsje met een groot marktplein in 
het midden waaraan meerdere pubs, hotels en vakwerkhuisjes zijn 
gevestigd. Het lijkt er altijd gezellig te zijn.
‘It is a typical English town with a big market place in the centre 
where several pubs, hotels and workshops are located. It always looks 
gezellig there.’
For a place to qualify as gezellig, several conditions must be met. Most 
crucially, there must be at least a potential for the presence of humans. 
A place where no humans ever dwell can’t be called gezellig. A gezellig 
place is one that makes people feel good, even when they are not in it and 
nobody else is in it either. People can see themselves spending time in such 
a place, alone or (space permitting) together with others. They can see 
themselves doing things in it, once again alone or with others. In the case 
of bigger places that allow for a larger human presence, gezellig implies at 
least the possibility, and often the reality, of collective enjoyment. There is 
a perception that nothing can go wrong.
Summarising the above in NSM terms, a gezellig place may be described 
as in [A]:
[A] een gezellige plaats ‘a gezellig place’
a . a place
b . when people think about this place, they feel something good
c . they want to be in this place
d . they want to do some things in this place
e . when people are in this place, they can feel something good
f . bad things can’t happen to people in this place
As an attribute of places, gezelligheid has often been compared to the 
Danish concept of hygge, subjected to detailed NSM analysis in Levisen 
(2012: 80–114). To describe a place where there is hygge, the adjective 
hyggelig is used. Both are no doubt cultural keywords, but the noun 
is the base form. It is the other way around in Dutch, where gezellig 
(the  adjective) is the base form, and the noun gezelligheid is derived 
(and much less commonly used).
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3 .2 . Gezellig + N referring to atmosphere
Uses of gezellig that relate to atmosphere or ambience can be viewed as 
extensions of uses related to place. There can be no atmosphere, in the 
relevant meaning, unless there is a place where that atmosphere ‘reigns’. 
A semantically similar verb, heersen, is used in Dutch; I will rely on it in 
the header of the NSM explication below. The place itself may be explicitly 
mentioned, as in (10) and (11):
(10) Onze polyvalente, sierlijke tenten in combinatie met hun verfijnde 
inrichting zorgen steeds voor een gezellige sfeer waarin uw feest van 
succes is verzekerd!
‘Our versatile and graceful marquees, combined with their refined 
equipment, always provide a gezellig atmosphere in which the success 
of your party is guaranteed!’
(11) Deze zaal heeft een gezellige uitstraling door de informele sfeer die 
hier hangt.
‘This hall has a gezellig vibe thanks to the informal atmosphere that 
reigns here.’
However, location is often implicit, as in (12) and (13):
(12) En dat allemaal in een gezellige ambiance met een hapje en een 
drankje.
‘And all of that in a gezellig ambience with a snack and a drink.’
(13) Met zijn tweeën een avond heerlijk getafeld in een gezellige, knusse 
sfeer met goede wijn en heerlijk eten.
‘The two of us spent the evening deliciously dining in a gezellig, cosy 
atmosphere with good wine and delicious food.’
Examples (14) and (15) rely on an indefinite pronoun and a copular verb, 
as did examples (7) to (9).
(14) De opkomst was groot en het was reuze gezellig.
‘The attendance was great and it was mightily gezellig.’
(15) Het was heel gezellig met een menigte mensen met kleedjes en 
stoeltjes en een podium met koortjes, solisten, bands etc.
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‘It was very gezellig, with a crowd of people with rugsDIM and chairsDIM 
and a stage with choirsDIM, soloists, bands etc.’
Examples (13) to (15) show that atmosphere is tied up with human 
presence. There can be no gezellig atmosphere (or any other kind of 
atmosphere for that matter) without it. In addition, there is a time 
factor  at work as well. In this respect, atmosphere differs from place, 
in that a place can be gezellig even when there is no one around for at 
least a brief period of time. Obviously, though, human presence is not 
a guarantee for a gezellig atmosphere. Dentists’ waiting rooms are often 
singled out as places that are notoriously ongezellig (the prefix on- turns 
a word into its opposite). How could it be otherwise, since most people, 
when they visit dentists, are painfully aware of the discomfort that awaits 
them and not in the mood to socialise?9
Explication [B] sums up these observations in NSM:
[B] er heerst hier een gezellige sfeer ‘there reigns 
a gezellig atmosphere here’
a . it is like this:
b . there are people in this place
c . these people want to be in this place
d . they feel something good when they are in this place
e . they are doing some things when they are in this place
f . they want to do these things for some time
Related to the use of gezellig with nouns conjuring up an atmosphere 
are the commonly heard cultural imperatives Hou het gezellig! ‘Keep it 
gezellig’ (Driessen 1997: 58) and Maak het gezellig! ‘Make it gezellig’:
(16) Hou het gezellig, warm en stijlvol in de achtertuin met deze Stahl 
X Vuurkorf! (G)
‘Keep it gezellig, warm and stylish in the backyard with this Stahl X 
Fire pit!’
9  McNeil and Jomeen (2010), on the other hand, have proposed to use gezellig as a concept for 
managing labour pain, the idea being that creating a gezellig atmosphere in the birthing place will 
somehow ease the discomfort of childbirth.
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(17) Dus maak het gezellig, mensen, want het gaat een lang weekend 
worden. (G)
‘So make it gezellig, people, because it is going to be a long weekend.’
The corresponding verb phrases het gezellig houden ‘to keep it gezellig’ and 
het gezellig maken ‘to make it gezellig’ are illustrated in (18) and (19):
(18) Burgemeester Berend Hoekstra van Leek doet een dringende oproep 
aan jong en oud om het met de jaarwisseling gezellig te houden. 
(G)10
‘Leek’s Lord Mayor Berend Hoekstra makes an urgent call to young 
and old to keep it gezellig on New Year’s Eve.’
(19) De eigenaar zal er alles aan doen om het gezellig te maken.
‘The owner will do everything to make it gezellig.’
Het gezellig hebben ‘to have it gezellig’ is the outcome of het gezellig maken:
(20) Wat zeker is is dat ook zij het gezellig zullen hebben en genieten 
van muziek en alle andere nieuwe kunstvormen.
‘What is certain is that they, too, will have it gezellig and enjoy music 
and all other new art forms.’
Two more phrases worth singling out are gezellig alleen ‘gezellig alone’ 
(cf. section 2) and gezellig samen ‘gezellig together’. The former is often met 
with incomprehension, the latter is related to the phrase gezellig samenzijn:
(21) Ik vier Kerstmis gezellig alleen met een zelfgemaakt driegangenmenu 
en een lekkere fles cava erbij. (G)
‘I celebrate Christmas gezellig alone with a self-cooked three course 
dinner and a nice bottle of cava to boot.’
(22) Ook staat er voor iedereen een hapje en een drankje klaar om gezellig 
samen na te praten.
‘In addition we have a biteDIM and a drinkDIM ready for everyone for 
an after-chat gezellig together.’
10  Example (18) agrees with the intuition of an anonymous reviewer who believes that the phrase 
Hou het gezellig! is ‘almost synonymous’ with the injunction not to drink too much and that, ‘in the 
historically Protestant influenced Netherlands alcohol is less associated with “gezellig”-ness (a cup of 
cocoa is “gezellig”, a glass of whiskey less likely so)’.
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3 .3 . Gezellig + N/Adj referring to bustle or buzz
Places can bustle or buzz with people, and that bustle or buzz, too, can 
be gezellig:
(23) Uiteraard is het altijd een gezellige drukte in onze hout en parket 
showroom.
‘Obviously there is always a gezellig bustle in our wood-and-parquet 
showroom.’
(24) Op de boulevard langs de haven was het ook gezellig druk.
‘On the boulevard along the harbour, too, it was gezellig busy.’
(25) Na het officiele gedeelte van de receptie ontstond al gauw een 
gezellige rumoerigheid, die zelfs voortduurde nadat het personeel 
de bar had gesloten.
‘After the official part of the reception there soon arose a gezellig 
buzz, which lasted even after the staff had closed the bar.’
Explication [C] accounts for the use of gezellig with a noun meaning 
‘bustle’ or ‘buzz’:
[C] er heerst hier een gezellige drukte 
‘there reigns a gezellig bustle here’
a . it is like this:
b . there are many people in this place
c . these people want to be in this place
d . they feel something good when they are in this place
e . they are doing some things when they are in this place
f . they want to do these things for some time
There appears to be much less of a difference between explications [B] 
(gezellige sfeer) and [C] (gezellige drukte) than one might expect. Unlike 
the former, the latter relies on the prime much~many, but only in 
component (b), which refers to a large human presence. The prime is 
not needed in the explication of gezellige sfeer, which does not necessarily 
presuppose large numbers of people, as shown in example (13). On the 
other hand, there is potential for more diverse activity in a gezellige drukte, 
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but this is not a requirement. Different people may be doing different 
things, with each individual or subgroup contributing to a collective sense 
of gezelligheid.
3 .4 . Gezellig + N/VActivity
Example (26) illustrates the use of the keyword gezellig with the noun 
activiteit ‘activity’:
(26) Vrienden of familie die op zoek zijn naar een gezellige activiteit zijn 
van harte welkom.
‘Friends or family who are on the lookout for a gezellig activity are 
most welcome.’
Activities are usually expressed by means of verbs. Example (27) has 
a noun and a verb; example (28) has two infinitives:
(27) Dan volgt nog een gezellig samenzijn met muziek van onze eigen 
DJ Anton en kunt u gezellig meezingen met onze karaoke. 
‘Then follows a gezellig get-together with music by our own DJ 
Anton and you can gezellig sing along with our karaoke.’
(28) Turnen is niet alleen goed voor de ontwikkeling, motoriek en 
kracht van kinderen, maar ook nog eens heel gezellig. Vrienden, 
vriendinnen, ouders, kom gezellig meedoen, iedereen is welkom!
‘Gymnastics is not only good for the development, motor skills and 
strength of children, it is in addition very gezellig. Friends, parents, 
join in the fun [lit. come gezellig participate], everyone is welcome!’
Examples (29) to (31) illustrate the very common association between 
gezelligheid and talking. The latter is often coupled with other activities, 
as in the latter two examples:
(29) Wil je meer weten, met veel plezier lichten we onze methodiek en 
wat het voor jullie kan betekenen toe tijdens een gezellige babbel.
‘If you want to find out more, we will be delighted to shed further 




(30) En toen werd het zo te zien heel gezellig en zaten ze nog een hele tijd 
met elkaar te drinken, te praten en te lachen.
‘And then things apparently got very gezellig and they spent quite 
some time drinking, talking and laughing together.’
(31) Vandaag hebben we gezellig op een terras in het zonnetje zitten 
beppen en kleppen, uiteraard ook gedronken en gegeten.
‘Today we spent our time gezellig in the sunDIM at a table in front 
of a café, chit-chatting; obviously we also had drinks and food.’
Some of our examples oppose solitude or isolation to activities described 
as gezellig:
(32) Af en toe miste hij het gevoel van een goede vriendschap wel—vooral 
als hij zijn zus zo gezellig met haar vriendinnen zag rondlopen.
‘From time to time he did miss the feeling of good friendship—
especially whenever he saw his sister walk around so gezellig with 
her friends.’
(33) Waar de rest gezellig bij ons zit in de woonkamer, zit zij 99 per cent 
van de tijd het liefst beneden in de woonkeuken.
‘Whereas the others gezellig sit down with us in the lounge, she 
prefers spending 99 per cent of the time downstairs in the kitchen.’
The activity envisaged is usually intrinsically social or collective, and 
entirely voluntary. There is no coercion, no obligation to engage in the 
activity if people don’t want to involve themselves. Explication [D] is an 
attempt at spelling this out:
[D] een gezellige activiteit ‘a gezellig activity’
a . something people do11
b . they want to do it for some time
c . they do it with other people
d . all these people feel something good when they do it
11  The first component of explications [D] and [E] is potentially controversial since it includes 
a relative clause. The role and place of relative clauses in NSM syntax remains to be further elucidated.
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No reference is made to the place where the activity occurs, since there 
is nothing to prevent gezellig activities from occurring in ongezellig 
‘un-gezellig’ places. The same is true in the case of events (section 3.5). 
In terms of gezelligheid, the link between an activity and the place where 
it occurs is more tenuous than that between a place and its atmosphere 
(section 3.2) or a place and its bustle (section 3.3).
3 .5 . Gezellig + NEvent
Examples (34) to (36) provide illustration of the use of gezellig with nouns 
referring to events:
(34) Overal in de Provence vindt u gezellige markten met vaten vol 
ronde olijven, bergen geurende kruiden en dikke schijven geitenkaas.
‘All over Provence you can find gezellig markets with barrels full of 
round olives, stacks of aromatic herbs and thick slices of goat cheese.’
(35) In het zomerseizoen kunnen we elk (buiten)evenement combineren 
met een gezellige BBQ.
‘In the summer season, we can combine each (outside) event with 
a gezellig BBQ.’
(36) Al jaren organiseert de bank deze gezellige familiefietsdag voor 
haar werkgebied.
‘For years the bank has been organising this gezellig family cycling 
day for its work sector.’
Relying on diminutives for increased effect, examples (37) and (38) are 
to some extent reminiscent of examples (4) to (6):
(37) Thuis heeft zijn vrouw alles in gereedheid gebracht voor een gezellig 
verjaardagsfeestje.
‘At home his wife took care of all the preparations for a gezellig 
birthday partyDIM.’
(38) Ik ben altijd wel voor een avondje gezellig uit.
‘I am always in favour of an eveningDIM gezellig out.’
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The diminutive in (38) favours an event interpretation: the example refers 
to an outing rather than to a period of time.12 The adverb gezellig qualifies 
the adverb uit ‘out’. It would have been equally possible to talk about een 
gezellig avondje uit, in which case gezellig is an adjective qualifying the 
noun avondje. The two phrases are very similar in meaning.
Example (39) shows that a gezellig event, like a gezellig activity, can occur 
in an ongezellig place:
(39) De dag wordt afgesloten met een gezellige maaltijd bij de 
ongezellige Chinees in de haven en een borrel in de lokale bar. (G)
‘The day ends with a gezellig meal at the ongezellig Chinese restaurant 
in the harbour quarter and a snifter in the local bar.’
Explication [E] is fairly close in its formulation to explication [D], which 
is of course to be expected since events and activities are related categories:
[E] een gezellig evenement ‘a gezellig event’
a . something that happens
b . it happens for some time
c . it happens when people do something with other people
d . all these people feel something good when they do it
3 .6 . Gezellig + NPeriod
Time spent together can be gezellig, too. It is usually relatively short, and 
filled with collective activity that makes all those present feel good:
(40) Met een volle buik en een kerstpresent werd deze gezellige middag 
afgesloten.
‘We concluded this gezellig midday with a full tummy and a Christmas 
present.’
(41) Al met al toch weer een gezellige avond met racen, pinballen en 
vooral veel gein!
12  The phrase een gezellige avond ‘a gezellig evening’ (no diminutive) favours the latter interpretation. 
See section 3.6.
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‘All in all yet again a gezellig evening with racing and pinball machines 
and above all lots of fun!’
(42) Jij was bij ons de gezelligste week van het jaar, de kerst.
‘You were with us during the most gezellig week of the year, 
Christmas.’
I propose the NSM explication in [F]:
[F] een gezellige tijd ‘a gezellig time’
a . some time, not a long time
b . at this time, it is like this:
c . people are with other people in the same place for some time
d . they feel something good when they are in the same place with 
these other people
e . they do some things with these other people
The infinitive phrase er een gezellig(e) NPeriod van maken ‘make it into 
a  gezellig NPeriod’ is related to the cultural imperative Maak het gezellig! 
‘Make it gezellig’, discussed in section 3.2. It is illustrated in (43):
(43) Alle leden zijn welkom om er weer een gezellige avond van te 
maken.
‘All members are welcome to help make it into a gezellig evening.’
3 .7 . Gezellig + NHum
‘If someone refers to you as gezellig, take this as a compliment’, wrote 
Kaldenbach (1995), quoted in section 2. To describe someone as gezellig 
amounts to saying that they are good company, they are fun to be with 
and at the same time they seek out the company of others. They try hard 
not to antagonise, but to socialise. Examples of gezellig  +  NHum in the 
Sketch Engine sample include the following:
(44) Ik ben een meid van 18 jaar en ga binnenkort bij een bureau werken. 
Ben tot dan nog op zoek naar gezellige klanten die zin hebben in 
een leuke, jonge meid.
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‘I am an 18-year old lass and will be joining an escort agency shortly. 
Until then, am looking for gezellig customers who fancy a nice young 
lass.’
(45) Kinderen worden gelukkiger, gezelliger en beter ontwikkelde 
mensen als ze de gelegenheid krijgen om met elkaar te spelen.
‘Children become happier, more gezellig and better developed 
individuals if they get the chance to play with one another.’
In NSM, een gezellig iemand can be explicated as in [G]:
[G] een gezellig iemand ‘someone gezellig’
a . someone
b . other people want to be with this someone
c . this someone wants to be with other people
d . when this someone is with other people,
these other people can feel something good because of it
e . this someone doesn’t want other people to feel something bad
when this someone does something
g . this is good
[G] is in many ways similar to Waters’ (2017: 42) explication of nice as 
a human attribute (e.g. a nice person). The most important difference lies 
in components (b) and (c), absent from the explication of nice.
Related to the above is the use of gezellig in the phrases gezellig zijn 
‘to behave gezellig’ and gezellig doen ‘to act gezellig’, which denote desirable 
behaviours of people (as opposed to permanent properties). Als je niet 
gezellig kan doen, ga je maar naar je kamer ‘If you can’t do gezellig, you 
might as well go to your room’ is, according to van Baalen (2003: 16), an 
often-heard parental threat to recalcitrant children. Gij zult gezellig zijn 
‘Thou shalt be gezellig’, on the other hand, is according to the same author 
‘just about the eleventh commandment in Dutch society’ (ibid.;  my 
translation).
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4 . Conclusion
In May 2003, during a visit to Leiden University, Anna Wierzbicka and 
Cliff Goddard taught a masterclass on ‘Empirical universals in semantics: 
lexicon, grammar, discourse’. Cultural keywords were among the topics 
addressed, prompting the class to try its hand at explicating a striking 
specimen of the category, the adjective gezellig. Appendix  3.3 contains 
English and Dutch versions of the masterclass explication, which didn’t 
relate to the keyword per se, but to an exclamation (Gezellig hier! ‘Gezellig 
here!’) featuring the arguably most common use of the word gezellig in 
today’s language: its use as an attribute of a place.
By contrast, the explications in this chapter rely on lexico-grammatical 
frames of a different nature. Use of gezellig with nouns shows the true 
versatility of a word that goes equally well with nouns of places, nouns 
referring to atmosphere, nouns (and adjectives) referring to a bustle or 
buzz, nouns (and verbs) referring to activities, nouns referring to events, 
nouns referring to periods, and nouns referring to humans. The list is not 
complete, but it accounts for the most important and indeed most salient 
uses of a cultural keyword that has exercised the minds of several scholars 
yet remains far from having yielded all its secrets.
Exploring gezellig through the prism of NSM, with its fine-grained 
reductive paraphrases, has led me on a fascinating journey into Dutch 
linguaculture. I hope to have shed new light on a language-specific 
concept in a way that makes sense to cultural insiders and outsiders alike. 
Unlike my predecessors, I have tried to take nothing for granted: neither 
Dutch linguaculture itself, as is done by those who, like anthropologist 
Henk Driessen (1997) and theologian Pieter Dronkers (2013), write in 
their own language (Dutch) for an audience that is obviously aware of 
what it means to live in and be part of the Dutch linguaculture; nor the 
cultural baggage that is inevitably embedded (but hardly ever detected) in 
English scholarly writing, such as that of philosopher Hilde Lindemann 
(2009), psychologist Alexander McNeil and maternity care specialist Julie 
Jomeen (2010), or ethnographer Rajendra Pradhan (1990). It should 
never be forgotten that English is anything but the culture-free medium 
it is often assumed to be. We can either remain ‘imprisoned’ in it, to use 
Wierzbicka’s (2014) beautiful metaphor, or take the key that, for years, 
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Appendix 3 .1
Table A3 .1 . Dutch exponents of the NSM primes .
IK, JIJ, IEMAND, IETS~DING, MENSEN, LICHAAM substantives
I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING~THING, 
PEOPLE, BODY
SOORT, DEEL relational 
substantivesKIND, PART
DIT, HETZELFDE, ANDERE~ANDERS determiners
THIS, THE SAME, OTHER~ELSE
ÉÉN, TWEE, SOMMIGE~WAT, ALLE, VEEL, WEINIG quantifiers










KNOW, THINK, WANT, DON’T WANT, FEEL, SEE, 
HEAR
ZEGGEN, WOORDEN, WAAR speech
SAY, WORDS, TRUE




(ERGENS) ZIJN, ER IS, (IEMAND/IETS) ZIJN location, 
existence, 
specification
BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, BE (SOMEONE/
SOMETHING)
VAN MIJ (ZIJN) possession
(IS) MINE
LEVEN, STERVEN life and death
LIVE, DIE
WANNEER~MOMENT~KEER, NU, VOOR~ERVOOR, 
NA~ERNA, EEN LANGE TIJD, EEN KORTE TIJD, 
VOOR EEN TIJDJE, OGENBLIK
time
WHEN~TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG 
TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT
WAAR~PLAATS, HIER, BOVEN, ONDER, VER, 
DICHTBIJ, ZIJDE, IN, AANRAKEN
place
WHERE~PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, 
SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCH
NIET, MISSCHIEN, KUNNEN, OMDAT, ALS logical concepts
NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF




Notes: Exponents of primes can be polysemous, that is, they can have other, additional 
meanings .
Exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes or phrasemes .
They can be formally complex .
They can have language-specific combinatorial variants (allolexes, indicated with ~).
each prime has well-specified syntactic (combinatorial) properties.
Source: Author’s summary .
Appendix 3 .2: Dutch versions of the NSM 
explications proposed in this chapter
[A’] een gezellige plaats
a . een plaats
b . wanneer mensen aan deze plaats denken, voelen ze iets goeds
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c . ze willen in deze plaats zijn
d . ze willen in deze plaats wat doen13
e . wanneer mensen in deze plaats zijn, kunnen ze iets goeds voelen
f . er kunnen in deze plaats met mensen géén slechte dingen gebeuren
[B’] er heerst hier een gezellige sfeer
a . het is zó:14
b . er zijn mensen in deze plaats
c . deze mensen willen in deze plaats zijn
d . ze voelen iets goeds wanneer ze in deze plaats zijn
e . ze doen wat wanneer ze in deze plaats zijn
f . ze willen het voor een tijdje doen
[C’] er heerst hier een gezellige drukte
a . het is zó:
b . er zijn vele mensen in deze plaats
c . deze mensen willen in deze plaats zijn
d . ze voelen iets goeds wanneer ze in deze plaats zijn
e . ze doen wat wanneer ze in deze plaats zijn
f . ze willen het voor een tijdje doen
[D’] een gezellige activiteit
a . iets dat mensen doen
b . ze willen het voor een tijdje doen
c . ze doen het met andere mensen
d . al deze mensen voelen iets goeds wanneer ze het doen
13  This very tentative proposal hinges on the realisation of the combination sommige~wat + 
iets~ding + doen as wat doen, whereas in the English NSM do + some + something~thing = do 
some things. Unlike iets, which is inherently singular, wat is unmarked for number.
14  zó is a portmanteau for the combination als dit (‘like this’), comparable to German so, French 
ainsi, Italian così, Spanish así, etc.
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[E’] een gezellig evenement
a . iets dat gebeurt
b . het gebeurt voor een tijdje
c . het gebeurt wanneer mensen iets doen met andere mensen
d . al deze mensen voelen iets goeds wanneer ze het doen
[F’] een gezellige tijd
a . wat tijd, geen lange tijd15
b . in deze tijd is het zó:
c . er zijn voor een tijdje mensen in dezelfde plaats met andere 
mensen
d . ze voelen iets goeds wanneer ze in dezelfde plaats zijn met deze 
mensen
e . ze doen wat met deze andere mensen
[G’] een gezellig iemand
a . iemand
b . andere mensen willen bij16 dit iemand zijn
c . dit iemand wil bij andere mensen zijn
d . wanneer dit iemand bij andere mensen is,
kunnen deze mensen daarom17 iets goeds voelen
e . dit iemand wil niet dat andere mensen iets slechts voelen wanneer 
dit iemand iets doet
f . dit is goed
15  niet ‘not’ + een lange tijd ‘a long time’ = geen lange tijd.
16  A quirk (?) of Dutch NSM syntax: bij ‘with’ needs to be used here instead of met.
17  ‘daarom’ is a portmanteau matching the English NSM sequence ‘because of this’.
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Appendix 3 .3: English and Dutch versions 
of the 2003 masterclass explication of the 
adjective gezellig
The only record of explication [H] I know of18 is incomplete: component 
(g) is missing. It must have been there, though, since it is part of the 
Dutch translation [H’] proposed by van Baalen (2003: 21). In line 
with current NSM practice, components (b) to (h) have been indented 
to clarify they contribute to spelling out the thought referred to in 
component (a). Component (d) is indented even further to highlight that 
it is a subordinate clause depending on component (c).
[H] Gezellig hier! ‘gezellig here’
a . everyone here can think like this:
b . I am here now with some other people
c . these people are all doing some things at the same time
d . because they want to feel something good
e . they don’t want anyone here to feel something bad
f . they all feel something good
g . this is good
h . I want to be here with these people
[H’] Gezellig hier!
a . iedereen hier kan iets denken als dit:
b . ik ben nu hier met andere mensen
c . deze mensen doen allen iets op hetzelfde moment
d . omdat ze iets goeds willen voelen
e . ze willen niet dat iemand hier iets slechts voelt
f . ze voelen allemaal iets goeds
g . dit is goed
h . ik wil hier zijn met deze mensen





on the Danish address 
pronoun De
Carsten Levisen1
1 . Address studies
Anna Wierzbicka’s recent work on the cross-European semantics of 
address has reopened and invigorated ‘address studies’ (Wierzbicka 2015, 
2016a, 2016b, 2016c). This is a remarkable achievement, given that the 
field of address for a long time has been considered ‘old hat’—a well-
studied, almost trivial area of cross-European linguistics, from which 
very little innovation emerged. For decades, address was popular in both 
sociolinguistics and pragmatics. Typologies based on the so-called T-V 
pronouns (such as French tu/vous and German du/Sie) emerged out of 
sociolinguistic research, and in pragmatics the once flourishing paradigm 
of ‘politeness theory’ analysed address as a component of ‘polite’ verbal 
behaviour. Somewhere along the line, the interest in the meaning of address 
1  I would like to acknowledge Anna Wierzbicka’s profound influence and inspiration on my 
work, including the present work on the semantics of address. The first time I discussed address with 
Anna was in 2008 at the Australian Linguistics Institute. Drawing her attention to the special case 
of Danish address, Anna said: ‘you should write about it!’. And so I did—with 10 years of delay. I 
would also like to thank Sophia Waters, Hartmut Haberland and the two anonymous reviewers of my 
chapter for engaging with my ideas, and helping me to improve on my analysis.
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was lost, and Wierzbicka’s work allows us to reconsider this question: what 
do address words mean to speakers? In this chapter, I want to contribute 
to the meaning-based turn in address research following Wierzbicka’s lead, 
and the emerging semantically driven address studies (see in particular 
Wierzbicka 2016a, 2016b, and the important contributions of Wong 
2014: 57–93; Farese 2018).
A central part of Wierzbicka’s (2016a) reopening of the field has to do with 
her search for a more fine-grained metalanguage as a tool for description. 
She says:
Simplistic distinctions such as that between ‘familiar’ and ‘polite’ 
forms of address, or between ‘T’ and ‘V’, are still widely relied on, 
and the focus of attention is often on collecting more data rather 
than on finding a framework within which the amassed data can 
be made sense of. (2016a: 523).
One has to agree with Wierzbicka that ‘more data’ cannot be the solution 
to the study of European address. We already know very well what the 
European address words are, and also great deal about how these words 
work in social interaction. The widest gap in our current knowledge is 
meaning, and Wierzbicka’s ‘meaning challenge’ has consequences not 
only for address but also for ‘relational grammars’ in general—that is, the 
variety of ways in which different linguacultures construe the connection 
between the ‘you’ and the ‘me’ in conversational rituals.2
Another key point in Wierzbicka’s criticism (2016b) is the way in which 
comparative studies have been wedded to Anglocentric terminology:
conventional labels like ‘informal’, ‘intimate’, ‘familiar’, ‘formal’, 
and ‘respectful’, are all drawn from the conceptual vocabulary of 
English (2016b: 212)
A third problem identified by Wierzbicka (2016a) is the tendency to elevate 
the micro-diversity of usage above the macro-diversity of semantics, and 
to favour use over meaning. She says:
Yes, the use of terms of address changes over time and varies across 
the social spectrum, but differences in their use do not necessarily 
indicate differences in meaning (2016a: 506)
2  The study of relational grammars belongs the more general field of ethnosyntax (Wierzbicka 
1979).
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I believe that all these points are important, and if I were to develop 
an analytical action plan based on these insights, I would propose the 
following:
Above all, we must insist on the retirement of the T-V system that was 
invented in the early ’60s (Brown and Gilman 1960). While the T-V 
approach has taken us some distance, this simple system is too crude 
for meaning-based analysis, even if used critically and competently 
(see e.g. Braun 1988; Clyne et al. 2009; Hajek et al. 2013). The main 
problem is that T and V gloss over address diversity in European languages 
and lump together words and meanings based on superficial similarities, 
rather than on a deep meaning analysis. Moreover, T and V have also 
introduced a highly problematic dualistic thinking, as though there are 
only ever just two competing address terms, and as though the so-called 
‘Vs’ are identical across Europe’s languages. The dullness of analysis is 
partly due to the metalinguistic biases introduced by the T-V paradigm, 
and the solution is to adopt a metalanguage that allows for a more high-
resolution analysis, and which does not impose a simplistic duality like 
T and V. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) offers itself as 
a metalinguistic tool for doing such analysis (Goddard and Wierzbicka 
2014; Goddard 2018), and in my view, NSM analysis can fully replace 
the T-V system.
Second, the Anglocentric bias needs to be addressed head-on. 
By comparing Europe’s languages through English words such as polite, 
formal, familiar, etc., we run the risk of viewing all these English words 
as neutral words, rather than value words with an Anglo cultural take 
on sociality and culture (for a criticism, see Wierzbicka 2010, on the 
problem of Anglocentrism, see also Levisen 2019; Ye 2019). Even if some 
of the traditional terminologies in address studies have quasi-counterparts 
in (some) European languages, there is a considerable ‘cryptodiversity’ 
at play in the terminology of values (Levisen and Jogie 2015). Precision 
in analysis cannot be reached unless we have a tertium comparationis, 
a common yardstick. This means that none of the explanatory keywords 
in English, not even solidarity or politeness, should be relied on when we 
analyse European address words and practices (on keywords, see also 
Levisen and Waters 2017).
Third, address words and practices are among the most important evidence 
for relational grammars in and across linguacultures. Address rituals play 
an important part in the everyday life of speakers. They model different 
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ideas and ideals of kinship and family relations, patterns of friendship and 
colleagueship, and other kinds of social cognition that constitute social 
and relational knowledge. Address words are never just linguistic devices; 
they are always manifestations of cultural meaning. They are always 
‘linguacultural’, and they profoundly link ways of speaking with ways of 
thinking about others (and ways of feeling towards other people). They 
deserve to be studied from a macro-diversity perspective,3 and from the 
perspective of cross-cultural semantics.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, I will briefly introduce 
Danish linguaculture in relation to address words and practices. 
In section 3, I will present some ‘rich points’ on how De enables cultural 
discourse. In section 4, I will provide an explication for the Danish De, 
and contrast and compare this with Wierzbicka’s explication for German 
Sie. This is followed by some concluding remarks.
2 . ‘Danish address’ in the 
European context
It seems clear that Danish address does not fit neatly into any of the two 
main camps of European address—neither the ‘Anglo’ nor the ‘continental 
European’. The difference between ‘Anglo’ and ‘Continental’ can be 
summarised as follows:
One of the deepest differences between English-based human 
interaction and the interaction based on the languages of 
continental Europe has to do with terms of address. For speakers 
of languages like French, Italian, or German it goes without saying 
that ‘polite’ words such as vous, Lei and Sie are indispensable in 
daily exchanges with others. (Wierzbicka 2016b: 209)
At a first glance, Danish address seems to be both English-like and 
Continental-like. Anglo relational grammar is known for its extensive 
discourses of ‘you’, and in terms of cultural values, you has been called 
a  ‘great social equaliser’ (Wierzbicka 2003: 47). The same can be said 
about the Danish du. ‘Du discourse’ is linked with an egalitarian ethos, in 
much the same way as the Anglo inclusive ‘you discourse’. But this is not 
3  By macro-diversity, I refer to semantic differences in address words across different languages, 
and to intercultural analysis. By micro-diversity, I refer to differences in registers, genres, styles and 
dialects within the same linguaculture, and to intracultural analysis.
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the full story. After all, Danish does have an address word De, which on the 
surface looks similar to German Sie, French vous, etc. An initial conclusion 
would be to say that discursive evidence points towards the ‘Anglo’ system, 
but that structural evidence points towards the ‘Continental’ systems.
Let’s now take a closer look at De. Unlike the words Sie and vous that 
are ubiquitous in everyday German and French interaction, De is not 
a part of the daily exchange of words in Danish. The De, it would seem, 
has almost fallen out of use. To illustrate, I have myself, in my life as 
a  Danish speaker, never used De in any ‘normal’ exchange of words. 
In fact, I have never used the word seriously at all—only for humorous or 
other rhetorical purposes. To the Danish mind, the ‘fall of the De’ forms 
part of the narrative of a Danish egalitarian ethos that grew out of the 
popular enlightenment and social democracy, and which was consolidated 
through the anti-authoritarian and anti-hierarchy discourses of the 1960s 
(see Hansen 1980: 89; Levisen 2012). Even the conservative newspaper 
Jyllands Posten, whose renowned slogan used to be hvis De vil vide mere 
‘if De want to know more’ has given up on De. To avoid ridicule, the 
paper has recently changed its slogan to hvis du vil vide mere ‘if you [du] 
want to know more’.
While the Danish De might be marginal in discourse, studies show that 
speakers are very much aware of the word (Kretzenbacher et al. 2018). 
De may have fallen, but the fall has mainly happened at the interactive 
level; the word is still alive and kicking in speakers’ linguistic consciousness. 
The reason for this seems to be that De provides speakers with meaning 
potentials and indexical affordances. One of these indexical affordances 
is to create voices from the past: if you want to make, say, a historical 
Danish film, just insert De in the dialogue, and the Danes will be 
convinced that ‘it feels old’. No other historically based lexicogrammatical 
and sociophonetic features of older stages of Danish seem to have same 
seductive power: De is recreating a sense of ‘the old days’ before the victory 
of social democracy, and the rise of an egalitarian ethos. Even the spelling 
of the word, with the old-fashioned capitalised D, contributes to invoking 
relational norms of the past.
In serious interaction, the Danish De is intricately linked with the Danish 
royal family. Almost akin to the ‘royal registers’ known from (for example) 
African linguistics (Storch 2011: 23–26), Danish ‘De discourse’ seems to 
have a royal ring. Using myself as an example again, the only situation in 
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which I would feel obliged to use the word De seriously would be if I were 
to have a conversation with a member of the Danish royal family. This has 
not happened yet.
But claiming ‘De discourse’ as a royal-only register might be going too 
far. Perhaps it would be more apt to categorise De as a feature of ‘residual 
conservatism’, and with a royal prototype. There are pockets of De use and 
De users not only in the Danish royal court, but also in certain business 
cultures (such as Maersk), in certain connoisseur shops (such as Perch’s 
tea shop), towards old elite-looking Copenhageners, but the fact of the 
matter is that for most speakers of Danish, De is a nice-to-have word, not 
a need-to-have word. And the reason why it is nice-to-have is that De can 
be used to humorously elevate people to a royal-like status, akin to saying 
Your Majesty! sarcastically in English. De, then, has something interesting 
to offer in terms of sarcasm, and humorous subversion, and the Danes are 
generally into sarcasm and humorous subversion (Goddard and Levisen 
forthcoming; Levisen 2018).
At a more general level, ‘Danish address’ stands out in a European 
context for its ‘minimalism’ and ‘exceptionalism’ (cf. Levisen 2017). It is 
‘minimalist’ in the sense that address words in general seem marginal in 
Danish linguaculture, and it is ‘exceptionalist’ in the sense that the majority 
of the few existing address words are the stylistically marked choice. 
Several address words that exist in Danish are actively discouraged, and 
have been actively discouraged for decades. This is true for the German-
based address words that index ‘old style’, words such as De, Hr. and Fru, 
(cp. German Sie, Herr and Frau) as exemplified in (1) but also socially 
stigmatised address words such as ven ‘friend’, makker ‘mate’, and do 
‘(jovial Jutlandic address variant of ) du’, as in (2). The English translations 
fail to capture the stigma, but in Danish such words index marginalised 
social or socio-regional speech.
(1) Vil De være så venlig?
‘Would De be so kind?’
Om forladelse, Hr. Mortensen
‘I beg your pardon, Hr. Mortensen’
Tak, Fru Nielsen
‘Thank you, Fru Nielsen’
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(2) Ved du hvad, ven?
‘You know what, ven?’
Hva’ så makker?
‘What’s up, makker’
Tak for hjælpen, do!
Thanks for the help, do!
Besides the ‘old’ and ‘stigmatised’ indexicalities, more recent influxes of 
English address words in slang registers such as boss, roomie, dude, cutie 
and pal have also found their way into Danish, where they index a ‘global’ 
street style, and often impart a humorous tone. So to recap, Danish 
address is marginal as such, and the address term De is likely to index 
something like ‘old and noble’ because of its royal-like meaning.
3 . The Queen, the Swiss, the train: 
Encounters with De
To further explore the meaning of De, I will now discuss three ‘rich points’ 
in order to come to a clearer understanding of what De means.
The first rich point goes back to my childhood in a Jutlandic town. As a 
10-year-old pupil, I remember having the first ‘De awareness’ moment in 
my life. Rumours had it that the Queen was coming to visit my town and 
that her procession would pass the town hall square where I happened to 
wait for the bus every day. Anxiously, I asked my mother what I should do 
if the Queen wanted to talk to me when she was passing the town square. 
I had heard in the schoolyard that I couldn’t say du to her, and that there 
was another word De that was used to address royals. I had never heard 
about this word before and asked my mother if it was true. She said that 
it was highly unlikely that the Queen’s visit would coincide with my bus 
ride. My mother was right, of course. The Queen’s procession didn’t pass 
during the 20  minutes that I happened to wait for my bus. Also, my 
mother reassured me that the Queen couldn’t get mad at me if I forgot to 
say De. Since I missed the Queen that day, I never got the chance to test 
my new word De, and still to this day, this was the closest I ever got to 
using a serious De in my life.
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A second rich point in my life with De happened a couple of months ago, 
when I was travelling by train from Aarhus to Copenhagen. I was in a train 
carriage full of people, some standing, some sitting on the floor, and I was 
trying to write emails on my laptop in a very small personal space in the 
middle of a crowded car. There were elderly people who found it difficult 
to keep their balance as the train was rocking along, and it was truly 
uncomfortable for all of us. I decided to explore the train to see if there 
was better seating elsewhere, and to my surprise I found two completely 
empty carriages. This annoyed me. I was thinking of all the people in the 
other carriage, and I complained to the conductor. I asked her why she 
hadn’t informed the passengers via the loudspeaker system that there were 
empty carriages when she knew that passengers were struggling in the 
overcrowded carriage. She responded that it wasn’t her problem and that 
it was the passengers’ own responsibility to find a place to sit. I disagreed 
with her publicly. Then she started addressing me with De. For the rest of 
our slightly heated conversation, she called me both Hr. and De, which 
upset me further. It felt like she was saying ‘mind your own business, Your 
Majesty’. I felt that she talked down to me in a passive-aggressive way, and 
that what she really communicated was that I had dared to think of myself 
as someone ‘above her’. The De, then, was clearly in the service of ‘cutting 
me down’, and also ridiculing me for my alleged hubris.
The third rich point happened a few years ago, when the Swiss-based 
multinational coffee chain Nespresso opened their business in the 
Jutlandic town of Aarhus. I went to the shop one day, and to my surprise 
I was greeted with a De. As a matter of fact, all employees used the address 
pronoun De when interacting with their Danish customers, and this was 
so unusual for me that I decided to do fieldwork in the store for a while. 
I listened to the De-based conversations, and I soon found out that 
most customers were bewildered by the De. In fact most customers were 
annoyed by it, and some even angry. I interviewed an employee about the 
De use, and I was told that they were simply following company policy. 
The ‘Swiss logic’ seemed to be that the German Sie or the French vous 
needed a counterpart in Danish, and since this counterpart existed in 
the form of De, all employees had been instructed to use it. I was further 
told in the store that the De was meant to express høflighed ‘politeness’. 
When I queried it further, the employee admitted that a large number of 
customers found it incredibly uhøfligt ‘impolite’. A couple of months later, 
I returned to the store and the De had gone. I interviewed the employees 
again and they confirmed that the De policy had been reconsidered, and 
that they had found new ways of expressing høflighed ‘politeness’ that were 
more in line with Danish customers’ preferences.
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4 . The Danish De and the German Sie
The German Sie serves as a historical model for the Danish De (see e.g. 
Kretzenbacher et al. 2018), and the same is true for other address terms 
that index ‘old’ style in contemporary Danish such as Hr. (Herr), and Fru 
(Frau). In Denmark, German language is no longer an important model 
for the borrowing of words and concepts, and general knowledge of the 
German language is no longer strong among Danish speakers. But the 
German Sie is one of the German words ‘known’ by the Danes—and 
the German Sie is largely reinterpreted and misunderstood. The Danish 
stereotype of German conversation as ‘hierarchical’ and ‘stiff’ to the point 
of being ‘comical’ is to a large degree finding its symbolic rationale in the 
notion of ‘address’4—and with a basis in ‘Sie-for-De’ transference. Let us 
take a look at the German Sie, as explicated by Wierzbicka (2016b: 229):
[A] The German Sie
a . when I say this, I don’t think about you like I can think about children
at the same time, I don’t think about you like I can think about some 
other people
b . I don’t think about you like this: ‘I know this someone well’
c . I think like this:
‘people can know some good things about this someone,
like they can think some good things about many other people’
In Wierzbicka’s analysis, German Sie differs in meaning from other 
European address pronouns such as the French vous, and the Italian 
Lei and Voi. The explication reflects these differences (for an extensive 
semantic analysis of the two Italian words Lei and Voi, see Farese 2018). 
One of the key elements in Sie is that ‘people can know some good things 
about this someone, like they can think some good things about many 
other people’. This ‘positive’, and ‘pro-social’ meaning is not conveyed 
by the De. In fact, the Danish De seems quite far removed from Sie, vous, 
Lei and Voi, and based on my analysis so far, I will propose the following 
explication for De:
4  Ørsness (2016) provides an interesting case study on the De–Sie complex, by exploring address 
practices in the teaching of German in Denmark. He proposes that a cultural cognitive dissonance 
analysis can explain the complex.
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[B] The Danish De (in its rare, serious sense)
a . when I say this, I don’t think about you like I can think about other 
people
b . I don’t think about you like this: ‘this someone is someone like me’
c . I think like this:
‘people can know that this someone is above other people,
like a king [m] is above other people, like a queen [m] is above 
other people
First, the theme about adults and children, which is present in German 
Sie (component (a)) as well in vous, Lei and Voi, does not seem to be a part 
of the meaning of De. This reflects the fact that neither adult Danish, 
nor children’s Danish, nor adult–children interactions in general have any 
age-based construal of address, and a shift from du to De does not seem to 
activate ‘age’ either. The main idea conveyed in De is ‘specialness’—‘I don’t 
think about you like I can think about other people’, and ‘difference’—
‘I don’t think about you like this: “this someone is someone like me”’. Also, 
and importantly, the idea is to convey ‘hierarchy’ modelled on ‘royalty’. 
I have used the two molecules king [m] and queen [m]—in Danish, 
konge ‘king’ and dronning ‘queen’—to convey the royal prototype of the 
hierarchical cognition embedded in De. This final component should 
account for an ‘aboveness of a royal-like kind’; that is, it should account 
for both the use in real interaction with royals (such as between journalists 
and the Queen), and the occasional shop in certain neighbourhoods 
in Copenhagen that uses De to enact a fornem ‘posh, distinguished, 
noble’ style.
The third component also provides us with a hook for explaining the 
humorous and sarcastic scripts associated with De. With De one can mock 
another person’s alleged special, outstanding and royal-like attitude or 
perceived status, and thereby police the cultural value of lighed ‘equality, 
similarity’. For instance, the sarcastic De could be interpreted through 
a general Danish sarkasme script (see Goddard and Levisen forthcoming), 
but the master script that undergirds the aversion towards De discourse 
is a script against ‘hierarchical social cognition’:
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[C] A high-level Danish script against ‘hierarchical 
social cognition’
many people think like this:
it is bad if someone thinks like this:
‘I am not like other people, I am above other people’
it is good if someone can think like this:
‘no one is above other people, no one is below other people’
The script in [C] spells out the socio-cognitive norm for thinking about 
good and bad thoughts in relation to being below and above others. 
The exception to script [C] is the Danish royal family. They are allowed to 
be ‘above others’, they can live by other scripts and follow other grammars 
of relationality. But even the royal family can go too far if they too 
demonstratively verbalise their exceptional status. In a much-discussed 
televised episode, Prince Joachim, the younger son of the Danish queen, 
once snapped at a journalist who failed to use De address, and insisted that 
the journalist changed his pronouns to fit the royal De code. The Danish 
public reacted very negatively towards the prince, and these reactions can 
be viewed as strong evidence in support for the cultural ethos reflected in 
script [C].
The script can also explain in part why Danish speakers, through a De-for-
Sie transfer, largely misunderstand (or, to be more descriptive, reinterpret) 
the German Sie. The master script in [C] governs several lower-level scripts 
that remain to be articulated, including the scripts for ‘royal registers’, 
and scripts for humorous, sarcastic and subversive uses, and the indexical 
scripts for invoking ‘old style’, ‘German style’, and so on.
5 . Concluding remarks
This chapter offered a first NSM-based analysis of Danish address, focusing 
on the Danish address pronoun De. It was found that De is different from 
European words that have been compared to De, such as German Sie and 
French vous. It would seem that Danish linguaculture has its own cultural 
logics, based on Danish words and scripts, and that it is not just a copy 
of the German or the Anglo system. Close in spirit to the Anglo system 
of address, and close in form to Continental address culture, it seems that 
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Danish, with its normalisation of ‘zero address’, with its focus on royal 
registers and humorous usages, constitutes a special case to the study of 
address that can help to explore the diverse ways in which Europeans do 
relational grammar in their daily lives. In order to study this diversity in 
depth, we need new approaches and new visions for address, and most of 
all we need to relinquish the strangleholds that prevent us from achieving 
this progress. I will conclude by sharing Wierzbicka’s (2016a) vision, 
a vision that I also hold. It is a vision that can truly transform the study 
of address in Europe and the world:
we need to let go of technical terms (such as ‘polite’, ‘familiar’, 
‘distance’, ‘formality’, and so on) and look for semantic components 
intelligible to native speakers and testable in context; and if we 
want to do so without ethnocentrism, we need to formulate our 
hypotheses (that is, the hypothesized semantic components) 
in cross-translatable words, put together into cross-translatable 
phrases and sentences (2016a: 523)
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1 . The evolving nature of 
Singapore English
One of the most important publications by Wierzbicka for me as 
a Singaporean is the paper entitled ‘Singapore English: A semantic and 
cultural perspective’ (Wierzbicka 2003). In my opinion, this was the first 
paper incisively written on the meaning and culture of Singapore English. 
In the paper, Wierzbicka pioneered the argument that there is a ‘Singapore 
culture’ (2003: 328) over and above the various cultures (Chinese, 
Malay and Indian) that thrive in the country. By studying a number of 
Singaporean cultural keywords, she showed that while Singaporeans are 
said to speak English, their English is culturally distinct from what was 
traditionally known as native varieties of English or what some might 
now call Anglo English (Wong 2008; Goddard 2012). Cultural keywords 
are ‘special, culture-specific meanings’ that ‘reflect and pass on not only 
ways of living characteristic of a given society but also ways of thinking’ 
(Wierzbicka 1997: 5) and studying Singapore English cultural keywords 
can help us understand and appreciate Singaporean ways of thinking. 
Regrettably, there seems to be little scholarly interest in the studying of 
the Singapore English with a view to understanding the ways of thinking 
it embodies. This chapter tries to fill this gap.
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One of the ideas that stood out for me in Wierzbicka’s paper is that 
Singapore culture is ‘evolving’ (2003: 328) and that is the theme that 
I want to broach in this chapter. That Singapore culture is evolving is 
reflected in Singlish, the main variety of Singapore English used among 
Singaporeans in all but the most formal settings. It may be seen in how 
Singlish cultural keywords or phrases can emerge or disappear, often in 
a short period. Examples of Singlish phrases that went out of use or are 
no longer relevant might be Marina kids, graduate mothers and dangerous 
dogs, phrases documented in Ho’s book chapter (1992: 212). Marina kids 
were younger teenagers who spent their leisure time socialising in Marina 
Square, a shopping mall, during the early years of the mall (late ’80s/
early ’90s) when it was not yet popular with shoppers. The Marina kids 
socialised in groups and were seen as a public nuisance. They disappeared 
when the mall became popular. Graduate mothers were the beneficiaries 
of the controversial ‘Graduate Mothers Priority Scheme’ introduced by 
the government in 1984, which saw the government using ‘financial and 
social incentives to encourage graduate women to marry and procreate’.1 
The discriminatory scheme understandably antagonised many women, 
which led to the formation of AWARE (Association of Women for 
Action and Research), whose mission is to ‘To remove all gender-based 
barriers so as to allow individuals in Singapore to develop their potential 
to the fullest and realise their personal visions and hopes’, the following 
year.2 Apparently, the discriminatory nature and unpopularity of the 
Graduate Mothers Priority Scheme led to its demise less than a year 
later. Subsequently, the phrase graduate mothers began to lose its cultural 
salience. The phrase dangerous dogs was used to refer to kinds of pet dogs 
that ‘must be muzzled when outside their owners’ premises’ (Ho 1992: 
212). However, a search for the phrase on the AVS (Animal & Veterinary 
Service) homepage now does not yield any result, except for the clause, 
‘Such potentially dangerous dog breeds are listed under the Second 
Schedule of the Animals and Birds (Dog Licensing and Control) Rules 
(“Specified Dogs”).’3 Presumably, this is because the owning of such dogs 
in Singapore is now regulated. This in turn suggests that there have been 
fewer and fewer ‘dangerous dogs’ in Singapore, which might explain why 
the phrase has lost its cultural importance and dropped out of use.
1  Available at: www.aware.org.sg/2010/11/the-birth-of-awarepart-one/.
2  Available at: www.aware.org.sg/about/.
3  Available at: www.nparks.gov.sg/avs/pets/owning-a-pet/licensing-a-pet/dog-licensing.
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New words in Singlish have emerged, including those culturally associated 
with the word kiasu, which literally means ‘afraid to lose’ or, according to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘a selfish, grasping attitude arising from 
a fear of missing out on something’. Wierzbicka (2003: 333) in 2003 
correctly described it as ‘the most salient cultural keyword in Singaporean 
English’. She proposed that the meaning may be represented in Natural 
Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) in this way (with added punctuation 
marks and a more reader-friendly layout for ease of reading):
[A] kiasu
a . Some people often think like this:
‘Many people can do something now.
If someone does it, something good will happen to this person .
If I do it, this good thing will happen to me .
If I don’t do it, this good thing will not happen to me .
If it doesn’t happen to me, I will have to think:
‘This good thing happened to other people, it didn’t happen 
to me .’
I don’t want to have to think like this .
Because of this I have to do something now .
I want to do it .’
b . Because these people think like this, they do many things .
c . i think: it is bad if people think like this. (Wierzbicka 2003: 335–336)
As a Singaporean, I think that Wierzbicka’s explication has a high degree 
of descriptive adequacy. The part ‘If it doesn’t happen to me, I will have 
to think: This good thing happened to other people, it didn’t happen to 
me’ seems to capture rather nicely the essence of kiasu or the ‘fear of losing 
out’, so to speak.
While some Singlish words dropped out of use, the word kiasu or at 
least the value it embodies is still relevant in Singapore culture today. 
The National Values Assessment survey of 2,000 people, conducted by 
local business consultancy aAdvantage Consulting Group and Barrett 
Values Centre in 2018, suggests that Singapore citizens perceive the 
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
102
Singapore society to be first and foremost kiasu.4 Also, an article written 
for the Los Angeles Times by David Pierson says that ‘Singapore’s “kiasu” 
culture makes FOMO look like child’s play’ (Pierson 2019). In the same 
article, Pierson states: ‘Long before Americans discovered FOMO—the 
fear of missing out—Singaporeans were fixated with its more excessive 
forebear, kiasu.’ At this point, one might ask how kiasu is ‘more excessive’ 
than FOMO. The Cambridge Dictionary defines FOMO in this way, 
with an example:
a worried feeling that you may miss exciting events that other 
people are going to, especially caused by things you see on social 
media: Don’t get FOMO. Get a ticket now! 5
In other words, FOMO is about the ‘fear’ of ‘missing’ ‘exciting events’ in 
the context of ‘social media’. By contrast, kiasu seems to be culturally more 
primal and contextually far more pervasive. It could be about something 
from as minor as piling up one’s plate in a buffet (thus maximising the 
dollar) to as major as enrolling one’s primary school child in a host of 
extracurricular activities (thus giving the child a good head start in life). 
The cultural salience and importance of the word kiasu in Singapore 
culture thus cannot be overemphasised. The difference is that, since 2003, 
a number of Singlish words that reflect values or behaviour associated with 
the word kiasu have emerged or gained cultural salience. If Singaporeans 
were considered kiasu then, they may be even more so now.
2 . The Singaporean interjection bojio
An example of a Singlish word that reflects the kiasu value might be bojio, 
which very roughly means ‘no invite’, literally, or ‘you didn’t invite me’. 
It is usually used as a response to someone who did not invite the speaker 
to join them in an activity, which means that the speaker feels that they 
are missing out on something. While it can be used as a verb, bojio is more 
often used as an interjection. In fact, as we shall see, it may be considered 
an ‘emotive interjection’, which has in its meaning the component ‘I feel 
something’ (Wierzbicka 1991: 291; 1992: 165). More specifically, an 
emotive interjection is one ‘whose primary burden is to express feelings 
4  Available at: www.slideshare.net/aAdvantageConsulting/2018-singapore-national-values-
assessment.
5  Available at: dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fomo?q=FOMO.
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in the emotional sense’ (Goddard 2014: 54); an emotion refers to a feeling 
that follows a thought (‘someone X thought something’ and ‘because 
of this, this someone X felt something’) (Goddard 2018: 72). This means 
that the meaning of bojio has the components ‘I think like this …’ and 
‘because of this, I feel something …’.
It is difficult to say but the word probably only entered Singlish in the last 
five or six years; some of my current undergraduate students said that they 
first used it in high school. It is not documented in The Coxford Singlish 
Dictionary (Goh and Woo 2009), which is a dictionary written and 
produced by laypeople (i.e. not professional lexicographers) published in 
2009. This probably implies that bojio was not commonly used in Singlish 
then. Moreover, it is observed that the word is mainly used among younger 
Singaporeans who are in their teens and early 20s. Limited evidence at 
this stage thus suggests that it is a relatively new Singlish word. To the 
best of my knowledge, it has not received much scholarly attention, if any.
Interestingly, although I argue that bojio is a culturally important Singlish 
word, I concede that it may not be a particularly salient one to some 
people. For example, it is not documented in the tongue-in-cheek 
A Companion to How Singaporeans Communicate (Gwee 2018), published 
in 2018. Nevertheless, its importance can be seen in the fact that the word 
or its meaning is discussed in various websites; a Google search yields 
a number of results. The word is also exploited for commercial purposes 
in Singapore. There was a ‘Bojio Café’ (although it did not seem to survive 
beyond one or two years). The Singapore Zoo used a phrase with the word 
‘Don’t say bojio’ in a publicity poster for its 45th anniversary in 2018.6 
In fact, a Google search suggests that the phrase ‘Don’t say bojio’ is used 
by some bloggers exclamatorily as a tagline to tell Singaporeans about 
eating places that give customers value for money. Additionally, the word 
bojio has a positive counterpart jio, a verb which roughly means ‘invite’ 
and which is not infrequently used. The Singlish word bojio thus deserves 
attention and the interjection is the object of study in this chapter. The 
objective of this chapter is thus to study the meaning of bojio and what 
it could possibly tell us about how younger Singaporeans think. For 
data collection, a  survey was administered to my last batch of students 
(August–November 2018) at the National University of Singapore (NUS). 
6  Available at: www.straitstimes.com/singapore/dont-say-bojio-all-are-invited-to-singapore-zoos-
45th-birthday-celebrations.
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The survey mainly asked students for authentic examples of use and the 
context for each example. Data were also collected with the help of a 
student assistant and from internet sources.
I hasten to add that this chapter is particularly important in part because 
it focuses on an aspect of Singapore English that is regrettably seldom 
discussed: interjections. Generally speaking, interjections are said to 
be ‘among the most characteristic peculiarities of individual cultures’ 
(Wierzbicka 1992: 160) and ‘they express the personal intentions, 
attitudes, assumptions, and the feelings of the speaker’ (Goddard 2011: 
163). Interjections can thus reveal certain ways of thinking associated with 
a culture. As we shall see, this is exactly what the Singlish interjection bojio 
does; it speaks about intentions, attitudes, assumptions and the feelings of 
its Singaporean speakers. This study could thus be seen as an attempt to 
understand an aspect of contemporary Singapore culture, an aspect that 
has evolved rather recently in the last few years.
The word bojio comes from Hokkien, a southern Chinese language from 
the Min family originally spoken in Fujian province. It is a transliteration 
of the characters 没 and 招, which very roughly means ‘(did) not invite’. 
However, jio in Singlish refers to a verbal ‘invitation’. As an exclamation, 
bojio is used by someone to accost, often teasingly, the addressee for 
not inviting them to participate in an activity or event. Of course, the 
implication is that the addressee would know that the activity or event 
was one that the speaker would have wanted to participate in. One might 
translate the exclamation into something like this in English: ‘you didn’t 
ask me to join you’. Here are some examples of use:7
(1) A: Yesterday we went out to eat supper.
B: Bojio! (*)
(2) A: I went to the IT fair last night.
B: You went without telling me? Bojio! (*)
(3) Someone finds out that their friend went out for a movie, and says 
to that friend,
‘Why bojio? Go watch movie never ask me.’(*)
7  Examples marked with an asterisk in brackets are collected by student assistant Michelle Hoe, to 
whom I am grateful.
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(4) Someone sees an Instagram story of his friends on an outing together 
and comments: Bojio! (*)
(5) Someone A indicates on Facebook that he is in Kuala Lumpur. 
A friend B comments on the post using a meme with the interjection 
‘Boh jio!!!’, a spelling variation of bojio. This is followed by a brief 
exchange as presented below (unedited for spelling and punctuation, 
but with some information omitted).
A: Boh jio!!!
B: Halo, u so busy going gym ( … ) Jio u will go meh [particle]?
A: you didn’t ask lor [particle], how you know I won’t go????
Usually, such an exchange happens after the outing to which the speaker 
was not invited. The formula is straightforward. An individual or a group 
of friends went out somewhere or did something together. A friend who 
was not invited found out about it afterwards. This friend then says to 
the individual or one of the group, ‘Bojio! ’ Examples collected from the 
survey show that events that are referred to when the speaker says ‘bojio’ 
include a birthday party, a gathering of friends, a movie, a lunch, a dinner, 
a trip to buy bubble tea, a soccer game, a tempura-making session in the 
college’s pantry and a mah-jong game. All these activities seem to be fun 
things that the speaker might like to do with the addressee. Thus, the 
speaker feels excluded and can think something like someone who feels 
kiasu thinks: ‘Something good happened to other people, it didn’t happen 
to me.’ It is argued here that this is how bojio reflects the Singaporean 
kiasu attitude; its meaning embodies a similar way of thinking.
It is noted that in most of the examples studied, the event has happened at 
the time of speaking. However, the time of speaking could happen before 
the event, as example (6) illustrates.
(6) Several friends are getting ready to go to a club. Someone, upon seeing 
them dressed up, asks them where they are going. The following 
exchange ensues.
A: Wa, dress until so nice! Where are you all going?
B: We are going to the club tonight.
A: Wa! Bojio!
B: You can come man!
A: Nah, just kidding.
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This means that the statement of meaning should take into account both 
situations.
Example (6) is particularly interesting, because it shows that the interjection, 
when taken literally, can make the addressee feel bad (and immediately issue 
a verbal ‘invitation’). This seems obvious; if someone approached one to say 
that they were not invited by one, one would naturally tend to feel bad. 
The speaker cannot not know it. Thus, it might be said that the speaker has, 
at least on the surface, the intention to make the addressee feel bad.
As mentioned, bojio can also be used as a verb, as the following examples 
of exchanges between friends show.
(7) A: I went to buy new running shoes last night.
B: Why you bojio me?(*)
(8) A: I had dinner with Lucy yesterday.
B: What? So exclusive? Why bojio?(*)
Speaker comments that the addressee did not invite someone (Jenny) 
to dinner:
(9) You bojio Jenny for today’s dinner.
As mentioned also, bojio has a ‘positive’ counterpart, jio, which is not 
infrequently used as a verb, as in jio someone (roughly, ‘invite someone 
[to do something with one]’), but sometimes a noun (roughly, ‘invitation’). 
A few examples of jio might help us appreciate the cultural significance of 
bojio. The verb jio suggests that some form of inclusiveness among friends 
is an important value and the use of bojio may be seen as a ‘protest’ when 
the value is not upheld, as when the speaker is excluded from an activity.
(10) Some friends are talking about their holiday activities.
A: What did y’all do?
B: Mike and myself went to play soccer!
A: Wah! Next time jio leh [particle]
(11) A friend asks the speaker why they did not invite someone to an 
event, saying:
Why you never jio her for KBBQ [Korean barbeque].
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(12) Some friends decided to ask someone to join them: Let’s jio her 
for dinner.
Although it is tempting to think that jio means ‘invite’ and bojio ‘didn’t 
invite’, one should not make that association. The English counterparts 
can sound polite and formal. After all, an invitation could come with 
a card, as in a wedding invitation. As the online Oxforddictionaries.com 
phrases it, in English, to invite is to make ‘a polite, formal, or friendly 
request to (someone) to go somewhere or to do something’.8 By contrast, 
the Singlish jio cannot be considered polite or formal, nor can it be 
considered a request.
Let us now try to state the meaning of the exclamation bojio from the 
inside. In simple English, when someone exclaims bojio, they are in a way 
complaining that the addressee did not tell them about an event and tell 
them to join in. Similar to swear words (Goddard 2015), its meaning thus 
embodies a cognitive trigger and a reaction. The cognitive trigger is that 
the speaker now knows that the addressee has planned to do something 
without including them. It is something that the speaker would have liked 
to do with the addressee. As a result, the speaker thinks that they have 
missed out on something, which is indicative of a kiasu attitude, and feels 
bad, rendering the interjection an emotive one. The speaker wants the 
addressee to know how they feel (the reaction) and consequently feel bad 
(if the interjection is taken literally). I propose that the meaning may be 
stated in NSM in this way:
[B] Bojio!
a . I now know you wanted to do something at some time before now .
b . You didn’t say to me at that time:
‘I will do this something, I want you to do it with me .’
c . You knew that if you said it to me at that time,
I would say to you something like ‘I will do it with you’,
I would feel something good because of this .
d . Because you didn’t say it to me, I now think like this:
‘Something good happened to other people, it didn’t happen 
to me .’
8  Available at: en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/invite.
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e . Because of this, I feel something bad,
like people can feel something bad when they think like this .
g . I want you to know it .
h . I want you to feel something bad because of this .
It thus follows that the meaning of the verb jio could be stated in this way, 
which suggests inclusivity:
[C] He jio9 her
a . He said something like this to her:
‘I will do something . I want you to do it with me .’
b . When he said it to her, he thought like this: ‘She will want to do it 
with me .’
c . He wanted her to feel something good because of this .
d . He knew at that time that if he didn’t say it to her,
she could think like this if she knew about what he did afterwards:
‘Something good happened to other people, it didn’t happen 
to me .’
e . She would feel something bad because of this .
f . He didn’t want her to think like this .
g . He didn’t want her to feel something bad because of this .
The examples also suggest that one would only exclaim bojio to someone 
whom one is familiar with; there is a degree of familiarity between the 
speaker and the addressee. At this point, one may be reminded of the idea 
of a shúrén (roughly, ‘insider’) in Chinese culture. However, the Chinese 
word shúrén, the meaning of which is described by Ye (2017: 76), is not 
used in Singlish and the word would thus not be part of any Singlish 
cultural script. However, some components of the meaning proposed by 
Ye may seem relevant for the purposes of formulating a script to reflect the 
attitude of a Singlish speaker who says bojio to someone:
9  Singlish verbs are not always inflected for tense.
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[D] Cultural script: Who one can say bojio to
a . I think about this someone (i .e . the addressee) like this:
‘I said some things to this someone many times before .
This someone said some things to me many times before .
Because of this, this someone is like someone I have known 
for some time .’
b . Because I think about this someone like this, I can say things to this 
someone
like I say things to people I know well .
c . I can say ‘bojio’ to this someone .
From an Anglo perspective, the presence of an exclamation like bojio 
might appear odd because such an exclamation does not respect what the 
addressee wants, and thus a semantically similar exclamation is not found 
in Anglo English. Studies have shown that Anglo culture values personal 
autonomy and Anglo people have a deep-rooted respect for what one wants 
(Wierzbicka 1991). Also, according to an Anglo-British informant, asking 
someone why one is not invited is ‘demeaning’ because it is like ‘begging 
to be asked’. Similarly, the speech act associated with jio is uncommonly 
used in Anglo English because it embodies an imperative, and we know 
that Anglo culture restricts the use of the imperative (Wierzbicka 1991).
By contrast, it seems easy to see why the exclamation is commonly used 
in Singapore culture, a culture that does not seem to place much emphasis 
on personal autonomy and space, as my own studies show (Wong 2014). 
What Wierzbicka noted some years ago is still descriptive of Singapore 
culture today:
When one watches, for example, the interaction of Singaporeans 
in the squeeze and the bustle of a hawker centre (with people’s 
elbows touching, and loud conversations criss-crossing the 
dense network of tables and food stalls), one can well imagine 
the functionality of interactive Singaporean particles (as well as 
expressive interjections); and the contemporary Anglo notions 
of ‘privacy’, ‘personal space’, ‘autonomy’, and ‘non-imposing on 
other people’ seem scarcely germane. (Wierzbicka 2003: 346)
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However, this does not fully explain the emergence and popularity of 
bojio. As discussed, the kiasu attitude is also responsible but, again, it does 
not fully explain why either. After all, older Singaporeans (perhaps forties 
and above) tend not to use the exclamation even if many of them may be 
considered group-oriented and kiasu; if they do, it is probably because 
they picked up the word from the youngsters. Presumably, there is an 
additional reason which has to do with face or more specifically, mianzi, 
an important value in Chinese culture (Ming and Zhang 2011; Zhou and 
Zhang 2017). Mianzi has to do with one’s ‘public self-image’ (Zhou and 
Zhang 2017: 165), and accosting a friend for not asking oneself to an 
event, even in jest, risks embarrassing that friend, causing them to lose face 
or mianzi. This is not what many older Singaporeans are prepared to do. 
The speaker might also embarrass themselves; the speaker might be seen as 
trying to inflate their own social importance, and older Singaporeans tend 
to be careful not to display any sense of self-importance.
3 . Changing Singapore values
This leaves us with the question of why younger Singaporeans in their 
teenage years and early 20s uninhibitedly use the exclamation bojio to 
accost their friends, teasingly or otherwise. I propose here that bojio 
reflects a cultural change happening, in that some values that parents in 
their 40s and 50s uphold are giving way to competing values. I argue 
here that mianzi has diminished in value in the face of rising kiasuness 
among Singaporeans in general and younger Singaporeans in particular. 
As Pierson (2019) noted:
It’s a survival instinct born out of Singapore’s dominant Chinese 
culture and deep-rooted insecurity as a blip on the map, one that’s 
only slightly bigger than the San Fernando Valley.
Letting opportunity pass is tantamount to failure, the thinking 
goes. And if you do, you have no one to blame but yourself.
It would appear that many Singaporeans, Chinese or otherwise, have 
an incessant worry about missing opportunities. This probably comes 
from how Singaporeans perceive Singapore as a fiercely competitive 
society, and increasingly so, where every opportunity is to be taken 
advantage of. This kiasu attitude or emotion can be quite overbearing and 
contagious. As a white American undergraduate studying in NUS noted 
in a newspaper article:
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Most of my classmates are very concerned with academic 
achievement, success and economic security.
Not long after arriving in Singapore, my own values began to shift.
I constantly heard people talking about elite education institutions 
and prestigious entry-level jobs, and for the first time in my life, 
I too decided that those were what I needed. (Linder 2019)
In NUS, where this study was undertaken, many students are unduly 
concerned about their ‘cumulative average point’ (CAP), which affects 
a  student’s chance of graduating with a good honours degree. Students 
may thus avoid reading modules in which they are not confident in 
securing a good grade, which may be considered a kiasu behaviour. In 
response, the university introduced a few years ago the ‘satisfactory/
unsatisfactory’ (S/U) option to replace the grades of a given number of 
modules.10 The S/U option, if used, means that the grade of the module 
does not contribute to the CAP. As stated in the NUS website:11
The S/U option is also intended to encourage students to pursue 
their intellectual interests, without undue concern that exploring 
a new subject area may adversely affect their CAP.
However, this S/U option has ironically become an advantage to be 
exploited by some students seeking to maximise their CAP. These students 
exercise the option for every grade that is below the A range (A-, A and 
A+), which in turn maximises their CAP. This means that the intended 
purpose of the S/U option may now be largely irrelevant to students. 
The kiasu attitude prevails and it may thus be said that some members of 
the younger generation (in NUS at least) carry the kiasu attitude to new 
heights. What was once an attitude has now become a way of life that 
expresses itself in relation not just to things that matter (e.g. one’s CAP) 
but the less relevant things as well (e.g. an outing with friends).
Over the years, words have emerged or gained salience (in terms of 
frequency of use) to reflect what I might call the augmentation of the 
kiasu value across generations. Such words include bojio, chope (very 
roughly, ‘putting one’s mark on something to reserve it for later use’) 
and the NUS cultural keyword S/U. In this respect, it might even be 
10  Available at: www.nus.edu.sg/registrar/academic-activities/satisfactory-unsatisfactory-(s-u)-option.
11  Available at: www.nus.edu.sg/nusbulletin/yong-siew-toh-conservatory-of-music/undergraduate-
education/degree-requirements/satisfactory-unsatisfactory-option/.
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tempting to think that Grab, ‘Southeast Asia’s largest ride-hailing app 
operator’, a ‘Singapore-based company’ (Iwamoto 2018), which entered 
the Singapore market in 2014 (Lin and Dula 2016), owes its huge success 
in recent years in Singapore in part to its name. Although it has received 
little or no scholarly scrutiny, the word grab as used in Singlish could 
be considered a cultural keyword that reflects the value of kiasu. The 
word grab and the value it symbolises are things many Singaporeans can 
identify with; Singlish-speaking Singaporeans are all too familiar with 
the phrase ‘everything also must grab’, which is not uncommonly used 
as a tagline or punchline for commercial purposes. The title of a comic 
book published in Singapore, Mr Kiasu: Everything Also Must Grab (Lau 
and Lim 2018) sums it all up. Wierzbicka (2003) recognised the evolving 
nature of Singapore culture in 2003 and provided us with a methodology 
to examine this linguistic evolution.
This present study on the evolving nature of Singlish has allowed me, 
a native Singaporean, to reach a deeper understanding of my own culture. 
It has helped me appreciate some of the values and behaviours associated 
with the younger generation in Singapore, such as my university students. 
This in turn helps me, an educator, to appreciate their challenges, 
sympathise with them and connect with them.
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Australian English can act as a mirror of conceptualisations of and 
attitudes towards extreme weather and climate events in the country, 
such as bushfires, drought, cyclones and floods.1 This variety of English 
encodes specific local meanings; for example, in the domain of landscape, 
words like creek and bush have particular senses in Australian English 
(Arthur 2003; Bromhead 2018). Bushfire is an Australian word for an 
uncontrolled fire in dry trees and shrubs, an event that can threaten 
homes and people, as well as vegetation and wildlife. The word could 
be seen as analogous to wildfire as used in North American English for 
forest fires.2 However, this would be to misunderstand the semantic 
content brought by the component bush. This chapter provides a rigorous 
1  Many thanks to Zhengdao Ye, James Grieve and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments 
on this chapter. I am grateful to Anna Wierzbicka and Jock Wong for workshopping of the semantic 
explication of bushfire. Participants at the Workshop on NSM Semantics and Mimimal English, 
The Australian National University, 15–16 April 2019, provided useful feedback.
2  Wildfire is not nearly as common in Australian English as bushfire. While there are 249 occurrences 
of the lemma bushfire, bush fire and bush fires in the Australian material of the Collins Wordbanks 
corpus, there are 35 of the lemma wildfire, wild fire and wild fires. Of these only 15 refer to events in 
Australia.
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semantic analysis of bushfire, discusses the term’s status as a cultural 
keyword in Australian English and offers a cultural script of Australian 
practices surrounding bushfires.
Employing the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach to 
semantic and conceptual analysis (Wierzbicka 1985, 1996; Goddard and 
Wierzbicka 2014; Ye 2017), the cultural scripts approach to the analysis 
of cultural practices and values (Wierzbicka 2003; Goddard 2006) and 
drawing on literature on cultural keywords (Wierzbicka 1997; Levisen 
and  Waters 2017a), the study is assisted by corpus-based collocational 
analysis. Discussion draws on environmental communication, 
environmental history, community bushfire information, news reports 
and survivor accounts, which are referred to in the chapter. The chapter 
provides a starting point for showing how semantic analysis and 
cultural scripts can help to capture the varying, conflicting and evolving 
assumptions about climate and extreme weather, influenced by factors 
such as climate change and increased understanding of Indigenous 
knowledge in Australia.
The chapter begins with an overview of extreme weather and climate event 
vocabulary as a domain, and the possible status of bushfire as a cultural 
keyword in Australian English. It then moves to provide an analysis of 
bushfire, discussing the examples used and meaning components, then 
providing a semantic explication and a bushfire-related cultural script. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects for semantic analysis 
of extreme weather and climate event words, including bushfire, and the 
writing of cultural scripts pertaining to these events.
2 . The semantic domain and 
cultural keywords
Extreme weather and climate events have played a role in the shaping 
of settler Australian history and national identity since Australia 
was colonised by Britain (e.g. West 2000; Sherratt et al. 2005). Non-
Indigenous Australians have had to deal with a climate prone to events 
such as droughts, floods and bushfires, different from that in lands from 
which they, or their ancestors, came, and try to come to terms with 
what Indigenous people already knew about the Australian environment 
(e.g. Gammage 2011; Barton and Bennett 2013; Pascoe 2014). Battling 
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nature’s elements and helping affected communities are seen as central 
to an Australian cultural ethos, which is both valorised and contested. 
The climate emergency increases the likelihood of extreme weather events 
in Australia, such as heatwaves and, the focus of the chapter, bushfires 
(CSIRO-BOM 2018). Australian English discourse in mainstream and 
social media often draws a connection between these kinds of events and 
the need for political action to address climate change (e.g. Hackett et al. 
2017; Flanagan 2019).
Extreme weather and climate events in Australia have been studied from 
the point of view of disciplines including meteorology, history, sociology, 
public health, community safety and environmental communication (e.g. 
Webb 1997; Morrissey and Reser 2007; Handmer and Haynes 2008; 
Leitch and Bohensky 2014), yet consideration of the semantics of terms 
like bushfire and cyclone, and their possible status as Australian cultural 
keywords, remains unexplored. Australians have a number of options as to 
what to call a period without rain, such as drought, dry season and El Niño 
event.3 When they either select a term to use, or encounter the word in 
discourse, different ideas about the Australian climate are revealed. Drought 
evokes a natural disaster, dry season an expected happening, and El Niño 
event a circumstance that comes about due to global factors. Pinning down 
the precise senses of words of these kinds and their associated cultural 
scripts sheds light on conceptualisations of the Australian environment. 
This chapter uses the case of the word bushfire as a way to begin exploring 
the semantic domain.
A brief word on the cultural and geographic context of bushfires in 
Australia is in order. Bushfires are more likely during the hotter, drier 
months of summer in many regions of Australia, and spread more 
easily in winds. They burn in ‘bush’, a mass noun denoting vegetation, 
dominated by eucalypts, as an undifferentiated mass (Bromhead 2011, 
2018). Fire is a natural part of some Australian ecosystems; a majority 
of Australia’s plant species either need or tolerate fire (Gammage 2011). 
Aboriginal people used fire as a tool, in part, to manage vegetation growth 
and prevent severe uncontrolled fires, practices that continue in some 
places today (AWNRMB-DEWNR 2014). Somewhat similar burning 
regimes have been adopted by Australian government bodies as part of 
3  Swings in rainfall in Australia are associated with an atmospheric event involving the Southern 
Oscillation, part of a global system of ocean–atmosphere interaction. Also involved are temperature 
variations in the eastern Pacific Ocean known as El Niño (Whetton 1997: 189).
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bushfire prevention (Pyne 2006). Although fire may be a natural part of 
the Australian environment, uncontrolled fires in bush constitute natural 
hazards that threaten vegetation, wildlife, homes and people’s lives, and 
are therefore culturally significant and have affordances in discourse 
(see Enfield 2008).
Bushfire could be considered an Australian cultural keyword. Drawing 
on Anna Wierzbicka’s pioneering Understanding Cultures through their 
Key Words (1997), Levisen and Waters (2017b) write that cultural 
keywords ‘govern the shared cognitive outlook of speakers and encode 
certain culture-specific logics, and impose on their speakers a certain 
interpretative grid through which they make sense of the world’ (2017b: 3). 
In Bromhead (2011, 2018), I presented the bush as a cultural keyword in 
Australian English and touched on its productivity in the formation of 
compounds, one of which is bushfire. This word, also, has an amount 
of associated phraseology too vast to detail in any depth (see also Arthur 
2003: 147–50). Bushfire-related vocabulary can range from scientific 
concepts, such as fuel load, to community safety terms, such as bushfire 
survival plan, to Aboriginal land management practices, as in caring for 
country with fire, to informal language, such as firies for firefighters, or 
even vollie firies for volunteer firefighters (see Wierzbicka 1986, 1992 
on colloquial ‘depreciatives’).
The meaning of bushfire brings with it the meaning of the Australian word 
for an undifferentiated mass of dry vegetation, bush (Bromhead 2011, 
2018). A crucial point of that meaning is ‘dry’—Australians expect that 
bush is likely to burn. This local Australian English meaning of the word 
bushfire can help explain why people feel especially confronted by fires 
burning in rainforest, which is not the canonical Australian bush.
The significance of bushfires to the psyche of Australians can be seen by 
the attribution of names for some major bushfires, such as Ash Wednesday 
(Victoria and South Australia, 1983). The fact that many Australians know 
the names of the American water-bombing aircraft used to fight bushfires 
in the Australian summer, such as Elvis, is indicative (Caruana 2012). 
Further, native animals that have survived bushfires become symbols of 
community resilience, such as Lucky the koala, found severely injured after 
the 2003 Canberra bushfires (Doherty 2008). Keyword status can also be 
seen in semiotic phenomena other than language (Levisen and Waters 
2017b: 7–8). The multicoloured, adjustable fire danger rating signs that 
appear along many Australian roads (Campbell 2017), and other bushfire 
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awareness signs, constitute examples of visual discourse about bushfires 
in place, experienced by many Australians as they drive (see Scollon and 
Scollon 2003 on discourses in place, also Jaworski and Thurlow 2010). 
In what follows, I explore the semantics of this cultural keyword and give 
a cultural script of Australian practices concerning bushfires.
3 . Bushfire examples used
My study of the bush (Bromhead 2011, 2018) was assisted by corpus 
analysis of the Australian English Oznews subcorpus of Collins Wordbanks 
of English,4 a relatively small corpus of Australian English, but one of 
the most suitable (see Ye, this volume). As part of this corpus assistance, 
a  word sketch, a summary of a word’s collocational behaviour sorted 
via grammatical relations and based on statistical significance, was used 
to find representative examples and indicative collocates. Such analysis 
is trickier for bushfire. The examples of bush in the corpus are far more 
numerous than those of bushfire and bush fire. In the Australian material 
of Wordbanks, 235 instances of the lemma bushfire appear (a frequency of 
6.44  per million words), and 14 of bush fire or bush fires (a frequency 
of 0.38 per million).
The word sketch of the lemma bushfire reveals collocational behaviour, 
yet some data may not be sufficiently robust. For example, the most 
statistically significant collocate of which bushfire is a subject is ravage; 
however, this is based on only one token in the corpus. By contrast, claim 
is the fourth most significant subject collocate, and this is based on a more 
robust five tokens. The chapter uses significant collocations as evidence 
of the semantics of bushfire (see Andrews 2016: 98 and n11 on the use of 
collocations in NSM analysis). One token with statistical significance can 
tell us something. All collocations taken from the word sketch based on 
token counts smaller than five have been checked in an ABC (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation) news search to ensure that they in fact do 
occur more widely.5 For example, a search of bushfire with the verb ravage 
yields many results, so this collocate is taken as indicative. On the other 
hand, afternoon is a significant collocate based on two tokens, but it is not 
attested on ABC news, so it is not mentioned. Unless otherwise indicated, 
4  Searched at: wordbanks.harpercollins.co.uk.
5  Searched at: www.abc.net.au/news.
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all examples used in the chapter are taken from Australian material in 
Wordbanks. The analysis of bushfire in this chapter can be seen as assisted 
by a corpus as opposed to corpus-driven (McEnery and Hardie 2011).
4 . Evidence from use
Bushfires are events situated in particular kinds of places. These must be 
places that span some distance, and in which a certain vegetation type 
grows, what can be described in Australian English as bush. Not all fires 
that take place in the natural environment can be classed as bushfires. There 
is also the category of a grass fire, often a less serious event, which takes 
place over a smaller area and has a different fuel source. An example of use 
of bushfire adduced by The Australian National Dictionary (AND) reads:
(1) ‘You ever seen a bush fire?’ ‘Not a real one  …  just grass fires in 
a paddock.’ (John Cleary, The Sundowners, 1952, in AND 2016)
While a particular type of vegetation is present, places in which 
bushfires occur are not necessary counted as being ‘the bush’. The bush 
is a polysemous term, and two of its senses particularly pertinent to this 
discussion I delineated in Bromhead (2011, 2018). One meaning of this 
bush is a kind of Australian folk biological zone. This meaning of the bush 
conveys not just that the vegetation type, ‘bush’, grows there, but also the 
presence of uniquely Australian wildlife, the nature of it as a place where 
not many people live and the fact that one may not see many people there. 
Another relevant meaning is the bush is zone where people can live—these 
places are outside major cities and near ‘the bush’ as a biological zone. 
A  Queensland state government extreme weather events safety website 
‘Get Ready Queensland’ writes the following about bushfires in (2):
(2) You don’t have to live in the bush to be threatened by bushfire—
you just have to be close enough to be affected by burning material, 
embers and smoke. (Get Ready Queensland n.d.)
For example, the western suburbs of Canberra affected by a bushfire in 
2003 could not be described as being part of the bush, either as the bush 
as a biological zone (the first the bush sense mentioned above), or the 
bush as a place in Australia opposed to the city (the second the bush sense 
mentioned above).
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Bushfires occur at hot, dry times of year. Bushfire collocates with season, 
the most numerous of all the significant collocates of which bushfire is 
a modifier, as in (3).
(3) The Queensland bushfire season lasts from August to December …
A bushfire is unwanted. Burning undertaken by people as a way of 
reducing fire fuel can be described as burning off, controlled burns and 
prescribed burns, which are part of the associated phraseology (see (4)). 
Yet no matter how big these fires, they could not be called bushfires, unless 
they were to move beyond the control of those undertaking them.
(4) What would you do to prevent fires like the one that devastated 
Canberra? You need deliberate prescribed burns …
In the main, bushfires are caused by lightning strikes or, unfortunately, 
deliberately lit (Muller and Bryant 2008). Arson and arsonist appear as 
significant collocates modified by bushfire in a word sketch (as in (5)), 
and light also appears as a significant verb collocate in examples that refer 
to arson.
(5) …  as a Government we have doubled the penalties for bushfire 
arson …
Many collocates of bushfire pertain to the nature of fire, such as flare 
(see  (6)), rage, burning and smoke. The movement of bushfires can be 
described by saying that bushfires rip and sweep across areas (see (7)), and 
a bushfire can have a path.
(6) Hundreds of people … were evacuated after the bushfire flared at 
lunchtime.
(7) More than 400ha have been burnt, with the bushfire sweeping 
from the residential hills fringe suburb  …  to the Cleland 
Conservation Park …
Bushfires are significant because of the destruction they wreak on bushland, 
animals, people’s houses and the person. Numerous collocates reflect 
this destructive nature, such as the verbs claim and ravage (see (8)), the 
adjectives deadly, devastating and bad (see (9)), and the nouns emergency, 
horror, catastrophe, hazard, danger, disaster, casualty, destruction and victim 
as in (10).
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(8) When bushfire has ravaged a farm …
(9) South Australia’s worst bushfire in 22 years was simply impossible 
to control.
(10) Governor Marjorie Jackson-Nelson was on the Eyre Peninsula …, 
visiting bushfire victims.
Looking at a selection of Australian television news reports of bushfires 
in videos uploaded to YouTube, one sees that the effects of bushfires are 
measured by their impact on people, houses and land, as in (11).
(11) Thirty-six homes have been destroyed and over 30,000 hectares of 
national park have gone up in smoke as massive fires roar through 
the territory. News just at hand of unconfirmed reports of at least 
one fatality and several burns victims being flown to the Canberra 
hospital. (‘Canberra firestorm news coverage’ 2019: 2:03–2:12)
However, a bushfire need not necessarily destroy homes and threaten 
people’s lives. Example (12) gives a definition of a bushfire from Australia 
law.
(12) The Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 … defines a bushfire 
as ‘a fire that burns, or threatens to burn, out of control causing 
damage to vegetation (whether or not other property is also damaged 
or threatened)’.
A bushfire leaves a characteristic burnt, black landscape in its wake. 
The  documentary Rising From The Ashes, in part, depicts the devastated 
Victorian landscape after the Black Saturday bushfires of 2009. In  (13), 
a bushfire survivor tells of the visual experience after the fire on his property.
(13) Immediately after the fire, you couldn’t see any green at all. All of 
that was just black. (Rising From The Ashes (2018): 2:37–2:43)
The evidence from collocations and examples discussed in this section can 
be used to capture the meaning of bushfire in a semantic explication.
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5 . A semantic explication of bushfire
As is the case for all NSM conceptual analysis, this study employs a human-
centred perspective (see especially Wierzbicka 1989; for reflection, see 
Newman, this volume, Allan, this volume). Like geographic concepts, 
such as mountain and the bush (Bromhead 2018), there are human 
interests in extreme weather and climate events, such as bushfire. Sherratt 
(2005: 2) cites the American historian of weather, David Laskin (1996: 
3–4), writing ‘weather “doesn’t just happen … it happens to us”’. These 
human interests make their way into analysis of bushfire not only via the 
effect of bushfires on people and the places where they live, but also by 
way of concepts such as ‘bush’ and ‘fire’, which contain human elements 
in their semantics. The following explication [A] presents the sense of 
bushfire. Its components are structured as follows: places, what happens, 
very bad things can happen and what a place is like after it happens.
[A] semantic explication of bushfire 
(Australian English)
[plaCes]
a . something bad can happen in places of some kinds
places of these kinds are very big, they have many parts
there is a lot of bush1 [m] in these places
at some times, there can be very little water [m] in some parts 
of these places
[whaT happens]
b . when it happens in a place, it is like this:
there is a big fire [m] in this place not because people want it
something bad is happening to the bush [m] in this place for 
some time because of this
it is burning [m], it happens like this:
fire [m] moves quickly [m] in this place because the wind [m] 
is moving quickly [m] in this place
if it is in one part of this place at one moment, a short time 
after this it can be in another part
there is a lot of smoke [m] in this place
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[very bad Things Can happen]
c . when something like this happens in a place, it can be like this:
very bad things can happen to many parts of this place
very bad things can happen to the bush [m] in this place
very bad things can happen to the creatures [m] in this place, 
they can die
very bad things can happen to people in this place, they can die
very bad things can happen to the places where people live in 
this place
[whaT a plaCe is like afTer iT happens]
d . after something like this happens in a place, this place is not like it was 
before
when someone sees this place, they can think like this:
‘something bad happened to the bush [m] in this place
as happens to wood [m] if fire [m] touches it for some time.’
Section (a) of the explication of bushfire presents the places in which 
a  bushfire happens. They are very big, composed of many parts, and 
there is a lot of bush in these places. The semantic molecule ‘bush’, as in 
bush as a vegetation type, not as a kind of place (the bush), appears. This 
molecule brings with it the sense of dry vegetation as a mass, indigenous 
to Australia and in its natural state (see Bromhead 2011, 2018, for 
a semantic explication). The fact that bushfire occurs in places where at 
times there is little water in a place is also conveyed.
Section (b) depicts what happens—a bushfire is an event. The molecule 
‘fire’, naturally, is used (see Wierzbicka 1996: 223; Goddard 2010: 
141–42). This fire is big and unwanted by people. Bushfires caused by 
arson were mentioned previously. The component ‘not because people 
want it’ still holds in such cases; an arsonist, ‘someone’, may desire the 
fire, but ‘people’ in general do not. The destruction of bush is portrayed. 
The movement of the fire as a result of wind, and the presence of smoke, 
is also treated.
Components in section (c) address the very bad things that happen as 
a result of bushfire. Damage to parts of places, to the vegetation (the bush), 
to creatures (even to death), to people (even to death) and to places where 
people live are covered.
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Section (d) portrays the characteristic burnt landscape following a bushfire. 
This is represented through human vision and the thought that fire has 
occurred.
6. Human responses to bushfire in 
Australian English: A cultural script
The response of humans to bushfires is a significant part of the discourse 
around the word. Extensive efforts go to fighting bushfires and, as 
previously touched on, these efforts are seen as shaping the nation’s 
psyche. Significant verb collocates of bushfire are fight and battle (see (14)). 
Professional fire brigades are supplemented by a large number of volunteer 
firefighters. The word sketch attests the significant collocations volunteer 
bushfire fighters (see (15)) and bushfire brigade.
(14) Fire crews are still battling a bushfire at Bicheno …
(15) … volunteer bushfire fighters, a national resource too easily taken 
for granted …
Furthermore, battling bushfires is too large a matter to be solely dealt 
with by dedicated fire brigades, who often focus on attacking the fires in 
a systematic way and protecting government assets, leaving the defence of 
individual houses to their occupants. Householders are urged to prepare 
for bushfires by drafting a bushfire survival plan, and by reducing hazards, 
such as by clearing gutters of leaves (see e.g. ‘Get Ready Queensland’ 
website). At a government level, the aforementioned prescribed burns are 
carried out in preparation for bushfire season.
Australians pride themselves on helping one another after a disaster, as 
seen in folk belief and in political discourse following disastrous extreme 
weather events, and this ties in with a national ethos of solidarity (e.g. West 
2000; Rudd 2009; Rowan 2017: 76–77, n12). The idea that Australians 
have a particular distinction in providing community assistance after 
disaster has been disputed; it has also been pointed out that this assistance 
can be subject to racial and class inequities (e.g. Fisher 2011). This 
community assistance is reflected in the corpus, in which bushfire appeal 
is a significant collocation, as in (16).
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(16) Real estate agents … will have a monster auction … to raise money 
for the bushfire appeal.
Bushfires are events from which people often try to get away. A significant 
collocate of bushfire is flee (see (17)). In Australia, there has been a policy, 
often called ‘stay or go’, whereby those whose houses are threatened by 
bushfire are advised to either stay and defend their property, or leave early, 
before it becomes too dangerous to do so (Griffiths 2012). Fleeing is not 
a safe thing to do; people are advised to leave in an orderly manner in 
accordance with their bushfire survival plan.
(17) … killed as they tried to flee the bushfire were Judy Griffith and her 
grandchildren …
Some human responses to bushfires can be captured in a cultural 
script, a simply phrased script composed in NSM conveying a culture’s 
practices and values, as following in [B].
[B] a cultural script of Australians’ response 
to bushfires
a . in Australia, many people think like this:
b . people don’t want a bushfire to happen in a place
because of this, it is good if some people do some things because 
of this
c . they do some things in this place when a bushfire is not happening 
because they don’t want it to happen
d . when a bushfire happens, they do some other things because they 
don’t want fire to be in this place
they know that they can die when they do these things
they don’t want to not do it because of this
e . some people don’t want to be in a place where there is a bushfire 
when it is happening
they want to be in other places, not near places where there is fire, 
they do some things because of this
when it is like this, it is good if they do these things before the fire 
is very near the place where they are
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f . after the bushfire happens, some people can do some other things
because they want to do something good for the people living 
in this place
this is good
Component (a) contains the header, similar to those in most cultural 
scripts. The script is particular to Australia and is widely shared, but not 
necessarily by all people in the country, so the wording ‘many people’ is 
used. Component (b) portrays the desire for a bushfire not to happen in 
a place, and the cultural evaluation that it is good if some people respond 
to combat it. These responses follow in components (c) and (d).
In component (c), some people are portrayed as taking steps to prevent 
bushfire. Component (d) addresses people doing things to combat the fire 
while it is happening. These actions are with risk (they know they can die 
when they do these things); however, they still want to do them.
Component (e) depicts people’s leaving of areas in which there is a bushfire. 
It is good if they do this early, before the fire is very near. Component (f ) 
conveys the idea of people doing good things for people affected by fire 
after it has taken place. This action by people is evaluated as good.
7 . Concluding remarks and prospects 
for further research
The chapter has shown that the semantics of bushfire in Australian English 
encode certain environmental attitudes. The event is conceptualised as 
bad and destructive to land, creatures, people and the places in which 
people live. There is same recognition in the sense of bushfire that the 
vegetation can be expected to burn—semantic content contained 
within the component ‘bush’. In 2003, Arthur outlined how wildfire 
may replace bushfire for problematic fires in Australian English due to 
a greater understanding of the necessity of fire for Australian vegetation. 
This may have happened in a scientific register, but has not come to 
pass in wider Australian English, as bushfire is still used for problematic 
fires in the 2010s. The cultural script portraying Australians’ responses 
to bushfire details how Australians value people acting to prevent and 
combat bushfires, leaving their residences early and helping the affected 
after the event.
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The cultural script given above is a very general one encompassing 
a variety of Australians’ responses to bushfires. Prospects for continuing 
research into bushfire and other extreme weather and climate event words 
include identifying more specific cultural scripts associated with the 
event. For example, as covered in this script, Australians place value on 
helping others after natural disasters. A cultural script could be written 
that details all the surrounding beliefs around this practice. The values 
elucidated by such a script would be related to the Australian emphasis 
on mateship and associated ideals, such as the injunction: ‘don’t abandon 
a mate’ (see  Wierzbicka 1997: 101–18, 2002: 1171–72). Australian 
mateship is the relationship of someone with people thought of as ‘like 
me’. This could help to explain why a critic like Fisher (2011), mentioned 
previously, sees the practice as excluding racial minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged.
Australians banding together to fight bushfires and other natural forces 
has often been connected to the nation uniting to fight a common 
enemy at war. The official Australian historian of the First World War, 
C.E.W. Bean, argued that the experience of battling natural forces shaped 
Australians as soldiers (Sherratt 2005: 3–4). A recruitment poster from 
1917 depicts a  farmer walking away from a scene in which other men 
are trying to fight back a fire. The poster asks: ‘Would you stand by while 
a bushfire raged?’ and urges ‘Get busy and drive the Germans back!’ 
(Weston 1917). This fighting is conceived of as gendered; men have 
traditionally been responsible for the fighting of both opposing countries 
and nature. A  specific cultural script could be formulated based on 
notions of many men doing things together in a place because they want 
something bad not to happen. They know that they could die when they 
are doing these things, but, despite this, they don’t want to not do them. 
People can think of these men as part of one thing, and they think it is 
very good if men do these things. In drafting such a script, I would seek 
not to devalue the contribution women have made to this activity, but 
capture the still prevailing notion of fighting bushfires as ‘men’s business’ 
(Eriksen et al. 2010).
Some of the beliefs Australians hold about climate and weather may be 
culturally ingrained but not necessarily serve them well. Explicitly stating 
the beliefs and values around extreme weather and the Australian climate 
allows us to examine them for what they are and, possibly, re-evaluate 
them. For example, the use of military discourse around individuals 
battling bushfires has been criticised for contributing to loss of life 
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during the 2009 Black Saturday Victorian bushfires. Some people, who 
may otherwise have left for safety, were led to believe they could stay 
and defend their houses against what turned out to be unprecedentedly 
severe bushfires (Griffiths 2012: 163–64). Griffiths writes, ‘military 
metaphors make us believe that we can and must beat fire, somehow. Yet 
our challenging task as Australians is to learn to live with it’ (Griffiths 
2012: 164). Griffiths sees such metaphors as a comfort to people because 
they imply that measures can be taken to stem a powerful natural force.
Metaphors concerned with violence in cancer discourse (such as, ‘fought 
a long battle with leukemia’), too, have been criticised for misleading 
patients. Yet, they have been found to help sufferers deal with negative 
emotions, and they are seen as psychologically useful for those with whom 
they resonate (Semino et al. 2017). Military metaphors may have their 
drawbacks but may be helpful if used judiciously, as in discourse such as 
the title of a newspaper article: ‘Science fights bushfires on a number of 
fronts’ (Spinks 2014). The article, in part, details how mitigating climate 
change can reduce the likelihood of bushfire-prone weather.
Further research prospects include examining the idea that some 
Australian extreme weather event words can be thought of as local cultural 
keywords rather than Australian cultural keywords. Communities hold 
high levels of local knowledge about their immediate environments 
(Foxwell-Norton 2017). Bushfire is built on the Australian English bush, 
so it may be easier to accept as an Australian cultural keyword than, for 
example, flood, common to all varieties of English. The word bushfire has 
a higher degree of salience in the discourse of Victorians than in that of 
Northern Queenslanders in which cyclone is a more relevant term. The 
matter requires more investigation and analysis of the senses other words 
of this kind.
Another fruitful area to explore is the discourse about the relationship 
between climate change and bushfires. This relationship is becoming 
more of a part of the Australian consciousness. Yet there is also a discourse 
opposing this view (Hackett et al. 2017). An entire separate cultural script 
could be written covering the cultural beliefs behind these conflicting 
positions.
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The linguistics of extreme weather and climate remains open to exploration. 
This chapter has shown that detailed semantic analysis of one extreme 
weather event word bushfire can reveal the cultural and environmental 
attitudes of Australians.
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According to the report entitled Trends in International Migrant Stock: 
The  2019 Revision (UNDESA 2019), Australia has one of the highest 
rates of foreign-born people as a percentage of its total population, far 
exceeding other English-speaking countries such as Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Indeed, according to the 2016 Census 
data released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2016), 29 per cent 
of the estimated residents population in Australia were born overseas.
The ABS refers to overseas-born persons generally as ‘migrants’. As an 
example, in its media release of 27 July 2018 entitled ‘Australia’s dynamic 
population’, it reports that ‘in 2016–17, 377,000 people moved interstate, 
276,000 moved overseas, and 539,000 people arrived as migrants’; 
of the latter, ‘315,000 arrived on a temporary visa, including just over 
150,000 international students, just over 50,000 working holidaymakers, 
and 32,000 workers on temporary skill visas’. It further elaborates that 
1  I dedicate this chapter to Anna Wierzbicka, an exemplary migrant. Extraordinary scholarly 
achievements aside, Anna has built a new life in a new country. Together with her husband John, 
she raised two multilingual daughters; and she is the doting babcia of Liz (Clem), Nick, Catherine, 
Therese, Benedict and John (for the meaning of the Polish term babcia, see Wierzbicka 1992: 282; cf. 
Wierzbicka 2017: 45–49).
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‘106,000 migrants arrived on permanent visas including 45,800 on 
skill visas, 29,800 on family visas and 23,900 on humanitarian visas’ 
(ABS 2018).
For speakers of Australian English, however, perhaps only those who 
‘arrived on permanent visas’ would be referred to as migrants;2 international 
students, backpackers and working holidaymakers would hardly be 
assigned such a label. Equally, it is hard to imagine that these people 
would refer to themselves as migrants. Nor is it conceivable that, when 
referring to themselves, migrants would prefer the description ‘those who 
arrived on permanent visas’ to the label migrants. So what does the word 
migrant mean in everyday Australian English? How is it used?
This chapter attempts to provide some answers to these questions. Its chief 
objective is to conduct a detailed semantic analysis of the word migrant as 
used in Australian English and in non-institutional contexts, and to offer 
a semantic explication in Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM). I first 
discuss the importance of studying nouns that denote social categories, 
drawing on Anna Wierzbicka’s seminal work on nouns and conceptual 
analysis (e.g. Wierzbicka 1985, 1986). I then explain the corpus I use 
for the semantic analysis conducted in this study, and the limitation of 
the data set. The main part of the chapter is an in-depth, corpus-assisted 
meaning analysis, which entails examining patterns of usage and using 
NSM as a tool for meaning description. In this process, I also compare 
and contrast the meaning and usage of migrant with those of immigrant. 
This is followed by a brief discussion of the use of migrant in government 
and international contexts.3
2 . Nouns for people
To categorise people is a human penchant. Salient categories of people are 
more often than not assigned labels, such as migrant, digger and battler in 
Australian English. Therefore, studying the meanings of the nouns that 
people use to label themselves and others can help pinpoint the priorities 
2  Australian English refers to the Standard Australian English, a regional variety of English. It is 
a common language of Australia, largely taking its present form since the Second World War and 
codified in publications such as The Cambridge Australian English Style Guide (Peters 1995; see also 
Delbridge 1999).
3  Due to limitations of space, the chapter will not compare the meaning and usage of migrant in 
Australian English and those in American and British English; for such a study, see Ye (2018).
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underlying social categorisation and social groupings within a speech 
community, and reveal the kind of generalisations that people make about 
themselves and others in general.
The importance of studying nouns for people is intrinsically related to 
the role and function of nouns as a universal word class. In her paper 
entitled ‘What’s in a noun? (Or: How do nouns differ in meaning from 
adjectives?)’, Anna Wierzbicka stresses the categorisation role of nouns as 
opposed to the description role of adjectives:
A description implies the presence of a number of characteristics, 
all on the same level of importance. Thus, one might describe 
a person as tall, thin, blond, freckled, and so on. But if one 
categorizes a person as a hunchback, a cripple, a leper, a virgin, or 
a teenager, one is not mentioning one characteristic among many; 
rather, one is putting that person into a certain category, seen at the 
moment as ‘unique’. One is putting a label on that person, as one 
might put a label on a jar of preserves. One might say that a noun 
is comparable to an identifying construction: ‘that’s the kind of 
person that this person is’. An adjective, on the other hand, is 
comparable to a simple predicate compatible with many other 
such predicates: ‘this person is X, Y, Z’. (Wierzbicka 1986: 358) 
Recognising the dual functions of nouns—referring and categorising—
Wierzbicka questions the feature approach to the meanings of nouns:
I submit that what most nouns (prototypical nouns) do is to 
identify a certain kind of person, a kind of thing, a kind of animal. 
These kinds are identified in language in positive terms, not in 
terms of their mutual differences. For examples, the words man, 
woman and child identify certain kinds of people, each of them with 
a certain positive image. I think that popular descriptions which 
suggest that the word man means HUMAN + MALE + ADULT or 
that child means – ADULT + HUMAN (cf. e.g. Bierwisch 1970), 
miss a crucial point about the semantics of human categorization, 
embodied in natural language. The meaning of a noun cannot 
be represented as a set of ‘features’, because the basic function of 
a  noun is to single out a certain KIND, a kind which may be 
partly described in terms of features but which cannot be reduced 
to a set of features. (Wierzbicka 1986: 360)
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What this means for semantic analysis is that NSM-based definitions 
should include how people think about the referent in question and not 
simply the referent itself.
Wierzbicka’s insistence on understanding the meanings of (prototypical) 
nouns based on the semantic prime of kind has influenced the NSM 
approach to the semantics of nouns (e.g. Ye 2017a); rather than 
identifying features, it attempts to elucidate and articulate what makes 
a category a certain kind.4 This chapter deals with the semantics of kinds 
of people; particularly, the kind of people who are referred to as migrants 
in Australian English.
3 . A word on the semantic primes 
and semantic molecules
The chapter employs the methods of reductive paraphrasing (that is, 
to say the same things but in simpler words) to explain the meaning of 
words concerned, and uses NSM as a descriptive language to represent 
paraphrased meaning. Research in NSM has shown that, despite their 
obvious referents, the semantic structure of nouns is complex, which 
often includes layers of embedded semantic molecules, in addition to the 
65 atomic-level semantic primes (e.g. Wierzbicka 1985, 1996; Ye 2017b; 
see Goddard 2018a for the list of semantic molecules). To explicate the 
meaning of migrant and related words, the semantic molecules ‘be born’ 
and ‘country’, which belong to the ‘biosocial’ domain and the domain 
of ‘place where one lives’, are necessary in order to paraphrase the more 
complex idea of ‘country of birth’. This idea can be paraphrased as ‘they 
were not born in this country/here; they were born in another country/
in another place’. The presence of the semantic prime ‘here’ and the 
combination of primes ‘in another place’ (‘another’ being a variant of 
‘other’) indicate that the terms containing a reference to changing places 
are in fact deictic in nature.
4  Obviously, kinship terms are not kind-based but specify relations between two persons. 
The relational nature of kinship terms means that they do not have to select the word class of nouns 
exclusively; they can, in fact, be verbs (see e.g. Evans 2000).
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4 . Corpus-based contrastive 
semantic analysis
4 .1 . The corpus
This study analyses the meaning of migrant as it is used in Australian 
English. For this purpose, I draw on examples from the Oznews 
subcorpus of Collins Wordbanks Online (hereafter Wordbanks).5 There 
are two advantages of using Wordbanks. One is that the inclusion of 
diverse varieties of English in this corpus—such as American English, 
British English, Canadian English, South African English—makes it 
possible to compare, within one site, the usage of concerned terms in 
Australian English and other varieties of English. The other is that the 
many existing functions of the database allow quantitative analysis of 
usage and collocational data.6 However, there are also serious limitations in 
relying on Oznews as the main source of data for semantic analysis. First, 
Oznews, being the only subcorpus representing Australian English usages 
in Wordbanks, comprises examples chiefly drawn from newspapers.7 
Notwithstanding that discourse about migrants often takes place in public, 
the reader should keep in mind that the data presented in this chapter 
are drawn from one genre only. The second limitation is the relatively 
small size of the Oznews corpus, which contains about 35 million tokens, 
accounting for 6.33 per cent of the total tokens in Wordbanks. The third 
limitation concerns the age of Wordbanks, which spans 1960 to 2005, the 
bulk of the corpus deriving from the period 2001–05. Given that many 
people change places due to social, political and economic events, be they 
local or global, the semantics of migrant, as discussed in this chapter and 
based on Oznews, is inevitably marked by the time period in which the 
term is used. Although the phrase ‘Australian English’ is used sparingly in 
the chapter, its referential range is largely limited, owing to the data set 
used in the study.8
5  Collins Wordbanks Online: wordbanks.harpercollins.co.uk.
6  For these two reasons, Wordbanks is preferred to the Australian National Corpus: www.ausnc.
org.au/.
7  This is different from the subcorpora of both American English and British English, which 
contain diverse genres, ranging from newspapers to spoken language.
8  The earliest example of migrant included in the Oznews subcorpus is from 1995, and the 
majority of the examples date from 2000–05. The age of Wordbanks, and the more recent examples of 
migrant in Oznews, also mean that this study is unable to comment on the usage of migrant between 
the late 1940s and early 1960s, a crucial period during which a large number of what are referred to 
today as migrants arrived and settled in Australia. 
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4 .2 . Frequency data
Table 7.1 shows the tokens of MIGRANT as a lemma, in contrast to those 
of IMMIGRANT across all varieties of English included in Wordbanks.9
A striking feature of the pair of words concerned here is that the frequency 
of MIGRANT is higher than that of IMMIGRANT, in reverse trend to all 
other varieties of English. This suggests that migrant is perhaps used more 
frequently than immigrant in Australian English. The frequency data 
are consistent with the observation offered by The Australian National 
Dictionary (AND 2016), which specifically includes the term migrant and 
says that it is ‘of special significance to the history of Australia’ and ‘now 
more usual than immigrant’ (AND 2016: 951; see also Peters 1995: 483).
What is also interesting is that roughly one-third of the 443 tokens of 
MIGRANT are used as a modifier of a following noun, such as workers, 
doctors, service and waves. In contrast, all the 379 tokens of IMMIGRANT 
are of nominal usage.10
The distinctiveness of migrant in Australian English is brought out further 
when compared with other varieties of English against the same genre 
of news, as reflected in Table 7.2.
4 .3 . Semantic analysis
The frequency data presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 point to the fact that, 
of the two terms, migrant and immigrant, the former could be seen as 
being more salient than the latter in Australian English.
In its nominal usage, the word migrant has two distinctive senses. 
Migrant1 has a country-specific meaning, ‘people who have migrated to 
Australia’, and migrant2 refers to interstate migrants. These two senses will 
be discussed in turn.
The country-specific characteristic of migrant1 is clearly reflected in the 
following examples:
9  In Table 7.1, the Part of Speech of the two lemmas is not specified.
10  In Oznews, the phrase ‘migrant workers’ typically refers to those based in countries other than 
Australia.
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(1) Jan Bassett’s collection draws the distinction between visitors who 
came to Australia and migrants who intended to stay.
(2) Like many new migrants, she felt lonely and isolated, unable to 
speak English and communicate with her new neighbours.
(3) Many of the thousands of migrants who came to this country after the 
Second World War thrived despite not being able to speak English …
(4) They are some of South Australia’s greatest imports—the migrants 
who brought their hopes, skills …
The collocational patterns of migrant in Oznews reveal many interesting 
points about the concept. They relate to its group-oriented nature, its 
references to countries of origin, age, language ability, the society’s 
attitudes and a high level of government planning.
In many cases, migrant1 is used in a plural sense and collocated with 
a collective noun, as shown in examples (5–6):
(5) a new generation of migrants from continental Europe
(6) waves of migrants
The majority of the corpus examples convey a group sense. The suggestion 
that migrant1 is normally evoked in a collective sense does not mean that it 
cannot refer to an individual. There are many such examples in Oznews, 
such as (7–8):
(7) The year was 1998 and the migrant who came to Australia for 
a better life had found it.
(8) Yet, a migrant from Beijing such as Guan Wei, who has settled in 
Sydney with his wife and small daughter, is a latecomer in the short 
history of European Australia.
The data in Oznews also show that migrants’ ethnicities are frequently 
mentioned. They include British, Danish, English, German, Greek, 
Italian, Lithuanian, Macedonian, Maltese and Slovenian. These descriptors 
simultaneously indicate migrants’ countries of origin. Expressions such as 
‘a Fijian-born migrant’ explicitly mention the place of birth.
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The range of countries alluded to in Oznews undoubtedly reflects the 
make-up of the migrant population and the history of migration in 
Australia.11 This is clearly shown when the frequency data of migrant1 
in Australian English are compared with that of migrant across all varieties 
of English. Wordbanks’ Word Sketch shows that, across all varieties of 
English, the most frequently used modifiers for migrant are actually 
Albanian, Haitian, Bangladeshi, Mexican, North Korean, Burmese and 
Cuban. None of these appear in the examples of migrant in the Oznews 
corpus, however.
Apart from country of origin, global modifiers such as African, Asian and 
European are also commonly collocated with migrant1, indicating the 
larger continents the migrants come from.
It is interesting to note that although expressions such as ‘the daughter 
of Slovenian migrants’ and ‘her father a German migrant’ exist in the 
corpus, there is no reference of migrants being children.12 This makes 
sense when we think of the typical motivations attributed to migrants, 
a point to be discussed later. However, we do find examples of migrant1 
where age is implied, such as ‘young migrants living in Australia’ (in this 
example, ‘young migrants’ refers to teenage) and ‘elderly Asian migrants’. 
When such descriptions are given, they often stress the vulnerability of 
being a migrant.
In general, the data show that migrants are portrayed positively, and 
seen as representing a disadvantaged social group because of their very 
limited language ability and of the fact that they are new to the country, 
as reflected in examples (2–3) and (9–10):
(9) Textile unions are concerned the tariff cuts between 2010 and 
2015 will force mainly older non-English speaking migrants out 
of work.
(10) Early migrants faced confusion, fears and frustrations settling into 
a foreign land.
11  For a succinct account of Australia’s migration history, see www.migrationheritage.nsw.gov.au/
belongings-home/about-belongings/australias-migration-history/index.html.
12  Another example of migrants, implying adults, comes from the same website mentioned in 
Footnote 11. In this article, entitled ‘Australia’s migration story’, the opening paragraph states that 
‘In New South Wales, four out of every 10 people are either migrants or the children of migrants’.
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Other indications that migrants are thought of as being socially 
disadvantaged include the frequent mention of the word migrants along 
with refugees, women and Aboriginal people in Oznews.13
The corpus data indicate that Australian society shows an overwhelmingly 
sympathetic attitude towards migrants, recognising the difficulties they 
face and providing various services to assist them. Some of the corpus 
examples are given in example (11) (see also example (3)):
(11) a. welcoming refugees and new migrants
b. Migrant Resource Centres/Migrants and Refugee Settlement 
Services assist new migrants
c. (the women’s and children’s hospital) to help migrants and 
refugee women
d. create a migrant friendly community
e. voluntary work teaching English to Vietnamese migrants and 
illiterate adults
The institution name Migrant Resource Centre is especially worth 
mentioning because it has become a fixed phrase in Australian English. 
The word ‘resource’ itself suggests that the society recognises that migrants 
need support.14
The verbs that go with migrant1, as shown in (11a–e), look markedly 
different from those that go with migrant in Word Sketch: when used as 
the object of a verb, the latter are most likely to collocate with repatriate, 
deport, intercept and detain. This difference in collocation affirms that 
migrant1 in Australian English has its distinctive usage, and that it has 
a positive connotation.
One also observes marked differences in the kind of modifiers the 
word migrant selects in Oznews and in Word Sketch, which confirm 
the dominantly positive sense of migrant1 in Australian English. 
Whereas Word Sketch reveals that the top three modifiers most likely 
to be combined with migrant are illegal (168 tokens/T-score 8.46), 
undocumented (15  tokens/T-score 8.24) and skilled (42 tokens/T-score 
8.09), in the Oznews subcorpus, the phrase illegal migrants only occurs 
13  And in government websites as well: see Footnote 17.
14  Peters (1995: 483) particularly mentions that ‘the word [migrant] is enshrined in institutions 
such as the Adult Migrant English Service (AMES)’.
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nine times (compared with the 134 instances of illegal immigrant/s in the 
same subcorpus); the phrase undocumented migrant simply does not exist; 
and the collocation skilled migrant occurs 39 times, accounting for almost 
all the examples contained in Wordbanks.
Upon a close examination of the nine occurrences of the phrase illegal 
migrant/s, it becomes clear that half of these refer to a foreign context. 
When referring to the Australian context, the situations described are 
actually positive, as is the case of example (12):
(12) Prime Minister John Howard and Immigration Minister Senator 
Amanda Vanstone are refusing to say sorry to the mentally ill 
woman, who was mistaken for an illegal migrant and forced to 
spend 10 months in detention.
Overall, the examples in Oznews show that the word migrant, when used 
in the Australian context, has a positive sense.
Words and expressions, such as ‘settle’ and ‘call Australia home’, 
also suggest  the societal expectations of migrants in Australia, where 
there is a high degree of government planning in matters relating to 
migrants, as reflected in the frequent mention of ‘Government’s plan 
for migrant intakes’, ‘intake of skilled migrants’ and ‘to attract skilled 
migrants’ in Oznews. Example (13) suggests that the uniqueness of the 
skill-based migration policy initiated by the Australian government is 
recognised overseas.
(13) The British Labour Party in turn has attempted to steal the thunder 
of the Conservative party, announcing the introduction of an 
‘Australian-style’ migration system which will give preference to 
skilled migrants over the unskilled.
Using NSM, the full explication of migrant1 is presented in [A]:
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[A] migrant1 (Australian usage)
a . someone of one kind CaTegory
b . people can know that it is like this: knowledge
people of this kind were not born in Australia, they 
were born in another country
sTaTus
after they lived for some time in that country where 
they were born, they wanted to live in Australia
because of this, sometime after this, they lived in 
Australia, not in that country where they were born
Changing 
plaCes
c . people in Australia can think about people of this kind 
like this: 
perCepTion
‘they wanted to live here, because at some time they 
thought like this:
‘if we live in Australia, very good things can 
happen to us, we want this’ 
moTivaTion
because they thought like this, they did many things aCTion
after this, they could live in Australia because 
Australian government said so’
permission
d . many people in Australia think about people of this kind 
like this: 
aTTiTudes
‘many people of this kind can’t speak English well, 
many people of this kind can’t do much
it is good if other people do many good things for them’
Explication [A] is framed around a semantic template encompassing 
CATEGORY, KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTION, MOTIVATION and 
ATTITUDE. Component (a) reflects that migrant1 refers to an individual 
belonging to a category. The components in (b) describe people’s 
general knowledge about migrants. They suggest that there are certain 
facts about migrants that are public knowledge. For example, they are 
not born in Australia, they come from another country, and it is their 
voluntary decision to take up residency in Australia (‘they wanted to live 
in Australia’). This mature way of thinking, as well as the geographic 
knowledge of Australia itself as the intended destination, explain why 
the referential range of the word migrant1 does not extend to children. 
Components under (c)  describe societal perception of migrants as 
reflected in Australian English, including their seeking a better life in 
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Australia and that they have the Australian government’s permission to 
reside in Australia. This sense of ‘for a better life’ is pervasive in the data 
(e.g. examples (4) and (7)), and the idea of their having a legal status adds 
to the positive meaning of the term.
In addition to semantic primitives and semantic molecules, the reductive 
paraphrases in [A], written in the English version of NSM, also include 
words belonging to Minimal English, such as Australia and government.15
The name of the country Australia is built into the explication to reflect 
the use of the term migrant in Australian English and the fact that the 
meaning being explicated is confined to the Australian language context.
The word government is included to reflect the idea that ‘they can live in 
this country because the government of this country says so’. It seems that, 
for ordinary speakers, the idea of people entering a country legally has 
much to do with what the government of that country says, whereas that 
of unlawful entry into a country is associated with not complying with 
the law.
4 .4 . Migrant1 vs immigrant in Australian English
To further appreciate the positive sense of the word migrant1 in Australian 
English, it is instructive to look at the general usage of the word immigrant. 
As already shown in Tables  7.1 and 7.2, the frequency data associated 
with this pair of words look very different from that in other varieties 
of English. A close look at the collocations of immigrant confirms that 
it is largely used in negative contexts. Further evidence comes from the 
fact that of the 379 total occurrences of immigrant/s, 134 actually are 
illegal immigrant/s, with references mostly to contexts outside Australia 
(e.g. ‘illegal Thai immigrants in NY’; ‘illegal Mexican immigrants in US’); 
and the related examples depict the means of people entering a specific 
country (e.g. ‘boat’, ‘truck’ and ‘smuggling … into’), and the actions taken 
by the government (e.g. ‘send back’; ‘interviewed by customs officers’). 
In Oznews, there are no collocations of immigrant with positive verbs, 
such as settle and help, or with nouns such as community. Nor does the 
word immigrant have a deictic reference to Australia.
15  For the notion of Minimal English, see Wierzbicka (2014: 185–96) and Goddard (2018b).
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
148
For reasons of space, the full explication of immigrant is not offered here. 
However, the differences in the explications between the two words can 
be summarised. First, the explication of immigrant does not contain the 
specific reference to ‘they want to live in Australia’; rather, the component 
‘they want to live in another country’ can refer to any country. Second, 
the meaning of immigrant does not include reference to activities under the 
PERCEPTION component; it only has the reference to motivation ‘if we 
live in another country, very good things can happen to us, we want 
this’. This ‘thinner’ semantic content of immigrant is consistent with the 
fact that it has become a marginal word in Australian English. The third 
difference is that the word immigrant is associated with a negative attitude: 
‘often, people in Australia think bad things about people of this kind’.
4 .5 . Migrant2 in Australian English
The second nominal usage of migrant (i.e. migrant2) in Australian English 
refers to interstate migrants, who change places for reasons of retirement, 
employment opportunities or lifestyle, as illustrated in examples (14–15):
(14) The biggest proportion were interstate migrants, overwhelmingly 
from Sydney fleeing soaring housing prices for southeast Queensland’s 
relative affordability and better lifestyle.
(15) No longer is Queensland attracting mainly elderly people escaping 
the bustling capital cities of NSW [New South Wales] and Victoria, 
but Queensland’s migrants are likely to be young and from 
regional areas.
This second sense of the word migrant is spelt out in [B].
[B] migrant2 (Australian usage, as in 
‘Queensland’s migrants’)
a . someone of one kind CaTegory
b . people in Australia can know that it is like this: knowledge
people of this kind live now in one part of Australia,
before, they lived in another part of Australia Changing 
plaCes
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c . people in Australian can think about people of this kind 
like this: 
perCepTion
‘they wanted to live in another place in Australia, 
because at some time they thought like this:
‘this other place is not the same as where I live 
now in Australia, 
moTivaTion
very good things can happen to me if I live in this 
other place,
these things can’t happen to me when I live here’
because they thought like this, they did many things aCTion
after this, they did not live any more where they lived 
before, they lived in this other place in Australia
Obviously, the notion of ‘country’ is absent in the meaning of migrant2. 
It follows that people do not think about interstate migrants in terms 
of ‘being lawful’ or ‘unlawful’. Explication [B] focuses on changing place 
and motivation. The corpus data do not suggest any particular attitudes 
that people have towards interstate migrants.
5 . The meaning of migrant in 
institutional contexts
In either of the two meanings discussed above, the use of migrant in media 
and the public space in Australia conveys the sense that the people being 
referred to intend to stay and settle. This folk understanding of the word 
migrant is different from its institutional meaning. The quotations taken 
from the ABS at the beginning of the chapter illustrate one institutional 
context where migrants refers to people who live in another country 
temporarily, such as international students, who typically spend a few 
years studying and living in Australia. Some may wish to settle in Australia; 
others may not. But they come to Australia mostly voluntarily. In fact, the 
ABS Glossary for the Migrant Data Matrices indicate that ‘being born 
overseas’ and ‘residing in Australia for a period of 12 months or more’ are 
integral to ABS’s definition of ‘migrant’ (ABS 2011).16
16  However, it is also interesting to note that on the Department of Human Services website, the 
everyday sense of migrants is used. For example, in talking about the kind of services available to 
different clients, the social categories of ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’ and ‘visitors’ are distinguished (e.g. www.
humanservices.gov.au/individuals/information-in-your-language).
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The 12-month residence element is also key to the definition of migrant 
in international contexts. For example, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) states that it follows the United Nations’ definition of 
‘migrant’ as ‘an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more 
than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the 
means, regular or irregular, used to migrate’ (IOM 2011).17 This is a broad 
definition which includes references to ‘migrant workers, refugees, asylum 
seekers and IDPs [internally displaced persons], as well as of remittances’, 
as is evident in the IOM’s World Migration Report 2018:
Current estimates are that there are 244 million international 
migrants globally (or 3.3  per cent of the world’s population). 
While the vast majority of people in the world continue to live in 
the country in which they were born, more people are migrating 
to other countries, especially those within their region. … migrant 
workers constitute a large majority of the world’s international 
migrants  …  Global displacement is at a record high, with the 
number of internally displaced at over 40 million and the number 
of refugees more than 22 million. (IOM 2018)
6 . Coda
Back to the Australian context. The Heritage Museum of the Bonegilla 
Migrant Experience provides information relevant to the meaning of 
migrant analysed in this chapter. Bonegilla, once a military barracks, was 
converted to a migrant reception and training centre in 1947. According 
to the information provided at the site, migrants stayed at Bonegilla for 
a few days or several weeks, depending on their level of English, before 
being dispatched to other places. And from 1958, it became the only 
centre of this type, until its closure in 1971. As stated on the website of 
the Bonegilla Migrant Experience, ‘more than 300,000 migrants passed 
[through] its doors between 1947 and 1971, most of those originating 
from non–English speaking European countries’ (Bonegilla n.d.a).18
17  According to the UN definition, the term ‘migrant’ can be understood as ‘any person who 
lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some 
significant social ties to this country’ (UNESCO 2017). See: www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-
human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/migrant/.
18  A brochure about the place states: ‘Today the centre touches the lives of millions of Australians. 
One in 20 Australians have had either a parent, brother, sister, uncle, aunty or grandparent who spent 
time at Bonegilla before work allocations dispersed them Australia wide’ (Bonegilla n.d.b).
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The Bonegilla camp serves as a reminder of the scale of postwar 
migration, early migrants’ experiences and their living conditions, as 
well as the enormous contributions they made to building Australian 
society. For  example, the timeline on display shows that in 1951, the 
year when the Displaced Persons Scheme ended and Assisted Migrant 
Scheme began in Australia, 10,000 migrants arrived at Bonegilla. The 
same year saw the first Australian naturalisation ceremony. Between 1949 
and 1974, the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme was completed, 
largely with migrant labour (100,000 migrants from over 30 countries). 
In 1973, the Multicultural policy speech, ‘Strength in diversity’, delivered 
by Al Grassby (the then Minister for Immigration), marked a new era 
in Australian government policy.
But what is perhaps most striking in Bonegilla is that migrants received 
there were from non–English speaking countries, and that a great deal 
of their training was about learning English. Signs displayed at the 
Bonegilla  site, such as ‘no English, no Jobs’, remind people of such 
reality. The site has kept the name ‘Tudor Hall’. It is so named ‘because 
it contained pictures of the Tudor monarchs and the British coat-of-
arms to help migrants identify with the British heritage of Australia’ 
(Bonegilla n.d.b).
At the time when the Bonegilla camp was operating, migrants to Australia 
also included many from Great Britain, but they came under a different 
scheme, according to the information provided at the camp site: from 
1946 onwards, the Commonwealth could act as their nominee. They 
were free to choose their own type of work and live in work hostels with 
their families, usually located in capital cities.19 Later, under pressure 
of numbers, some also came to Bonegilla, but not before the camp was 
readied and considerably improved.
19  In fact, they could also vote after six months!
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Thus, in reality, it seems to me that there were, and continue to be, two 
kinds of migrants: the marked and the unmarked. The latter come from 
English-speaking countries (particularly England),20 which are typically 
developed countries; and the former non–English speaking countries. 
Explication [A] offered in this chapter indicates that typical conceptions 
of migrants are that they are non–English speaking. This point, which is 
ubiquitously observed in the Oznews subcorpus, is also reinforced by the 
enormous emphasis placed on learning and speaking English for migrants’ 
social advancement.
Thus, it seems that in the public image and perception, migrants 
are simultaneously ‘accented’. This marks their position as a socially 
disadvantaged group. A typical migrant to Australia is, therefore, one who 
comes from a non–English speaking country.21
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8
The semantics of verbs 
of visual aesthetic 
appreciation in Russian
Anna Gladkova
Ty postoj, postoj, krasavica moja,
Daj mne nagljadet’sja, radost’ na tebja.
‘Wait, wait, my beauty,
Let me feast my eyes on you, my joy!’
Russian folk song
1 . Introduction
The lines of the Russian folk song chosen as an epigraph for this article 
contain an interesting Russian verb nagljadet’sja, which defies translation 
into English due to its language and culture specificity. Here, I chose to 
translate this verb as ‘to feast one’s eyes on’ but true translational equivalence 
is not achieved. The chapter is devoted to the analysis of two Russian verbs 
expressing visual aesthetic appreciation: nagljadet’sja ‘to look at someone/
something to complete satisfaction/feast one’s eyes on’ and ljubovat’sja 
‘to admire/feast one’s eyes on’, both defying translation into English. 
These verbs provide a key to understanding folk aesthetics (Gladkova 
and Romero-Trillo 2014, forthcoming(a), forthcoming(b)) because they 
capture the desire and longing for something through looking—the 
primary sense of appreciation of what is considered ‘beautiful’. This study 
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also contributes to the area of ‘visual semantics’ (e.g. Wierzbicka 2005; 
Apresjan 2018; Levisen 2019) where linguistic and cultural variation is at 
an early stage of exploration.
The study will use data from the Russian National Corpus and will aim to 
provide semantic explications of these words in semantic primes as they 
are represented in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) developed 
by Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002, 
2014). Anna Wierzbicka has applied NSM to the study of Russian 
language and culture in her numerous publications (Wierzbicka 1972, 
1990, 1992, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2009, 2011, 2012, among others). This 
chapter to a significant extent builds on Wierzbicka’s research in this area.
2 . The semantics of nagljadet’sja
Nagljadet’sja belongs to a group of Russian verbs that share structural 
similarity (prefix na- and reflexive suffix -sja) as well as the meaning ‘to do 
something to the degree of complete satisfaction’ (Švedova 1980). Some 
examples of other verbs belonging to this group are: napit’sja ‘to drink 
enough’, naest’sja ‘to eat enough’, naslušat’sja ‘to listen enough’, naguljat’sja 
‘to walk enough’, nakatat’sja ‘to ride enough’, naradovat’sja ‘to rejoice 
enough’, načitat’sja ‘to read enough’, naplakat’sja ‘to cry/whip enough’, 
nasmejat’sja ‘to laugh enough’, as well as others.
For nagljadet’sja, as well as other verbs in this group, it is difficult to 
identify equivalent verbs with exact meanings in English, which express 
completeness of an action as well as a degree of satisfaction on the part of 
the actor. Nagljadet’sja expresses satisfaction from looking at something.1 
In this regard, it is notable that the verbs expressing ‘seeing’ or ‘looking’ fall 
within the same group of verbs as ‘eating’, ‘drinking’, ‘walking’, ‘crying’, 
‘laughing’ and ‘reading’. These verbs present activities that a person might 
want to do for existential need or pleasure and might want to do it for 
some time and achieve a degree of satisfaction from doing them. This fact 
emphasises the role of ‘seeing’ in human perception. Analysing it through 
1  Along with nagljadet’sja there is another verb with similar meaning—nasmotret’sja. They share 
morphological structure (prefix na- and suffix -sja), but differ slightly stylistically due to the difference 
of root verbs they derive from: gljadet’ and smotret’, both translating into English as ‘to look/see’. 
While the analysis of nasmotret’sja can be equally enlightening in terms of linguistic and cultural 
specificity of the semantics of visual aesthetics, we will ignore the analysis of nasmotret’sja due to space 
limit and focus on the meaning of nagljadet’sja.
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the prism of language-based ‘folk aesthetics’, one might get important 
insights and understandings relevant to this salient human function 
(cf. Itier and Batty 2009; Hansen and Ji 2010).
Nagljadet’sja, as suggested by the Russian Grammar (Švedova 1980), has 
the meaning ‘to look at someone/something to the degree of complete 
satisfaction’. Interestingly, in actual use, the verb might have a slight 
variation in meaning depending on the structure and the context. 
Observations over corpus data suggest that when used in the past, the 
verb mainly refers to a negative experience and involves one looking at 
something to the degree that one does not want to do it anymore. Some 
contexts contain direct reference to some negative experience. In others, 
there is a hint of negativity that might be arising from the component of 
meaning implying satisfaction and not wanting to do it anymore. In this 
use, nagljadet’sja frequently collocates with adverbs expressing a high 
level of satisfaction: vvolju, vdostal’, vdovol’, all translating into English as 
(approximately) enough, in full or in plenty.
In certain contexts, the object or objects of observation and the associated 
emotions are clearly negative:
(1) Ljudi nagljadelis’ na vsevozmožnye akty žestokosti, svireposti …
‘People have seen enough acts of cruelty and ferocity …’
(2) Nagljadelis’ v gorode vsjakoj grjazi, načitalis’ knižek, vse uprostili 
i prišli, estestvenno, k vyvodu, čto nadobno stroit’ novyj mir.
‘[They] have seen all sorts of filth in the city, read books, simplified 
everything and consequently concluded that [they] need to build 
a new world.’
In numerous contexts the objects are not mentioned straightforwardly 
and involve words like mnogoe ‘a lot’, raznoe ‘different things’ and vse 
‘everything’, thus indicating a great degree of experience, including both 
positive and negative, but mainly negative:
(3) Poživ v Moskve, ona, pravda, na mnogoe nagljadelas …
‘Having lived in Moscow she has seen a lot …’
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(4) Oni oba dolgie gody proveli v stalinskix lagerjax i nagljadelis’ 
mnogogo.
‘They both spent many years in Stalin’s camps and had seen a lot.’
(5) My ne sumasšedšie. My prosto vsego nagljadelis’.
‘We are not mad. We simply have seen all sorts of things.’
(6) Vsego nagljadelas’, ko vsemu privykla, daže k prestupnikam!
‘[I] have seen everything, got used to everything, even to criminals!’
Certain contexts do not necessarily involve an evaluation, but there is 
a possible interpretation of the situation as negative:
(7) …  on otslužil v armii, a zaodno i vdovol’ nagljadelsja na kraski 
russkogo severa, poskol’ku načalas’ ego služba v Komi, a zakončilas’ 
pod Arxangel’skom …
‘…  he had served in the army and had seen the colours of the 
Russian North a lot as his service started in Komi and ended near 
Arkhangelsk …’
The use that interests us most is the use of nagljadet’sja expressing a high 
degree of visual aesthetic appreciation. In this use, nagljadet’sja is used 
in constructions expressing modality:
dat’ nagljadet’sja: ‘let (someone) nagljadet’sja’ (as in the song 
quoted in the epigraph)
ne moč’ nagljadet’sja: ‘can not nagljadet’sja’
ne nagljadet’sja: ‘not nagljadet’sja’ ‘not be able to nagljadet’sja’
nevozmožno nagljadet’sja: ‘impossible to nagljadet’sja’
Let us consider some examples of such use from the corpus:
(8) … pjat’desjat let ja každyj den’ gljažu na Volgu i vse nagljadet’sja 
ne mogu.
‘… I have been looking at the Volga for fifty years and cannot see 
enough of it.’
(9) Skol’ko ja ni smotrju na ėtot pejzaž – ne mogu nagljadet’sja.
‘No matter how much I look at this landscape, I can’t see enough 
of it.’
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(10) Potrjasennyj, ja ne mog nagljadet’sja na otkryvšujusja vzoru krasoty.
‘Stunned, I could not see enough of the beauty in front of my eyes.’
(11) Ona ljubit smotret’ na nizkie oblaka – ne nagljadet’sja.
‘She likes to look at low clouds; one can’t see enough of them.’
(12) Ne toropis’, vse budet. Daj xot’ nagljadet’sja na tebja …
‘Don’t be in a hurry, everything will happen. Let me at least look 
at you enough …’
In the second use in modal frames, the verb tends to be used with people 
and landscape or creations of nature as objects. It can also be used with 
objects created by people. In all cases, these objects are characterised by 
some special beauty or they are of particular value to the observer. For 
example, as in example (12), the object of admiration is someone’s dear 
relative or friend they haven’t seen for a long time.
A close link between the action nagljadet’sja and one’s close and dear people 
is well illustrated by its derivative nenagljadnyj (literally, ‘someone that one 
cannot look enough at’). It is an adjectival form which means ‘one’s dear/
beloved person’. It is commonly used as an endearment form of address—
moj/moja nenagljadnyj(-aja) ‘my dear/beloved’. This form fits well the value 
of warmth in interactions with close and dear people (Gladkova 2013a).
It is debatable whether there is enough justification to posit polysemy for 
nagljadet’sja. We would argue that despite the observed difference in use, it 
is unlikely that this difference is the case of polysemy (cf. Goddard 2009; 
Polguère 2018). Rather, we observe some different resonance due to the 
context and the tendency to occur in different structures. However, we 
will tentatively propose two different explications: one for the use in the 
past (as the invariant of meaning) and one in modal constructions.
The following explication2 can represent the invariant meaning of 
nagljadet’sja:3
2  Presumably, this explication, with the change of the prototype verb can be extended to other 
Russian verbs expressing an action performed to the degree of complete satisfaction.
3  The explications proposed in this chapter use the semantic universal SEE. It is also possible 
that in certain contexts it would be preferable to use to look as a semantics molecule to reflect the 
intentional element of the seeing process. The relationship between SEE and to look is complex 
and requires further investigation (see Padučeva (2004) on the relationship between the Russian 
equivalents of to see and to look).
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[A] X nagljadelsja na Y ‘X has seen enough of Y’
a . someone X saw someone/something Y for a long time
b . someone X saw someone/something Y many times
c . because of this, after this, X didn’t want to see someone/something 
Y anymore
When referring to events in the past, nagljadet’sja emphasises the idea 
of sufficiency of the action of ‘seeing’; it happens to the degree that one 
does not want to do it anymore. In many contexts, there is a shade of 
meaning of this action being unavoidable. However, it is unlikely that 
this component could be posited as part of meaning of the word; rather, 
it comes from the context.
For the use of nagljadet’sja in a modal frame we would propose the 
following explication:
[B] X ne mog nagljadet’sja na Y ‘X couldn’t look 
enough at Y’
a . someone X saw someone/something Y for a long time
b . someone X saw someone/something Y many times
c . someone X wanted to see someone/something Y more
because when someone X sees someone/something Y,
someone X feels something very good
d . someone X felt something very good when someone X was doing it
This frame of use involves a prolonged process of looking at something 
or someone and also a desire to do it more. This desire is associated with 
inherent pleasure acquired from this process.
It might be illuminating to mention again morphological and structural 
similarity of nagljadet’sja with other Russian verbs, such as napit’sja 
‘to drink till satisfaction’, naest’sja ‘to eat till satisfaction’, among others, 
which express actions that one wants to do till complete satisfaction. 
In  this regard, seeing someone or something (usually for the sake of 
pleasure or satisfaction) is conceptualised as a kind of basic need along 
with eating or drinking.
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3 . The semantics of ljubovat’sja
We will now turn to the analysis of another Russian verb expressing 
aesthetic admiration and appreciation: ljubovat’sja ‘to admire/feast one’s 
eyes on’. Etymologically it relates to the verb ljubit’ ‘to like/love’, therefore 
one can interpret its meaning as ‘to like something by looking at it’. Jurij 
Apresjan describes ljubovat’sja as:
a controlled prolonged action, in the process of which the gaze 
can be gliding from one detail of the object to the other; this 
movement of the eyes can be accompanied by bending of the 
head, mimics, etc. (2004: 527)
Importantly, this process brings pleasure to the observer.
As it is the case with nagljadet’sja, ljubovat’sja defies translation into 
English. The English verb to admire, its closest equivalent, is broader in 
use. The expressions like I admire your sense of humour or I admire your 
strength would be more suitable to translate with the verb vosxiščat’sja. 
Also, to admire can extend to hearing and smell, while ljubovat’sja is 
strictly limited to seeing. Another possible translation of ljubovat’sja—‘to 
feast one’s eyes on’—is a metaphoric expression and has more limited 
use in English than ljubovat’sja does in Russian. The suggested difference 
in conceptualisation between the two languages emphasises the role of 
linguistic influence in the conceptualisation of senses and their relationship 
to aesthetic appreciation (Iordanskaja 1979; Wierzbicka 2010; Gladkova 
and Romero-Trillo 2014; see also Ye 2007). While this point requires 
further investigation, it is possible to hypothesise that Russian suggests 
a sharper distinction between ‘senses’ than English does and ‘seeing’ 
occupies a clearly ‘leading’ role among other ways of perception.
Ljubovat’sja is a process taking place over some time, it cannot be 
momentary. Looking at something or someone brings satisfaction to the 
person. The objects of ljubovat’sja can be quite diverse—people and parts 
of their bodies, elements of nature and landscapes, objects produced by 
people as well as people’s actions. I will provide examples from the corpus 
to illustrate each of the uses:
Nature and landscape:
(13) Egor stal ljubovat’sja pejzažem.
‘Egor was admiring the landscape.’
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(14) Paroxod otxodil tol’ko noč’ju, a ja, vzjav bilet, sel, ožidaja pribytija 
paroxoda, na vysokom beregu, ljubovalsja Volgoj, zaxodjaščim 
solncem, večernim nebom.
‘The ship was leaving only in the evening; after buying the ticket 
I sat on the bank admiring the Volga, the sunset and the evening sky 
while waiting for the ship.’
(15) Ej vsego-to i hotelos’ – ljubovat’sja krasivymi rastenijami, uxaživat’ 
za nimi, trogat’ inogda rukami i vdyxat’ ix zapaxi …
‘All she wanted was to admire beautiful plants, look after them, 
sometimes touch them and inhale their smell …’
People and parts of their body:
(16) I moej babuške bylo prijatno, vsjakoj materi prijatno, kogda 
ljubujutsja ee rebenkom.
‘It was pleasing to my grandmother, like to any mother, when her 
child is being admired.’
(17) Stoja na beregu ruč’ja, ja ljubovalsja djadej i ego lošad’ju.
‘Standing on the bank of the creek I was admiring my uncle and 
his horse.’
(18) Ja dolgo ljubovalsja ego licom, krotkim i jasnym, kak večernee nebo.
‘I was admiring his face for a long time, meek and clear like 
evening sky.’
(19) Každyj raz, kogda on prixodil, ja ljubovalsja na ego ruki.
‘Every time he came I was admiring his hands.’
People’s actions:
(20) Kogda byval v nastroenii i delal čto-to putnoe, na nego nel’zja bylo 
ne ljubovat’sja.
‘When he was in good mood and did something worthwhile, it was 
impossible not to admire him.’
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(21) Ljubujas’ dočer’ju, on smejalsja, gljadja, kak ona lovko laviruet meždu 
poklonnikami, ne podozrevajuščimi o suščestvovanii drug druga.
‘Admiring his daughter he laughed seeing how skilfully she was 
manoeuvring between her admirers who did not suspect about the 
existence of each other.’
Objects:
(22) I posle obeda my ljubovalis’ kovrami.
‘After lunch we admired the carpets.’
(23) Takie 3D-kartiny pritjagivajut vzgljad, xočetsja postojanno 
ljubovat’sja imi, čtoby obresti duševnoe ravnovesie i spokojstvie.
‘Such 3D pictures attract the eye; one want to constantly admire 
them in order to achieve spiritual balance and calm.’
Šmelev (2005a: 454) argues that ljubovat’sja occupies a special place in 
the Russian value system because, overall, the Russian language encodes 
a  negative attitude to gaining and experiencing pleasure. However, 
ljubovat’sja is an exceptional type of pleasure that is encouraged by public 
opinion because it is a ‘selfless’ aesthetic pleasure. In this regard, Zalizniak 
and Šmelev (2004: 210) also note that ljubovat’sja would not be applicable to 
a person gaining pleasure from looking through a pornographic magazine.
Undoubtedly, ljubovat’sja is associated with positive value. It indicates 
pleasure derived from looking at something and implies beauty of the 
object. As a general cultural rule, ljubovat’sja is an accepted action. 
However, in the situation of gender relations, one might want to not 
demonstrate it openly because it signals one’s admiration. Some contexts 
from the corpus point to that:
(24) Valentina Ivanovna daže slegka ustranilas’ ot del i ljubovalas’ so 
storony Ėdikom-Siloj.
‘Valentina Ivanovna even briefly put aside her job to admire Edik 
from the side.’
(25) Ljudmila, otkrovenno ljubujas’ nežnym rumjancem, prisuščim 
vsem ryžim ljudjam, ne otpuskala ego podborodka …
‘Ludmilla openly admiring the tender blush characteristic of all 
red-haired people, did not leave his chin …’
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We will attempt the following explication of ljubovat’sja:
[C] X ljubovalsja Y ‘person X was admiring Y’
a . someone X saw someone/something Y for some time, not a short time
b . someone X wanted to do it
c . when someone X was doing it,
someone X wanted to see many parts of someone/something Y
someone X wanted to see someone/something Y well
d . when someone X was doing it, someone X couldn’t not feel something 
very good
like people can’t not feel something very good at some times
when they see some things
e . someone X thought something very good about someone/something Y
This explication captures that ljubovat’sja is a prolonged and intentional 
process (components a and b) which involves looking at the object in 
detail (component c). This process brings pleasure to the observer 
(component d) that is akin to ‘aesthetic’ admiration and involves a positive 
evaluation of the object (component e).
In the semantics of both verbs it is interesting to observe an overlap with 
the meaning of krasivyj ‘beautiful’ (Gladkova and Romero-Trillo 2014; 
Gladkova forthcoming). Krasivyj implies an absolute characteristic. This 
quality is absolute in the sense that looking at the object should bring 
pleasure regardless of personal preferences of the observer. In Gladkova 
and Romero-Trillo (2014) the relevant component is formulated as ‘this 
someone can’t not feel something very good because of this, like people 
can’t not feel something very good at some times when they see some 
things’. This component is explicit in the meaning of ljubovat’sja, thus 
making it a verb of aesthetic appreciation. This difference is blurred in the 
case of nagljadet’sja in the sense that this word denotes primarily personal 
pleasure derived from looking at someone or something that might or 
might not be ‘beautiful’.
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4 . Discussion and conclusions
This work presented the analysis of two Russian verbs of visual aesthetic 
appreciation—nagljadet’sja and ljubovat’sja. It demonstrated that 
nagljadet’sja involves looking at someone or something to the degree of 
complete satisfaction. We observe some difference in the use of the verb. 
In the past use, it mainly refers to a negative or neutral experience. Its 
use in the frame expressing modality is of particular interest to us, where 
it conveys a high degree of pleasure derived from looking at someone 
or something and the desire to continue doing it longer. Ljubovat’sja 
expresses a desired, controlled and concentrated action, which involves 
looking attentively at someone or something for some time. This process 
also brings pleasure and involves a positive evaluation of the object.
While there is no scope in this chapter for a full-fledged cross-cultural and 
cross-linguistic analysis that could bring light on cultural characteristics 
and diversity in this area, it is possible to make some observations about 
specificity of the lexicon in question and set a possible agenda for future 
research in the domain of aesthetics-related visual semantics.
To start with, it is possible to consider the semantics of the verbs in 
question against several Russian ‘cultural themes’, which have mainly 
been described by Wierzbicka.
First, the verbs of ‘aesthetic appreciation’ discussed in this chapter relate 
to the general theme of ‘open’ and ‘sincere’ expression of emotion. 
Wierzbicka (2002) formulates relevant scripts as follows:
[people think like this:]
it is good if a person wants to say to other people what this person 
thinks (feels)
it is bad if a person says to other people that this person thinks (feels) 
something if it is not true
it is good if a person wants other people to know what this person 
thinks (feels)
In some regard, the verbs in question denote a desire to look at someone/
something as a demonstration of a genuine and spontaneous positive 
attitude and this desire is openly shown as the conducted analysis suggests.
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Second, the role of ‘desire’ to look at someone or something for aesthetic 
pleasure is quite prominent in the semantics of the verbs in question. 
These elements of meaning can be associated with the theme of a ‘strong’ 
desire, discussed by Wierzbicka in relation to the role of gorjačij ‘hot’ in 
Russian conceptualisation of feelings and desires (Wierzbicka 2009). She 
formulates a relevant cultural script as follows (Wierzbicka 2009: 430):
[people think like this:]
it is good if someone can think like this about some things:
‘something very good can happen
I want it to happen
I want it very much’
it is good if this someone feels something because of this
like people feel when they want something very much
Third, the analysis of these verbs makes it possible to relate their meanings 
to other Russian cultural themes. Primarily, it is a special role of human 
relations and warmth in interactions with close and dear people (Wierzbicka 
1997, 2002; Gladkova 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Larina 2015; Larina et al. 
2017). As it has been observed, the words under analysis might have close 
people as objects; that is, someone whom one wants to see for a long time. 
At the same time, the verb nagljadet’sja is an interesting example of encoding 
an action performed ‘to the full’ that correlates with the cultural theme of 
‘doing things to the full or extreme’ (Šmelev 2005b).
Fourth, the Russian verbs can also be discussed in the light of the 
tendency of openly telling another person what would be good or not 
to do (Wierzbicka 2011, 2012). This could be interpreted as ‘putting 
pressure’ from the point of view of Anglo culture, but it does not have this 
implication in Russian. A request daj mne nagljadet’sja na tebja (‘let me 
look enough at you’) might sound imposing from an Anglo perspective. 
However, from the point of view of Russian culture, it does not have 
such implication because it is primarily interpreted in view of expressing 
positive feelings among close people.
It is also notable that the Russian verbs in question defy translation into 
English. This might suggest that aesthetic admiration and appreciation is an 
important cultural theme in Russian. It testifies itself in the fact that such 
kind of admiration can be expressed and is encouraged to be expressed. 
167
8. THE SEMANTICS OF VERBS OF VISUAL AESTHETIC APPRECIATION IN RUSSIAN
When it comes to exploring cultural diversity, it would be interesting to 
consider what standards of ‘beauty’ in terms of human body and clothes are, 
as well as nature (e.g. Bromhead 2011, 2018; Romero-Trillo and Espigares 
2012; Lišaev 2015). This can lead us to the issue of cultural difference in 
the arena of non-verbal communication and different attitudes to gazing 
at someone or something for a prolonged time.
With a brief reference to possible English translational equivalents of the 
verbs in question, we could observe difference in the role of senses in 
aesthetic appreciation. The Russian verbs under analysis have a distinct 
reference to vision as a primary source of aesthetic pleasure. The difference 
in distinction and separation of senses for Russian and English has been 
observed earlier (Iordanskaja 1979; Wierzbicka 2010) and in particular 
in relation to aesthetic appreciation (Gladkova and Romero-Trillo 2014; 
Gladkova forthcoming). Russian seems to differentiate more distinctly 
than English does the role of senses in aesthetic appreciation, assigning 
‘seeing’ a particularly prominent role. To put it differently, Russian 
associates aesthetic pleasure mainly with seeing and hearing, while 
in English this type of pleasure more easily extends to all senses. This 
indicates a further need of exploration of the field of aesthetics in relation 
to different senses.
Overall, the study supports the need for further investigation in the 
field of folk aesthetics and understanding how different languages 
conceptualise human aesthetic experience. The study of visual semantics 
and in particular aesthetics of visual semantics cannot be exhausted by the 
study of words as such, but it would require a development of cultural 
scripts and rules associated with appreciation of ‘beautiful’ and attitudes 
to ‘ugly’. Tentatively, the data analysed in this chapter support the ideas 
expressed earlier in the literature (Levontina 2004; Zalizniak and Šmelev 
2004; Šmelev 2005a) that aesthetic appreciation occupies a special role in 
the Russian linguistic world view and might suggest the existence of the 
following cultural script in Russian culture:
[many people think like this:]
it can be good if someone can’t not feel something very good when this 
someone sees someone/something
like people can’t not feel something very good when they see something
it can be good if someone wants to see this someone/something for 
some time
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embedded in the Italian 
language: A semantic 
analysis of carità
Gian Marco Farese
1 . Christianity in Italian language
In an essay titled ‘Perché non possiamo non dirci cristiani’ (‘Why we cannot 
help calling ourselves Christians’, 1942), the Italian philosopher and 
linguist Benedetto Croce contended that it is impossible to deny  the 
Christian roots of Italian society and the influence of what he called 
‘the Christian revolution’ on Italian history and culture:
The Christian revolution worked upon the very centre of the soul, 
upon the moral consciousness, and by emphasizing the inner 
essence of that consciousness, almost seemed to confer on it a new 
power, a new spiritual quality, which had hitherto been lacking 
in humanity. … We must hold that those men most effectively 
carried on the advances both in thought and life. And, in spite of 
some superficial anti-Christianity, these were in fact the humanists 
of the Renaissance. (Croce 1949: 37)
One may or may not agree with Croce on the idea that Italian society 
and culture have inherently Christian roots. However, at least from 
a strictly linguistic point of view, Croce is no doubt right: the influence 
of Christianity on the Italian language is undeniable. Italian is rich in 
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words, fixed phrases and idiomatic expressions which reflect Christian 
values and are frequently used by speakers in discourse. Even the most 
fervent upholders of the secular nature of Italian society must have 
said che peccato! (‘what a sin’, meaning ‘what a pity!’), beato te!/beati voi! 
(‘blessed you’, meaning ‘lucky you!’), misericordia! (‘mercy!’), Madonna 
mia! (‘my  Madonna!’) and per carità! (‘for charity’s sake’) at least once 
in their lives.
The peculiarity of various Italian words and phrases expressing Christian 
values is that they are polysemous: in discourse, they are used both in their 
Christian meaning and in a phraseological meaning which may or may not 
be related to the Christian one. A glaring example of this kind of polysemy 
is the word carità (/kari’ta/, roughly ‘charity’, ‘act of love’), which expresses 
both a Christian meaning and a series of distinct phraseological meanings 
which are only partly related or completely unrelated to the Christian 
one. The different meanings of carità coexist, but do not compete in the 
same contexts; therefore, it is possible to identify and distinguish these 
meanings clearly and precisely by analysing how carità is used in different 
contexts and by looking at specific collocations. Both the Christian and 
the phraseological meanings of carità are represented by prototypical 
collocations: atto di carità (‘act of carità’) for the Christian meaning 
and per carità (literally, ‘for carità’s sake’) for the phraseological meanings.
This chapter presents an analysis of the different meanings expressed by 
the  word carità in different contexts and discusses the conceptual and 
semantic relation between these meanings. The analysis is made by 
adopting the methodology of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) 
(Wierzbicka 1992a, 1996, 1997, 2001; Goddard 2011, 2018; Goddard 
and Wierzbicka 2014) from an exclusively synchronic perspective and 
is in line with Wierzbicka’s (2001, 2019) semantic analysis of the core 
principles of Christianity as expressed in language. Separate semantic 
explications are presented for each meaning of carità. The body of data 
includes examples from the coris/codis corpus of contemporary written 
Italian, from contemporary novels and online material.1 The  chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of the relation between the polysemy 
of Italian words reflecting Christian values and the double-sided 
(Christian and secular) nature of Italian society.
1  coris/codis (n.d.) Corpus of Written Italian. Available at: corpora.dslo.unibo.it/TCORIS/.
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2 . The Christian meaning of carità
As Wierzbicka has demonstrated in her works on the semantics of 
Christianity (most notably 2001, 2019), it is impossible to elucidate the 
key principles of Christianity without analysing Christian keywords and 
their meanings. Language, Wierzbicka writes, has the ability ‘to express 
what Christians believe, and to do so clearly, intelligibly and truthfully’ 
(2019: 28). At the same time, Wierzbicka has often pointed out that the 
language of Christianity is not easy to analyse, both for reasons of style 
(e.g. the ubiquitous use of metaphors) and because of linguistic differences 
and translation inaccuracies characterising different versions of Christian 
texts (e.g. the Bible). For these reasons, a semantic analysis of words 
that are carriers of Christian values like carità needs to be scrupulously 
grounded in discourse and in texts. In What Christians Believe (2019), 
Wierzbicka has stressed the importance of sticking as close as possible to 
the texts not only for the sake of semantic accuracy, but also for the correct 
interpretation of the Christian values encapsulated in the meanings of 
Christian keywords like carità.2 This can be done only by simplifying the 
often-abstruse language of metaphors and by identifying any translation 
inaccuracies. Following Wierzbicka’s analytical approach, in my analysis 
of the Christian meaning of the Italian word carità presented in this 
section I have kept the New Testament and other key texts of Christian 
thinking under close scrutiny.
The noun carità is conceptually, etymologically and semantically related 
to the adjective caro (‘dear’), which denotes an expression of good feelings 
towards someone (Farese 2018a). More precisely, carità has always been used 
in the Christian tradition to talk about a specific form of ‘love’: God’s love of 
people above all things, the love which unites people with God. It was Jesus 
who preached this form of love in his commandment ‘ama il prossimo tuo 
come te stesso’ (‘love your neighbour as yourself ’). In doing so, Jesus referred 
to God’s feelings for people, and this raises the much-debated question of 
whether or not ‘mental actions’ and anthropomorphic features like feeling 
2  One glaring example of semantic misinterpretation discussed by Wierzbicka is that of the 
English word almighty and of the Latin omnipotens in contrast to the original Greek pantokrator used 
in relation to God in the Old Testament. Wierzbicka argues that the English almighty and the Latin 
omnipotens give a distorted idea of God as someone who can basically do whatever he wants. This, 
in her view, is very different from the actual idea of God reflected in the meaning of the Ancient 
Greek pantokrator, which is semantically much more focused on ‘happening’ than ‘wanting’. For 
Wierzbicka, the main component of the meaning of pantokrator is ‘if God wants some things to 
happen, after some time they will all happen, as God wants’.
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(and wanting) are at all ascribable to God. Discussing this point in detail, 
Wierzbicka (2019) has shown that there is compelling evidence in Christian 
texts unambiguously proving that God ‘feels’, and more precisely that ‘God 
feels something very good towards people’. It is Jesus himself who speaks 
about God’s love (‘God so loved the world that he gave his only son …’) in 
the New Testament. Moreover, Wierzbicka emphasises the fact that several 
times God himself speaks about Jesus in terms of his ‘beloved son’. Although 
there is no semantic equivalent for the Greek agapao used in the Bible to 
talk about God’s feelings towards Jesus and people, Wierzbicka contends 
that it is possible to capture these feelings in universal terms and proposes to 
do so by positing the components ‘God feels something very good towards 
people’ and ‘people feel something very good towards God’. This mutual 
expression of very good feelings between God and people constitutes the 
conceptual and semantic base of the Christian meaning of the Italian carità. 
Crucially, Wierzbicka contends that if all words (including feel ) could not 
be attributed to God there could be no dialogue between God and people, 
and this would conflict with the very foundations of Christianity (2019: 
36). Although the meaning of carità includes an expression of good feelings 
towards someone, this word is not an emotion term like, for example, pietà 
(‘pity’); in discourse, one does not say *provare/sentire carità per qualcuno 
(‘to feel carità towards someone’) as one can say provare/sentire pietà per 
qualcuno. Italian speakers talk about un atto/un gesto/un’opera di carità 
(‘an act/a show/a work of carità’) and about actions inspired by a spirito di 
carità (‘spirit of carità’). In verb phrases, carità collocates with domandare/
chiedere (‘ask’), accettare (‘accept’), rifiutare (‘refuse’) and especially fare (‘do/
make/perform’). The constructions fare la carità a qualcuno (‘to perform an 
act of carità for someone’) and fare la carità di + Nph/Vph (‘to make the carità 
of ’) are by far the most frequent collocations in the body of collected data:
(1) Papa Francesco ai ragazzi ambrosiani: ‘Testimoniate la vostra fede 
con gesti di carità’.3
Pope Francis to the Milanese teens: ‘Testify your faith through acts 
of carità.’
(2) Mi domando: quanto si può chiedere a un uomo? A un essere di 
carne e sangue? Gli si può chiedere di non rubare, di lavorare con il 
sudore della fronte, di fare la carità ai poveri.
3  Available at: www.chiesadimilano.it/news/chiesa-diocesi/papa-francesco-ai-ragazzi-ambrosiani-
testimoniate-la-vostra-fede-con-gesti-di-carita-212987.html.
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I wonder: how much can one ask of a man? To a being of flesh and 
blood? One can ask him not to steal, to work with the sweat of his 
brow, to make the carità to the poor. (coris/codis corpus, narrativa)
(3) Dovrei ringraziarti in ginocchio? Per avermi fatto la carità della tua 
attenzione?
Am I supposed to go down on my knees and thank you? For having 
made me the carità of your attention? (coris/codis corpus, narrativa)
The discourse on carità clearly indicates that conceptually and semantically 
this word is related to ‘doing’ before being related to ‘feeling’; the word 
does express the idea of feeling something good towards someone, but 
these good feelings are manifested through actions. An act of carità 
consists in doing something good for someone who needs help and suffers, 
and is inspired by the good feelings that the helper expresses towards the 
sufferer. The characteristic of these good feelings and their associated way 
of thinking is that they are instilled in people as a value. Christians are 
taught that it is good to feel something good and to do good things for 
people who suffer as they would feel and would do for their brothers 
and sisters, the underlying assumption being that all people are sons and 
daughters of God. The idea of ‘brotherly love’ and of belonging to the 
same family of God is reflected in the collocation carità fraterna (‘brotherly 
carità’) used in Italian discourse. Like other words expressing Christian 
values, the semantics of carità does not just encapsulate a particular way of 
thinking about other people, but also serves as a moral and ethical code for 
people’s conduct. Carità denotes a way of thinking that has implications 
both for people’s feelings towards other people and for people’s actions: 
more precisely what people do to other people. Its semantics synthesises 
thinking, feeling and doing, and ultimately relates to ‘how people can live 
well with other people’ and ‘how people can live well with God’, to use 
Wierzbicka’s words (2019).
There are significant semantic differences between acts of carità and acts 
of gentilezza (‘kindness’) or solidarietà (‘solidarity’), which also consist in 
doing something good for someone. Differently from acts of carità, acts 
of kindness are not triggered by someone’s suffering. As pointed out by 
Travis (1997), the kind person does something good for someone because 
he/she does not want this person to feel something bad, but not because 
this person is suffering or because he/she cares for this person. An act 
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of solidarietà is performed towards people to whom something bad has 
happened recently and who suffer because of this (Farese 2018b), whereas 
disgraces or calamities are not triggers of carità.
The performer of an act of carità does something good for someone whose 
current life conditions do not permit him/her to live well and who suffers 
because of this. The helper witnesses this person’s suffering and decides 
to offer his/her help, both because he/she was taught to feel and to do 
something good for people in need and because he/she does not want this 
person to suffer. The helper knows that what he/she can do won’t permit 
the sufferer to live well and that he/she can only alleviate the suffering 
momentarily. However, the helper can at least satisfy an immediate 
necessity of the sufferer and can bring momentary relief from sorrow, 
as stated in Benedict XVI’s encyclical Deus Caritas Est:
Following the example given in the parable of the Good Samaritan, 
Christian charity is first of all the simple response to immediate 
needs and specific situations: feeding the hungry, clothing the 
naked, caring for and healing the sick, visiting those in prison, etc. 
(Benedict XVI 2005)
An act of carità can be defined as such if it satisfies four conditions related 
to the helper’s attitude: (i) the helper does not expect to receive anything 
in return for his/her good actions; (ii) the helper does not expect that 
something good will happen to him/her because he/she offered his/her 
help; (iii) the act is not performed to attract people’s respect and admiration; 
(iv) the helper does not consider the person in need ‘someone below me’. 
The fourth condition is related to the fact that sometimes an act of carità 
can be refused because it can be perceived as a way of highlighting the 
social differences (in power, life conditions and opportunities) between 
the people involved in the act:
(4) Il fabbro appoggia le due nocche sul tavolo e mi dice a voce diversa, 
ora bassa come un ringhio: ‘Non ci serve la tua carità. Ci serve che 
scendi dall’altare’.
The locksmith puts his two knuckles on the table and with a different 
tone of voice, now low as a growl, says to me: ‘We don’t need your 
carità. We need you to get down the altar.’ (coris/codis corpus, 
mon2014_16)
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Essentially, an act of carità is inspired by a genuine expression of good 
feelings towards someone with no ulterior motives or personal interests in 
mind, as stated by St Paul in the First Letter to the Corinthians (13: 4–7):
La carità è magnanima, benevola è la carità; non è invidiosa, non 
si vanta, non si gonfia d’orgoglio, non manca di rispetto, non cerca 
il proprio interesse, non si adira, non tiene conto del male ricevuto, 
non gode dell’ingiustizia ma si rallegra della verità. Tutto scusa, tutto 
crede, tutto spera, tutto sopporta.
Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity 
vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself 
unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no 
evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all 
things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.
The Christian meaning of carità used in Italian discourse is captured in 
the following explication. It is divided in two big cognitive scenarios: 
the first captures how the helper thinks, whereas the second captures 
how the helper does not think. The explication captures the conceptual 
relation between living, feeling and doing, the idea of ‘brotherly love’, the 
immediacy and momentariness of the helping act and the idea ‘I know 
that I can do it’. Wanting to help is only one aspect of the act of carità; the 
helper also needs to be able to help and most of all, he/she acts following 
his/her conscience. Knowing that one can help excludes any hesitations 
and emphasises the awareness that carità is a matter of moral duty. 
The final component captures the fact that carità is a value:
[A] la carità verso il prossimo (carità towards 
the neighbour)
a . it can be like this:
b . someone thinks like this about someone else:
‘this someone can’t live well now if someone else doesn’t do 
something good for this someone
because of this, this someone feels something bad
when I think about this, I feel something good towards this someone 
like I can feel towards some people if it is like this:
these people are part of something, I am part of the same 
something
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I don’t want this someone to feel something bad
because of this, I want to do something good for this someone in this 
moment, I know that I can do it’
c . because this someone thinks like this, this someone does something 
good for this other someone
d . when this someone does it, this someone doesn’t think like this about 
this other someone:
‘this someone is someone below me
I want to do it because if I do it people will think something good 
about me
I want to do it because if I do it something good will happen to me
if I do something good for this someone now,
this someone can’t not-do something good for me after this’
e . it is good if it is like this
3 . The meanings of per carità
The phraseological meanings of carità emerge in the idiomatic 
prepositional phrase per carità, which is highly polysemous. Only in the 
construction fare qualcosa per carità (‘to do something for carità’) carità 
retains its Christian meaning. In this construction, the preposition per 
performs the function of ‘purpose’ and the phrase expresses the idea of 
an action inspired by the Christian spirit of carità and performed to help 
someone who suffers:
(5) ‘Ebbene, si tratta di questo. Ieri mi trovavo nei paraggi, vicino alla 
riva del mare. Un uomo mi aveva offerto per carità un tozzo di 
pane, e io lo gustavo lentamente.’
‘Well, it is about this. Yesterday I was around here, near the seashore. 
A man had offered me a crust of bread for carità and I was enjoying 
it slowly.’ (coris/codis corpus, narrativa)
In various other contexts, per carità is used as an additional, indented 
fixed phrase in different positions in an utterance. The insertion of 
per carità does not add content to the utterance, which already makes 
sense without this phrase. Its semantic contribution consists either in 
emphasising the speaker’s feelings or in clarifying the speaker’s position 
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on a statement, an intention or an opinion. The fixed phrase per carità is 
no longer a simple prepositional phrase, but an interjection expressing a 
series of distinct meanings (cf. Ameka 1992; Wierzbicka 1992b); for this 
reason, it seems plausible to consider per carità used in specific contexts as 
the result of a process of grammaticalisation.
Various dictionaries of Italian (including Treccani, Nuovo De Mauro and 
Zanichelli) ascribe a generic meaning ‘rejection/refusal’ to per carità, as 
well as the more specific meanings ‘scorn/disdain’ and ‘of course/surely’. 
However, the contexts in which this fixed phrase is used as an interjection 
in Italian discourse are too different to posit an invariant meaning ‘not’. 
This ‘not’ means different things in different contexts—in NSM terms, 
‘I don’t say’, ‘I don’t want’ or ‘it can’t be like this’. It is impossible to 
produce a single explication which would be valid for all the contexts 
in which per carità is used. Therefore, it is necessary to produce separate 
semantic explications for the different phraseological meanings of per 
carità expressed in different contexts, not only for the sake of semantic 
accuracy and clarity, but also for the sake of accurate language teaching and 
translation. In addition to the Christian meaning, per carità expresses six 
different phraseological meanings; their numbering in the present analysis 
is based on their similarity to the Christian meaning, per carità6 being the 
least similar. The main semantic difference between the Christian and 
the phraseological meanings of per carità is the shift in perspective from 
‘someone else’ (‘doing something good for someone else’) to ‘I’ (‘I don’t 
say/‘I don’t want’). The Christian and the six phraseological meanings of 
per carità cannot overlap because they are expressed in different contexts; 
however, it is also possible to express different meanings of per carità in 
the same turn.
The first meaning of per carità as an interjection is expressed when the 
speaker asks the interlocutor to do something good for him/her as people 
would do for someone they care for.
This can mean either doing or not doing something to save the speaker 
from feeling something bad. The speaker’s bad feelings are associated with 
a specific thought and are intentionally emphasised by uttering per carità. 
The speaker rejects these bad feelings and ‘begs’ the interlocutor to help 
him/her. In (6) the speaker asks the interlocutor to do something, whereas 
in (7a) and (7b) not to do something (e.g. not to kill him):
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(6) Adesso il piccolo Ambrogio, svegliato dal rumore e dal caldo, gridava 
come un’aquila attaccato alle sbarre del lettino. Sua madre, che faceva 
la cassiera nella pasticceria di fronte, era arrivata di corsa e adesso 
gridava: ‘Fate qualcosa, per carità! Qualcuno vada a salvare il mio 
bambino!’
By now the little Ambrogio, who had been woken up by the noise 
and the heat, was shouting like an eagle hanging on the bars of his 
tiny bed. His mother, who worked as a cashier in the patisserie on the 
other side of the road, had run back home and now was screaming: 
‘Do something, per carità! Somebody go save my child!’ (coris/
codis corpus, narrativa)
(7) a. Fazio si fece vivo che erano le dieci passate. ‘Come mai avete 
fatto così tardo?’ ‘Dottore, per carità, non me ne parlasse! 
Prima abbiamo dovuto aspettare il sostituto del Sostituto!’
Fazio didn’t turn up until after 10. ‘Why so late, Fazio?’ ‘Please, 
Chief, I don’t want to hear about it. First we had to wait for the 
assistant prosecutor’s assistant.’
b. Il professore si era susuto addritta e Montalbano, lento lento, 
isò la pistola e gliela puntò all’altezza della testa. Allora capitò. 
Come se gli avessero tranciato l’invisibile cavo che lo reggeva, 
l’omo cadì in ginocchio. Mise le mani a preghiera. ‘Per carità! 
Per carità!’
The doctor was now standing up, and Montalbano ever so slowly 
raised the gun and pointed it at his head. Then it happened, as if 
someone had cut the invisible rope holding him up, the man fell 
to his knees. He folded his hands in prayer. ‘Have pity! Have 
pity!’ (Andrea Camilleri, La Gita a Tindari, 2000)
The meaning per carità1 can be explicated as follows. It is the idea of 
someone doing something good for someone else and of this good action 
being inspired by good feelings towards a sufferer that makes this first 
phraseological meaning of per carità the closest to the original Christian 
meaning. The component ‘I can’t not say it’ captures the idea that the 
speaker cannot refrain from expressing his/her bad feelings in discourse:
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[B] per carità1
a . I say: ‘when I think about this, I feel something bad
I can’t not say it
I don’t want to feel something bad
because of this, I want you to do something good for me now, like 
people can do something good for someone if they feel something 
good towards this someone’
As an interjection, per carità can also be used to express the meaning 
‘I  don’t want to do this’. In this case, too, the refusal is caused by the 
thought of something that generates bad feelings. This is the kind of bad 
feelings prototypically associated with the thought ‘something bad can 
happen to me if I do this’. Thus, by uttering per carità it is as if the speaker 
‘protected’ themselves from potential dangers by stating clearly that he/
she is not going to do something. In this case, not only does per carità 
emphasise the speaker’s feelings, but also what the speaker does not want 
to do. Sometimes, the refusal can be emphasised even more by raising 
one’s arms and hands in the air to make a sort of ‘not me’ or ‘send-away’ 
gesture. The meaning per carità2 can be explicated as follows:
[C] per carità2
a . I say: ‘I don’t want to do this, I want you to know it
when I think about it, I feel something bad’
A good example of per carità2 can be found in the dialogue between the 
Neapolitan brothers Capone and their friend Mezzacapa in the famous 
comical film Totò, Peppino e la Malafemmina (1956).4 The brothers need 
to go to Milan for the first time and ask their friend, who has been there 
before, for advice. Mezzacapa scares the two brothers and warns them 
against the dangers of a big city like Milan with a lot of dangerous traffic 
and fog. By uttering per carità, each of the brothers makes clear that he is 
not going to do something:
4  Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2V0av8ypY4, uploaded 28 October, 2006.
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(8) Mezzacapa: ‘Ma c’è un traffico enorme. Anzi, vi dovete stare accorti, 
eh? Là attraversare una strada è una cosa pericolosa assai.’
Antonio: ‘E chi attraversa? E chi si muove, per carità.’
Mezzacapa: ‘There’s a huge traffic there. In fact, you’ve got to be 
careful, okay? Crossing the road is very dangerous there.’
Antonio: ‘Not me … I’m not crossing, I’m not moving, per carità.’
Mezzacapa: ‘A Milano, quando c’è la nebbia non si vede …’
Antonio: ‘Ma dico se i milanesi a Milano quando c’è la nebbia non 
vedono, come si fa a vedere che c’è la nebbia a Milano?’
Mezzacapa: ‘No, ma per carità, ma quella non è una cosa … che si 
può toccare …’
Peppino: ‘Aaah, ecco.’
Antonio (al fratello): ‘Non si tocca.’
Peppino: ‘Io adesso  …  a parte questa nebbia, non la tocco, 
per carità …’
Mezzacapa: ‘In Milan, people can’t see when there is fog …’
Antonio: ‘But I mean, if the Milanese in Milan can’t see when there 
is fog how can one see that there is fog in Milan?’
Mezzacapa: ‘No, but per carità, that’s not something  …  one can 
touch.’
Peppino: ‘Right, I see.’
Antonio (to his brother): ‘Don’t touch it.’
Peppino: ‘What I’m wondering now … apart from this fog, I won’t 
touch it, per carità …’
Another prototypical context of per carità2 is when someone refuses to 
have more food or drinks. The speaker fears that he/she will feel bad if 
he/she eats or drinks more and utters per carità to express a clear refusal:
(9) Vuoi ancora un po’ di pasta?
Per carità!
Would you like some more pasta?
Per carità! (‘No way!’)
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In the dialogue in (8) there is another instance of per carità uttered by 
Mezzacapa when he states that fog is not something one can touch. In 
this case, per carità expresses the meaning ‘it can’t be like this, I know it 
well, I want you to know it well now’. The context of this meaning of per 
carità is when a speaker considers a specific scenario emerged from the 
discussion with the interlocutor and totally excludes that it can be the case. 
The speaker sounds extremely confident and convincing by talking with 
the didactic tone typical of the ‘sapientone’ (‘the know-it-all, clever-clogs’, 
Farese 2019), the omniscient narrator who knows or claims to know the 
facts in question well thanks to first-hand or reported experience. At the 
same time, the speaker emphasises the statement with an expression of 
feelings. This specific meaning, labelled here per carità3, can be explicated 
as follows:
[D] per carità3
a . I say: ‘it can’t be like this, I know it well, I want you to know it now
when I think about it, I can’t not feel something’
Per carità3 can be easily identified and distinguished from the other 
meanings of this phrase because only in this context per carità can be 
preceded by ma (‘but’), which emphasises the speaker’s statement and 
feelings even more:
(10) ‘Mia moglie non mi capisce …’ ‘Tra noi non c’è dialogo.’ ‘Tra noi 
non c’è nessun afflato spirituale.’ ‘Tra noi non ci sono più rapporti 
sessuali …’ ‘Con altri? Mia moglie? Per carità, è pazza di me …’
‘My wife doesn’t understand me …’ ‘There’s no dialogue between 
us.’ ‘There’s no spiritual impulse.’ ‘We don’t have sexual intercourses 
anymore …’ ‘Sleeping with someone else? My wife? Per carità, she’s 
crazy about me …’ (coris/codis corpus, narrativa)
(11) L’esercito per le strade di Napoli? Ma per carità. Non credo che 
la semi-militarizzazione della città sia la soluzione del drammatico 
problema criminalità.
The army around the streets of Naples? But per carità. I don’t think 
that the semi-militarization of the city is the solution to the dramatic 
problem of criminality. (coris/codis corpus, mon2005_07)
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A similar context is when a speaker does not exclude that something 
can be the case, but at the same time cannot say that it can be the case 
either. In this context, per carità is typically followed by ma or però (‘but/
though’), which express a contrast between the first and the second part 
of the statement. In the first part, the speaker makes clear that he/she 
does not exclude something; in the second part, the speaker adds that 
something cannot be the case unless the circumstances change or anyway, 
not a priori:
(12) Berlusconi torna alla carica con il documento politico. Quello, 
almeno, Follini potrebbe sottoscriverlo. Per carità, nessun 
problema, risponde il segretario dell’Udc, però … la mia priorità 
riguarda la necessità che questo governo sia più attento al suo profilo 
istituzionale.
Berlusconi insists on the political document. Follini could sign that, 
at least. Per carità, no problem at all, replies the UDC [Unione di 
Centro: the Union of the Centre political party] secretary, but … my 
priority is the necessity that this government pays more attention to 
its institutional profile. (coris/codis corpus, mon2001_04)
(13) ‘Contro la Danimarca, vi basta perdere per 1-0.’ ‘Non ci passa 
per la testa. Si può anche perdere, per carità. Ma non certo per 
principio. Vogliamo vincere e vincere bene.’
‘Against Denmark, it is sufficient for you to lose 1-0.’ ‘That’s out 
of the question. Losing is possible, per carità. But certainly not 
in principle. We want to win and win well.’ (coris/codis corpus, 
stampa)
Per carità4 is added to let the interlocutor know well what the speaker’s 
position is. This specific meaning can be explicated as follows:
[E] per carità4
a . I don’t say: ‘it can’t be like this’
b . at the same time, I don’t say: ‘it can be like this’
c . I want you to know it
187
9. CHRISTIAN VALUES EMBEDDED IN THE ITALIAN LANGUAGE
Per carità as a fixed phrase can also express the speaker’s way of thinking 
about something. Like the context of per carità4 , per carità5 is followed by 
ma in a statement which contains two contrasting ways of thinking: in 
the first part of the statement, the speaker denies that something is bad, 
whereas in the second part the speaker states that it is not good either:
(14) Per carità, il film è bellissimo, Ferrara è bravissimo, un grande 
regista che fa commuovere, ma in Sicilia donne come Teresa non 
esistono.
Per carità, the film is great, and Ferrara is excellent, a great director 
that makes people cry, but there are no women like Teresa in Sicily. 
(coris/codis corpus, ephemera)
(15) Segno evidente che l’imputato si interessò per le due pratiche. Nulla 
di illecito, per carità: ma, allora, perché hanno mentito dicendo di 
aver avuto frequentazioni superficiali?
This is the unmistakable sign that the accused dealt with the two 
cases. Nothing illicit, per carità: but, then, why did they lie saying 
they only knew each other superficially? (coris/codis corpus, 
miscellanea)
Stating first that something is not bad before stating that it is not good 
is a specific discursive strategy on the part of the speaker not to sound 
hypercritical of something and to ‘mitigate’ the criticism expressed in the 
second part of the statement. Per carità5 expresses the speaker’s evaluations 
and its meaning is clearly distinct from the other ones because it is based 
on the primitive concepts good and bad, which are not inherent in the 
other meanings of this phrase. Per carità5 is explicated as follows:
[F] per carità5
a . I don’t say: ‘I think about it like this: “this is bad”’
b . at the same time, I can’t say: ‘I think about it like this: “this is good”’
c . I want you to know it
Finally, the interjection per carità is also used to protect oneself from the 
risk of passing for someone who does not know the facts well, which is 
countercultural and potentially dangerous for one’s public image in Italy 
(Farese 2019). In this context, per carità expresses the meaning ‘I don’t 
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say: it is not like this, I want you to know it’. By clarifying that he/she 
is not denying something, the speaker demonstrates that he/she knows 
the facts well and, in this way, saves him/herself from making statements 
which could be perceived as superficial or potentially offensive:
(16) Caro signor Manganaro, per quel che riguarda i documenti 
d’archivio stranieri, tutte le carte dei servizi segreti americani e 
sovietici venute alla luce quarant’anni dopo quell’estate del 1964 
(da prendere con le molle, per carità) ci dicono che—diversamente 
da quel che all’epoca si suppose—la Cia non solo non favorì ma, 
anzi, si preoccupò moltissimo del possibile deragliamento del nostro 
convoglio democratico.
Dear Mr. Manganaro, as far as the foreign archive documents are 
concerned, all the documents about the American and Soviet secret 
services which came to light forty years after that summer of 1964 
(to be taken with a pinch of salt, per carità) tell us that—differently 
from what was believed at that time—not only did the CIA 
encourage, but it was also deeply concerned about the derailment of 
our democratic train. (coris/codis corpus, mon2001_04)
(17) Solo l’Argentina ora come ora mi sembra abbia qualcosa in più di 
tutti, anche di noi. La Francia no. Per carità, è forte, affidabile, 
ma con loro voglio giocarci …
Right now, it seems to me that only Argentina have something more 
than the other teams. Not France. Per carità, France are strong 
and reliable, but I don’t want to play against them … (coris/codis 
corpus, mon2001_04)
The speaker’s self-defence is complemented by the idea that the interlocutor 
does not think well if he/she thinks that the speaker does not know the 
facts well. This sixth meaning of per carità can be explicated as follows:
[G] per carità6
a . I don’t say: ‘it is not like this’, I want you to know it
b . if you think about me like this: ‘this someone doesn’t know well 
how it is’, you don’t think well
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4 . Concluding remarks
The semantic analysis of carità presented in this chapter has highlighted 
one of the most striking cases of polysemy which characterises Italian words 
expressing Christian values. The parallel shift in function and context of 
use (from a word expressing a Christian value to an interjection expressing 
the speaker’s feelings and way of thinking in discourse) and in semantic 
perspective (from ‘someone else’ to ‘I’) reflects a significant semantic 
change of carità which should be investigated in diachronic perspective. 
Unfortunately, this kind of analysis could not be made here for reasons 
of space. One of the main aims of the present analysis was to emphasise 
the unparalleled benefits and contributions that the Wierzbickian NSM 
methodology has brought to the understanding of the foundations and 
principles of Christianity and its undisputed influence on everyday 
discourse in many European languages, including Italian. Adopting the 
NSM framework, it is possible to
convey the essentials of Christian faith accurately, making every 
word count and be justifiable from a theological and historical, 
as well as linguistic point of view … An explication couched in 
simple and universal words can help us to identify that intended 
meaning and to articulate  …  faith more accurately and more 
authentically, as well as more cross-translatably, for a global world. 
(Wierzbicka 2019: xiv)
The copresence of Christian and phraseological meanings of Italian words 
expressing Christian values is relevant to the analysis of the influence of 
Christianity on Italian language and culture and, at the broader level, to 
the relationship between meaning, culture and society. A parallel could be 
drawn between the polysemy of Italian words expressing Christian values 
and the dual nature of the Italian society, which is traditionally characterised 
by a constant tension between Christianity and secularism. Article 7 of the 
Italian Constitution sanctions the secular nature of the Italian State and 
the juridical separation from the Vatican. Yet, in Article 8, the Catholic 
religion is given a privileged position over the other faiths because it is the 
only religion that is recognised at constitutional level (Farese 2018b). One 
of the most significant and controversial events in contemporary Italian 
history was the so-called compromesso storico (‘the historical compromise’), 
the political alliance between the Christian Democratic Party and the 
Communist Party. The tension between Christianity and secularism is not 
a contradiction, but a well-known and accepted fact in Italy; they are two 
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sides of the same coin. The huge popularity of the TV series Don Camillo 
e Peppone (1952) and later Don Matteo (2000–present), where priests 
are in constant conflict with politicians and with the police, confirms 
that the Italians like this tension, as they somehow recognise themselves 
and their society in those fictional characters. The Italian society is both 
Christian and secular and the language needs to have words that express 
both Christian and phraseological meanings. As in the case of carità, if 
a word originally expresses a Christian meaning, it is very likely that over 
time it will be shaped and changed by speakers so that new, phraseological 
meanings develop and become regularly used in discourse.
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The semantics of two 




This study focuses on the semantics of two words used in the variety of 
Peninsular Spanish spoken in Navarre, one of the regions in northern 
Spain where Spanish and Basque have been in intense contact for centuries. 
Although their real origin still needs to be proven, the two words studied 
have been traditionally identified as borrowings from Basque—that is, 
words that at some point came into the Spanish spoken in the area by 
transfer from that language.
The existence of borrowings in languages can be explained by the need 
of speakers to refer to culturally specific objects, traditions and, most 
importantly, ways of thinking that cannot be found in their language. 
As  Wierzbicka explains, there are language-specific names for special 
kinds of ‘things’, for customs and social institutions, as well as for people’s 
values, ideals, attitudes and ways of thinking about the world (1997: 2).
In this case, I am going to study words that are not language-specific but 
varietal-specific, since they only exist at present in the variety of Peninsular 
Spanish spoken in some areas of Navarre. The particularity of  the two 
words chosen is that they convey special meanings, non-existent in general 
Spanish and definitely different from the ones encoded in other Spanish 
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words that are usually identified as their equivalents. I believe that an 
appropriate semantic analysis of these borrowings will reveal the specific 
way of thinking about certain human experiences of Navarrese speakers of 
Spanish—that is, some of the ‘ethnopsychological constructs’ (Goddard 
2007a: 29) that characterise this regional variety.
Analysing and explaining the meaning of such words, especially to 
people from other cultures, is not an easy task. The theory of the Natural 
Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) developed by Wierzbicka and Goddard 
(see Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002, 2014) has provided semanticists with 
the appropriate tool to tackle the analysis of meanings. As Wierzbicka 
and her colleagues have demonstrated over the last four decades, NSM is 
the most appropriate analytical framework to accomplish this task, since 
it allows the researcher to explain meanings through a self-explanatory 
mini-language, constituted by a set of semantic primitives, which are 
universal, innate and language-independent (Gladkova 2010; Wong 
2014; Wierzbicka 2015; Ye 2017; among others).
Since the words I am going to study do not generally appear in Spanish 
corpora due to their limited use and testimonies of their use are scarce, 
I based my analysis mainly on the information gathered from a few 
lexicographic sources and, especially, from the interviews I carried out 
with 20 Spanish monolingual speakers from the region.1 This information, 
together with my own insights as a Spanish speaker from Navarre, allowed 
me to accurately describe and provide the NSM explications of the 
meanings of these words.
Before presenting the semantic analysis, and in order to contextualise the 
words studied, I will provide first an overview of the nature of lexical 
borrowings between these two languages in contact.
1  Interviewees were men and women, between 35 and 70 years old, who were born and still live 
in the capital city (Pamplona) or in neighbouring villages. They answered the following questions in 
written form: Do you use this word?; Can you provide some examples of phrases in which you would 
use this word?; How would you explain its meaning to someone who does not know this word? A few 
days later, and after an analysis of this information, oral interviews were carried out in which the 
researcher asked further questions on specific aspects of the meaning of each word.
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2 . Basque and Spanish in contact: 
Loanwords
In spite of being genetically unrelated, Spanish and Basque have 
influenced each other along the centuries of intense contact between 
them. Although evidence exists at different linguistic levels, mutual 
influence between these two languages is especially salient at the lexical 
domain, since lexical items are the elements most easily transferred from 
one language to another (Thomason and Kaufman 1988; Haspelmath 
2008). Importantly, lexical transfer occurs primarily from Spanish, the 
dominant language, into Basque. Thus, Basque has borrowed words from 
Spanish like kamioi (from camión ‘truck’), ligatu (from ligar ‘flirt’), saltsa 
(from salsa ‘sauce’) and many others, adapting them to its phonological 
particularities (Cid-Abasolo 2010).
Although there are more instances of borrowings from Spanish into 
Basque, there is evidence of lexical transfer in the opposite direction 
as well. The Basque word ezker ‘left’, for example, has been borrowed 
not only by Spanish (izquierda) but also by other Romance languages 
like Catalan (esquerra) and Gascon (querr and esquerr) among others 
(Echenique 2016). In the Spanish spoken in Navarre, quite a few words 
have been claimed as borrowings from the Basque spoken in the area 
such as sarde ‘pitchfork’, zartaco (from zartako ‘bump, slap, spank’), etc. 
(Ciérvide 1979). These words have been labelled ‘léxico residual’ (‘residual 
lexicon’) to indicate they are remains of the Basque once spoken in the 
area. However, as Santazilia and Zuloaga (2018) point out, lexicographers 
should be cautious, since there is not always enough evidence to support 
this kind of claim.
Among the words registered as borrowings from Basque in Navarrese 
Spanish, we find nouns referring to objects (farming and domestic tools, 
musical instruments, food, games, shows’ characters  …), adjectives 
referring to personal qualities (physical appearance, personality traits …) 
and verbs referring to various human actions or experiences. Some of the 
lexical transfers from Basque into Spanish probably took place decades 
or centuries ago, through bilingual speakers who used a word from 
one language when speaking the other language. Others have occurred 
more recently, accelerated by cultural globalisation, mobility and new 
technologies. As Tabernero (2008, 2012) explains, this is the case of 
cultural loanwords which are known and used not only in the whole 
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region of Navarre and the Basque Country, but also in other areas of 
Spain as well: trikitixa (a musical instrument similar to a small accordion), 
pelotari ‘pelota player’ and chacolí (from txakoli (a kind of wine))—the 
last two already registered in the Dictionary of the Spanish Language by 
the Real Academia Española (2014).2
One of the reasons these borrowings came into Navarrese Spanish and 
got easily adopted over time by Navarrese Spanish monolinguals is the 
fact that they name things that do not exist in other places (certain 
objects, games etc.) or concepts that are culture-specific, like the words 
I am going to study here. Basque–Spanish bilinguals who started using 
these words when speaking Spanish most probably felt the need to 
express something that could not be conveyed with other Spanish words 
at their disposal. As Wierzbicka explains when talking about the lexicon 
of bilinguals, there are certain concepts that are never substituted by the 
other language counterparts:
For example, I think that in my own mental lexicon the concept 
linked with the Polish color word niebieski (from niebo ‘sky’) has 
never been replaced with the English concept ‘blue’ (much wider 
than that of niebieski). (2011a: 203)
The cases studied here, which have reached the other language as 
borrowings, correspond to these kinds of words: ‘those deeply rooted 
in perception and those which are linked with a given lingua-culture’s 
cultural key words’ (Wierzbicka 2011a: 203).3
At present, Navarrese Spanish monolinguals keep using these borrowings 
for the same reason, since they need to refer to the same things and to the 
same concepts that are culturally specific to the region.
2  It should be highlighted that all these loanwords have become part of the recipient language 
(Navarrese Spanish or, in a few cases, general Peninsular Spanish); that is, they are used, transmitted 
and modified according to Spanish rules and patterns.
3  The words chirrinta and ciriquiar have been chosen for this study among other existent Basque 
loanwords in Navarrese Spanish because, in my view, they constitute the most clear examples of how 
human experiences and actions have been culturally shaped by this community.
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3 . Txirrinta/Txirrintxa, Chirrinta/Chirrintas/
Chirrincha/Chirlinta: Sources and 
testimonies
The word chirrinta and its variant chirrincha was registered by Iribarren 
in his lexicographic work Vocabulario Navarro (Navarrese Vocabulary) 
(1984). He reports its use in the north, in Pamplona and in the Améscoa 
region (69  km west from Pamplona); that is, within the areas now 
established as ‘Basque-speaking’ (north) and ‘mixed’ (centre).4 Although 
other sources report its use in other areas of Navarre and in a few villages 
of neighbouring regions (Goicoechea 1961; De Cruchaga y Purroy 1970; 
Andolz 1992; Marín Royo 2006), judging by the testimonies found, it 
seems that, at present, the word is more generally used in northern and 
central Navarre.
The origin attributed to this word is the Basque txirrinta (Ciérvide 1979; 
Rebolé del Castillo 2003), which appears in different varieties of Basque 
spoken in Navarre and is defined by the General Dictionary of Basque 
(Michelena and Sarasola 1987–2013) as deseo, ansia ‘desire, want’. In my 
interviews with Spanish monolinguals, many speakers associated the word 
with the Basque language, since they chose the Basque graphemes (‘tx-’) 
instead of the Spanish ones (‘ch-’) when writing it. The hypothesis of the 
Basque origin of this word is reasonable, since it exists in this language 
with a similar meaning and it is nowadays mainly used by Spanish 
speakers from the ‘Basque-speaking’ and from the ‘mixed’ areas. However, 
as I explained above, more evidence, which has not yet been found, would 
be needed to confirm it.
In Iribarren’s dictionary (1984, s.v. chirrinta), this word appears with two 
different meanings: one meaning is described as deseo vehemente, capricho, 
anhelo, antojo ‘strong desire, caprice, wish, craving’ and the other as 
dentera, envidia, rabia, tirria ‘envy, jealousy, grudge, ill will’. The examples 
he provides for the first meaning are the following:
4  The regional government established in 1986, for administrative purposes, three linguistic areas: 
the Basque-speaking area in the north, the mixed area in the north and centre, and the non–Basque 
speaking area in the south. If we look at the number of speakers in each of these areas, we find that the 
biggest percentage of Basque speakers lives in the north, where 61.1 per cent of the population speak 
the language. By contrast, in the mixed area, the percentage of Basque speakers is 11.3 per cent and 
in the south is 2.7 per cent (Gobierno de Navarra et al. 2017).
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(1) ¡Tengo una chirrinta de ver Madrid!
‘I have such a chirrinta of seeing Madrid!’
(2) Me quedé con la chirrinta de comer churros.
‘I was left with the chirrinta of eating churros.’
For the second meaning, the example provided is:
(3) Le ha tomado chirrinta a su hermanica
‘He/She has taken a dislike to his/her little sister.’
In her sociolinguistic study of the lexicon of Pamplona, Aragüés (2003) 
finds that 60 per cent of the informants use this word, instead of other 
similar Spanish words, with the meaning of ‘strong desire for something’. 
More specifically, the context for which the informants used the word 
chirrinta is that of eating and food, in response to the following item in the 
questionnaire: ‘We all sometimes feel like eating special things: sometimes 
strawberries, some other times chocolate, some other salty things, etc. 
In that case, we say we have …?’. Regarding the second meaning of this 
word, only one informant used it to refer to envy or jealousy.
In my interviews, all users of this word and its variants give examples and 
explanations related to the first meaning; none of them recognises its use 
with the second. The information found in Aragüés (2003) and in my 
interviews makes it possible to presume that the second meaning is in the 
process of disappearing. Because of this, and provided the scarce evidences 
of the use of this word in its second meaning, I have decided to focus on 
the analysis of the first one.
4 . The prototypical scenario of chirrinta
Iribarren’s account (1984, s.v. chirrinta) seems to consider that this word 
refers to a strong desire to do something, and that this something could 
be equally visiting a place or eating something, that is, any activity. In the 
examples provided by the informants in my study, chirrinta and its graphic 
and phonological variants are primarily used in reference to the desire of 
eating some food (see examples (4) to (6)), although in a few of them the 
word appears in other contexts as well (see examples (7) and (8)):
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(4) Tengo txirrinta de txistorra
‘I have txirrinta of txistorra (a kind of chorizo).’
(5) Me he quedado con la chirrinta de unos churros
‘I have been left with the chirrinta for churros.’
(6) ¡Qué chirrinta de comer fresas!
‘What a chirrinta of eating strawberries!’
(7) Tengo chirrinta de ir a una sidrería
‘I have chirrinta of going to a cider house.’
(8) Tengo chirrintas de visitar ese pueblo
‘I have chirrintas of visiting that village.’
When asked about its possible use in other contexts, many of the speakers 
who used the word to refer to the desire of eating something considered 
examples like (7) and (8) acceptable, but reported that they would never 
use it in those contexts. Speakers who provided examples like (7) and (8), 
in turn, recognised examples like (4)–(6) as equally used by them. Hence, 
based on this evidence and on my own intuition as a native speaker, 
I think that feeling chirrinta is prototypically associated to some kind of 
desire to eat some food in particular.
The association of chirrinta with the desire to eat a particular food explains 
why, when trying to explain its meaning, many speakers mentioned the 
word antojo, used in general Spanish to refer to cravings. However, they 
made it clear that the Spanish word antojo, although close in meaning, 
corresponds to a very different concept, as we will discuss below.
The following example from an article about a gluten-intolerant boy that 
appeared in the regional newspaper Diario de Navarra illustrates the kind 
of feeling that chirrinta conveys. Also, although I will not go into this 
matter here, it is interesting to observe how this meaning of chirrinta 
is related to that second meaning of ‘envy and jealousy’ registered by 
Iribarren, which may have developed from the first (seeing somebody 
eating something makes you feel chirrinta of that something but it also 
may make you feel envious of that person).
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(9) Desde entonces, Jesús no ha tenido ningún problema de salud y una 
vez al año acude a una revisión. Pero no puede evitar pasar un poco 
de ‘chirrinta’. ‘La dieta la llevo muy bien, pero me da un poco de 
envidia no poder comer las mismas cosas que mis amigos, como 
bollos o palmeras. Y en los cumpleaños, cuando voy a sus casas, 
tampoco puedo comer todas las cosas. Ahora ya lo saben todos mis 
amigos y sus madres, pero antes me aburría de tener que contarle 
a todo el mundo que soy celíaco’.
‘Since then, Jesús has not had any health problem, and once a year he 
goes for a check-up. But he cannot help feeling a bit of ‘chirrinta’. 
‘I am dealing well with the diet, but it makes me feel jealous not 
being able to eat the same things as my friends, like a bun or a puff 
pastry. And at birthday parties, when I go to their homes, I can’t eat 
those things either. Now all my friends and their mothers know it, 
but in the past I was bored of having to tell everybody I was gluten 
intolerant’. (Lamariano, A dieta desde los dos años y medio, Diario 
de Navarra, 18 April 2009)
In the following lines I will analyse the prototypical scenario of chirrinta, 
based on this example, on my own insights as a native speaker and user 
of the word, and on the information gathered in the interviews.
First, as this example shows, chirrinta refers to a feeling of desire for some 
particular food, in this case, sweet buns and pastries. Although most 
examples provided include sweets or some kind of special food that one 
does not eat every day, speakers agreed that what is relevant is not the 
kind of food, but one’s feelings associated to past experiences of eating it. 
Thus, a person can feel chirrinta of something as common as fried eggs, 
as long as this person felt good when he/she ate them in the past. Some 
speakers highlighted this component, explaining that they feel chirrinta 
for things they ate in the past in pleasant situations and with their loved 
ones, for example, when their grandparents took them to a café to have 
chocolate with churros. Hence, unlike the Spanish word antojo, chirrinta 
involves thinking about that food in a particular way (recalling previous 
experiences) and includes an emotional component.
Second, the feeling of chirrinta seems to be triggered by one’s sensory 
perception of that food: the boy in example 9 feels chirrinta when seeing 
his friends eating buns and pastries. In my interviews, a general insight 
among speakers is that, though not necessarily simultaneous, there is 
usually something that triggers the feeling of chirrinta, most prototypically 
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seeing that food, although smelling it could also produce the same effect. 
Again, the word antojo does not imply any sensory perception of the 
desired food; feeling antojo is not prototypically linked to the presence of 
that food in the situational context.
Third, feeling chirrinta also seems to imply that the speaker has not been 
eating that food lately. Definitely, a person cannot say that he/she feels 
chirrinta for something he/she ate the day before, or for something that 
he/she eats usually. As I explained earlier, this feeling is associated with 
past pleasant situations, not everyday or very recent ones.
So, the prototypical scenario implied by chirrinta is that of a desire to eat 
some food that the speaker has just seen or is seeing, that he/she associates 
to past pleasant situations and that he/she has not eaten for some time.
5 . An NSM explication of chirrinta
Since chirrinta is an abstract noun, the frame proposed by Goddard and 
Wierzbicka (2014) for this kind of word has been used in the explication. 
On the other hand, the molecule eat [m] is needed in the explication. 
Semantic molecules are complex lexical meanings which, although could 
be further decomposed, function as ‘chunks’ in the semantic structure 
of more complex concepts (see Goddard 2007b, 2012). Among the 
different categories from which molecules are drawn, eat [m] belongs to 
the category of physical activities (Goddard 2007b, 2012).
[A] Chirrinta (e .g . Someone has chirrinta 
of something)
a . something
b . people can say what this something is with the word chirrinta
c . when someone says something with this word, this someone can 
think like this:
d . ‘It can be like this:
e . someone wants to eat [m] something at some time when this 
someone sees this something
f . because this someone thinks like this’:
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g . ‘I have eaten [m] this thing before now a few times
h . I felt something very good when I ate [m] this thing at these 
times
i . I haven’t eaten [m] this thing for some time
j . Because of this, I want to eat [m] this thing now’
Components (a) to (d) correspond to the frame used for the explications 
of abstract nouns, as proposed by Goddard and Wierzbicka (2014). 
Component (e) makes clear that chirrinta conveys the desire of someone 
to eat something and that this experience is triggered when this someone 
sees this particular food. Component (f ) introduces the prototypical 
thought content of the experiencer of chirrinta, which is spelled out in 
the four components of the cognitive scenario: (g) and (h) referred to the 
pleasant experience of eating this thing in the past; (i) referred to the time 
since the person last ate that thing; and finally (j) referred to the resulting 
desire to eat this thing.
6 . Ziriquiar/Ciriquiar: Sources and 
testimonies
The second word used in Navarrese Spanish that I am going to analyse is the 
verb ziriquiar/ciriquiar. This word, like the previous one, is also registered 
by Iribarren’s dictionary of Navarrese lexicon (1984) together with the 
variant ciricar. It appears with two orthographic variants: ziriquiar, which 
combines Basque (using the initial ‘z’) and Spanish (using ‘qu’ instead 
of the Basque ‘k’) spelling, and ciriquiar, which uses Spanish spelling. 
The phonetic variant ciriquear has been also found in some examples.
Iribarren registers its use in central and northern Navarre and, like 
Ciérvide (1979) and Rebolé del Castillo (2003), attributes its origin to 
the Basque zirikatu, which, according to the General Dictionary of Basque 
(Michelena and Sarasola 1987–2013), has different meanings such as: 
1. hurgar (con un palo, etc.) ‘to rummage (with a stick, etc.)’, 2. ‘inchar, 
punzar ‘to poke, to prick’, 3. tentar, provocar, incitar, hostigar ‘to tempt, to 
provoke, to incite, to annoy’.
There is no doubt that ciriquiar is semantically related to the Basque 
word zirikatu. Iribarren’s dictionary includes three meanings for ciriquiar. 
The first one is hurgar con un palo u otro objeto en un orificio ‘to rummage 
in a hole with a stick or another object’. The second, considered an 
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extension of the previous, is described as toquitear, manosear, enredar ‘to 
handle, to finger, to fiddle with’. The third one is molestar, importunar ‘to 
annoy, to pester’.
Due to the space limit of this contribution, I am going to focus on only 
one of the three meanings: ciriquiar3. This meaning is the most abstract 
and it seems to be a figurative development from the other two. It is 
the meaning that appears first in my interviews with Navarrese speakers 
and the only one registered by Ciérvide (1979) and Rebolé del Castillo 
(2003), who explain it as fastidiar, enredar ‘to annoy, to fidget with’ and 
importunar ‘to pester somebody’.
As the information given so far shows, ciriquiar3 is a complex concept that 
is not clearly defined by lexicographic sources, which only provide a very 
general and approximate idea of what this verb conveys. The cultural 
specificity of ciriquiar3 is mentioned in this text written by an English 
speaker living in Pamplona:
There is a word that I learnt thanks to reading one of the books 
written by that great Pamplonican doctor, writer and historian, 
Jose Joaquin Arazuri, that apparently is typically Navarran. 
The word is ‘ciriquiar.’ To make mischief. Well, Pamplona is full 
of mischief makers, jokers and comedians. I don’t know if the 
Catholic Church has a saint for that little trio of fun-folksters, 
but I think they should have. (heartofpamplona.com/sf-2018-
escalera-2 (site discontinued))
However, the cultural specificity of this word is overlooked by the author 
of this text when he offers the translation ‘to make mischief ’ as an 
equivalent to it. As many NSM studies have shown, it is not possible to 
explain the meaning of a word by translation means (Wierzbicka 2011b, 
2013; Goddard and Ye 2014; Wong 2018; among other works).
7 . The prototypical scenario of ciriquiar3
In this section I will try to explain the meaning of this verb on the basis of 
the testimonies found in written texts and the examples provided by the 
informants in the interviews.
The prototypical context in which ciriquiar3 appears is ‘A person ciriquia 
another person’—that is, it is a verb referring to an action that someone 
does to another person. Interestingly, when native speakers think about 
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the person who ciriquia, they immediately think of a child. In fact, 
although the word can be used in other contexts, when asked to provide 
examples of their use of this word, most interviewees provided contexts 
referring to children’s behaviour:
(10) ¡Deja de ciriquear a tu hermano!
‘Stop ciriquear-ing your brother!’
(11) Le encanta ciriquear, hasta que no le deja llorando a su hermano, 
no puede parar.
‘He loves ciriquear-ing, he does not stop until he leaves his brother 
crying.’
(12) Está todo el rato ciriqueando, y luego le sacuden. ¡Normal!
‘He is ciriquear-ing all the time and then he gets hit. What else does 
he expect?’
If these are the kind of examples that first come to mind to native speakers, 
it is reasonable to think that the kind of action that ciriquiar3 depicts is one 
usually carried out by children, even though adults can perform it too.
The second semantic component that can be drawn from these examples is 
that the action performed can be annoying—that is, it can make the other 
person feel something bad. In example (10), the speaker tells the child 
to stop doing it since he/she is considering the negative feelings that this 
action can produce in the child’s brother. In example (11), this component 
can clearly be seen since the action makes the boy cry. In example (12), 
this negative feeling produces a violent reaction against the person who 
ciriquea, which is judged by the speaker as a totally normal reaction. 
To  this respect, it should be noted that ciriquiar3 seems to involve 
a physical action, more specifically, it seems to involve touching the other 
person. This component of physical contact is consistent with the other 
two meanings of this verb (ciriquiar1 and ciriquiar2), both referring to 
touching something with the hands or with a stick.
Another aspect that should be pointed out is that this verb is always used 
in a non-perfective tense, like in these three examples. This means that 
when someone ciriquia another person, he/she does not do so in one 
moment, but rather, he/she does so for some time or repeatedly.
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Finally, ciriquiar3 seems to include an expectation on the part of the agent: 
when children act like this, they are expecting some kind of reaction from 
the other person.
The use of ciriquiar3 in the following testimony confirms these first 
insights about its meaning. In this case, the subject is not a child but 
a kiliki, a character with oversized head who comes out during festivals to 
tease children with a sponge tied with a thread to a stick:
(13) Toda la Comparsa sería menos alegre sin la presencia de los kilikis, que 
van ciriquiando a todos los críos, produciendo carreras y tonadillas 
jocosas a cada uno de los personajes por toda la chiquillería.
‘The whole troupe would be less lively without the presence of the 
kilikis, who go ciriquiar-ing all the children, producing runs and 
ditties by all the kids to each of the characters.’ (Ilargi, Vienen los 
gigantes, El tuto 14, 1989)
However, some testimonies have also been found where this verb is not 
used either in the context of children or to refer to an action involving 
physical contact. The following example illustrates such case:
(14) Los poetas de Umbría eran muy suyos. Eso sí, tenían, como todos los 
del mundo, la manía de no dejarse en paz ni a sol ni a sombra y de 
formar tribu y tener acólitos, cómplices, aliados, allegados, etc., etc., 
etc. … Había uno que disfrutaba enormemente haciendo daño al 
prójimo, confundiéndolo, mortificándolo, humillándolo, que luego 
se hizo psicoanalista para poder hacer lo mismo que antes pero con 
patente de corso, que le ciriquiaba a Eguren con que si sus versos 
no tenían pathos.
‘The poets from Umbría were very special. They had, like all poets in 
the world, a fixation with not giving each other a moment’s peace and 
with making tribes and having acolytes, accomplices, allies, intimates, 
etc., etc., etc. … There was one who enjoyed enormously doing harm 
to neighbours, confusing them, tormenting them, humiliating them; 
who later on became a psychoanalyst so that he could do the same 
thing he used to do but with a carte blanche, who used to ciriquiar 
Eguren saying that his verses didn’t have pathos.’ (Sánchez-Ostiz, Un 
infierno en el jardín, 1995; in Real Academia Española (n.d.))
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This kind of testimony shows that, although the prototypical situation 
that this verb evokes is a child touching another child repeatedly and for 
some time, ciriquiar3 can also be used to refer to adults doing things that 
don’t imply physical contact but can be equally annoying and conform to 
the features of that kind of behaviour discussed above.
8 . An NSM explication of ciriquiar3
Based on the information on the meaning of this word explained in the 
previous section, I propose below an NSM explication of ciriquiar3. For 
this explication, two molecules are needed: child [m], which belongs to 
the category of basic social groups, and hand [m], which is included in the 
category of body parts (Goddard 2007b, 2012).
[B] Ciriquiar3 (e .g . Someone X was ciriquiar-ing 
someone Y)
a . someone X was doing something of one kind to someone else Y 
for some time
b . like a child [m] can do something of this kind when this child [m] thinks 
like this:
c . ‘I want this someone to feel something bad now
d . because of this, I will do something with my hand [m] now
e . if I do this, my hand [m] will be touching this someone’s part 
of the body many times for some time
f . I want this someone to do something because of this’
g . because someone X was doing it to someone Y for some time, 
someone Y felt something bad
Since ciriquiar3 is prototypically a physical action, the first component 
corresponds to the lexicosyntactic frame of physical activity verbs (Goddard 
2012, among others). The second component introduces the prototypical 
motivational scenario, which includes the reference to children as the 
prototypical agents of this kind of action. This prototypical motivational 
scenario is spelled out in components (c) to (f ), expressing the intention 
to annoy the other person by touching this person repeatedly and the 
expectation of a reaction from him/her. Finally, component (g) expresses 
the negative feelings that this action produces in the other person.
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9 . Conclusion
This contribution has sought to explain the meaning of chirrinta and 
ciriquiar3, two loanwords of cultural relevance used by Navarrese Spanish 
speakers, which are unknown to speakers from other areas of Spain. 
As has been discussed, the few regional dictionaries that offer information 
about these words fail to spell their meaning out, probably because of 
their cultural specificity and the absence of equivalents in general Spanish. 
The present study has shown that, in spite of their complexity, these two 
culture-specific words can be fully understood by non-native speakers 
through NSM explications based on simple universal concepts. As Anna 
Wierzbicka has argued in her numerous publications, it is only through 
this self-explanatory set of semantic primes that complex meanings can be 
explained and compared in an intelligible way. Although they constitute 
a first approach and they may be subject to future revisions, the explications 
provided here will definitely help Spanish speakers as well as speakers of 
other languages to understand these two culture-specific concepts.
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Time in Portuguese saudade 
and other words of longing
Zuzanna Bułat Silva
1 . Introduction
The basic aim of this article is to see how the category of time relates to the 
domain of emotions. I believe that the dimension of time is important 
while defining emotion concepts and that the recognition of this fact can 
have profound consequences for cross-cultural psychology.1 Drawing on 
some Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) explications of emotions2 
referring to ‘pain caused by distance’ in different languages, I am going to 
show the differences between various cultural conceptualisations of that 
‘intersection’ of emotional spectrum. Comparing the Portuguese word 
saudade, roughly ‘longing’, with its Polish (tęsknota), Spanish (morriña), 
and Chinese (chou) counterparts, I am going to look at how the domain 
of time is captured in their meaning and how time relates to the intensity 
of emotions described by these terms. To be able to express myself from 
a culturally neutral perspective, I will rely here on the NSM approach 
(Wierzbicka 1996; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002). Thanks to NSM, 
1  The previous versions of this article were presented at the STALDAC conference, held at the 
University of Cambridge, UK, in April 2010 and at the talk given at the School of Language Studies, 
ANU, Canberra, in August 2013.
2  When I refer to emotions in this article, in most cases I mean ‘emotion concepts embedded 
in words’.
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
212
we are able, as Wierzbicka (2009: 4) notes, to ‘explore human emotions 
from a universal point of view, independent of any particular languages 
and cultures’.
The present article will be organised as follows. First, in section 2, the NSM 
primes referring to time will be examined. Then, in section 3 different 
ways in which emotions may relate to time will be discussed. Section 4 
will consist of the presentation of a key Portuguese emotion, saudade, 
together with its metalinguistic explication. And finally, in section 5, the 
explication of saudade will be contrasted with the explications of tęsknota, 
morriña and chou in order to show the different role time plays in each 
of these emotions.
2 . Semantic primes referring to the 
domain of Time
NSM is a theory of semantic analysis that has been developed over the 
period of more than 40 years. There are eight time primes in the most 
recent version of NSM: when~time,3 now, before, after, a long time, 
a short time, for some time and moment. As with all the NSM primes, 
it is assumed that they exist in all languages in the world. Interestingly, 
in the earliest versions of NSM (Wierzbicka 1972), there were no time 
primes at all; temporal phenomena were defined via ‘worlds becoming 
worlds’ (Goddard 1998: 325).
Basic time primes proposed in Goddard and Wierzbicka (1994) were 
when, before and after. The authors argued that in every language one 
may ask simple questions, such as: ‘When did it happen?’ or ‘When will 
you do it?’, and also ‘This someone died before this other someone’ or ‘This 
other someone died after this someone’ (see Wierzbicka 1996: 57). Thanks 
to the categorical element when~time, it is easy to explicate different time 
adverbs. Then can be explained as ‘at that time’; often—‘at many times’; 
always—‘at all times’; sometimes—‘at some times’; and ago—‘some time 
before’. when~time can be used with all the predicates as a ‘temporal 
adjunct’, as in ‘at that time you did something bad’ or ‘some time before 
these people were doing something else’ (Wierzbicka 1996: 132; Goddard 
3  when and time are two English allolexes (contextual variants) of the same prime.
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and Wierzbicka 2002: 66).4 These temporal adjuncts are best identified 
with reference to the prime now, introduced in 1996; in other words, 
if one can substitute the temporal phrase with now (or at this time), it is 
well-formed (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002: 67).
As for after and before, at first sight, one may contend that they are 
converses, so there is no need to postulate them both as primes. But as 
the authors of the NSM approach state (Wierzbicka 1996: 57; Goddard 
1998: 326; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002: 15–16), there is a difference 
in perspective, a different configuration of trajector and landmark, if we 
were to use Langackerean terms (see Langacker 2009). ‘Y happened after 
X’ cannot be paraphrased without loss of meaning as ‘X happened before 
Y’; it is a matter of a different viewpoint. Reducing the two to something 
as ‘temporal sequence’ also seems counterintuitive, because it is much 
easier to find terms such as after and before across languages of the 
world, than the very abstract term of ‘temporal sequence’.
In the classic NSM work, Semantics: Primes and Universals (Wierzbicka 
1996), the time set was expanded. Four new primes were added—two 
duration (or time period) antonyms a long time and a short time, 
accounting for the ‘passage of time’, a deictic now and a ‘vague’ duration 
term for some time, which was posited only tentatively. As for now, it 
was earlier believed that it could be explicated as ‘when I say this’, but 
then it was discovered that the range of application of now is much 
wider (Wierzbicka 1996: 100; Goddard 1998: 328). now, being the 
basic deictic time marker, is used with all NSM predicates, especially the 
mental ones: ‘now I know/feel/see … something’. The duration primes 
a long time and a short time combine not only with predicates such 
as do, happen, move, live, but also with mental predicates feel and 
think: ‘I felt something bad for a long time’. What is less obvious is that 
they both collocate well with before and after, and hence can appear 
within temporal adjuncts, as in ‘it happened a long time before’ (see also 
Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002: 70). And they can function on their own, 
as can be seen from the previous examples, as ‘durational adjuncts’. What 
is important to note though, is that the range of contexts in which they 
4  when can also be used in a bi-clausal construction, such as: ‘when I did these things, I felt 
something bad’ (see Wierzbicka 1996: 132).
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can occur depends on the lexical aspect of the predicate (one may say ‘this 
someone lived for a long time’, but not *‘this someone died for a long 
time’, see Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002: 71).5
The most recent time prime is moment, added in 2002 (Goddard 2002: 
301). This prime accounts for the immediacy of some actions and reactions, 
and expresses the idea of suddenness (Goddard 2018: 75). It is, so to 
say, punctual, it is time with almost no duration: such as in ‘it happened 
a moment before’. And, as we can see from this example, moment, just as 
the duration primes, can be used with before and after.6
Interestingly, in many languages of the world (e.g. Polish, Hopi, Kayardild) 
the exponents of before and after are polysemous and mean also 
‘in front of ’ or ‘going ahead of ’ and ‘behind’ or ‘following’, respectively 
(see also Goddard 2001: 46; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002: 68). It is 
worth noting here that there is a strict correspondence between the NSM 
primes of time and space. As Goddard and Wierzbicka put it:
There is a certain degree of parallelism in the inventory of proposed 
primes of time and space … we can see that both domains have 
a ‘categorical’ or substantive-like element [correspondingly 
when~time and where~place], that both have a deictic element 
[now and here], that both have a pair of relational antonyms 
[after, before and above, below], and also a pair of ‘scalar’ 
antonyms [a long time, a short time and far, near]. In view 
of these facts, it is not surprising that there are numerous parallels 
in the combinatorial characteristics of temporal expressions and 
spatial expressions. (2002: 66)
3 . Emotions and Time
As Averill (1994: 384, 385) points out, our emotional experience ‘is not 
static, but [it] extends in time’ and ‘emotions differ greatly in their temporal 
course’. Many researchers view emotions as scripts, narratives or scenarios 
5  One may think that these durational elements, a long time and a short time, are based on the 
prime time, and hence are too complicated to be considered primitive. We must remember though 
that in many languages their exponents are simple, unanalysable words—e.g. in Polish, długo and 
krótko—that have nothing to do with the lexical exponent of the prime when~time (see Goddard 
and Wierzbicka 2002: 67).
6  The introduction of the prime moment is also related to the fact that the combination ‘a very 
short time’ is not available cross-linguistically (Goddard 2002: 301–03).
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(see e.g. Shweder 1994; Kövecses 1995; Apresjan and Apresjan 2000). 
If emotions are narratives, they extend over time, hence the importance of 
temporal primes in their explications.
Within the NSM framework, emotions are normally defined through 
a  prototypical cognitive scenario (Goddard 1998: 95; Goddard 2018: 
70). Usually there is someone who ‘is thinking about something’ that 
he did or about something that happened or can happen to him. As a 
result, this person is feeling ‘something good’ or ‘something bad’ for 
some time. Hence, the prototypical scenario gives us a clue how a person 
experiencing the given emotion may feel. These thoughts and feelings 
are considered a prototype of the emotion in question: ‘like people often 
feel when they think like this’. As Páez and Vergara (1995: 415) note, the 
prototypical emotional scenarios ‘are embedded in, and dependent on, 
culture’. That is why emotion terms are so different in every linguaculture. 
And they can be seen as ‘a record of how earlier generations of speakers of 
a given language thought about their feelings’ (Besemeres and Wierzbicka 
2010: 20). In a sense, names of emotions are linguistic artefacts in which 
past experiences of a given community are crystallised. As such, they are 
dependent on the geographical and historical conditions that community 
lives in (for interesting examples, see Briggs 1971 on Inuit emotions). 
By analysing emotion names, we gain an insight into the history of 
that community. It is not surprising that in Portuguese we find a word 
saudade, an emotion term basic to the Portuguese identity, that relates to 
the centuries-long history of Portuguese colonisation of the world and 
to the separation of families caused by that maritime expansion.
Emotions may also differ as far as time perspective is concerned. Some 
of them relate to past experiences, others are about things happening 
now and ‘have distinctly present perspective’ (Goddard 1998: 92 on 
happy and joy; see also Goddard 2018: 77 on pleased and contented ). 
Emotions differ in their intensity as well. ‘Some emotions are more like 
sneezes, others more like crimes’, as Dixon (2003: 246) notes, wittily. 
And, as Clore (1994: 391) suggests, emotional intensity is a function of 
amplitude multiplied by duration, rather than merely amplitude. So there 
must be some correlation between the duration and the intensity of an 
emotion. Expressions like for some time and in one moment help us to 
distinguish between prolonged feelings (e.g. saudade) and momentary 
ones (e.g. surprise; see also Goddard 2018: 71).
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According to some psychologists (Davidson 1994: 51; Ekman 1994: 16), 
emotions do not last longer than a few minutes, and if they do, they are 
dysfunctional (Ekman and Davidson 1994: 419; see also Ekman 1994: 16: 
‘[h]ere is not the place to argue about just how long an emotion typically 
lasts, but certainly it is not hours or days, but more in the realm of minutes 
and seconds’). Watson and Clark (1994: 90) claim along similar lines 
that ‘emotions … are typically quite short-lived in their full form, lasting 
only a few seconds or perhaps minutes’. Ekman (1994: 56) goes even 
further, stating that the emotional state that lasts several weeks should 
be classified as an affective disorder. As I will try to demonstrate later, 
this is a very Anglocentric point of view.7 In many cultures of the world, 
people are used to feelings that go on for hours, or even days, and consider 
long-lasting and intense emotional states as a sign of mental health, not 
an affective disorder (see e.g. Wierzbicka 1995: 22 on how absence of 
emotions is perceived as an indicator of ‘a deadening of a person’s duša 
(‘heart/soul’)’ in Russian culture).
There is one more question we should touch upon in speaking of the 
relations between emotions and time. Time perception is a very subjective 
phenomenon, there is no unique sense of time, but there are multiple 
experiences of time. And, most importantly, our judgement of time 
depends on how we feel. When we are happy, ‘time flies’.8 On the 
contrary, when we are in deep sorrow, time may almost stop (see Droit-
Vallet and Gil 2009: 1947, on how sadness induces a general slowing 
down). As Geoffard and Luchini (2010: 271) say, ‘time is not exogenous 
to the individual, it is elastic, and this will be influenced by the emotion 
the person experiences’.
As we can see, investigating the relations between time and emotions 
is a  fascinating field of study, and there certainly is a ‘critical need for 
research on the temporal dynamics of emotional processing’ (Ekman and 
Davidson 1994: 419). Exploring the topic in more depth is beyond the 
scope of the present chapter though, so let us proceed to see how four 
emotion concepts referring to ‘longing’ differ in their time perspective.
7  As one of the anonymous reviewers of this chapter rightly noticed, it may be more a question of 
what English-speaking psychologists and not ordinary speakers of English have in mind when they 
talk about emotions.
8  At the same time, when we are happy, we often feel we have plenty of time, even though it passes 
by quickly; in fact, research shows that experiencing awe leads to expanding one’s perceptions of time 
availability (see Rudd et al. 2012).
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4 . Portuguese saudade
Saudade is a key emotion term in Portuguese, usually translated into 
English as longing, missing, homesickness or nostalgia. Its uniqueness resides 
in the fact that for a long time the Portuguese have seen it as a national 
identity marker. It is said to have emerged during the times of Great 
Portuguese Discoveries (Época dos Descobrimentos), when many left their 
families and departed to the unknown. Those left behind, suffering from 
the absence of their loved ones and longing for their return, thought of 
them with a mixture of melancholy and pride (see Bułat Silva 2012).
The Great Dictionary of the Portuguese Language (Machado 1981: 13) 
states that saudade is ‘a word that probably doesn’t have equivalents in 
other languages, and that expresses a lot of feelings, especially melancholy, 
caused by recalling something good that one was deprived of ’.9 In the 
Dictionary of Contemporary Portuguese Language (Casteleiro 2001), 
saudade is defined as ‘a memory of something that was pleasant but is 
distant in terms of time or space’.10 In my opinion, it refers more to the 
domain of time than to the domain of space, and not simply to distance 
in time, but rather, I believe, it is the past that constitutes the prototypical 
object of saudade (Bułat Silva 2012: 207). One may say that saudade is 
a feeling about times gone by. But, interestingly enough, it can also refer 
to the future (one may have saudades do futuro, ‘saudades of the future’). 
It is typically an overwhelming and long-lasting feeling. The element of 
‘thinking’, recalling the past, is inherent to its meaning (saudades in plural 
can also mean ‘memories’, see Casteleiro 2001). As I have written earlier 
(Bułat Silva 2012), equally important is the positive evaluation it has in 
the Portuguese culture—‘não ha nada mais triste que a saudade de saudade’, 
‘there’s nothing sadder than saudade of saudade’ (Barreto 1959: 22). When 
we have a look at the verbs that collocate most frequently with saudade, the 
impression of its intensity is even stronger. One may morrer de saudade, 
‘die of saudade’, and one can also matar saudade, ‘kill saudade’ (by seeing 
people he missed so badly), just as one can morrer de fome, ‘die out of 
hunger’, and matar a fome, ‘kill the hunger’ (by eating something). These 
parallels in metaphorical expressions show that psychological reaction to 
saudade may be similar to the body’s reaction to hunger (see Apresjan and 
9  Vocábulo considerado sem equivalente noutras línguas e que exprime multiplicidade de sentimentos, 
sobretudo a melancolia causada pela lembrança do bem do qual se está privado.
10  Recordação de alguma coisa que foi agradável mas que está distante no tempo ou no espaço.
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Apresjan 2000: 205: ‘emotion is hardly ever expressed directly, but always 
compared to something’). And just as hunger, saudade is perceived as an 
emotion that doesn’t leave much space for other thoughts or feelings.
Now let us try to summarise what have just been said about saudade, using 
the simple and cross-translatable words of NSM:
[A] Tenho saudades de …
a . I think like this:
b . some time before something very good was happening to me 
for some time
c . I felt something very good because of this
d . it is not happening now
e . I very much want this to be happening now
f . I know it can’t happen anymore
g . this is bad
h . I can’t not think about it
i . at the same time I think like this:
j . some time before something very good was happening to me 
for some time
k . I felt something very good because of this
l . I can think about it now
m . this is good
n . when I think like this, I feel something like people feel at many times 
when they think like this for a long time
o . it is good if someone can feel something like this
Source: Bułat Silva (2012: 207).
The explication in [A] starts with ‘I think’ to capture the element of 
nostalgic thoughts that constitute the base for the feeling (a). Saudade is 
paradoxical—its cognitive scenario is that of having ambiguous thoughts 
about the past. Therefore someone thinks: ‘some time before something 
very good was happening to me for some time’ (b) and because of that 
‘I felt something very good’ (c). But it is not happening anymore (d), 
even though this person would very much like it to be happening (e). 
It is a very acute feeling. And that fact is stressed by the use of the deictic 
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now twice. First, in line (d) when the person experiences some kind of 
loss or emptiness and then, in line (e) when this somebody desires to 
revive the past. There is also some kind of Portuguese fatalistic resignation 
towards the future embedded in (f ), ‘I know it can’t happen anymore’, 
and a negative appraisal, ‘this is bad’, in (g). The pervasiveness of saudade 
is captured in line (h): ‘I can’t not think about it’. At the same time the 
person appreciates having good past experiences (j) and feelings (k). Those 
memories are a reason for a positive appraisal now (l, m). All this makes 
this person feel ‘something like people often feel when they think like this 
for a long time’. In that component the long-lasting quality of saudade is 
substantiated. The very last component (o) shows that saudade is positively 
valued in the Portuguese culture.
5 . Saudade and other emotions of longing
5 .1 . Saudade vs tęsknota
Patrick Farell, in his article ‘Portuguese saudade and other emotions of 
absence and longing’ (2006: 336), suggested that of all the languages 
known to him, the closest counterpart of Portuguese saudade is the 
Polish word tęsknota. I must disagree with him though. In spite of 
being a very salient Polish emotion word, tęsknota has a different focus 
than that of saudade. Having a quick look at the explications of the 
two ([A] and [B] respectively), we may easily see that tęsknota is much 
more space-oriented. As Wierzbicka (1992: 125) argues, it has ojczyzna, 
‘patria’, as its prototypical stimulus. Tęsknota is said to have gained its 
status of a Polish key concept during the so-called Great Emigration in 
the nineteenth century. In 1795, Polish lands were divided and seized (for 
the third time) by three neighbouring powers, Austria, Prussia and Russia, 
and that caused a great exile of the political, literary and artistic elite. 
One of the dominant themes (and the driving force) of their work was 
tęsknota, the pain of being away from their homeland (cf. Goddard and 
Wierzbicka 2008: 205–07). Today tęsknota is often felt towards a person, 
as in the explication quoted below, but even then it implies absence or 
separation in space rather than in time. One feels something very bad, 
because one thinks about someone who is very far from the place that 
person is. In NSM simple terms, the verb tęsknić, ‘to have tęsknota towards 
someone’ is explicated as follows:
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[B] ktoś (X) tęskni do kogoś (Y)
a . this someone (X) thinks about someone else (Y)
b . when X thinks about Y, X feels something very bad
c . like someone can feel when they think like this about someone:
d . this someone is very far from the place where I am now
e . because of this I can’t be with this someone now
f . when I was with this someone before, I felt something good
g . I want to be with this someone now
Source: Goddard and Wierzbicka (2008: 206).11
As we can see, there are less temporal primes featuring in the above 
definition, and it is due to the fact that prototypical stimulus of tęsknota 
is distance in space, not in time12 (although tęsknota is also a very acute 
feeling: the deictic now is used three times in its explication). It is important 
to distinguish two syntactic frames of the verb tęsknić: tęsknić do and tęsknić 
za.13 According to Grzegorczykowa (1999), the former is future-oriented, 
while the latter is past-oriented and somewhat fatalistic, but both refer to 
cierpienie wywołane rozłąką z bliskimi ludźmi (miejscami), ‘pain caused by 
separation from a beloved person (or place)’ (Grzegorczykowa 1999: 203). 
Saudade, as it was said before, is time-oriented, it is about something 
good one had in the past, and it can also refer to something good that can 
happen in the future, but it most likely won’t—as in saudades do futuro, 
‘nostalgia of the future’, or saudades do que ainda não aconteceu, ‘saudades 
of something that hasn’t come to being yet’.
5 .2 . Saudade vs morriña
Interestingly, saudade doesn’t have a cognate in Spanish. Maybe the 
closest Spanish counterpart of saudade would be añoranza, ‘longing‘ 
(from añorar, ‘recordar con pena la ausencia, privación o pérdida de alguien 
11  For the explication of tęsknić do miejsca, ‘to feel tęsknota towards a place’, see Goddard (2018: 80).
12  One of the anonymous reviewers of this chapter suggested that the prototypical stimulus of 
tęsknota is nieobecność ‘absence’ rather spatial distance. I think being separated from one another 
implies distance in space, whatever the reason for that separation is (emigration, work travel, end of 
the relationship).
13  Do is roughly ‘to’ in English, and za could be translated as ‘for’. Actually, there is one more 
syntactic frame tęsknić po, roughly ‘after’, but as it is an archaic expression (which can be found e.g. in 
Adam Mickiewicz’s works), it lies beyond the scope of the present chapter.
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o algo muy querido’ ‘to recall with sorrow the absence or loss of someone 
or something we love’, see RAE 2014). Often saudade is translated into 
Spanish as nostalgia. And there is one more Spanish word of Galician origin 
that can be considered equivalent to saudade, that is morriña, defined by 
the Dictionary of Spanish Language as ‘tristeza o melancolía, especialmente 
la nostalgia de la tierra natal ’, ‘sadness or melancholy, especially nostalgia 
for one’s homeland’ (RAE 2014). Morriña is said to emerge as a result of 
the emigration of people from rural Spain to Argentina in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, so it is strongly space-oriented, very much like 
Polish tęsknota (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2008). Unlike tęsknota though, 
morriña has also a very clear reference to the past, specifically to the times 
of one’s childhood. As the explication in [C] says:
[C] morriña
a . someone (X) thinks about this place (Y)
b . when X thinks about place Y, X feels something bad
c . like someone can feel when they think like this about a place:
d . ‘I am like a part of this small place
e . I did many things with people there when I was a child [m]
f . I felt many good things at many times when I was there
g . I want to be in this place now
h . I know that I can’t be in this place now because it is far from here’
Source: Goddard and Wierzbicka (2008: 12).
Morriña has one’s tierra natal, ‘homeland’ or ‘land of one’s birth’ (Heimat 
in German), as a prototypical target (small place in line (d)). One is 
far away from that place and cannot easily come back (g–h). Morriña 
is accompanied by memories of one’s childhood (e) and of happiness 
resulting from being a part of a community and sharing joys and troubles 
with it (f ).14 Morriña is similar to saudade in that memory-based element. 
Comparing to saudade though, it is more focused on space, but they both 
share the component of a desire that cannot be fulfilled (line (f ) in [A] 
and (h) in [C]) that Polish tęsknota lacks.
14  In the most recent explication of morriña in Goddard (2018: 83), there is a stronger reference to 
community. Line (d) in [C] is rewritten as ‘some people are like a part of this small place, I am one 
of these people’.
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5 .3 . Saudade and chou
Having compared saudade with two ‘nostalgic emotions’ relating to space, 
tęsknota and morriña, let us look now at a Chinese nostalgia, chou, that 
is, just like saudade, time-oriented. Unlike saudade though, it refers more 
to the present than to the past. Chou is a very salient Chinese emotion 
usually translated into English as ‘sadness’, ‘homesickness’ or ‘profound 
melancholy’ (Ye 2001: 378–91). Comparing to other sadness words in 
Chinese, bei (roughly ‘sorrow’, ‘sadness’) and ai (‘sorrow’, ‘grief ’), chou is 
strikingly ego-oriented. When describing chou, Ye (2001: 379) gives the 
following glosses ‘sadness at leaving a friend; the loneliness of setting out 
on a journey in a tiny boat on the vast sea; … emptiness …; yearning …; 
depression and dissatisfaction caused by the inability to achieve what one 
yearns for; confusion in not knowing what to do …; the inability to put 
an end to one’s chou’.
[D] chou
a . X felt something because X thought something
b . sometimes a person thinks:
c . ‘something very bad is happening to me
d . before this, I did not think this would happen
e . I don’t want things like this to happen to me
f . because of this, I want to do something if I can
g . I don’t know what to do
h . I cannot not think about this all the time’
i . when this person thinks this, this person feels something bad 
for a long time
j . X felt something like this
k . because X thought something like this
Source: Ye (2001: 383) .
When we look at the NSM definition in [D] proposed by Ye (2001: 383), 
we may see that chou is experienced in difficult, stressful and unpredictable 
situations (‘something very bad is happening to me/before this I did not 
think this would happen’, (c)–(f )). The experiencer is confused and doesn’t 
know what to do (g). The feeling of chou is overwhelming and persistent 
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and this person cannot stop thinking about bad things that are happening 
to them (h). The component (i) conveys the long duration of chou, ‘this 
person feels something bad for a long time’. If we compare saudade to chou, 
we can see immediately that both of them are long-lasting emotions.15 They 
are both overwhelming, pervasive feelings—one cannot stop thinking 
about what is happening. We may notice that in the definition of chou 
this pervasiveness is even more intense—it is stressed by the expression all 
the time in line (h). While saudade is a bipolar, paradoxical feeling based 
on both positive and negative thoughts towards the past, chou is negative 
and refers in a more straightforward manner to ‘feeling something bad’.
6 . Concluding remarks
The present comparison of ‘nostalgia’ terms in Portuguese, Polish, Spanish 
and Chinese seems to confirm the fact already pointed out by Geertz 
(1973: 81) that emotions are cultural artefacts. We cannot translate 
emotion names easily, because of rich semantic content such words 
possess. Nostalgia-like emotion terms have a special relation to the past, 
and a great deal of what happened to a given community can be seen 
when we unpack their meaning. Saudade recalls the epoch of Great 
Portuguese Discoveries (Época dos Descobrimentos), when the Portuguese 
were one of the most powerful nations in the world. Tęsknota speaks about 
the three partitions of Poland, and the great pain of those who had to 
leave the country. Morriña brings into one’s mind millions of gallegos who 
emigrated to Argentina and Chile in the nineteenth century. As Apresjan 
and Apresjan (2000: 203) note, ‘language contains the experience of 
millennia of psychological and cultural introspection and its data are every 
bit as reliable as those provided by experimental research’. By studying 
semantics we may learn a lot about history.
Emotions are not punctual, but they are more like stories or scenarios that 
extend in time. And, as we have seen, in some cultures emotions that we 
refer to as ‘longing’ simply last longer than in others. Saudade and chou 
seem to be more pervasive, more overwhelming emotions than morriña 
and tęsknota. Why is that so? My hypothesis would be that what makes 
saudade such a long-lasting feeling is the change between all the good 
15  Note that also toska, a Russian word for ‘longing’ or ‘ennui’ shares the same component of lasting 
for hours or even days, see Wierzbicka (1992).
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memories of the past and the present feelings of emptiness and absence 
that are experienced by the subject. It is this constant change between 
feeling something good and feeling something bad that allows saudade to 
persist for such long periods of time. It does not focus on something bad 
happening to a person, but rather submerges in the past and then comes 
back to the present. And it is that swinging motion between good and 
bad feelings that allows the time pendulum to go on for so long. Further 
studies on chou are needed in order to explain its long-lasting quality.
We can also note that the emotions we feel change our subjective sense 
of time. When we feel nostalgic, or sad, time is most likely to slow down 
and we may experience it differently. Portuguese identity is said to be 
based on experiencing saudade—maybe this is why Portuguese people are 
perceived as passive by their more energetic Spanish neighbours?
Summing up, we may say that emotions relate to time in three different 
ways—as cultural artefacts of the past (1), as scenarios taking place within 
a specific amount of time (2) and as psychological processes that can 
change our subjective sense of time, adjusting our internal clock to the 
kind of emotion we feel (3).
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Lost in translation: 
A semantic analysis 
of no da in Japanese
Yuko Asano-Cavanagh
1 . Introduction
The Japanese expression no da (のだ, as well as its variants n da んだ and no 
の) is frequently used at the end of a sentence and it adds a nuance to the 
statement (Alfonso 1966). Syntactically, no da consists of the nominalising 
particle no and the copulative da, and no da roughly corresponds to it is 
a fact that (Aoki 1986), or it is that in English (Kuno 1973a; Noda 1997). 
A translation of no da is commonly considered untranslatable or unnecessary 
when converting text from Japanese into English. For example (Yoshimoto 
1988: 180; translated by Backus 1993: 121):
(1) いつか冬の日、等が言った。「弟がいるんだけどさ、柊っていうん
だ。」
‘One winter day Hitoshi had said, “I have a younger brother. His name 
is Hiiragi.”’
In (1), a man is stating the fact that he has a younger brother and his name 
is Hiiragi. N da (んだ) appears twice in the original Japanese; however, 
the meaning is not expressed at all in the English translation of the text. 
Although n da is lost in translation, these utterances in Japanese without 
n da would indisputably sound unnatural. As a consequence, it can be 
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assumed that n da in Japanese has a significant, definable meaning and 
relevance. The following example is also worthy of consideration and 




N da is used in giving a command to the listener, and without n da, 
the utterance in (2) would not convey the same meaning. As Wierzbicka 
(2003) and Wong (2004) state, the meaning of particles is crucial to 
the interaction between interlocutors. Particles ‘express the speaker’s 
attitude towards the addressee, or towards the situation spoken about, 
his assumptions, his intentions, his emotions’ (Wierzbicka 2003: 341). 
The meaning of a particle can be so subtle that the intended proposition 
would not significantly differ, in a practical sense, with or without the 
particle being used. Notwithstanding this, however, mastering the 
meaning and function of particles significantly enhances a speaker’s 
ability to communicate.2 In fact, in the field of teaching Japanese, several 
error analyses have been carried out regarding no da, indicating that the 
expression is a difficult but crucial form to understand and master for 
learners of Japanese (McGloin 1984; Koganemaru 1990).
There are a considerable number of studies dedicated to clarifying the 
meaning of no da (e.g. Alfonso 1966; Kuno 1973a, 1973b; McGloin 
1984; Koganemaru 1990; Tanomura 1990; Maynard 1992; Noda 1993, 
1997; Najima 2007). The research here mentioned has helped to define the 
function of no da. However, from a semantic point of view, the definitions 
are inadequate. They do not comprehensively articulate the exact 
meanings of no da, as they equally apply to other particles. This study uses 
the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach (Wierzbicka 1986, 
2003, 2006, 2010; Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994, 2002; Goddard 1998; 
Peeters 2006) to examine the semantics of no da, using examples found in 
newspaper articles, tweets, blogs and translated texts. As a full study of no 
da including its variants lies outside the scope of this study, this chapter 
will focus on the semantics of no da, which are considered to represent 
an ‘explanation’ (Alfonso 1966; Kuno 1973a, 1973b), or to indicate the 
1  seiga.nicovideo.jp/seiga/im5830462 (2016).
2  It has been pointed out that the misuse of particles could be considered a reflection of the speaker’s 
lack of communicative skills rather than as a grammatical mistake (Wong 2004; Saigo 2011).
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speaker’s mood (Koganemaru 1990; Noda 1993, 1997). The  following 
section includes an examination of studies that have elaborated on the use 
of no da in a variety of contexts, shedding light on the above mentioned 
uses of no da. This is followed by a practical application of the NSM 
framework, which will clarify two distinct meanings expressed by no da.
2 . Previous research on no da
2 .1 . Arguments in previous research
Among the previous analyses on the meanings of no da, Kuno (1973a, 
1973b), Noda (1993, 1997) and Najima’s studies (2007) are particularly 
noteworthy as they were detailed investigations that greatly helped in 
clarifying the functions and meanings of no da. First, Kuno (1973a, 
1973b) states that no da is used to offer an ‘explanation’ for something the 
speaker has said or done, or for a state or condition (1973b: 144):
(3) 風邪を引きました。雨に濡れたんです。
‘I have caught a cold. I got wet in the rain.’
(4) 体重が１０ポンド減りました。病気なのです。
‘I have lost 10 pounds. I am sick.’
No da in (3) indicates that ‘the explanation for catching a cold is that 
I got wet in the rain’. In (4) no da means that ‘the explanation for losing 
10 pounds is that I am sick’. In both examples, the explanation is also the 
cause or reason for the preceding situation, and the meaning is almost the 
same as ‘I have caught a cold. It is because I got wet in the rain’, or ‘I have 
lost 10 pounds. It is because I am sick’. However, Kuno also states that 
there is another usage of no da, which cannot be paraphrased with ‘it is 
because’. Kuno instead, uses the term ‘evidence’, as demonstrated in the 
following example (1973a: 226):
(5) 病気です。体重が１０ポンド減ったのです。
‘I am sick. The evidence for my being sick is that I have lost 10 pounds.’
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(6) 僕は馬鹿です。いくら勉強してもダメなのです。
‘I am a fool. The evidence for my being a fool is that I am no good 
however hard I may study.’
Kuno argues that ‘losing 10 pounds’ is presented as evidence for ‘being 
sick’; and ‘being no good however hard I may study’ is given as evidence 
for ‘being a fool’.
Next, Noda (1993, 1997) points out that no da should be classified into 
two categories, depending on the existence of a listener. In examples 
(7) and (8) below, no da indicates that one has just grasped or come to 
understand an aspect of a situation. In these examples the speakers are 
speaking inwardly; therefore, it does not matter if a listener is or is not 
present to hear or witness the utterances (Noda 1997: 67):
(7) 山田さんが来ないなあ。きっと用事があるんだ。
‘Mr. Yamada has not come. Surely he must have something to do.’
(8) そうか、このスイッチを押すんだ。
‘Oh, I see. I just need to press this switch.’
In (7), no da relates a preceding context and the resultant situation. Thus, 
no da in this context is called ‘relating no da’ (1997: 71). Here no da 
implies that the speaker has understood the situation that ‘Mr Yamada has 
something to do’, as the reason or explanation for the preceding context 
that ‘Mr Yamada has not come’. In contrast, in example (8), no da is used 
but does not connect two separate situations or contexts. Thus, (8) is 
considered an example of ‘unrelating no da’ (1997: 71). Rather, no da here 
indicates that one has just grasped or come to understand that ‘one should 
press the switch’ as a newly perceived, stand-alone fact.
According to Noda, another function of no da is to present a listener, 
someone at whom or for whom the utterance is expressed, with 
information that the speaker had previously known but is now sharing 
so that the listener is also made aware. Therefore, when no da is used 
in this way, by definition, the existence of a listener becomes obligatory 
(1997: 67):
(9) 僕、明日は来ないよ。用事があるんだ。
‘I will not come tomorrow. I have something to do.’
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(10) このスイッチを押すんだ！
‘Press this switch!’
No da in (9) directly associates one idea with another and therefore it is 
regarded as ‘relating no da’. It expresses the speaker’s wish to inform the 
listener of a situation Q (e.g. ‘I have something to do’), of which the speaker 
presumes the listener was not aware. By providing information to the 
listener about a situation Q, no da facilitates the listener’s understanding 
of the situation P (e.g. ‘I will not come tomorrow’). In contrast, no da in 
(10) does not make a connection between two concepts and it is therefore 
an example of ‘unrelating no da’. No da here indicates the speaker’s desire 
that the listener perceives whatever it is that, in the speaker’s mind, is an 
established fact. This usage can often be observed when someone is giving 
an order or confession and it adds emphasis to the phrase being spoken.
Finally, it is worth considering Najima’s detailed analysis of no da 
from the perspective of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986). 
Najima (2007) says that the interpretation of no da depends primarily 
on the speaker’s intention. Najima argues that no da has only one 
basic function: one intentionally and explicitly presents a listener with 
a proposition—a proposition interpreted from the listener’s point of view. 
This point is illustrated well by the example below, where no da is a crucial 
component of the utterance, without which the sentence in Japanese 
would be nonsensical. Suppose that a student, who has arrived late for 
class, makes the following utterance to their teacher (Najima 2007: 61):
(11) a. 犬のポチがご飯を食べなかったんです。
‘My dog Pochi didn’t eat his food.’
b. ？犬のポチがご飯を食べませんでした。
‘My dog Pochi didn’t eat his food.’
The utterance (11b) without no da is, as a result, not appropriate, natural 
or sensical in the aforementioned context. This is because, ‘being late for 
class’ and ‘the fact that the dog did not eat his food’ are not concepts that 
have an obvious cause and effect relationship. By using no da, the utterance 
can imply the speaker’s intention to convey a proposition to the listener 
and can therefore be interpreted as a reason for the situation; that is, being 
late. No da, in this context, indicates that the speaker is inferring that 
there is a connection between the proposition and the context wherein the 
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utterance is being made. Najima argues that the various functions, such 
as ‘explanation’, ‘recognition’, ‘order’, or ‘emphasis’, are the derivatives 
of this basic function of no da.
2 .2 . Inadequacies of previous research
Previous attempts to provide definitions of no da offer some general 
explanations for its usage. However, these definitions are inaccurate as 
they do not clarify the subtle semantic differences between no da and 
other particles in Japanese (especially in situations where the translations 
into English would be the same).
First, no da is considered to possess the function of giving an ‘explanation’ 
(Kuno 1973a, 1973b). As argued by many (e.g. Tanomura 1990), the 
term ‘explanation’ is problematic, since there are various cases where it 
does not apply, such as when the speaker is giving an order or instruction. 
Second, Noda (1997) argues that a function of no da is to indicate that 
one has newly ascertained a concept or situation. However, this claim 
is also flawed, as this function is not only expressed by no da, but also 
communicated by other particles in Japanese. Consider the following 
utterance where someone has just experienced an earthquake:3
(12) うわ！地震だわ。。
‘Oh my! An earthquake …’
It is well recognised (e.g. Hattori 1993; Washi 1997) that the sentence-
final particle wa (わ) is often used with a falling intonation, by both male 
and female speakers, when the speaker has come to newly appreciate 
or perceive something. Likewise, the sentence-final particle ka (か) has 
a similar function (Moriyama 1992). See the following example, where a 
woman has just realised that Christmas is coming very soon:4
(13) 郵便局に行ったら、今回もまたオススメされた。サンタクロースか
らの手紙の申込書。えぇ！もうクリスマスですか！？
‘When I went to the post office, they gave me the application form 
for a letter from Santa Claus. Wow! Is it Christmas already!?’
3  ameblo.jp/mimizuku-cafe/entry-12252046129.html (2017).
4  ameblo.jp/moji-moji-tsushinkyoku/entry-12312648949.html (2017).
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In this way, the sentence-final particle ka (か) is used when the speaker has 
come to appreciate something new.
According to Noda (1997), another function of no da is to present the 
listeners with information of which they were not previously aware. 
However, the sentence-final particle yo (よ) has a similar function, 
as demonstrated by the following example:5
(14) 明日香レンタサイクル 観光に便利ですよ。
‘Asuka bicycle hiring service. It’s convenient for sightseeing.’
In (14), a traveller who hired a bicycle for sightseeing is informing other 
tourists that it is convenient. Yo (よ) is used to inform readers who 
may be looking for information or a recommendation. In (14), no da 
could also be used. One may therefore ask what the difference would be 
between using no da and yo in this context. This point will be discussed in 
section 3.1.1. Finally, there is a point that contradicts the claim that the 
function of no da is to intentionally and explicitly present the listener/s 
with a  proposition (Najima 2007). In the following example an office 
worker has just learned about business etiquette:6
(15) へ～そうなんだ！社会人になって初めて知ったビジネスマナー
‘Oh, that’s how it is! Business etiquette which I have only come to 
know after starting work.’
In (15), the office worker is talking inwardly to herself. No da, in this 
context, is not being used by the speaker to convey information to someone 
else. The meaning of no da in this case does not include one’s intention to 
convey information to the listener/s. Thus, it is not reasonable to claim that 
the main function of no da is to present the listener/s with a proposition 
intentionally and explicitly. In summary, the definitions provided by 
previous research are descriptively inconclusive and inaccurate. Although 
there have been detailed investigations into the functions of no da, the 
explanations can apply to the usage of sentence-final particles such as wa, 
ka and yo, and therefore ambiguity remains. In order to define the subtle 
5  www.jalan.net/kankou/spt_29402ee4590068726/kuchikomi/0003875770/ (2016).
6  woman.mynavi.jp/article/150406-10/ (2018).
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meanings of no da, this study utilises the NSM method and proposes two 
definitions for no da. The proposed explications apply exclusively to no da 
and explain the core usages of no da.7
3 . Analysis of no da
3 .1 . Two meanings of no da
As Noda (1997) points out, there is considerable value in making 
a distinction between two uses of no da: where no da is directed to the 
listener/s (no da
1
); and where no da can be used with or without a listener 
or listeners (no da
2
). The distinction is an important component of the 
analysis, since the meaning of no da is slightly different depending on 
whether the existence of a listener is required. Therefore, two explications 
of no da will be proposed here using semantic primes.
3.1.1. No da as used when directed towards a listener: no 
da1
First, no da is used when the speaker addresses a listener or listeners 
(no  da1). Its function is considered to be to provide an ‘explanation’ 
(e.g.  Kuno 1973a, 1973b). In the following example, no da
1
 gives 
background information by connecting two contexts (Yoshimoto 1990: 
203; translated by Sherif 1994: 177):
(16) 咲いないよ。旅行に行ったんだ。
‘Saki’s not here. She went on a trip.’
7  See below for examples of NSM explications defining the sentence-final particles wa, ka and yo 
(Asano 2004):
wa
a . I know this
b . I want to say this now
c . I didn’t know before that I would know this
ka
a . you know this
b . I can know the same now
c . I didn’t know this before you said it
yo
a . I know this
b . I want you to know this
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By using n da, the speaker is stating that ‘Saki went on a trip’, which led 
to the present condition that ‘she is not here now’ (Noda 1997: 91–95). 
N da is necessary, as it links two separate pieces of information. In short, 
the speaker is attempting to help the listener understand the situation by 
adding supplementary information. Note that the existence of a listener 
or listeners is obligatory for this usage. Without the listener, the use of 
no da
1
 would sound awkward. Maynard (1992) also suggests that no 
da functions as a ‘marker of conscious mention’. It is therefore possible 
to deduce that no da
1
 in this situation expresses the speaker’s desire to 
convey information to the listener by linking two pieces of information, 
indicating ‘I want to say something X about something Y to you; I say: 
it is like this; I can say it because I know it’.
Noda (1997: 71) classifies no da1 into two categories: ‘relating no da’ 
and ‘unrelating no da’. Example (16) is a typical example of ‘relating 
no da’. However, the difference between ‘relating no da’ and ‘unrelating 
no da’ is simply whether or not there is a preceding context, and there 
does not seem to be any observable semantic difference between them. 
Consider the following example of no da
1
, which is used when the 
speaker addresses a listener, but does not connect two contexts (unrelating 
no da
1
). In (17), a young man is making a phone call to his friend at 
midnight (Yoshimoto 1988: 70; translated by Backus 1993: 45):
(17)「あいつはちゃんと、戦って死んだんだよ。」雄一はいきなりそう
言った。
‘“She died fighting.” Yuichi said without preamble.’
In (17), a young man is talking to his friend on the phone and bluntly 
states that his mother had died. By using no da1, the speaker attempts to 
convey the information to the listener, indicating ‘I want to say something 
X about something Y to you; I say: it is like this; I can say it because I know 
it’. No da1 represents the speaker’s wish to give a piece of information to 
the listener, and it does not matter whether there is any preceding context. 
The following example also demonstrates this definition. In (18), someone 
who previously studied in New Zealand is recommending the country as 
the ideal destination for study abroad to readers of the website:8
8  schoolwith.me/columns/31800 (2016).
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(18)ニュージーランド、留学するなら断然オススメの国なんです！！
‘New Zealand is highly recommended for study abroad!’
In (18) also, no da
1 indicates the speaker’s desire to give readers 
information, which can be paraphrased as ‘I want to say something X 
about something Y to you; I say: it is like this; I can say it because I know 





. Now recall that no da
1 is often used in relaying the 
speaker’s decision or when giving an order to a listener. For instance:9
(19) 今度　東京へ行くんですが　東京駅から月島まで一番簡単な
ルート教えてもらえませんか
‘I am going to Tokyo. Could anyone tell me the easiest way to get 
from Tokyo to Tsukishima station?’
(20) 頑張るんだよ！応援しているからね！
‘Do your best! I am rooting for you!’
In (19), a man is seeking advice on how to get from Tokyo to Tsukishima 
station. Although this is not an established fact in the speaker’s mind, 
the man declares his decision, indicating ‘I can say it because I know it’. 
Similarly, in (20), someone is encouraging a sports team to do their best. 
Here no da
1 is indicating that, by presenting an action that the speaker 
believes the listener should perform, the speaker wants to urge the listener 
to do something.10 That is, the speaker is declaring that she knows the 
action will be done in the future, stating that ‘I can say it because I know 
it’. This is how no da
1 qualifies as a command.
Noda (1997) claims that the speaker gives the information that the listener 
has not previously recognised. It is true that the no da
1 
may connote that 
the information is new to the listener. In fact, the use of no da
1
 becomes 
somewhat inappropriate in situations where the listener shares the same 
information.11 However, it is questionable whether no da
1
 includes the 
9  (19): oshiete.goo.ne.jp/qa/6211711.html (2010); (20): twitter.com/hashtag/%E9% A0%91% 
E5% BC%B5%E3%82%8B%E3%82%93%E3%81%A0%E3%82%88 (2018).
10  Note that no da used in giving an order is different from an imperative form (頑張れ！) which 
signifies ‘I want you to do it’.
11  As commonly noted (e.g. Maynard 1992), the sentence-final particle ne is usually used to signal 
that the information is equally shared between the speaker and the listener.
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speaker’s assumption regarding the listener’s stance or previous knowledge. 




‘One winter day Hitoshi had said, “I have a younger brother. His 
name is Hiiragi.”’
In (1), a man is stating the fact that he has a younger brother and his 
name is Hiiragi. So, does n da (no da1) here signify that the speaker has 
made a presumption about the listener’s previous knowledge, indicating 
‘I think: you don’t know this’, or ‘I want you to know this’? Actually, it 
does not. Although the presence of a listener is obligatory, no da
1 does 
not infer or make any suggestion regarding the listener’s epistemic stance. 
Using no da
1, Hitoshi is simply stating what he knows to be a fact, focusing 
on his own knowledge, while disregarding the listener’s stance. This is the 
reason why the utterance can infer that the information is being presented 
to the listener as new information. On the other hand, the sentence-final 
particle yo implies the speaker’s wish to convey new information to the 
listener, indicating ‘I want you to know this’. As Martin (1975: 918) 
points out, ‘yo is often used in asserting a claim, advocating a course of 
action or emphasising a warning’. For instance, suppose that an adult sees 
a child playing on a busy street and cautions the child about the dangers 
of the traffic. Yo is thus the natural choice instead of no da1 in (21):
(21) a. 危ないよ。
‘(Look out—) it’s dangerous!’
b. ? 危ないんだ。
‘It’s dangerous.’
Yo (よ) clearly functions as a warning about the traffic, while n da does 
not, because in (21a) the particle yo insinuates the speaker is giving new 
information to the listener. Yo is used to give the listener information 
perceived to be necessary, indicating ‘I know this; I want you to know this’ 
(Asano 2004). On the other hand, no da1 merely conveys the information 
(‘I want to say something X about something Y to you’), and therefore the 
utterance does not qualify as a warning. To further illustrate this point, 
recall example (14) where yo is used:
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(14) 明日香レンタサイクル 観光に便利ですよ。
‘Asuka bicycle hiring service. It’s convenient for sightseeing.’
In (14), a traveller who hired a bicycle for sightseeing is informing other 
tourists that it is convenient. Yo signifies the speaker’s intention to tell the 
listener/s what the speaker knows, indicating ‘I want you to know this’. 
This is the reason why the utterance is for the benefit of those who did 
not previously possess the information. It is possible to use no da1 instead 
of yo in (14), however the particle will merely connote that a fact is being 
stated:
(14)’ 明日香レンタサイクル 観光に便利なんです。
‘Asuka bicycle hiring service. It’s convenient for sightseeing.’
By using no da1, the writer is simply connecting two pieces of information; 
Asuka bicycle service exists and it is convenient for sightseeing. Therefore, 
if the writer had intended to deliberately infer she was conveying new 
information to the viewers, she may have combined no da1 with yo, as in 
(14) below:
(14)’’ 明日香レンタサイクル 観光に便利なんですよ。
‘Asuka bicycle hiring service. It’s convenient for sightseeing.’
N desu yo (んですよ or n da yo んだよ) is often used in daily conversation. 
The combination of no da1 and yo signifies ‘I want to say something X 
about something Y to you; I say: it is like this; I can say it because I know 
it; I want you to know it’.
Based on these observations, no da
1
, which is directed to a listener, can be 
defined using semantic primes as follows:
[A] no da1
a . I want to say something X about something Y to you
b . I say: it is like this
c . I can say it because I know it
Component (a) expresses the speaker’s desire to portray information to 
the listener/s. Components (b) and (c) mean that the speaker claims that 
the information is factual.
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3.1.2. No da as used with or without a listener: no da2
The second meaning of no da, referred to here as no da
2
, can be used 
with or without the existence of a listener/s. In short, the existence of 





. First unlike no da
1
, semantically no da
2
 does not include the 
component ‘to you’. Second, as Noda (1997) suggests, no da
2
 signifies 
that the speaker has perceived something or become aware of a situation 
of which they (the speaker) had not previously been aware. Therefore, 
no da
2




‘When aiming to go to the fridge I realised I’d entered the toilet 
room. That was the moment I realised how tired I am.’
In (22), no da
2
 indicates that the writer, of this comment on twitter, has 
just realised she is tired, evidenced by the fact that she went to the toilet 
when intending to go to the fridge. Here, no da
2 connotes that the speaker 
has just recognised something new. This can be explicated as follows: 
‘I know something now; because of this, I want to say something about it 
now; I say: it is like this’.
Noda (1997) divides no da
2
 into ‘relating no da
2
’ and ‘unrelating no da
2
’. 
It is true that no da2 can be used to connect two separate concepts (relating 
them to each other), as shown in (22). However, the distinction does 
not seem to affect the core meaning of no da
2
. Consider the following 
example, where no da
2
 is used without linking two separate concepts or 
situations:13
(23) 今日って祝日だったんだ。
‘I just realised that today is a public holiday.’
In (23), the speaker just became conscious of the fact that it is a public 
holiday. No da
2
 is often used when one suddenly registers something; that 
is, suddenly becomes conscious of it. Thus, in such situations it would not 
12  twitter.com/hashtag/%E7%96%B2%E3%82%8C%E3% 81%A6%E3%82%8B%E3% 82% 
93% E3 %81%A0%E3%81%AA%E3%81%A8%E6%80%9D%E3%81%A3% E3%81% 9F% E7% 
9E% AC%E9%96%93 (2017).
13  ameblo.jp/lapi-slomaga/entry-12410469115.html (2018).
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matter whether or not there is a related statement before the utterance. 
In example (23), no da
2
 is used to express surprise, indicating ‘I know 
something now; because of this, I want to say something about it now; 
I say it is like this’.
Similarly, no da
2
 is also used when one recollects information that had 
been forgotten:14
(24) 結婚記念日って今日だったんだ。
‘Today is our wedding anniversary.’
In (24), a woman has suddenly remembered that it is her wedding 
anniversary. No da
2
, in this context, connotes that the speaker has 
recollected something in that moment but is not making a connection 
between the realisation and any other idea or concept. Here, no da
2 does 
signify that one has just become aware, indicating ‘I know something 
now; because of this, I want to say something about it now; I say: it is 
like this’. It is reasonable to surmise that linking two unrelated contexts 
is not a factor in the fundamental meaning of no da
2
. Judging by the 
analysis discussed above, the meaning of no da
2
 can therefore be explicated 
as follows:
[B] no da2
a . I know something now
b . because of this, I want to say something about it now
c . I say: it is like this
Components (a), (b) and (c) show one’s desire to convey that one has just 
grasped a situation, of which one was not previously consciously aware.15 
As demonstrated in the explication, no da
2
 does not involve listeners 
‘to you’, and therefore it can be used when speaking inwardly to oneself.
14  3594-chika.jugem.jp/?eid=462599 (2018).
15  One may argue that no da2 represents thoughts rather than tangible knowledge. However, this 
perspective lacks plausibility because no da2 is usually used when stating facts. In instances where the 
speaker shows understanding, no da2 can be combined with omou ‘think’: no da to omou (which would 
signify ‘I say: I think like this; I can say it because I know something now’).
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4 . Conclusion
This chapter examined the meanings of no da and proposed new definitions 
using semantic primes. This study has clarified the meaning of no da when 
the existence of a listener is obligatory, and when the existence of a listener 
is not a compulsory component. The difference between the two can 
subsequently be explained based on whether or not no da includes the 
components ‘to you’ and ‘now’:
[A] no da1
a . I want to say something X about something Y to you
b . I say: it is like this
c . I can say it because I know it
[B] no da2
a . I know something now
b . because of this, I want to say something about it now
c . I say: it is like this
One may argue that the difference between no da
1 and no da2 is contextual. 
However, the use of no da
1
 is not natural or sensical without a listener and 
in contrast, no da
2
 can be used when speaking to oneself. Furthermore, 
the component ‘now’ does not apply to examples of utterances wherein 
no da
1 has been used. The proposed definitions are consistently applicable 
to a range of usages and in a range of contexts.
This research is an example of the applicability of the NSM approach to 
reveal the subtleties and nuances of Japanese particles that are often lost in 
translation. Wierzbicka states that particles ‘are what distinguishes human 
language from the languages of robots’ (1986: 519). Wierzbicka asserts 
that particles ‘reflect the culture of a given speech community’ better 
than other aspects of language (2003: 341). Her statements are directly 
applicable to the Japanese language, as it would be nearly impossible to 
hold a natural conversation without particles in Japanese (Saigo 2011). 
If no da is absent, the utterance would indicate that the speaker is simply 
presenting the information mechanically, with no emotional involvement.
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Locating ‘mind’ (and ‘soul’) 
cross-culturally
Frances Morphy and Howard Morphy
1 . Introduction
In 2016 Anna Wierzbicka extended her 1989 analysis of words akin to 
‘mind’ and ‘soul’ in European languages to include discussion of Australian 
Aboriginal languages, and offered a critique of our treatment of Yolngu 
conceptualisations of mind and, particularly, soul.1 She was responding 
to a seminar paper that we gave at The Australian National University 
(H. Morphy and F. Morphy 2013). That paper was never published, 
and this chapter presents us with a welcome opportunity to continue 
the conversation.
We are in agreement with Wierzbicka that mind is not a ‘thing’, but 
a culturally embedded, language-specific way of conceptualising mental 
states and processes. From our perspective—and this is where we begin 
to differ from her—the semantic overlap that she discerns between 
1  The Yolngu, numbering between 6,000 and 7,000 and speaking closely related languages known 
collectively as Yolngu Matha (matha is ‘tongue, language’), are the people of north-east Arnhem Land 
in the Top End of Australia’s Northern Territory. They were colonised relatively late, with arrival of the 
first Methodist Overseas Mission at Milingimbi in the western part of the Yolngu region in the mid-
1920s. They live at the hub settlements of Milingimbi, Galiwin’ku and Yirrkala, all former mission 
settlements; at Gapuwiyak, originally established as an outstation from Galiwin’ku; and at numerous 
small ‘homeland’ settlements on their clan estates established during a period of decentralisation in 
the early 1970s. The vast majority of Yolngu speak one or more varieties of Yolngu Matha as their 
first languages.
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meanings of ‘mind-like’ words in different languages suggests a family 
resemblance; there are both similarities and differences between them, 
and it is productive to set up a potential cross-cultural metacategory—
let us call it mind to differentiate it from the English word—for use in 
cross-cultural analysis. Wierzbicka describes ‘words that are cognate and 
may share some semantic components but differ significantly in their 
over-all meaning and cultural significance’ as ‘false friends’ (2016: 451). 
Our approach is to consider them instead as particular instantiations 
of a  polythetic metacategory that can fruitfully be compared with one 
another to reveal both similarity and difference. Wierzbicka herself comes 
close to taking such an approach in saying that, with reference to the 
articulation between mind-like and soul-like concepts, ‘one could even 
arrange European languages on a scale, with Russian and English at 
opposite ends and with French and German between’ (1989: 41).
In this chapter, our major focus is on what Wierzbicka refers to as the 
‘modern Anglo concept of mind’ and our comparator is an analogous 
Yolngu concept which is not realised as a single lexeme.2 But while Yolngu 
do not have a word that can be directly translated as ‘mind’, they do have 
words for ‘know’, ‘think’, and so on, and they locate those processes in 
the top and front parts of the head.3 Our analysis will reveal an overlap 
between Anglo and Yolngu conceptualisations that suggest they share 
much in common, as well as differing, and that they can be encompassed 
within a cross-cultural metacategory mind.
2 . Body, mind and soul
In post-Enlightenment Anglo (and arguably European) thought, mind 
is seen as part of a person. ‘I think therefore I am’ gives mind a central 
place in the existence of the individual. But can it be located in the body, 
and if so, where? In recent European theory of mind, and in everyday 
understanding, mind is associated with the brain and located in the head. 
It is possibly, then, also a part of the body.
2  And here we cannot resist pointing out that if semantic primes are not universally realised as 
lexemes (Wierzbicka 2016: 448), the same might be true for concepts.
3  The Yolngu Matha online dictionary does in fact give ‘mind’ as one of the meanings of 
buku (‘front  of  the head and upper face’). For reasons that will become clear, we think this is an 
oversimplification and does not represent its core meaning. Rather it is a locational referent for a lexically 
unmarked concept (Available at: yolngudictionary.cdu.edu.au) (Yolngu Matha Dictionary 2015).
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The body can be viewed as an assemblage of anatomical parts and 
physiological processes. Parts can be seen, MRI-ed, revealed through 
dissection and felt. Processes can be observed or theorised—limbs move, 
breath is inhaled and exhaled from the lungs, the heart beats. Body parts 
are theorised in Western systems of knowledge on an underlying premise 
that they are connected to the functioning of the organism. Theory has 
made the function of the heart easy to understand; the heart pumps blood 
around the body. The heart stops beating, life ends. Of course, this is 
only part of the story but it is one most people understand—the heart 
is a pump. The relationship between mind, as our capacity to think and 
know, and the brain seems more complex—very much under exploration, 
poorly understood.
In this chapter, we look at the location of thought and knowledge in 
Yolngu conceptions of the body. We do so to see if the Yolngu can be 
said to have a concept of mind that links the process of thinking and 
the transmission of knowledge to the body in a way that has anything 
in common with the Anglo concept of mind or English-speakers’ use of 
the word mind. Since Yolngu do not have a word that easily translates as 
mind,4 what we posit is, in analytical terms, a cross-cultural metacategory 
mind, that is shared but differently elaborated in each case, and differently 
articulated with other metacategories. To signpost the direction of our 
thinking, two factors will prove salient. Yolngu associate mental processes 
and mental states with the front and top of the head; and in talking about 
their world to English-speakers, in English, they frequently use ‘mind’.5
Wierzbicka’s 1989 definition of ‘modern English’ mind (as cited in 
Wierzbicka 2016: 458) is as follows:
one of the two parts of a person
one cannot see it
because of this part, a person can think and know
4  Wierzbicka (1989) argues that that is the case with most languages, including other European 
languages.
5  Yolngu, like many other people who inhabit a contact zone, have an explicit theory of 
biculturalism—of different but coexisting systems of knowledge and ways of thinking about and acting 
in the world—that individuals can productively apply both when acting and communicating among 
themselves and in articulating their position to outsiders. We would argue that those systems of thought 
are only relatively autonomous because people are always in a context of cross-cultural communication. 
Analytically minded Yolngu are able to recognise the relative autonomy of their ‘own’ concepts and also 
think about areas of overlap just as the culturally Anglo person/anthropologist can.
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This explication has an implied association with the discourse on mind–
body dualism—the other part of the person, in this case, is the body.6 
A later version of the explication (Wierzbicka 2016: 458) spells this out 
more explicitly, while simultaneously removing the (absolute) dualism:
someone’s mind (2014)
something
this something is part of this someone
people can’t see this something
this something is not part of this someone’s body
when this someone is thinking about something
something happens in this part
because this someone has this part, it is like this:
this someone can think many things about many things
this someone can know many things about many things
The Yolngu concepts that will emerge from our discussion differ in 
some ways from the one captured in these explications.7 But a family 
resemblance will remain. A full comparative analysis would involve an 
exploration of the history of the mind in English-language usage and 
conceptual thinking from prehistory to the present. That history would 
reveal many changes over time as both understanding of thinking and 
understanding of the brain have evolved. The history of Yolngu concepts 
is even harder to research, but there is no reason to think it has not also 
been a history of change.
Wierzbicka acknowledges that the sense of the English word mind 
has changed over time—and this change has crystallised in the post-
Enlightenment era. An earlier concept of mind that was associated with 
the soul and goodness has become ‘morally neutral’.
The older mind had spiritual and psychological dimensions, but it 
did not have the predominantly intellectual orientation which 
it has now, with thinking and knowing dominating over any other 
nonbodily aspects of a person’s inner life. (Wierzbicka 1989: 49)
6  Lillard’s summary of research into Euro-American (EA) folk conceptions of mind is compatible 
with Wierzbicka’s in that the ‘major functions of the mind in the EA view … are housing mental 
states and generating mental processes’ (Lillard 1998:10).
7  A topic that we will not cover here for reasons of space is the problem of ‘part’ in Yolngu Matha 
and many other Australian languages (for a summary see Nash 2014: 84).
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Lillard similarly concludes that ‘the EA [Euro-American] mind has 
become a unitary concept, has lost much of its spiritual connotation, and 
has come to have an especially strong (although not exclusively) rational 
connotation’ (1998: 13). We will argue, perhaps surprisingly, that Yolngu 
ideas about mind are similarly focused on thinking and knowing—
but that they are also entangled with birrimbirr (the Yolngu Matha 
instantiation of soul) in the more general Yolngu theory of personhood, 
in ways that are very unlike the English mind’s relationship to the English 
soul today. We suggest that cross-culturally and cross-temporally it may 
be meaningful to talk about a mind–soul complex in which the two 
metacategories are deeply entangled—indeed, that much of Western 
theological discourse has concerned their entanglement or separation.
The emergence of the ‘rationalist’ concept of mind is clearly linked to the 
history of religion in Western Europe, including Britain. In the Yolngu 
case we will be investigating:
• whether we can identify Yolngu concepts that are analogous to Anglo 
‘mind’ and ‘soul’ and whether they are entangled in similar or in different 
ways. We are not looking for precisely bounded equivalences and indeed 
will argue that the role given to ‘goodness’ in Wierzbicka’s explication 
of soul does not have a central place in the Yolngu case. The absence of 
goodness in the Yolngu soul and the entanglement of soul in the Yolngu 
mind makes for an interesting contrast to both Wierzbicka’s ‘modern’ 
Anglo mind and to its antecedents in Anglo thought.
• whether Yolngu conceptions of the corporeal location of thinking and 
knowing share a family resemblance with what Wierzbicka refers to as 
the ‘modern’ concept of mind. We will argue that, in the Yolngu case, 
the location of the capacity for thinking and knowing, as in the case 
with much Christian belief and theology (see Bieniak 2010), is seen 
as partly of the body and partly external to it.
3 . Cross-cultural metacategories
The development of cross-cultural metacategories has explicitly or 
implicitly been integral to the history of anthropology. The challenge to 
evolutionary paradigms of progress—for example, from ‘magic’ though 
‘religion’ to ‘science’—has involved a continuing discourse over religion.8 
8  For a relevant discussion with reference to the categories of art and aesthetics see H. Morphy (2007).
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Anthropology has searched, through definitional discourse, for a cross-
cultural definition of religion, which has, over time, encompassed greater 
diversity and, we might argue, framed a cross-cultural metacategory 
religion. There have been similar discourses over art, the person, politics 
and so on. Such discourse has often involved shifting the meaning of 
English words away from a temporally based Anglo- or Euro-centric 
focus and working towards comparators from the vocabulary of other 
languages. Words such as habitus are redefined, and words such as 
taboo are appropriated to become part of the categorical vocabulary of 
anthropology. The vocabulary of anthropology may have an Anglo bias, 
but it is not the language of the everyday. While similar changes occur in 
the conceptual vocabularies of other disciplines, the creation of agreed 
epistemologies for communicating across languages and cultures, the 
openness to revision and to encompassing different ways of thinking, are 
integral to anthropology’s methodology.
The categorising exercise is very different from the process of word for word 
translation. There are differences and similarities that cannot be grasped at 
the level of the word. The absence of a word that can be easily translated 
into a direct equivalent in another language, in particular English, is not 
evidence that the culture’s conceptual and cognitive systems do not overlap 
with those of English-speakers in a particular domain—that there is not 
a family resemblance that can be grasped though categorical analysis. 
Anthropology does not reduce one ontological system or world view 
to another. Rather, it sets them in conversation, just as communication 
and contact across borders and boundaries has done throughout human 
history more generally. Indeed, many of the shifts in meaning of English 
words have been in response to a widening of understanding of difference 
in the world.
Those changes are also reflected relatively independently in the ways in 
which people in postcolonial contexts map their own concepts onto English 
vocabulary and use English terms in explaining the particularities of their 
own society. Yolngu, for example, use words such as ‘law’, ‘parliament’, 
‘embassy’, to indicate to outsiders the family resemblance between their own 
political and religious institutions and those of their colonisers—in effect, 
they create analogies based on their intuitions about overlapping categories, 
as a means of cultural translation (see F. Morphy 2009).
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Such processes are not neutral—in Australia, neither the Yolngu world 
nor the Anglo world remains the same. However, we would argue that 
their deployment allows the relative autonomy of cultural systems to be 
maintained, while changing (see F. Morphy and H. Morphy 2013, 2017). 
By explaining aspects of their own way of life to non-Yolngu through 
creating a shared vocabulary, Yolngu hope to facilitate understanding and 
mutual adjustment. Yolngu can explain aspects of their own sociocultural 
world to non-Yolngu by using emergent categories that they sense are 
helpful in conveying aspects of their world to non–Yolngu speakers: 
‘We have our own laws just as you do, let us work them together.’ We use 
the word emergent deliberately, in that the adoption of English words 
in their particular Yolngu sense is a process that takes place over time 
according to the relevance of the concept and the development of cross-
cultural (‘two-way’ in Yolngu parlance) learning. Yolngu use of the word 
‘mind’ is indeed more recent than their incorporation of the word ‘law’. 
It overlaps with but is not subsumed by the contemporary Anglo use of 
the term. And, interestingly, their sense of ‘mind’ points towards earlier 
senses that the word had in English usage.
By arguing for a cross-cultural metacategory of mind or art or religion, 
we are not arguing that people across cultures or times share the same 
concept as is conveyed by the English words; rather, we are enabling 
a discourse over difference in an area of family resemblance. We make 
explicit that the comparative analytic statement of the kind ‘Yolngu locate 
mind in the head whereas Illongot locate mind in the heart’ makes sense, 
while requiring deep explication.9
People who take on board Wierzbicka’s explication of the modern Anglo 
mind respond by using terms such as ‘counterparts’ and ‘approximations’, 
in effect creating an implicit cross-cultural metacategory. Toril Swan, for 
example, writes that ‘English uses the term mind very differently than its 
seeming counterparts are used in the other Germanic languages (as well as in 
French, Polish, etc.)’ (2009: 462, emphasis added; see also Low 2001: 11).
9  The sentence references Rosaldo’s rich ethnography of the Illongot (1980, 1984) and Lillard’s 
(1998: 12ff) discussion.
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4 . On the Yolngu head be it
Yolngu Matha (Yolngu language) has a rich vocabulary of verbs for things 
that we, as English-speakers, think of as things the mind does (marrngi 
‘know’, guyangirri ‘think’, guyanga ‘think of/about, remember’, moma 
‘forget’, dharangan ‘understand’, and so on), and a rich vocabulary of 
metaphorical forms (both verbal and nominal) for what we, as English-
speakers, might describe as ‘states of mind’, ‘characteristics of mind’ 
and ‘processes of mind’. These take the form of compounds in which 
the first word is buku or one of its near-synonyms dämbu, mulkurr and 
liya. All refer to the top and front parts of the head: mulkurr is the top 
part of the head in a general sense, including the temples, liya is more 
precisely  the crown, and the close synonyms buku and dämbu refer to 
the forehead, and to the upper part of the face more generally. A final 
term, wanda, which does not participate in these kinds of compounds, 
references the skull. But, as we shall see, it has a role to play as a container.
A word that does not figure at all in such compounds is mamburungburung 
‘brain’, or any of its synonyms. Thus Yolngu do not suffer from ‘brain 
fade’, and there are no ‘brainy’ or ‘brainless’ Yolngu. Mental operations 
and states are located, it seems at first sight, rather precisely on the top and 
frontal regions of the head rather than inside it.
This is not the place for a detailed analysis of Yolngu Matha semantics; 
rather, our aim is to give a flavour of how the vocabulary of mental states 
and processes works, with a few examples.10
4 .1 . ‘Minimal pairs’
The addition of the privative suffix (‘lacking/without’) to the words 
for parts of the head yields the following idioms that might be seen as 
analogous to the minimal pairs of phonology:
mulkurr-miriw ‘muddleheaded’
liya-miriw ‘stupid’
dämbu-miriw ‘senseless, idiotic’ (buku-miriw is not attested)
There seems to be a cline of severity here that we will return to below.
10  For a general grammar of a Yolngu Matha language, see F. Morphy (1983).
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4 .2 . Djambatj idioms
The adjective djambatj on its own summarises the distributed qualities 
of a good hunter: alertness, quick reactions, sharp eyesight, skill with 
weapons. When this occurs as the second part of a compound we get:
mulkurr-djambatj or liya-djambatj ‘intelligent, clever, able’
focusing thus on the mental aspects of being djambatj (cf. mel-djambatj 
‘keen of eye, marksman’, which focuses on aspects related to vision).
Idioms that predominantly involve one part of the head help us to refine 
the aspects of mental states or attributes that each seems to reference.
4 .3 . Mulkurr idioms
Mulkurr-gulku, literally ‘top of head-many’, translates as ‘indecisive’ 
(a  property of a group or individual) as opposed to mulkurr-wanggany 
‘top-of-head-one’, ‘of one mind’ (property of a group). Compounds 
with mulkurr seem to reference general states of mind that in their 
negative versions are related to lack of clear purpose (recall mulkurr-
miriw). Mulkurr-wanggany contrasts with wanda-wanggany (skull-one), 
which refers to people who are spiritually linked to the same ancestral 
being—a point we will return to later.
4 .4 . Liya idioms
Recall that liya-miriw ‘lacking the crown of the head’ was glossed roughly 
as ‘stupid’. There are two further liya compounds that allow us to refine the 
import of liya constructions further: liya-yalnggi, literally ‘crown-weak’: 
‘impressionable, lacking in understanding, intellectually challenged’; and 
liya-gulinybuma, literally ‘crown-criticise’: ‘reject (someone else’s) ideas, 
disagree’. It would seem that liya is associated with the notion of ‘idea’ in 
a rather intellectual, perhaps almost context-free sense. To be without liya 
is to be lacking in ideas and therefore ‘stupid’, to be weak in the liya is to 
be too susceptible to the ideas of others.
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4 .5 . Buku idioms
Buku metaphors are all about mind in its social context. We will leave 
aside the many compounds that reference particular kinds of speech acts 
and mental operations, and focus on those that seem to reveal aspects of 
the Yolngu conceptualisation of the nature of mind in context.
First, buku can be used as an alternative to dämbu or liya in combination 
with the adjective dhumuk, which means ‘closed, blocked, impenetrable 
or blunt’, in the expression buku-dhumuk ‘forgetful, stupid’. And it 
contrasts with liya in one telling ‘minimal pair’: whereas liya-marrtji, ‘liya-
go’, means (roughly) ‘feel homesick’ (or more precisely ‘go to the idea (of 
home)’), buku-marrtji means ‘to go with one thing or purpose in mind’.11 
Purpose or intent is the metaphorical core of buku compounds, so we will 
start there, with the following examples (all of which are buku-specific):
buku-däl (+ strong, hard, steady, firm, difficult) ‘persistent, 
hard-headed, can’t be deflected’
buku-duwat (+ upwards) ‘persistent, insistent’
buku-duwatthun (+ go up) ‘ persist, keep trying’
buku-dhuwalyun (+ say ‘this’) ‘nag, keep asking for something’
As in all but the last of these examples it can be an admirable (or perhaps 
neutral) quality. But this quality can veer into obsession, for example:
buku-dhayka (+ woman) ‘woman-crazy’
buku-guya (+ fish) ‘always thinking about fish’ (to hunt and eat)
buku-dharpa (+ tree) ‘always climbing trees’ (e.g. of a child)
buku-mari (+ trouble) ‘troublemaker who wants to keep feuds alive’
buku-dhirr’yun (+ disturb) ‘incite by reminding of past injury’
buku-man.guma (+ collect) ‘accumulate possessions, hoard’
And so on. This is a very productive construction.
11  We will see later in the analysis why the idea ‘of home’ in particular is invoked by liya.
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A second theme might be characterised as ‘thinking together’, for example:
buku-mala (+ set, group) ‘crowd, flock, school of fish’ (i.e. a 
group that acts as if it has one mind/purpose)
buku-lukthun/luŋ’thun (+ come together, collect) ‘come together, gather 
together for one purpose’ (used e.g. for a memorial 
ceremony)
also:
buku-lupthun(marama) (+ wash, bathe) ‘perform cleansing ceremony 
following an illness or death and burial (also 
baptise)’
and:
buku-manapan (+ join, link, mix, combine) ‘gather together’
as opposed to:
buku-gänang’-thirri (+ alone, separate, distinct + become) ‘wander off 
alone’
and:
buku-lalawukthun (+ peel off, shed (snakeskin)) ‘refuse to become 
involved in quarrels between one’s kin’
Whereas the first of these suggests ‘group mind’ in some instinctive sense, 
and the last two suggest the rejection of group mind, the three metaphors 
in the middle are the core of this theme. And they link to the first theme 
through the idea of purpose. This leads us to a third metaphorical theme 
concerning what happens to the mind at death. For example:
buku-mulka (+ hold, touch, reach, feel, arrive at) ‘end of a 
person’s life’
buku-y-moma (+ instr case-forget) ‘leave others behind at death’
(as opposed to buku-moma (+ forget) which means 
to ‘forget, lose or misunderstand’)
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and lastly:
buku-but(marama) (+ fly away (cause))
which is the descriptive name for a ceremony in which a person’s bones 
are brought back to their own country, to their final resting place.
In this series of metaphors the aspect of mind that is the socialised 
(sometimes group), purposeful mind is conceptualised as being realised to 
its full potential in an individual as they near death, and then it leaves the 
living behind on death. Freed from the weight of embodiment, it returns 
with the birrimbirr (soul) to the ancestral realm.
5 . The Yolngu mind as process
In surveying the sets of metaphors associated with regions of the head our 
focus has been on the individual, human mind. But understanding of the 
semantics requires us to step outside the head and place knowledge and 
understanding in a wider cultural context. The Yolngu mind is both inside 
and outside the body. In talking about knowledge Yolngu give priority 
to the Wangarr—the ancestral determinants of the present (H. Morphy 
1991).12 Narratives of the journeys of Wangarr beings centre on them 
as a source both of knowledge and of human existence. Wangarr beings 
think their way through the world and externalise their thoughts and 
actions in the form of objects and features of the landscape. These objects 
are referred to as madayin rom which can be translated into English as 
ancestral/sacred law/knowledge.
Yolngu society is based on a division into two moieties, Dhuwa and 
Yirritja, and Wangarr beings belong to one or other moiety. Wangarr 
beings travelled cross-country transforming features of the landscape and 
creating sacred objects, songs and dances that commemorate their actions. 
Certain places in each clan’s estate are centres of their spirituality. These 
are referred to as djalkiri (footprints or foundations) of the clans that 
succeeded the Wangarr in place. They are locations of spiritual power, 
restricted of access and adjacent to sites of major ceremonial performance. 
12  Wangarr is very similar to concepts such as Tjukurrpa and Altyerre (in desert languages) that are 
translated into English as Dreamtime or Dreaming. However, the Yolngu point out that Wangarr is 
not related either etymologically or semantically to the notion of ‘dream’ in Yolngu Matha, and do 
not like the connotation of ‘unreality’ that dream conveys. Both they and we avoid using the term.
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Each place is associated with a mangutji—a sacred well (literally ‘eye’) 
that is the source of and emanates Wangarr power (märr).13 The songs, 
paintings, dances, objects and sacred names that provide the substance of 
ceremonies re-enacting the founding ancestral events are manifestations 
of the Wangarr and are centred on the mangutji.
There are many different narratives centred on this knowledge. For 
example, the Dhuwa moiety ancestors known as the Djan’kawu sisters 
carried their knowledge with them in their sacred dilly bags and also gave 
birth to the ancestors of clan members beside the mangutji.14
Clan members are deeply connected to their Wangarr; in Munn’s phrase 
they are consubstantial with the Wangarr domain (1970: 141). Life is 
initiated by a conception spirit emanating from one of the clan’s Wangarr 
entering the mother’s womb. The person’s relationship with the Wangarr 
dimension is cumulative. Experience of the Wangarr dimension through 
participating in ceremonies and living in the ancestrally created landscape 
adds to a person’s spiritual identity—knowledge and spirituality are 
intertwined. On a person’s death both buku and birrimbirr leave the body 
and become reincorporated within the ancestral domain. The return 
takes place over a number of years and is associated with a ritual process 
that transforms the individual’s identity into an ancestral one. There is a 
process of remembering and forgetting that moves the focus of ritual from 
the sense of loss that follows death to the positive presence of the Wangarr 
domain and the strength of the foundation (djalkiri) that continues across 
the generations.
We can see now how this complex process of the entanglement of 
knowledge with the spiritual dimension of Wangarr is reflected in the 
ways in which the metaphors associated with different parts of the 
head are structured. Liya is the locus of the initial connection between 
Wangarr mind and knowledge and the individual mind. When an infant’s 
fontanelle is still open and pulsating, they may be described as liya gapu-
mirr or liya mänha-mirri ‘liya-water-having’. This water, occurring in 
a depression in the skull (wanda), is thought to be water from the place 
where the baby’s conception spirit originated, that is the maŋutji where 
the Wangarr knowledge that flows in the waters beneath the land wells 
to the surface through the wanda of the Wangarr ancestor (see also Blake 
13  For a general discussion of Yolngu religion see H. Morphy (1991).
14  For more on the Djan’kawu sisters see Berndt (1952) and West (2008).
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2012: 54 and Stubbs 2012: 39). The human wanda is consubstantial with 
the ancestral wanda. Head wounds sustained as a result of conflict are 
considered much more serious than other wounds, because, as someone 
explained to us, ‘you are also hitting the wanda of the Wangarr when you 
hit that person’s head’.
Yolngu metaphors and their referents are framed by Yolngu ontology and 
enacted through ritual processes. It is significant that following a person’s 
death, in the past, the liya (of the skull) was painted with likan’puy 
miny’tji—the painting that represents the mangutji associated with the 
person’s clan, the wanda from which the conception spirit came.15
Liya, then, is the locus of the connection between the Wangarr and human 
mind. In the infant’s fontanelle it is just a potential, as yet not fully realised. 
Buku, on the other hand, is the locus of the socialised, individuated, often 
purposefully developed mind. It is telling that a  number of the buku 
metaphors centre on the process of the mind leaving the body and with the 
process of forgetting the identity of the individual person. Consciousness 
goes, and so too, gradually, does the memory of the individual person 
among those who remain behind.
6 . Yolngu mind and the use of 
English ‘mind’
In May 2017 we attended an event at the Australian Consulate in Los 
Angeles. Yinimala Gumana, a young Yolngu ceremonial leader and artist 
raised and educated at his clan’s homeland settlement of Gäṉgaṉ, had just 
concluded the event with a powerful rendition of a sacred song (manikay). 
The audience was moved, and so clearly was he. He said to us: ‘The rirrakay 
(‘sound, voice’) was here in Los Angeles but my mind was in Gäṉgäṉ.’
Gäṉgäṉ is not just a homeland. It is a djalkiri place associated with 
Barama, a major Yirritja moiety Wangarr. Yinimala sees his rirrakay as an 
aspect of the emplaced Wangarr knowledge. The rirrakay carries manikay, 
an expression of that emplaced knowledge. When Yolngu use the English 
word ‘mind’ they ‘have in mind’ the Wangarr body of knowledge and 
15  In the past Yolngu performed several ceremonies to effect the transfer of the dead person’s 
birrimbirr back to the Wangarr realm. The body was first buried or exposed on a raised platform. 
When the flesh was gone the bones were retrieved and cleaned, then carried by relatives for several 
years before final disposal. It was at this point that the skull was painted with likan’puy miny’tji.
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sources of power invoked in songs, performances and the sacra—the dilly 
bags and sacred objects. Yinimala’s mind is, in a profound sense, always 
in Gäṉgäṉ, wherever he happens to be himself. Like all clan members he 
is rirrakay dhawalwu ‘the voice of the land’—this is the duty of Yolngu 
towards the Wangarr.
Song equally connects the singer emotionally to other people associated 
with the place in a way readily accessible to European audiences. Referring 
to a performance of the Yolngu manikay-jazz improvisation ‘Crossing 
Roper Bar’ Daniel Wilfred explained:
In my mind when I sing I cry. You listen to me when I changed my 
voice, I am crying … Always singing this song, always thinking 
about my brothers, sisters, all my nieces, nephews. When I sing 
this song, it’s always in my mind, making me cry. Maybe you 
listen and hear my voice changing: that’s me crying. (cited in 
Curkpatrick 2019: 90)
In our experience the association between thought and painting is routine 
in Yolngu accounts of the production of paintings. In the 1970s, Narritjin 
Maymuru stressed to Howard Morphy the connection of the marwat 
(brush made from human hair) with the head and the connection of hair 
to the fontanelle as a source of knowledge. He ‘thought with’ or ‘through’ 
his marwat (marwat-thu). Narritjin’s daughter Galuma, 20 years after his 
death, sat before a plain sheet of bark and said that she had to ‘think hard’ 
before she began a painting.
About 15 years on, in April 2011, the late Joe Gumbula, speaking to an 
audience in Geneva in the lecture theatre where Ferdinand de Saussure 
taught, stated unequivocally, ‘we paint in our mind’. And, more recently, 
Gunybi Ganambarr is quoted in a catalogue essay for the Annandale 
Gallery in Sydney in 2012: ‘I try and bring the Yolngu law into reality. 
That is what is in my mind. To show what is already there.’ His use of the 
word ‘law’ translates Yolngu Matha madayin rom, which refers to the body 
of knowledge that people inherit from the Wangarr who pre-exist them in 
their country, and pass to one another in life.
It is interesting that in these statements in English, Narritjin and Galuma 
speak in terms of thinking, whereas both Joe and Gunybi, speaking more 
recently, use the word ‘mind’, as did Yinimala in 2017. We did not hear 
Yolngu routinely use the word ‘mind’ until about 15  years ago. This 
suggests a process. In earlier Yolngu English, people used English words 
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that map more closely onto Yolngu translation equivalents when they 
spoke in the ‘art frame’. They spoke in terms of ‘thinking’ (guyanginyara) 
and ‘meaning’ (mayali). But more recently they have adopted ‘mind’, and 
their use of it makes perfect sense to their English-speaking audiences.
It is important to note at this stage in our argument that Yolngu would 
not substitute the English word ‘spirit’ or ‘soul’ in any of these uses of the 
word ‘mind’. Yolngu do also use ‘spirit’ when speaking in English. For 
example, we were once sitting in clearing in the bush working on the Blue 
Mud Bay native title claim, drinking tea. A hint of breeze touched our skin. 
Ralwurranydji said: ‘That was the spirit of X’, referring to a woman who 
had died at Yirrkala the previous week. We must have looked sceptical, 
though we did not say anything. Ralwurranydji elaborated: ‘Couldn’t 
you smell it? She was a drinker, you could smell the alcohol in the air.’ 
We postulate that when using English, Yolngu are likely to choose ‘spirit’ 
when they are referring to external manifestations or expressions of the 
ineffable part of a person (the ‘soul’ birrimbirr, or in this case the ‘ghost’ 
mokuy), and ‘mind’ when they are referencing the Wangarr generator of 
knowledge located in a mangutji.
Since Wangarr are also the source of animating conception spirits, there is 
no absolute boundary division in the Yolngu conceptual universe between 
mind and spirit. But when speaking in English, Yolngu distinguish the 
two—they do not conflate them.
7 . Yolngu mind and English mind as 
instances of mind
Our analysis so far suggests that Yolngu have a complex set of concepts 
about the location, nature and processes of thinking and knowledge that 
can be placed in the same cross-cultural metacategory mind as the set of 
lexemes from different European languages that Wierzbicka places in her 
comparative frame. We will now suggest areas in which the Yolngu mind 
differs from and overlaps with the Anglo concept. While we cannot complete 
a full comparison of all of the languages encompassed in Wierzbicka’s 
argument, it will be apparent that in some cases the Yolngu concept shows 
more in common with non-Anglo concepts and in other cases less. We will 
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centre on the dialogue that Wierzbicka sets up between spirit and mind in 
European ontology and theory and suggest ways in which, as cross-cultural 
metacategories, mind and soul relate to Yolngu concepts.
If we accept Lillard’s conclusion that the EA (Euro-American) concept 
of mind can be summarised as the ‘housing [of ] mental states and 
generating mental processes’ (1998: 10), it provides evidence for an 
overlap between EA and Yolngu conceptual schema. Although Yolngu do 
not have a word for mind, we have seen that they do have an elaborate 
vocabulary associated with the head that makes it the locus for knowledge 
and processes of thought. When Yolngu use the word mind in English, 
they are referencing cognitive capacities that enable them to act in the 
world, as it is construed by them. It is significant that Yolngu do not 
associate mind with a specific organ such as the brain, but with (external) 
parts of the head. There is also an association between the water pulsing 
under the newborn’s fontanelle and the waters of the clan mangutji, the 
source of Wangarr knowledge, with the entire skull (wanda) of the infant 
conceptualised as consubstantial with the skull of the Wangarr being.
The metaphors associated with parts of the head and the Yolngu use of mind 
when speaking English suggest areas of overlap with the Anglo concept 
of mind. However, Yolngu have a theory of the origin and acquisition 
of knowledge that posits Wangarr origin and an initial entry point into 
the human body through the fontanelle. The Wangarr source of madayin 
rom and also of birrimbirr means that mind and soul are more closely 
linked than in modern Anglo usage. However, the fact that Yolngu, when 
speaking in English, distinguish between mind and spirit, and do not 
conflate them, suggests that Yolngu knowledge-in-mind is substantively 
different from the individual’s birrimbirr. There are no compounds or 
phrases that link birrimbirr to knowledge, in marked contrast to buku 
and liya. The distinction captures different processual aspects of Yolngu 
ontology, which involve the separation and reintegration of the sentient 
human body and the sentient ancestral body.
A person’s accumulation of knowledge is conceived of as a 
transferral—a passage of knowledge from the Wangarr domain into the 
human domain where it is for a while manifest in the actions of human 
beings in the world. Yolngu praxis centres on processes that ensure that 
the knowledge that pre-exists the individual is acquired incrementally 
through their lifespan. And it grows through exposure to Wangarr 
knowledge in the form of sacred objects, paintings and songs. These 
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externalised manifestations of the Wangarr beings are the substance of 
ceremonies—the major context in which people develop the expertise to 
live under madayin rom.
The person who becomes knowledgeable also becomes closer to the 
Wangarr. Yolngu mortuary rituals can be seen as a process for returning 
both the mind and the birrimbirr to the Wangarr dimension—a process 
through which they ultimately forget or leave behind the person of which 
they were for a time a part. The birrimbirr does not carry with it the 
characteristics of the living person beyond the Wangarr essence itself. 
The birrimbirr does not come back to haunt the living or express anger 
towards relatives left behind. That role is left to the mokuy (ghost). The 
buku metaphors discussed above suggest that the accumulated mind—
knowledge purposefully acquired during life—also becomes disembodied 
and returns to the Wangarr domain at death (H. Morphy 1997).
8 . Birrimbirr, soul and soul
In Yolngu Matha, as we have seen, something very similar to Anglo ‘soul’ 
is lexicalised as birrimbirr; in our terms both belong to the cross-cultural 
metacategory soul. But birrimbirr seems not to share certain essential 
characteristics with the ‘European’ concept of soul. Wierzbicka writes 
of the soul that:
We can begin with what seems reasonably clear: the word soul 
can only refer to persons, not to things; it doesn’t normally refer 
to a person as a whole, but only to one part of person; the part 
to which it refers is not a part of the body; and it cannot be seen. 
(1989: 43)
Wierzbicka writes further of the soul’s ‘moral character, that is, to its links 
with the idea of “good.”’ (ibid: 43) and ‘to a person’s capacity to be good’ 
(ibid: 44).
In 2016, Wierzbicka sets out her explication of birrimbirr (2016: 472). 
Here we want to respond briefly to some details of that explication in the 
light of the discussion in this chapter.
Our first and perhaps most substantive comment is that birrimbirr 
does not  carry the connotation of ‘goodness’ that Wierzbicka’s detailed 
explication of both soul and birrimbirr entails. Whereas Wierzbicka notes 
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people can be referred to as ‘good souls’ in English, in Yolngu we have never 
heard an equivalent reference to birrimbirr. In the Yolngu case people have 
a responsibility to follow the ancestral law (madayin rom), and to do so is 
to be dhunupa ‘straight’. But morality is not involved; madayin rom is not 
inherently good or bad, it just is. If anything it is inherently dangerous, and 
transgression potentially invites catastrophic consequences.
We also think that Yolngu would find the absence of any reference to 
the Wangarr very strange, and unsatisfactory. Wierzbicka’s explication 
attempts to capture the, perhaps unique, emplaced nature of Yolngu 
(and  by extension other Indigenous Australian) belief systems in the 
following way in part [D] of her explication (2016: 44):
[D] [WHAT PeOPLe CAN KNOW ABOUT THiS PART OF SOMeONe]
people can know that it is like this:
some time before this someone was born/this part of someone 
was part of a place
where some people lived before
after this someone dies, this part of this someone can be part 
of the same place
The Yolngu birrimbirr is the ancestral identity of the person, something 
that is consubstantial with and a manifestation of the Wangarr. Djalkiri 
places, and the mangutji from whence the birrimbirr comes, is not just any 
place where ‘people have lived before’—that would be true of many places 
in Yolngu country. It is a special kind of place imbued with Wangarr 
märr, and any explication would have to account for that in some way 
if it were to ring true to a Yolngu person. Birrimbirr is an expression of 
an ancestral (Wangarr) process that connects a spiritual domain with the 
lived and living world through a transformational process that includes 
spirit conception, the growth of the birrimbirr in the living person and 
the return of the spiritual dimension on death. The human cycle is one 
manifestation of the Wangarr that can also appear in material form and 
in the forces of nature—winds, tides, lightning, trees. But certain places 
are focal pints of the spiritual essence (märr) of particular Wangarr. 
The body (perhaps particularly the skull) is the container of both the 
mind and soul, which are arguably different aspects of the same märr, 
but conceptually distinct. The birrimbirr is the soul of the individual, 
consubstantial with the Wangarr, and madayin rom is the socially shared 
and transmitted product of the associated Wangarr mind.
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Both birrimbirr and madayin rom differ in another significant way from 
the Anglo concepts as analysed by Wierzbicka, in that arguably both 
are intimately associated with material objects. In Wierzbicka’s (1989) 
explication of both mind and soul ‘one cannot see it’. In the Yolngu case, 
paintings, sacred objects, elements of the environment, properties of 
the ecosystem are all in different ways externalised manifestations of the 
Wangarr. The connection with the person is emphasised in metaphor and 
ritual. On a person’s death in the past the skull—the wanda—was painted 
with a design that comes from the mangutji—the source of Wangarr 
knowledge. A sand sculpture in a mortuary ritual originates from the 
same place, and the grave has the name of the mangutji sung into it. 
In  each of these cases, from a Yolngu perspective, the material objects 
and the images and sounds they convey carry the agency of the Wangarr. 
As Daniel Wilfred puts it when referring to sound and rhythm of the clap 
sticks in song: ‘The clapping sticks, they lead everything. You think they 
are just sticks but they have a song. Everything comes out of the clapping 
sticks’ (Curkpatrick 2019: 24–25).
In our terms, and as Wierzbicka’s detailed (2016) analysis of soul-like 
concepts including birrimbirr shows very clearly, the cross-cultural 
metacategory soul needs to encompass the diversity of birrimbirr and other 
soul-like concepts. If it is to encompass the English soul and birrimbirr 
it needs to encompass a polythetic set of attributes, and ‘goodness’ is not 
a necessary attribute of every instantiation of the category.
9 . Conclusion: The nature of cross-cultural 
metacategories
In her comparative analyses of soul and mind across a wide set of languages, 
Wierzbicka uses the difficulty of translation of key terms from one 
language to another as part of the evidence for cultural difference. Yet at 
the same time what she chooses to translate is evidence of an intuition 
that the concepts compared have something in common. Translation 
from one language to another involves a double articulation, which is why 
it can seldom be ‘literal’. On either side of the divide is an enculturated 
language, such that the categorisations salient to each culture are encoded 
in its language in complex ways. The task of anthropology is in part to 
focus on the commonalities that exist within trajectories and discourses 
of difference that intuitively make comparison possible. A long view of 
contact between human societies suggests a history of interaction across 
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boundaries, histories of translation and comparison, in which categories 
are continually emerging and boundaries shifting. Methodologically, we 
believe it is important to make explicit the categories of comparison and 
frame them in such a way that they encompass difference and change 
while reflecting intuitions of similitude. Often communication reveals 
difference at moments of profound misunderstanding, when people find 
themselves using apparently the same word with very different senses 
(see e.g. F. Morphy 2007). A cross-cultural metacategory should facilitate 
discourse by holding certain things in common while anticipating 
difference. Not all concepts are going to be amenable to a cross-cultural 
analysis; the widening of a metacategory may result in a change to its 
definition, but too much widening may make it meaningless.
Implicit in our cross-cultural metacategory mind is that the family 
resemblance which defines the polythetic set of culturally embedded 
concepts centres on the cognitive capacities of thinking and knowing. 
The boundaries around a concept may be fuzzy and may change through 
time; the modern Anglo mind is continuous with early and more morally 
or spiritually entangled variants, but all are instances of mind. Discourses 
that occur across boundaries of language, culture, religion and discipline 
may also cause boundary shifts. The category mind can thus be compared 
across cultures and/or time on the basis of factors such as its location, or its 
relationship to soul, or the degree to which it can be distributed among 
persons, supernatural forces and things. Our comparison of Wierzbicka’s 
‘modern Anglo’ mind with ‘our’ Yolngu concept is highly productive in 
that it sets both within their own local cultural trajectories. The Yolngu 
mind complex, though historically distant from the concepts belonging 
to the set of European languages and cultures that Wierzbicka compares, 
is not categorically discontinuous. Which is to say, the concepts are not 
incommensurable, but may be meaningfully compared because they are 
members of the polythetic mind.
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Teknocentric kin terms in 
Australian languages
Harold Koch
1 . Introduction and overview1
Australian Indigenous languages have long been known to have systems 
of kinship terminology that are shared across much of the continent 
and differ widely from those of well-known European languages.2 For 
instance, they typically distinguish between elder and younger siblings, 
between a mother’s and a father’s child, between maternal and paternal 
‘uncles’ and ‘aunts’ (MB vs FB and MZ vs FZ: see note 3 for clarification 
of abbreviations), between maternal and paternal grandparents (MM vs 
FM, MF vs FF).3 On the other hand, some relations are not distinguished 
terminologically; for example a parent and their same-sex siblings 
(so F = FB and M = MZ); or siblings and parallel cousins (so FBS or 
MZS = B, etc.). Another characteristic of Australian kin terminologies is 
1  It is with pleasure that I present this study in honour of my long-term colleague Anna Wierzbicka. 
I thank the editors and two reviewers for useful feedback.
2  Further discussion and exemplification of Australian kinship systems can be found in standard 
works on Australian anthropology, e.g. Elkin (1964) and Berndt and Berndt (1977).
3  For the description of kin relations I here use a version of the kind of abbreviations widely used 
in kinship studies; all kin relations are reduced to strings of these symbols. Kinship symbols used, 
following the practice of the AustKin project (see below), are: B = brother, C = child, D = daughter, 
e = elder, f =  female’s, F =  father, H = husband, m = male’s, M = mother, S =  son, Sb =  sibling, 
Sp = spouse, W = wife, y = younger, Z = sister. For a critique of this style of definition from the 
Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) perspective see Wierzbicka (2013). See section 5.3 and note 
24 for further comments relating the findings of this study to the NSM approach.
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the reciprocal use of some terms.4 The same term may denote a grandparent 
and grandchild: for example, FF = mSC, MM = fDC.5 Likewise for affinal 
(in-law) terms: for example, WM = fDH, HB = mBW. Abbreviations for 
the main kin relations discussed here are set out in Table 14.1, arranged 
according C(onsanguineal) vs A(ffinal) relation and to generation (G) 
relative to the propositus.
Table 14 .1 . Kin abbreviations .
















C G+1 M mother MB mother’s 
brother
F father FZ father’s 
sister













A G0 W wife WSb wife’s 
sibling
H husband HSb husband’s 
sibling


















Source: Author’s summary .
Two further characteristics of Australian kin terminology should be 
mentioned. First, kin terms may be extended beyond the immediate 
family. There are widely recurrent principles by which kin terms that 
describe genealogically close relations are extended to more distantly 
related relatives; these have been explored especially by Scheffler (1978). 
Second, affinal (in-law) relatives typically belong to particular classes of 
consanguineal relatives (depending on the marriage rules applying in each 
society); for example, a spouse is often a kind of cross-cousin (i.e. child 
of FZ or MB), WM a kind of FZ, WF a kind of MB, etc. There may 
4  Cousin is a reciprocal term in English.
5  In some cases, the terms are not identical but are derivationally related: either the senior or the 
junior term may involve an affix added to the shared stem.
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be alternative ways of referring to someone depending on whether they 
are (potentially) related by marriage in addition to their (classificatory) 
consanguineal relation.
The subject of this chapter is a further kind of terminological relation 
that has come to light in connection with the compilation of kinship 
terminology for the AustKin project (see Dousset et al. 2010; www.
austkin.net). A puzzling systematic formal relation exists between terms 
denoting one’s spouse’s parents (and reciprocally one’s child’s spouse) and 
grandkin terms. This was first noted in Dharumba data (from around 
Ulladulla, NSW), then observed in Ngarrindjeri from South Australia, 
and finally found, with more of an explanation, in languages of Cape 
York Peninsula. The respective data sets are discussed in sections 2, 
3 and 4 respectively. This unavoidably involves some discussion of the 
morphology of the forms. Then in section 5, I provide an explanation 
in terms of pragmatics, the altercentric usage of consanguineal terms to 
denote affinal relatives, for which I propose the term ‘teknocentric’, and 
explore some of the implications of these results for semantic description, 
semantic change and the etymological study of Australian kin terms.
2 . Dharumba
The Dharumba kinship data were collected as one of the ‘schedules’ 
prepared at the behest of Fison and Howitt.6 The Fison and Howitt 
schedule F.15, said to be from the Búrgural tribe in the Jervis Bay district, 
was recorded on 28 September 1874 by Andrew Mackenzie of Moelly, 
Wandandian (near Ulladulla).7 This is the same Andrew Mackenzie whose 
documentation of Dharumba (and Dharrawal) is analysed in Besold’s 
(2012) study of historic documentation of the Yuin languages of the 
New South Wales South Coast. Mackenzie’s kinship data are presented 
as a family tree with 22 named individuals, followed by 10 lists detailing 
the terms used by 10 of the individuals for the other persons on the table. 
This yields 44 kin terms, many of which have several senses. The use 
of the genealogical method of elicitation has yielded not only a greater 
6  For Fison and Howitt’s kinship studies, including the ‘schedules’ they solicited, see McConvell 
and Gardner (2016).
7  The manuscript containing the Australian kinship schedules is in the Lorimer Fison papers 
within the Tippett Collection in the library of St Marks National Theological Centre, Canberra.
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number of kin terms,8 but increased precision in the reference of terms 
usually translated as ‘grandmother’, ‘father-in-law’, etc. Mackenzie’s data, 
however, also present us with a puzzle; the terms reveal an intriguing set of 
formal relations between grandkin terms and parent/child-in-law terms, 
which cries out for an explanation.
Table  14.2 sets out the relevant terms, with spellings normalised and 
rendered into a standard orthography.9 Note that the grandkin terms 
occur both with and without a final syllable -nga, whose significance is 
not known. For pawu(nga) the longer form occurs only with reference 
to the junior member (i.e. fDC). For kupa(nga), both the longer and 
the shorter forms occur in both senior and junior reference. For ka(ty)
panga (forms with and without ty occur) there is no short form. Ngapupu, 
which appears to be a partially reduplicated form of ngapu, occurs only 
as a senior term, and the corresponding junior term involves a suffix -ara, 
with elision of the stem-final u.
Table 14.2. Dharumba terms for grandkin and affines.
Grandkin gloss Grandkin form Affine form Affine gloss
MM/fDC pawu(nga) pawiri WM/fDH
FF/mSC kupa(nga) kupanthiri HF/mSW
FM/fSC ka(ty)panga ka(ty)panthiri HM/fSW
MF/mDC ngapupu/ngapara ngaparama WF/mDH
Source: Adapted from Mackenzie (1874) [see note 7, this chapter].
Affinal terms for parent-in-law and child-in-law appear to be based on the 
stem of the grandkin terms—although there are irregularities. Thus pawiri 
involves -iri added to pawu, with vowel elision. Two other terms, ka(ty)
panthiri and kupanthiri, appear to contain a suffix -nthiri. The fourth affinal 
term, ngaparama, appears to suffix -ma to the junior grandkin term ngapara. 
Although the suffixes differ somewhat, there is a clear pattern of deriving 
terms for parent/child-in-law from terms for grandparent/grandchild. 
Specifically, the term for spouse’s parent (and its reciprocal) is consistently 
related to that for the parent of one’s own parent of the same sex as the 
spouse: compare WM with MM, WF with MF, HM with FM, and HF 
with FF. Why should this be so? Is a similar pattern found elsewhere?
8  The traditional stories he recorded yielded only eight kin terms.
9  It is impossible to know whether r represents a tap/trill or an approximant; the two rhotics 
typically contrast in Australian languages.
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3 . Lower Murray languages
3 .1 . Ngarrindjeri
The language spoken—up to the mid-twentieth century—by the 
Narrinyeri, now called Ngarrindjeri, around the mouth of the Murray 
River in South Australia was described in the nineteenth century by 
Meyer (1843) and Taplin (1873), reproduced in an appendix to Taplin 
(1879). I am here concerned with a subset of the kinship terms. Some of 
the kin terms are extraordinarily difficult to understand, due to a plethora 
of prefixes, suffixes and suppletive stems. The grandkin terms to be 
discussed, however, lack some of these complexities. The meanings are 
assured due to the fact that Taplin used Fison and Howitt’s genealogical 
method of eliciting kin terms; that is, terms were gathered with reference 
to the relationship of individuals known to the informant. The same kin 
terms are also given in later works by Radcliffe-Brown (1918) and Berndt 
and Berndt (1993).
The grandkin terms are presented in Table 14.3. The citation forms for 
the grandparental terms include the marker of first person propositus, 
-ano(wi) ‘my’. The base of the lexeme is given in the next column. 
(For MF the form marked for third person propositus, ngatyapali ‘his/
her MF’ is also known.) The junior reciprocal terms, female’s daughter’s 
child (fDCh) etc., are provided in column four. They are derived from 
the senior terms by means of a suffix -ari (or probably just -ar, since -i is 
singular marker). Forms without the final -i are found in Radcliffe-Brown 
(1918) and Berndt and Berndt (1993). These later sources also indicate 
junior forms without the suffix (i.e. pak, muth and ngaty), which suggests 
that the junior relatives need not be overtly marked with the junior suffix; 
that is, the unsuffixed forms have as their referent either a grandparent 
or the reciprocal grandchild. As in many Australian kin systems, these 
grandparental terms extend to the siblings of each grandparent; thus 
pakanowi MM can also refer to MMZ or MMB. The same extension 
applies to junior terms; thus pakari can refer not only to daughter’s child 
of a woman but also to the daughter’s children of the sister or brother of 
the grandmother. The same suffix -ar(i) that indicates the junior member 
of a grandkin relation is found with some other kin terms as well. Thus 
the reciprocal of FZ ngampano(wi), which has a short form (m)pano, is 
(nga)mpari, and the reciprocal of FeB ngopano(wi) is ngopari.
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Table 14 .3 . Grandkin terms .
Gloss Senior Base Junior Gloss
MM pakanowi pak- pakari fDC
FM muthanowi muth- muthari fSC
MF ngatyanowi ngaty- ngatyari mDC
FF mayanowi may- mayarari10 mSC
Source: Adapted from Taplin (1879) .
Now the base of two of the grandkin terms of Table 14.3, plus the FeB 
term ngop-, are found additionally in affinal (in-law) terms, shown in 
Table  14.4. Two separate suffixes are involved, -antun and -eli. Meyer 
gives three forms in -antun. The only similar form in the other sources is 
Berndt and Berndt’s mayanti, which looks like Meyer’s mayantun without 
the -un but with the addition of the singular suffix -i. I therefore analyse 
the derivational suffix as just -ant. Mayareli, which contains the same extra 
-ar- as mayarari in Table 14.3, is attested from Taplin, Radcliffe-Brown 
and Berndt and Berndt. Ngopeli is attested from Radcliffe-Brown and 
Berndt and Berndt, who omit the final -i. Hence I treat the relevant suffix 
as just -el. The function of the suffixes -ant and -el is not otherwise known. 
For our purposes, it is sufficient to treat the affinal terms as derivatives 
of the grandkin terms.
Table 14.4. Grandkin and affine terms.
Gloss Base Junior -ar In-law -ant In-law -el Gloss
FF/mSC may(ar)- mayarari mayant- mayarel- HF/mSW
FM/fSC muth- muthari muthant- – [HM]/fSW
FeB/myBC ngop- ngopari ngopant- ngopel- HB/mBW
Source: Adapted from Meyer (1843), Taplin (1879), Radcliffe-Brown (1918) and Berndt 
and Berndt (1993) .
As for the meanings of the in-law terms, mayant- and mayarel- appear 
to be synonyms, although there is the possibility that they belong 
to different dialects. Berndt and Berndt give two senses for mayant-: 
the senior affine ‘husband’s father (or his brother)’ as well as its junior 
reciprocal ‘man’s (or  brother’s) son’s wife’. Meyer gives only the junior 
term ‘daughter-in-law’, which I interpret as mSW on the basis of the other 
10  The form mayarari presents a difficulty in that it appears to have an extra syllable. But the 
expected mayar is attested in the forms spelled maiyar (Radcliffe-Brown 1918) and maiar and mair 
(Berndt and Berndt 1993).
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sources; the expected senior sense would be HF. For mayarel both Taplin 
and Radcliffe-Brown give both the senior and junior senses, while Berndt 
and Berndt give only the junior meaning ‘man’s or brother’s son’s wife’. 
For muthantun as well Meyer gives only the junior sense—in fact the same 
undifferentiated gloss ‘daughter-in-law’ as for mayantun; I assume that it 
must be interpreted as fSW, and probably had the reciprocal senior sense 
HM as well. For ngop(ano) vs ngopar-, the senses of FeB and its reciprocal 
yBC are assured from Taplin, Radcliffe-Brown and Berndt and Berndt, 
while Meyer gives simply ‘uncle’ vs ‘nephew’. For ngopel both Radcliffe-
Brown and Berndt and Berndt provide glosses HB and its reciprocal 
mBW; for ngopantun Meyer gives an undifferentiated gloss ‘sister-in-law’, 
which I infer is mBW. The semantic relations between the grandkin terms 
and their affinal derivatives can be seen by comparing the first and last 
columns of Table 14.4.
3 .2 . Ngangaruku
Radcliffe-Brown (1918: 243–46) discusses the kinship terms of what 
he called the ‘Ngangaruku tribe’, located further up the Murray River 
from the Ngarrindjeri, between Mannum and Herman’s Landing, 
whose social organisation he found to be similar in the main to that of 
the Ngarrindjeri.11 Here two of the grandkin terms, paka and ngatta (in 
his spelling), appear to be cognate with Ngarrindjeri pak- and ngaty- 
respectively. The grandkin terms extend to the grandparent’s siblings of 
both sexes (e.g. MF = MFB/Z) and the same applies to their reciprocal 
use (mDC = BDC). Radcliffe-Brown notes as an interesting feature the 
application of grandkin terms to refer to in-laws of the parents’ and 
children’s generations, discussing how this works only from a woman’s 
viewpoint (his informant being a woman named Jenny).
A woman applies the term noidla to her father’s mother and to the 
brothers and sisters of the latter, and also to her husband’s mother 
and to her son’s wife. Her son’s children are also noidla … A woman 
calls her husband’s father metsa, that being the term she also applies 
to a father’s father. She also calls the wife of her napnap (brother’s 
son) metsa12 … (Radcliffe-Brown 1918: 245)
11  The language is apparently in a dialect relation with Ngayawung.
12  This is the reciprocal of HFZ; hence we can assume that the usage of these terms extends to 
siblings. It would be expected that metsa would also be used by HF for mSW.
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The resultant senses are set out in Table 14.5.
Table 14.5. Ngangaruku grandkin and affinal terms.
Grandkin gloss Form Affinal gloss
MM(Sb), f/ZDC13 paka –
MF(Sb), m/BDC ngatta –
FM(Sb), f/ZSC noidla HM/fSW
FF(Sb), m/BSC metsa HF, [HFZ]/[mSW], fBSW
Source: Adapted from Radcliffe-Brown (1918).
3 .3 . Summary of Lower Murray kin terms
In both Ngangaruku and Ngarrindjeri it is only paternal grandkin terms 
that have been documented as being related to affinal terms, unlike 
Dharumba, where all four grandkin terms are involved. Note that in 
Ngangaruku the senior and junior terms are identical, whereas in the 
other languages one is usually a derivative of the other. In Ngarrindjeri 
the relationship between terms for parent’s sibling and sibling-in-law 
seems to be a related phenomenon and deserving of a similar explanation. 
In an attempt at explanation Taplin (1879: 164) correctly noted that 
a man’s daughter-in-law, mayarel- mSW, is the mother of mSC, the man’s 
paternal grandchild, may-, reciprocal of FF. His further explanation in 
terms of patrilineal clan succession is too vague, as is Radcliffe-Brown’s 
suggestion that the terminological equivalence represent traces of an 
earlier matrimoiety system.
4 . Cape York Peninsula
4 .1 . Wik Mungkan
In some of the languages of western Cape York Peninsula we find similar 
phenomena. The anthropologist Donald Thomson did a considerable 
amount of work on kinship in the area in the 1930s. He described some 
patterns in the use of kin terms that provide the clue to our puzzle; I begin 
with his data on ‘Wik Moŋkan’ (Thomson 1972: 15–20). In Wik Mungkan, 
a Middle Paman language, only three grandparental terms are used: the same 
13  To be read as: mother’s mother or her siblings, and reciprocally the daughter’s child of a female 
ego or of one’s sister.
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terms is used for cross-grandparents MF and FM. The junior reciprocals 
involve a suffix -i(n)yaŋ; see Table 14.6. A more recent linguistic source, 
the Wik Mungkan dictionary (Kilham et al. 1986), gives the grandkin 
terms shown in Table 14.7. For the older generation the basic stems are 
compounded with wuut ‘old man’ and wayyow ‘old woman’. Otherwise 
a suffix -(an)chin may occur, including when used for address.
Table 14 .6 . Wik Mungkan grandkin terms .
Senior gloss Senior form Junior form Junior gloss
FF pola poliyaŋ mSC
MM kema keminyaŋ fDC
MF ŋatja ŋatjiyaŋ mDC
FM ŋatja ŋatjiyaŋ fSC
Source: Thomson (1972) .
Table 14 .7 . Wik Mungkan grandkin terms .
Senior gloss Senior form Senior address Junior form Junior gloss
FF(B) puulwuut puulanchin puuliyang mSC
MM(Z) kemwayyow14 kemchin kemiyang fDC
MF(B) ngechwuut15 ngechanchin ngechiyaŋ mDC
FM(Z) ngechwayyow ngechiyaŋ fSC
Source: Kilham et al . (1986) .
In this society, the normal marriage is between classificatory cross-
cousins. A woman’s preferred husband is the son of a (classificatory) kala 
MyB. A  (prospective or actual) HF is distinguished as kal amp ‘poison 
uncle’ vs kal kampan, a ‘friend-uncle, not for marrying’. But an alternative 
form of address—making reference to her children—is available.
A woman’s kala [MyB] may be her father-in-law. If he is she 
calls him puk pol’nyin, child’s pola [FF], and he calls her poliyaŋ 
[reciprocal of FF] kallin, poliyaŋ carrier, or mother of (my) poliyaŋ. 
Similarly a woman calls her HM (her pinya [FeB]) puk ŋat’njin, 
child’s ŋatja waiyo [FMZ] and she calls her SW kat’n ŋatjiyaŋ, 
mother of (my) ŋatjiyaŋ. (Thomson 1972: 20)16
14  A short form kem is also used.
15  An alternative form is athiy.
16  On the previous page Thomson says that the woman and her father-in-law ‘may address’ one 
another in these terms. So it seems there are two possibilities for addressing in-laws, both using 
consanguineal terms: one based on marriage practices and the other based on relations to a child.
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This naming practice—using the child as a reference point—is confirmed, 
at least for parents-in-law, from the Wik Mungkan dictionary.17 The kin 
term puulanchin (FF) is:
used especially in phrases such as puk ngath puulanchin18 ‘my 
children’s grandfather on father’s side’ and as such is the term used 
by a woman to address her father-in-law. (Kilham et al. 1986: 195)
A similar statement is made concerning ngechanchin, a term of address 
for FM and MF: ‘A common expression is also: puk ngathar ngechanchin19 
“she’s grandmother of my children”’ (Kilham et al. 1986: 140). Although 
the dictionary does not give phrasal glosses for grandchildren, it goes 
beyond Thomson’s data in providing analytical glosses of a similar type 
for siblings-in-law. Table  14.8 indicates the available terms for affinal 
relations. Husband’s parents are referred to as ‘my child’s grandparent’, 
spouse’s senior sibling-in-law as ‘my child’s parent’s elder sibling’, 
and spouse’s junior sibling-in-law in terms of the function of the in-law 
in relation to the child.
Table 14 .8 . Wik Mungkan in-law terms .
Cons. gloss Consanguineal Affinal form Affinal gloss
FF puulanchin puk ngath puulanchin HF
FM ngechanchin puk ngathar ngechanchin HM
FeB/Z piny(chin) puk ngath pinychin HeB/Z
MeB/Z muk(anchin) puk ngath mukanchin WeZ
yZC mukayng mukay-wunpan20 yZH
FyB ? puk ngath emathan21 HyB
Source: Kilham et al . (1986) .
It becomes clear from the data of both Thomson (1972) and Kilham et al. 
(1986) that parents-in-law and siblings-in-law and their reciprocal 
relations may be described in terms of their relation to the child of the 
propositus. That is, the relationship is referenced from the viewpoint 
of the child: the propositus refers to their parent-in-law in terms of the 
child’s grandparents, and, reciprocally, the senior affinal relatives refer to 
17  There is an alternative strategy for describing parents-in-law as taboo or ‘poison’ uncles and aunties: 
kaal-aamp WF, piny-kench WM, the first member of the compounds being MyB and FZ respectively.
18  Literally, ‘child-to.me FF-senior’.
19  Literally, ‘child-to.me FM-senior’.
20  Literally, ‘yZC begetter’.
21  Literally, ‘my child raiser’.
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their daughter- or son-in-law in terms of their own grandchild. Likewise 
a person may refer to their brother- or-sister-in-law in terms of the child’s 
relation to their parent’s sibling, and reciprocally these refer to their 
in-laws as the parent of their nephew or niece.
4 .2 . Other Cape York languages
Similar derivation of affinal terms from terms for grandkin and uncles 
and aunts can be found in some Northern Paman languages. Thomson 
(1972: 21–24) presents data from Tjungundji and Hale (1965, 1997) 
from Linngithigh. Here phonological changes have somewhat obscured 
the etymological relations and the morphological details are not fully 
understood. Accordingly, and for reasons of space, I will refrain from 
presenting the full evidence here. Regarding forms, an example of the 
relations can be seen in Tjungundji thaya MF, thandhi (-ndhi is the 
junior suffix) mDC but also affinal mDH, and thanuma thandhi WF. 
In Tjungundji affinal terms are based on all four grandkin terms as well 
as on FeB/Z and FyB/Z. (Wik Mungkan is the only language in my data 
that attests a terminological relation between MeSb and WeSb.) For 
Linngithigh Hale (1965) provides revealing glosses such as ngom inhaghay 
‘HeB, his (i.e. woman’s son’s) FeB’ in comparison to inhaghay FeB and 
ayom.thindhigh ‘mDH/WF, to whose child I am thiy’ vis-à-vis thiy MF. 
Such glosses emphasise the child-centred nature of the terms.
5 . Discussion
5 .1 . Teknocentricity
We have now found a recurrent pattern of lexical relationships in three 
widely separated regions of Australia: the south-east coast, the lower 
Murray  River, and Cape York Peninsula in the far north-east. In this 
pattern affinal kin are referred to in terms that reflect the consanguineal 
relation they bear to a child: my spouse’s parents in terms of my child’s 
grandparents and my spouse’s siblings in terms of my child’s uncle 
or aunt. Furthermore, since kin terms may be reciprocal, a person’s 
son- or  daughter-in-law is referred to in terms of being the parent of 
a (potential) grandchild.
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I propose to call this a ‘teknocentric’ usage of kin terms. The word 
teknocentric is derived from a classical Greek noun teknon meaning 
‘offspring’, whether son or daughter, which is based on a root tek- 
‘bear’, ‘beget’. Note that this root refers to both maternal and paternal 
relations, which makes the term especially suitable for describing parent–
child relations in Australian languages, since these typically distinguish 
terminologically between a woman’s and a man’s children.22
5 .2 . Pragmatic explanation
These equivalences are not simply a matter of semantic structure but 
require a pragmatic explanation. They involve a shift in propositus, the 
person from whose perspective the relationship is calculated. This is 
a kind of altercentric usage, as described by Merlan (1982: 127) for the 
Mangarrayi:
A senior speaker, in talking to a junior relative (especially a young 
child), tends to refer to third persons in terms of the junior’s 
relationship to them. Thus MoMo addressing DaCh may say with 
reference to her own husband ‘Where is (your) jabjab?’ (speaker’s 
husband, child’s MoFa) using the altercentric referential mode.
Several kinds of motivations may be hypothesised for teknocentric 
usage. The most obvious is accommodation to children within a family 
context. Parents would refer to their own in-laws using the terms that 
their children use. This would apply especially in speech directed to 
a child (e.g. ‘give it to grandma’). Then a mother may, especially in the 
presence of her child, address her own HM with a grandparental term, 
used almost as a name (e.g. ‘here, take it grandma’). These habits may 
extend to using the grandparental term in more general contexts as well. 
Altercentric reference also serves an instructional purpose: ‘children are 
constantly being taught how they should refer to others by being spoken 
to in terms of their relationship to them’ (Merlan 1982: 129).
22  McConvell (2018: 249) has used a similar term, filiocentricity, based on Latin filius ‘son’ and 
filia ‘daughter’, for a narrower sense describing a ‘pattern where the term used converges on the form 
used to and by the child in a parent-child dyad’.
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A second motivation may involve avoidance. Fêng (1937: 203) describes 
teknocentric usage as ‘a circumlocutory way of expressing embarrassing 
relationships’.23 The use of consanguineal terms for affinal relatives thus 
constitutes a kind of euphemism. It serves to disguise reference to the 
marriage relationship with its sexual connotations (cf. Garde 2013: 121). 
Note that all the examples we have discussed involve the replacement 
of a spousal term: ‘husband’s or wife’s father, mother, brother, sister’ by 
‘father’s or mother’s father, mother, brother, sister’ respectively; likewise, 
‘son’s wife’ by ‘son’s child’s mother’ and ‘daughter’s husband’ by ‘daughter’s 
child’s father’ (although here the reference to the child may not be explicit).
Third, teknocentric reference to affines is one of a number of strategies 
employed in the etiquette of Australian societies to make indirect reference 
to individuals. It is becoming well known that Aboriginal people use many 
strategies other than the use of names to indicate who they are referring 
to. Some of this indirect referencing requires much inferencing on the 
part of hearers, as is amply illustrated in Garde (2013) and Blythe (2018).
5 .3 . Implications for semantic description
It is clear that the shared semantic content in teknocentrically related kin 
terms—especially where there is pure polysemy, as in Ngangaruku between 
noidla FM and HM—would be impossible to capture in a componential 
analysis, such as that illustrated for the Australian language Nyamal 
in Burling’s (1970) chapter ‘Kinship terminology’, where all possible 
senses of a term are to be captured by a combination of features such as 
generation, sex, seniority, etc.
Scheffler’s (1978) approach is more promising. He accounts for many of 
the multiple senses of individual Australian kin terms (i.e. polysemies) in 
terms of equivalence rules, stated as expansions or extensions of a primary 
sense along various parameters. Thus F is extended to FB and M to MZ by 
a ‘same-sex sibling-merging rule’. Actually the direction of his merging rules 
is the opposite of extension: they involve rewriting a string of relations in 
terms of fewer symbols: for example FBS → FS (since FB = F) = B. Scheffler 
(1978: 145) has a ‘spouse-equation rule’ that relates affinal to consanguineal 
23  Fêng uses the term ‘teknonymic’ to describe this usage in Chinese. But teknonymy is not the same 
thing as our teknocentricity: it is a term invented by E.B. Tylor ‘to describe the custom whereby a person 
is called the father, mother, grandfather or grandmother, etc. of one of his descendants instead of by his 
own name’ (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 348–49). For example, Anna may be referred to as ‘Mary’s mother’.
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relationships: Sp → Cousin, SpM → FZ, SpF → MB, etc. These relations 
result from marriage practices, such as intermarriage between kin who are 
terminologically first cross-cousins. Scheffler’s equivalence formulas do not 
make direct reference to their motivation. Nor do any of them involve shifts 
of propositus of the kind we have seen here. One could however construct 
a rule for the equivalence HF = FF, which would substitute fCF for H, thus 
HF → fCFF, and for the reciprocal equivalence mSW = mSCM, one which 
replaces W with mCM.
The Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach championed by 
Anna Wierzbicka, could, it seems, account for the kinds of relations I have 
described here. Her approach to the explication of kin term meanings, as 
outlined in Wierzbicka (2017), is anchored in the child’s perspective, pays 
attention to who is using the term and to whom, incorporates pragmatics 
and could apparently incorporate the shifts in propositus of the type 
described above.24
5 .4 . Semantic change
The reader will have noticed that our teknocentric terms involve 
different degrees of explicitness with respect to the altered propositus. 
An expression like Wik Mungkan puk ngath puulanchin ‘my child’s FF 
[= my HF]’ is fully explicit. A term like Linngithigh ngom inhaghay ‘his 
FeB [= my HeB]’ requires the hearer to infer that the perspective is the 
speaker’s child. A form like Ngarrindjeri mayarel mSW, presumably 
derived from mSC, requires an inference concerning how the referent is 
related to the grandchild. Ngangaruku metsa FF, which is used without 
any modification in the sense HF, either requires a strong inference or has 
to be understood as a synonymous kin term. When the teknocentrically 
used term has become opaque—whether through the irrecoverability 
of the shifted propositus, the lack of transparency of the derivational 
morphology, or replacement of the term for the consanguineal relation—
semantic change will have taken place. Even without these prerequisites, 
semantic change takes place when invited inferences are reanalysed as 
primary senses (Traugott and Dasher 2002).
24  I am not competent to attempt to supply NSM-style formulas explicating these kin terms. 
I would however welcome an NSM description of these phenomena.
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5 .5 . Implications for etymology25
If the teknocentric usage of consanguineal kin terms to indicate affinal 
relations has been widely used and has resulted in semantic change, we 
can expect that more cognates between the two kinds of kin terms remain 
to be discovered. This applies both within and across languages. Within 
a given language, a form like Linngithigh ayom.londhigh mSW may no 
longer be synchronically perceived as being lexically related to olay FF. 
Interaction with other kinds of semantic extension may lead to some 
interesting cognate senses. For example, kami (or a reflex such as Wik 
Mungkan kem(a)) is MM in many Pama-Nyungan languages. Apparent 
derivatives are found in the sense of WM in languages that lack kami 
as MM: kamintha in Gathang and kamiyan in Wangaaybuwan. These 
are nevertheless plausible reflexes of an earlier *kami MM. Furthermore, 
there is often polysemy between WM and FZ in Australian languages. 
In Wangaaybuwan kamiyan has both meanings—possibly by extension 
from WM. In some languages (e.g. Duungidjawu), kami has only the 
FZ sense—the language having unrelated terms for both WM and MM. 
It would be hard to account for the apparent cognacy of terms for MM 
and FZ without a teknocentrically based shift of the kind we have found.
6 . Conclusions
Indigenous Australian societies are characterised by a multiplicity of 
means of referring to one’s relatives, including various strategies of 
indirection. One such strategy is to substitute consanguineal kin terms 
for affinal ones,  especially given the sensitivity surrounding allusions 
to spousal relations. Although the actual use in interaction of kin 
terminology has not been studied in many societies, and although the 
recorded kin terminology for many societies is lacking in detail, there 
are indications among attested kin vocabularies that a teknocentric usage 
of kin terms has led in a number of languages to the lexicalisation of 
consanguineal kin terms or derivatives therefrom as affinal kin terms. 
Thus the communicative practices are revealed by a careful study of the 
vocabulary of kinship.
25  I should admit that my main interest in Australian kin terminology is etymological: establishing 
which terms are cognates and identifying their earlier form and meaning.
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15
Showing and not telling 
in a sign language
John Haiman
Anna Wierzbicka’s classic article on direct and indirect speech (1974) is 
one of the very few that I have read in linguistics whose major insight, 
once seen, can never again be unseen: direct speech (DS)—or at least 
that recycling of other speakers’ words that is meant to be recognised 
as such—is a dramatic mimetic performance.
Direct speech (DS) is obviously an act of impersonation, in which a speaker 
identifies with and inhabits a character. Indirect speech (IS), on the other 
hand, is a distanced descriptive act whereby the speaker talks about the 
speech of others, as of all things other, from their own perspective, that is 
to say, from the outside. DS and IS therefore contrast exactly, as do vocal 
showing what’s going on (e.g. shouting with anger/crooning with pleasure; 
paralanguage; ideophones) and telling a story about it (e.g. saying ‘I am 
angry/ecstatic’ or anything else in so many words; propositional language). 
Minimally contrasting utterances like, for example,
She said ‘you’re a liar’
She said (that) I was a liar
can thus be distinguished on the basis of simple syntactic tests. One of 
these is the ‘go  …’ or ‘be, like  …’ framing test in English. As is well 
known, these predicates introduce a dramatic performance:




On the basis of this test, a dramatic performance may be any action 
(e.g. scratching one’s ear), any posture (e.g. hunching over), any gesture 
(e.g. a shrug), any facial expression (e.g. a smile) or any ideophone (e.g. 
‘Yuk!’). It may also be any direct quote, but it can not be an indirect quote.
She goes/’s, like, ‘You’re a liar’
*She goes/’s like, that I was a liar
Comparable ‘quotative frames’ in other languages pick out the same roster 
of behaviours (cf. Güldemann 2008).
The present essay does not so much argue for the correctness of Anna’s 
illuminating analysis (which strikes me as self-evident, now that she has 
pointed it out for all of us to see), as to point out another formal distinction 
between direct and indirect speech, this one in signed languages like ASL 
(American Sign Language), BSL (British Sign Language), German SL, 
Italian SL, Catalan SL and Quebec SL, which may be seen to follow 
naturally from this analysis. As such, it argues for the thesis that iconicity 
is unexpectedly the natural motivation for the expression of yet another 
conceptual distinction. And, via the circumstantial evidence afforded by 
this one example, it suggests, at least as an optimistic heuristic, that all 
signs (written, spoken or signed) may well derive from comparably natural 
beginnings. Laziness, convention and other factors may have rendered 
these iconic origins obscure over time.
One formal distinction in many if not all sign languages is this: in IS, 
signers maintain eye contact with their addressees, while in DS this eye 
contact is interrupted.
Since the scholars who originally described the phenomenon in ASL 
(Bellugi and Klima 1976: 521–22) and BSL (Sutton-Spence and Woll 
1999: 95) provided no reason for this contrast, the distinction may seem 
to the outside observer to be yet another unremarkable example, among 
thousands, of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign. Yet the coincidence 
among sign languages in this marking strategy argues that there must be 
some natural motivation behind it. (It should be noted that ASL and 
BSL, unlike American and British English, are totally distinct languages, 
as unlikely to trace their commonalities to common origin as Arabic and 
Hungarian.) Indeed, Quer (2005) and Jarque and Pascual (2015) report 
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that the ‘temporal interruption of eye contact with the interlocutor in the 
here and now’, which they describe for DS in Catalan SL, is ‘typical’ in 
a variety of signed languages (Jarque and Pascual 2015: 429).
Suspension of eye contact is in fact only the tip of an iceberg of concomitant 
non-manual ‘role shift’ markers (Padden 1986) that signal DS. The others 
include change of head position, body shift and facial expression, with eye 
gaze change being the most frequent, most probably because it is the most 
compatible with the principle of least effort (Hermann and Steinbach 
2012: 13; Hübl 2012).
The transparent, natural (and indeed to signers presumably self-evident) 
motivation for the marking of DS is immediately manifest once one 
correctly models the difference between Jakobson’s (1965) ‘Speech Stage’, 
which is inhabited by the participants of the speech act (the speaker and 
the interlocutor right here and right now) and the ‘Event Stage’, which 
is inhabited by the signs they make: models of the things and events that 
they are talking about. It may seem from Jakobson’s nomenclature that the 
Speech Stage (with its two inhabitants) is therefore infinitesimally small 
compared to the Event Stage, which may encompass the entire universe at 
any time; but the truth is the opposite. Consider the relationship between 
the two in Douglas Adams’ immortal, but grammatically unexceptionable, 
sentence: ‘Thus, the universe ended.’ (Adams 1981: 146). (Spoken 
when, by whom, standing where?) As in the Adams example (1981), the 
participants of the speech act (in this case, Adams and his readers) are 
a part of the real world, but the Event Stage, rather than being the real 
world, for all its apparent size, is not ‘the universe’ but only a picture of 
it: it is merely a theatre in which they stage their linguistic productions. 
Not only is the Event Stage totally contained within the Speech Stage, 
those puppets that speakers animate are as remote from the real world 
inhabited by the speaker and the interlocutor as the characters of a play are 
supposed to be from the playwright and from their audience. As countless 
adages and proverbial expressions in a number of traditions make clear, 
all stages, like all games, are temporary bubbles of pretence, and what 
transpires on any stage is ideally distinct from what goes on in the real 
world. Thus, ‘It’s only a game’, ‘The show must go on’, the notorious 
polysemy of the word ‘play’ in English and other languages for both games 
and dramatic representations (noted by Huizinga 1955), etc.
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That the bubble may in fact be punctured is well known. There are 
hybrid performances that are partially acts of showing and acts of telling: 
exhibitions of divided empathy with the characters on stage on the part 
of the impresarios (as in free indirect discourse), and self-referential 
‘postmodern’ hijinks where the characters ‘step off the stage’ and directly 
address and thereby recognise the presence of their audience—also known 
as mugging. For all the hipness of these playful tweaks, it is notable that 
the bubble has some integrity: the distinction between showing and telling 
is a real one that is recurrently enforced by grammatical rules. Thus, in 
language after language, ideophones (dramatic performances on the Event 
Stage) cannot be negated (negation being a metalinguistic judgement 
expounded from the Speech Stage) (cf. Haiman 2018: 126).
The simplest model that diagrammatically characterises this contrast is one 
of two concentric circles. The innermost—the Event Stage, which I am 
calling a theatrical bubble—is admittedly a small part of the real world, 
like all theatres (Goffman 1974), but through the willing suspension of 
disbelief, separated from the real world for the duration of the performance. 
The outermost or Speech Stage, for all that it seems to contain only the 
speaker and the listener, is the one whose limits are actually coextensive 
with those of the real world. The formally heterogeneous class of shifters 
or egocentric particulars (among them the personal pronouns and tense, 
as well as the conventional deictics of time and place, but also a whole 
slew of apparently ordinary words like ‘(un)natural’, ‘foreign’, ‘familiar’ 
and, arguably, most others) serve as anchors to situate the Event Stage and 
its participants and props with respect to the Speech Stage and the rest 
of the real world outside.
The extreme thesis that all words ultimately depend for their meanings 
on who is saying them and to whom, and thus serve as such shifty anchors, 
is proverbial; for example, one of these words, ‘beauty’, is exclusively in 
the eye and ear of the beholder. The same point is worked out in a fable 
by Ivan Krylov (1848) about a noted preacher whose spellbinding 
eloquence leaves one of his listeners completely unmoved, because he 
hails from a different parish. That truth is in the mouth of the speaker is 
notoriously asserted by Jorge Luis Borges in his ‘Pierre Menard, author 
of the Quixote’. He argues, with a concrete demonstration, that the exact 
same words written by the historical Miguel Cervantes, a Spaniard of the 
seventeenth century, and his ‘Pierre Menard’, a fictional French symbolist 
poet of the twentieth century, mean radically different things. A random 
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sentence of what is mere verbal wallpaper in Cervantes, writing in the 
seventeenth century, becomes radically, ‘brazenly pragmatic’ issuing from 
the pen of Pierre Menard (Borges 1941).
Consider now the position of the participants of the speech act, who can be 
thought of as the real-world impresarios on the Speech Stage who put on 
the make-believe show that proceeds on the Event Stage. They are not 
themselves a part of the show. They and the Speech Stage that they inhabit 
are equally part of the real world: as far as that communal participation 
goes, interlocutors relate as equals to each other. They recognise each 
other and give each other attention; they are equally ‘above the fray’. 
But when as mimes/impersonators they ‘step into character’ in the Event 
Stage, they leave the real world behind. For the duration of their mimicry, 
the play’s the thing and during their display they relate only to the other 
puppets on the Event Stage that they have created. This means that they 
do not recognise or relate to their real-life interlocutors when on stage, 
any more than do the characters portrayed by actors to the members of 
their audience. As eavesdropping inhabitants of the real world, we can see 
them, but they are not supposed to see us, or to be addressing us.
How can speech act participants in a gestured medium most naturally 
signal when they are above the fray (telling their story, talking about stuff 
from outside) or when they go native (acting it out)? A most natural 
performance of these two contrasting modes of discourse is for the signer 
to maintain eye contact in narrative/telling mode (explicitly signalling 
that ‘I am talking to you’), and drop eye contact in dramatic/showing 
mode (leaving it to be inferred that ‘I am not talking to you’).
Accordingly, the absence of eye contact is also a distinctive feature of all 
pantomimed ‘constructed action’ (Quinto-Pozos 2006; Lillo-Martin 2012), 
where the signer as mime largely abandons conventional sign language 
and ‘becomes one with’—and thereby shows, rather than tells—what s/he 
depicts. Maintaining eye contact, as in the use of conventional sign language, 
is how one signals that s/he remains above the fray, which is what s/he does 
when engaged in acts of telling. Not surprisingly the same distinction is 
used to signal the difference between direct and indirect speech.
As Capirci notes (pers. comm.) apropos of Italian SL:
The signer of DS takes the look of the character who speaks, so 
s/he usually does not look at the actual interlocutor, but in the 
direction of the locutor within the [staged] narration.
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This is also the matter of fact observation of Hübl (2012: 7) regarding 
German SL:
Non-manual markers reflect iconically the matrix signer’s adoption 
of the role of the reported signer and his/her alignment towards 
the reported addressee.
Nothing could be more natural. As Dwight Bolinger sensibly observed 
(1975), there is probably nothing in language that is arbitrary simply 
because its original creators wanted it to be that way. In this case, we 
can see the iconicity behind apparent arbitrariness not, as we often can, 
by undoing the work of convention and abbreviation, but by identifying 
the appropriate model in terms of which signers conceive of direct and 
indirect speech. That natural model, as all signers and students of signed 
languages seem to recognise, and as Anna Wierzbicka taught the rest of us 
45 years ago, is the iconic metaphor of the stage.
What is remarkable about this insight is how hard-won it is to workers 
in one tradition (spoken language theoreticians like me), but how self-
evident it is to workers in another (sign language researchers). In a way my 
own recognition of this commonplace recapitulates an observation I once 
made about the metalinguistics of ordinary language, with particular 
reference to the stage model I have presented here, wherein the Speech 
Stage surrounds and encloses the Event Stage. The ontology of this 
diagram is explicit in the philology of the word ‘about’ in a number of 
spoken languages including English (Haiman 1998), and in at least one 
signed language, ASL, where ‘about’ is rendered by:
The left hand is held at chest height, all fingers extended and 
touching the thumb, and all pointing to the right. The right index 
finger circles about the left fingers several times. (Sternberg 1994: 1; 
emphasis added)
Language is everywhere more or less arbitrary, but it was probably born 
iconic. In fact, all human languages may have been born from what 
is now  regarded by grammarians, if it is considered by them at all, as 
paralanguage (Fonagy 2002; Haiman 2018): unsystematic, largely 
idiosyncratic, analogue displays or performances that now linger in the 
spoken language as accompaniments to the digitally coded message, and 
in the written language not at all.
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Perhaps even now paralanguage is not quite so facultative as it is made 
out to be. Some authors (Nugent 2008) have suggested that the failure 
to attend to the paralanguage of others or to produce the required 
paralanguage oneself can be socially crippling, and is even a defining 
property of people with Asperger’s syndrome, a population that, he 
argues, overlaps with canonical nerds.
Of course, making a distinction between language and paralanguage in 
signed languages is very much an unresolved issue, as is the distinction 
between language and gesture. I have myself suggested that gestures 
are those portions of the signal that are performed/shown rather than 
narrated/told (Haiman 2018: chapter 1). I have seen no discussion on 
whether ‘constructed action’ counts as language or paralanguage, for 
example, and I am unsure whether sign language theoreticians even 
consider the distinction a useful one. Sherman Wilcox (pers. comm.) 
suggests a  convenient test for determining whether pantomimed 
‘constructed action’ in signed languages is linguistic or paralinguistic: 
if it is linguistic, then fluent signers can identify as ‘ungrammatical 
performances’ those that they judge to be made by non-signers, while 
‘grammatical performances’ are those that are attributed to native signers. 
If, however, fluent signers accept as equally grammatical all constructed 
action performances, whether they are produced by native signers or not, 
then constructed action will count as paralinguistic.
No present definition of paralanguage is entirely acceptable. One possible 
candidate might be the following one: what counts as paralanguage is 
always definable relative to an institutional code. Given such a code, 
paralanguage in any medium is those spontaneous dramatic performances 
(that is, gestures, by my definition) which co-occur with the coded signs 
of a message, but are so disinherited in that code that they cannot occur by 
themselves. They survive only as accompaniments to the coded linguistic 
signal. Matters are different when communicators share no common code: 
then paralanguage comes into its own as the only medium they’ve got.
Another possible definition, suggested by Wilcox’s idea about 
grammaticality judgements of constructed action, is this: if a signal 
is universal (made with equal fluency and authority by both native 
speakers/signers and others), then it’s probably motivated, and ipso facto 
paralinguistic. If, on the other hand, it’s parochial, and properly produced 
only by native speakers/signers, then it is part of the grammatical code 
where it occurs. (I am cheerfully ignoring the ostensible charter of the 
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whole ‘generative enterprise’, which is to assert hardwired externally 
unmotivated grammatical universals.) For example, in a small number 
of languages, interrogation is signalled by subject–verb inversion. This 
is a highly parochial fact, and part of the grammatical code wherever it 
happens. In many, if not most languages, interrogation is signalled by 
a rising intonation. This should count as paralinguistic signal, one that is 
so natural that it doesn’t warrant a grammatical description. It becomes 
a grammatical fact if rising intonation is conventionalised in different ways 
in different languages. Thus, for example, Javanese is one of the many 
languages in which interrogativity can be signalled by rising intonation 
(as well as by conventional lexemes). But rising intonation in Javanese is 
not the same as rising intonation in English:
Normally, Javanese questions have intonation like the rising-
falling pattern [characteristic of statements], except that the 
pitch does not fall so low at the end as for statements; it ends on 
a suspended note, as in the ‘B’ speech of this sort of context:
[A. I like rainy weather.]
B. Well, I don’t! (Horne 1961: xxvi)
Now it seems that the perfectly natural means of signalling DS that 
I have been describing is shared by several sign languages, and is naturally 
motivated. But if it is not shared by all of them, then, however natural its 
motivation may be, it becomes a parochial fact. So, if there is even one 
sign language in which gaze direction shift is not (or, possibly, cannot be) 
used to signal the shift into DS, then such gaze shift becomes part of the 
grammar, and no longer a paralinguistic natural accompaniment to the 
message, in those sign languages where it is so employed.
One final observation. To the extent that the degree of arbitrariness, 
indeed of the very systematicity, of a sign system is a consequence of 
conventionalisation over time, we may ‘predict’ a couple of present 
truisms: that the signs of written language, with its relatively shallow 
history, are more transparently or reconstructably iconic than those 
of spoken language (consult any history of writing), and that those of 
signed languages are more iconic than those of written ones (although the 
early history of signed language studies is replete with well-intentioned 
but (surely!) grotesque attempts by their promoters to assert that signed 
languages like ASL are by God as arbitrary—hence as worthy of respect—
as spoken languages). And we may well make a ‘prediction’ about the 
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future: that signed languages will continue to grow ever more arbitrary 
as they become canonically sanctioned through repetition by established 
communities of the deaf. This prediction is already borne out by the 
existence of separate grammars for the various signed languages that have 
been described.
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Games that people play: 
Capitalism as a game
Annabelle Mooney
In this chapter, I draw on Wierzbicka’s explication of ‘game’ in order 
to show that it is an extremely useful tool in understanding aspects 
of contemporary capitalism. I begin with an overview of discussions of 
Wittgenstein’s definition of ‘game’, including the difference between ‘play’ 
and ‘game’. While it is tempting to think that both are inconsequential, 
they are not. As Huizinga writes, ‘All play means something’ (1949: 1). 
The same is true of games. I then rehearse Wierzbicka’s elegant account 
of ‘game’ (1996). Building on Wierzbicka’s analysis, I attempt to situate 
the concept of games in contemporary life, particularly in the domain of 
economics and finance. I draw on work that shows discussion of capitalism 
and its activities in terms of games and their attributes in order to show 
that while there is a comparison to be made between these activities 
and Wierzbicka’s explication of ‘game’ there are nevertheless important 
differences. Specifically drawing on Zaloom’s work on risk and Buchanan’s 
work on austerity, I argue that the ‘game of capitalism’ does not follow the 
same kind of rules as those succinctly explained by Wierzbicka for ‘game’. 
Specifically, the separation of the game world from the real world breaks 
down in the game of capitalism.
There is a feature of Wierzbicka’s work that is both a great advantage and 
a ‘problem’. This is the fact that there are very few places she has not 
turned her analytical lens. This is advantageous, especially to those of us 
without the analytical precision that Wierzbicka consistently brings to 
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bear on any topic. Indeed, because of her precision and her wide-ranging 
research, I have always found her work extremely useful in thinking 
through semantic issues in the specific domains in which I am interested. 
As Wierzbicka is concerned with clear semantic explications in service 
of better understanding both language and culture, her work has been 
particularly useful to me in thinking about topics we think we understand. 
This chapter uses her insights in order to provide a different way of 
understanding aspects of contemporary capitalism. My aim is modest. 
I simply want to raise some questions about the consequences of thinking 
about capitalism as a ‘game’ by considering some of the consequences of 
the game of capitalism itself. To do so, I begin with the semantics of ‘game’.
1 . ‘Game’
In Philosophical Investigations (1958), Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that 
at least some concepts cannot be defined in terms of semantic features; 
instead, they may best be approached by thinking about ‘family 
resemblances’. As Wierzbicka notes, even though Wittgenstein did not 
explicitly refer to prototypes, his theory of family resemblances suggests 
the same kind of approach.1 The particular passage in which Wittgenstein 
discusses games is a precursor to this and as Wierzbicka notes it does 
indeed have a ‘hypnotic force’ (1996: 158). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of games does not appear to have been the subject of a great deal 
of philosophical scrutiny (especially when compared to work on ‘family 
resemblances’), but there is some commentary in this field. I now provide 
a brief account of two works commenting on Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
‘games’. As will become clear, they draw out the importance to games of 
skill, chance, reality and rules.
In the first of these, Rowe (1992) seeks to further refine Wittgenstein’s 
account of ‘games’. Rowe draws on Callois’s typology of games as set out 
in Man, Play and Games (2001). Rowe initially suggests the following 
typology of games:
1  Also, see Manser (1967) for what is essentially a prototype analysis.
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(1) Games with internal point 
(a) games of skill
(b) games of pure chance
(2) Make-believe games
(3) Sequential games (Rowe 1992: 469–70).
The ‘internal point’ (1) refers to the goal of the game. The internal point 
of chess, for example, is checkmate, while the internal point of roulette is 
to choose the right number on the wheel. The point is ‘internal’ in that 
the goal is meaningless outside of the game itself. There are, however, 
differences among games with internal points. For example, a distinction 
between chess and roulette can be made on the basis of whether skill 
or chance is determinative of reaching the goal. Rowe also argues that 
make-believe games (2) are games. Key here is that make-believe 
games are quite separate from real life and reality (1992: 469). Finally, 
‘sequential games’ develops one of Callois’s categories: ‘Games of physical 
exhilaration (twirling round and round)’. While conceding that Callois’s 
is ‘not a helpful category’, Rowe nevertheless accepts that if such activity 
was repeated, he would be ‘happy to describe this as a game’ (1992: 468).
Perhaps the most important feature of games as Rowe defines them is 
their separation from real life. For games with an internal point (1), the 
separation from ‘real life’ is implicit in the point itself. As the internal point 
has no meaning outside of the game, there is already a disconnection. 
Rowe is careful to distinguish games of type (2) and (3) in particular from 
‘rituals, works of art, and several other activities which involve sequences of 
make-believe, and are all insulated from reality in ways which are difficult 
to define’ (1992: 470). His initial typology of three kinds of game (above) 
is refined to fuse (2) and (3). He thus suggests two kinds of game ‘those 
that are constituted by sequences and those that are constituted by goals’ 
(1992: 478). He provides the following definition of ‘game’:
An abstract object (either a sequence or a goal) which is designed 
to have no instrumental value; the realization or pursuit of which is 
intended to be of absorbing interest to participants and spectators. 
(Rowe 1992: 478)
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The second account, Manser (1967), also dwells on the distinction between 
games and real life.2 Drawing on Huizinga (1949), Manser argues that 
‘the area of a game is “marked off” either literally or conceptually from 
the normal area of human life, that of genuine ‘action’ to which moral 
predicates apply’ (1967: 217). He continues ‘What is done in the course of 
the game is not meant to have effects in the “real world”’ (1967: 217). The 
most important feature across both accounts is the suspension of reality. 
As Rowe writes:
Games are designed to be purposeless, and this can be done, 
either by giving them no point at all, or a point which is valueless 
or unintelligible outside the context of the game. (1992: 477, 
emphasis in original)
2 . Wierzbicka’s account
In Wierzbicka’s account of ‘game’, we find a distillation of the themes 
already encountered but with important additions. In contrast to 
Wittgenstein, Wierzbicka argues that we can in fact define games in terms 
of their semantic features. In contrast to Rowe and Manser, she provides 
a fuller account phrased in accessible terms. She suggests the following 
components as central to ‘games’:
(1) human action (animals can play, but they don’t play games);
(2) duration (a game can’t be momentary);
(3) aim: pleasure;
(4) ‘suspension of reality’ (the participants imagine that they are 
in a world apart from the real world);
(5) well-defined goals (the participants know what they are 
trying to achieve);
(6) well-defined rules (the participants know what they can do 
and what they cannot do);
(7) the course of events is unpredictable (nobody can know what 
exactly is going to happen). (Wierzbicka 1996: 159)
2  In his account of games, there is also a focus on pleasure (whether for the producer or spectator) 
and rules of some kind.
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The inclusion of goals and rules means that we are clearly talking about 
games rather than play. As Wierzbicka notes, the components (and the 
explication) do ‘not apply to a situation when a child idly throws his ball 
at the wall and catches it again, but in English this activity would not be 
called a game’ (1996: 159). She notes that while this may be called ‘Spiel’ 
in German, this term ‘has a wider range of use’ than the English ‘game’ 
(1996: 159; see also Manser 1967: 217).
The explication for ‘game’ that Wierzbicka proposes is as follows:
games
a . many kinds of things that people do
b . for some time
c . ‘for pleasure’ (i .e . because they want to feel something good)
d . when people do these things, one can say about these people:
e . they want some things to happen
f . if they were not doing these things, they wouldn’t want these 
things to happen
g . they don’t know what will happen
h . they know what they can do
i . they know what they cannot do. (Wierzbicka 1996: 159)
This account captures extremely well the aim of games (pleasure) and 
their structure and outcome as discussed by both Rowe and Manser. 
Games have rules (elements (h) and (i)) but there is a certain degree of 
chance involved (element (g)). The game is played voluntarily (elements 
(e) and  (f )) and activity is not unlimited—it has a beginning and an 
end (element  (b)). The duration of the game and the voluntary nature 
of participation (element (f )) also mean that the game is set apart from 
ordinary life. As with other explications in Natural Semantic Metalanguage 
(NSM), this account has the advantage of being clear and accessible. It is 
translatable and, most importantly, it sets out the key elements of ‘games’.
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3 . Games and capitalism
I want to suggest that Wierzbicka’s definition of game provides an important 
analytical viewpoint when thinking about capitalism. This requires, of 
course, that a connection be made between ‘game’ and capitalism. I come to 
this presently. First, it is necessary to define what I mean by capitalism, for 
as Chun notes ‘capitalism means many different things to different people’ 
(2017: 141).3 I define capitalism here as late neoliberal capitalism, which has 
political and economic features and consequences. At its heart, capitalism 
is a system that values economic growth and in which people (rather than 
states) hold capital, trade in a market and seek profit. Neoliberal capitalism 
makes further political claims, that is, it makes claims about how the 
relationship between the state, the market and people should be configured. 
As the International Monetary Fund explains, neoliberalism involves two 
things: increased competition ‘through deregulation and the opening up of 
domestic markets’ and ‘a smaller role for the state’ (Ostry et al. 2016, cited 
in Pettifor 2017: 125).
The connection of games to capitalism (or indeed any ordered human 
behaviour) can be made, at least in part, by noticing that economic activity 
requires rules. For markets to work, for trade to take place and for people 
to hold capital and property, rules are needed. Some take the form of laws, 
others are found in regulation, and still others operate as more or less stable 
conventions and norms. It is not my purpose to enter into an analysis of 
the myriad laws and practices that regulate the modern economy and the 
various activities within it. Rather, I turn to research on people engaged 
in activity that is clearly connected to the capitalist system in order to see 
whether considering capitalism as a game is either warranted or useful.
I first outline the argument that capitalism is a discourse before turning 
to work on the metaphors found in both news media reports on the 
financial crisis and in the language of foreign exchange traders. This kind 
of trade is sometimes construed as gambling. I then turn to a discussion 
of risk, relying on Zaloom’s ethnographic account of the Chicago Board 
of Trade. I want to suggest that while capitalism is sometimes construed 
as a game, there is a key difference in relation to Wierzbicka’s explication. 
The  capitalist game is neither completely voluntary nor of limited 
duration. It is also not separate from real life. The ‘game’ of capitalism is, 
in many ways, the game of life.
3  For an excellent account and analysis of the different views people hold, see Chun (2017).
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4 . The discourse of capitalism: 
Human action and rules
Dahlberg (2014) argues that capitalism is a practice that combines 
specific elements (concepts, objects and subject identities). He therefore 
suggests that it may be productive to think of capitalism as a discourse and 
argues that this helps us understand the norms and rules of capitalism. 
Discourses, like games, are connected to human thought and action. 
Discourses have a structure as well as a relation to both language and 
practice. Perhaps they tend not be thought of in terms of ‘rules’ as they 
are—in the final analysis—arbitrary. Rules of all kinds, however, are also 
often arbitrary and insufficient to the task they are supposed to perform. 
This is clear at times of crisis (Dahlberg 2014: 260). At such times, either 
rules are not available or they do not solve the current challenge. This can 
be seen in the most recent financial crisis. As Cox notes, ‘Former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, a hero for free-marketeers, famously 
acknowledged that the market’s capacity for self-regulation had failed’ 
(Cox 2018: 198). In this crisis, the discourse had too few rules. Economic 
crises may be a result of rules or gaps in the system itself: the existing rules 
and practices fail to deliver what they promise.
In order to fully analyse capitalism as a discourse, Dahlberg makes 
use of  the concept of ‘social logics’ (from Glynos and Howarth 2007), 
explaining that social logics can be either general or specific. These logics 
can be considered on a continuum from rules (or law) to norms as they 
‘consist of rule following’ (Laclau 2005: 117 cited in Dahlberg 2014: 264). 
As they may be more or less explicit, social logics may not take the form 
of ‘concrete social codes, such as explicit work place rules … they operate 
at a more abstract level, characterizing practices’ (2014: 263).
The connection of social logics to games is clear when Dahlberg considers 
whether social logics can have predictive effects. He compares their 
operation to chess. Once a game of chess starts:
the rules, together with the player’s knowledge of past games 
and  their aim of winning, progress the game in particular 
directions that can be prognosticated before each move, as more 
or less likely. (2014: 265)
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Along these lines, Dahlberg considers what would happen if interest rates 
were to rise:
there will be a range of likely responses from a range of actors—
with a variety of roles (from parent to banker), goals (from paying 
bills to maximizing profit) and knowledge of the system—and an 
associated range of consequences for actors. (2014: 265)
It seems to me that we need not even consider the predictive power of 
social logics in order to see the similarity with games. The responses from 
actors will be oriented towards certain rules: the rules and norms by which 
the economic system functions. These rules certainly differ from those 
of, for example, board games. Economic ‘rules’ are not always set out 
in a  clear summary of instructions to ‘players’. In a similar vein, Bjerg 
in his book Poker: The Parody of Capitalism argues that the card game 
poker is ‘an idealized version of democratic capitalism where everybody 
has equal access to the spheres of value circulation’ (2011: 242, emphasis 
added). Nevertheless, the point is that there are more or less predictable 
actions and consequences in these economic domains. In Wierzbicka’s 
terms, ‘the participants know what they can do and what they cannot do’ 
and ‘the participants know what they are trying to achieve’ (1996: 159).
5 . Metaphor: Rules and reality
The presence of rules and games in capitalism is also attested in the language 
that describes particular kinds of economic activity. A good example of 
this is Pühringer and Hirte’s (2015) work documenting metaphors (in the 
tradition of Lakoff and Johnson (1980)) in texts written by economists 
in magazines and newspapers. In addition to finding that the 2007–08 
economic crisis is described as a natural disaster, military attack and 
infection or disease, they also find evidence for the idea that the crisis is 
misfortune in an economic game. That is, the financial crisis is represented 
as a result of ‘bad luck’. This is consistent with games in which outcomes 
are not determined, ‘nobody can know what exactly is going to happen’ 
(Wierzbicka 1996: 159). The presence of luck in these metaphors is also 
consistent with other economic and financial metaphors. Stock market 
trading, for example, also uses the language of gambling (for example, 
‘betting’ on a stock or the market more generally). As Pühringer and Hirte 
argue, ‘The game metaphor suggests that the economy follows specific 
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rules … which have been designed by a superior authority’ (2015: 618). 
This metaphor has a bearing not only on how we conceptualise economic 
events, but also how society responds to them.
An ‘extraordinary event’ as the financial crisis according to an 
understanding of the economy as a game is then consequently 
interpreted either as a consequence of someone breaking the rules 
or simply as misfortune. (2015: 618)
In terms of Rowe’s game with internal point, the crisis is thus explained 
in terms of bad luck (like roulette) or breaking the rules (as one might 
attempt to in chess, for example, moving the king more than one space). 
Note that attributing the crisis to a lack of skill is not prominent.
It is worth stating that the presence of the game metaphor in relation to 
economic activity is not simply a consequence of media representations. 
Oberlechner, Slunecko and Kronberger’s research (2004) focuses on 
‘participants’ subjective experience of the [foreign exchange] market and 
on the role of metaphors in this experience’ (2004: 134) and finds ample 
evidence of game metaphors.4 The markets in which traders trade are 
conceptualised as bazaars, machines, oceans, wars, living beings, sports 
and gambling spaces. Clearly sports and gambling are connected to games: 
both have rules and depend on skill and chance. I turn first to sport and 
then consider gambling.
A sports competition  …  is always conducted within a defined 
framework. It has an agreed-upon beginning and end; it takes place 
on a particular playground … and it follows a set of constitutive 
rules. (Oberlechner et al. 2004: 141)
In examples of this metaphor in Oberlechner et al.’s research, informants 
refer to ‘competition’, ‘teams’ and ‘goals’ (2004: 143). Sometimes the 
comparison is directly made in the form of a surface simile, for example: 
‘to me trading is like sports. It’s about winning. It’s a competitive game 
that starts every morning at 7 o’clock’ (informant B14, 2004: 143).5 As it 
is a competition, players have the same goal (Wierzbicka 1996: 159).
4  Foreign exchange markets are clearly tied to contemporary economic activity, as they would not 
exist but for particular features of the economic world: different nations have different currencies, 
these can be traded, their values fluctuate in relation to each other.
5  B14 is a reference to an informant in Oberlechner et al.’s research.
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While success in sports usually presupposes physical ability and skill, the 
other metaphor identified, gambling, relies on chance. Here, traders refer 
explicitly to ‘casinos’, ‘roulette’ and having ‘little chips on your table’. 
The casino, like the sports arena, is set off from everyday life (Wierzbicka, 
1996: 159). The reference to the casino substitutes for money (‘little 
chips’) may be designed to suggest such a separation. And while chance 
is a feature of gambling, this activity is represented as requiring skill, 
technique and discipline. Oberlechner et al. write:
Besides pure gambling, the metaphorical field of gambling 
includes strategic games, such as professional poker or a game 
like chess perhaps [B17], in which the combination of chance 
and strategic thinking becomes manifest. These games highlight 
elements of discipline, skilfulness and expertise, and may thus be 
seen as a bridge between the metaphorical fields of gambling and 
of sports. (2004: 141)
The case of gambling presents an interesting example in relation to games. 
Gambling is connected with the real world but in mediated ways. This is 
clear in the convention of using ‘chips’ instead of everyday currency notes 
when gambling in a casino. Despite not being conventional money, there 
is a direct correlation between these chips and ‘real’ money. The chips 
can be purchased and redeemed for money. But as Wierzbicka notes, in 
games ‘the participants imagine that they are in a world apart from the real 
world’ (1996: 159). If one is playing with real money (albeit represented 
by a token), this separation from the real world is much less clear.
6 . Risk
Where there is gambling there is risk. And while contemporary society 
has been called the ‘risk society’ (e.g. Beck 1992) examining individual 
behaviour in relation to risk provides a clearer picture of what it means 
and the consequences it may have. The kind of risk I discuss here is directly 
connected to economic activity. I draw on Zaloom’s work, which focuses 
on risk in the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), ‘a major global financial 
futures exchange’ and shows the centrality of competitive game playing 
in this arena (2004: 365). While risk might be thought of as the absence 
of rules, Zaloom demonstrates that risk requires rules. Zaloom explains: 
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‘The tightly regulated markets of the CBOT make speculation possible. 
Aggressive risk taking is established and sustained by routinization and 
bureaucracy; it is not an escape from it’ (2004: 365).
What is striking about Zaloom’s fieldwork is how it shows the connection 
between capitalism’s games and real life. In her study, she shows how the 
games that are played on the trading floor have consequences outside 
of this domain.
Financial calculations are always present. However, with each 
trade, these dealers wager much more than money. Their market 
engagements are significant social games, a form of ‘deep play’ in 
the heart of capitalism. Each trader displays a risk-taking self that 
his competitors, the market, and he himself will judge … These 
games gain their significance from voluntarily placing the self 
under threat of annihilation. The reward is creating a newly 
defined self. (Zaloom 2004: 367)
There are many games present here. The trading pit itself has rules (about 
who buys and sells, where people can stand and so on). The market they 
are trading in has rules (of supply and demand, regulation, laws and so 
on). There are also rules about how the trader behaves in the market itself 
(what the trader can and cannot do while trading). These behavioural 
norms are collectively described as a particular kind of ‘discipline’. ‘Traders 
use discipline as a tool to shape themselves into actors who can produce 
appropriate and successful interactions with the risks of the market’ 
(Zaloom 2004: 378). This requires traders not to behave as emotional 
individuals, but rather as finely tuned instruments.
According to their professional norms, discipline enables traders 
to coast with the uncertainties of the market and judge effectively 
when to enter and exit the game. Speculators train themselves 
to become embodied instruments for reading the market and 
reacting to its every twitch. (Zaloom 2004: 379)
While part of the trading identity and practice is to enter into the trading 
game for its own sake (2004: 378), to really be successful as a trader 
(financially and in identity terms) one has to win more often than one 
loses. But as Zaloom observes, ‘Traders play the game, but winning is not 
necessarily the first objective’ (2004: 383) in that their personal identities 
are also at stake. This is not just a profession, it is a constant expression 
of self. This expression and performance of self also brings pleasure, a key 
aspect of games (Wierzbicka 1996: 159). But the game does not always 
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end well. Zaloom documents the effects of ‘playing’ this ‘game’ on the real 
world in a particularly acute way, as this game (which already has serious 
identity stakes) has effects on traders’ bodies even to the point of death, 
with instances of suicide among ‘failed’ traders well known among her 
informants (2004: 380–81).
7 . Policy and individuals
Zaloom’s work shows the leakage of the game of capitalism into the real 
lives of real people. Similar evidence can be found, however, by looking 
at the way particular terms are used. Here, I briefly consider ‘austerity’, 
a term and set of practices (a discourse) that became popular in the wake 
of the 2007–08 financial crisis.
Austerity is a set of economic and political policies aimed at reducing 
public spending. It can be seen as a tactic of neoliberal capitalism in 
this sense, as a reduction in public spending will usually mean a smaller 
role for the state in society. With national debt incurred because of the 
bailouts of the financial crisis, many nations sought to rationalise their 
domestic budgets through introducing austerity measures. In the face of 
high national debt, austerity appears to be a logical solution (see Borriello 
2017). This is only the case, however, if certain economic positions 
and views of national economies are taken. That is, there are abundant 
arguments against austerity on purely economic grounds (see, for example, 
Krugman and Layard 2012). There are also arguments that can be made 
against austerity by focusing on language use.
Buchanan writes:
Let us consider the grammar of the following: ‘necessary austerity 
measures in health’; ‘due to necessary austerity measures this 
service will close’; to, ‘due to necessary austerity measures your 
surgery has been cancelled’. While using essentially the same 
clause ‘necessary austerity measures’ this one clause plays three 
different games. (2013: 39)
Perhaps because ‘austerity’ has become so familiar as a term, it is difficult to 
immediately see these three different games. But if we substitute another 
noun phrase in each instance, we might arrive at:
‘funding cuts in health’;
‘due to lack of money this service will close’;
‘due to low staff numbers your surgery has been cancelled’.
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Examining the use of ‘austerity’, Buchanan argues that ‘austerity’ 
functions like a metaphor that obscures the real people affected by the 
real harm austerity policies cause (2013: 39). That is, ‘austerity’ is given 
more representational weight than the people involved; they are simply 
‘the collateral damage of necessary austerity measures’ (2013: 39). Paying 
particular attention to health care and health outcomes, he argues that:
A sleight of hand has indeed occurred as the reality of a person’s 
suffering due to actual cutbacks is repackaged as collateral damage 
(a metaphor) and the metaphor of the game of capital has become 
the more literal. (2013: 39; emphasis added)
The reason this can happen is because national economies are closely 
connected to the game of capital. Buchanan argues that ‘The game of 
capital does not take place due to conceptual confusion—rather this 
game thrives because of conceptual confusion and the game itself actively 
promotes such confusion’ (2013:40). He continues, observing that 
‘the game of capital thrives because of the threats held within its game’, 
threats which ‘force governments to the bargaining table’ (Buchanan 
2013: 40).
The difference between Buchanan’s account of the game of capital and 
Wierzbicka’s explication of ‘game’ above is clear. First, the game of capital 
does not have clear rules that everyone knows (even though everyone 
knows, or pretends to know, that it functions according to certain rules). 
Second, the game of capital is not set apart from real life, it is real life. 
To take one example, the most recent recession coincided with a rise in 
male suicide across Europe and appears to be caused by unemployment 
(Reeves et al. 2015).6
8 . Conclusion
Games involve human action, directed by rules and goals, played for 
a  fixed period of time, with an uncertain outcome but nevertheless 
involving some enjoyment in the activity. The central feature of games 
for Rowe and Manser is the separation of games from real life. This is 
also a key element in Wierzbicka’s account. But this separation between 
the game and real life does not apply to ‘capitalist games’. As research on 
6  ‘Each percentage point rise in the male unemployment rate is associated with a 0.94% rise’ in 
male suicide (Reeves et al. 2015: 405).
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foreign exchange traders, traders working in the CBOT and indeed in 
relation to austerity itself shows, the consequences of these ‘games’ are 
not confined to the world of the game. The world of the game is the real 
world. The game of capitalism has effects on real people. Does it make 
sense, then, to describe capitalism and its attendant practices as games?
Wierzbicka provides a clear account of the semantic features of games. 
They begin and end, they are voluntarily entered into, they have clear 
rules and they are distinct from real life. While specific games in capitalism 
may only last for a period of time, for capitalism itself there is no final 
end point. There is no final winner; only periodic winners and losers. 
The game continues. Further, while it is possible to opt out of some of 
capitalism’s domains and activities, given how enmeshed nation states 
are with global economic practices, it is difficult to escape altogether. 
While theoretically our participation may be voluntary, it is a kind of 
coerced consent. While there may be ‘rules’ and norms, these are not 
always transparent. Considering the effects of the games of capitalism on 
real life, and the inability to avoid the consequences of some of these 
games, it seems that while contemporary capitalism is often discussed and 
described in terms of rules and games, as it is so connected to real life, it is 
clearly not a ‘game’.
Metaphor, as Aristotle (1991) observed, brings something before the eyes. 
It allows us to see something new or to appreciate the world in a new way. 
However, metaphors are always selective. They provide new perspectives, 
but they erase others. What they ‘show’, therefore, needs to be carefully 
examined. Wierzbicka’s analysis of ‘games’ clearly shows that usually 
games are separate from real life. But the games of capitalism are the rules 
we increasingly live by. It would perhaps be more appropriate to think of 
these activities not in terms of games but in terms of war. Perhaps then, 
the very real suffering that people endure would not be forgotten.
The language choices we make are never innocent.
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Our ordinary lives: Pathways 




When one considers the range of data types, methods and research 
questions that characterise contemporary linguistics, it is clear that the field 
is diverse and ever expanding in ways that were hardly conceivable 100, 
or even 50, years ago. One shift underlying many of these developments 
within linguistics has been the increased attention given to the speakers 
and writers of language. This shift is manifest in a variety of ways: how 
speakers interact in conversation, the cognitive processes accompanying 
acts of speaking and writing, the language used by speakers and writers 
in the form of language corpora, the role of the human body in shaping 
language (i.e. the idea of ‘embodiment’), etc. It is clear that the idea 
that linguistics is primarily concerned with a system untethered to the 
speakers and writers of the language no longer holds sway in the way it 
once did.
1  It is a distinct pleasure to contribute to the present volume in honour of Anna Wierzbicka, whose 
body of linguistic research has been so uniquely original and insightful. Also, I thank the two anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful and thought-provoking comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
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The excerpt from Lass (1997: xviii) in (1) epitomises this earlier bias 
towards the language system that was dominant throughout much of the 
twentieth century:
(1) My main interest, and I suggest this ought to be one prime 
focus of the discipline, is in systems, not their users; the latter 
simply have to make do with what’s historically presented 
to them, and cope with it when it changes … This is not of 
course to say that the users aren’t interesting; merely that they 
and their properties and actions belong to another subject-
area, not historical (or perhaps any) linguistics proper.
Although the immediate context of the above quote is the subfield of 
historical linguistics, Lass here advances the opinion that ‘language users’ 
(he means human beings), their properties and their actions perhaps do 
not belong to ‘linguistics proper’. Even by 1997, however, speakers and 
writers of language, their intentions and their actions had come well 
into focus in many subfields of linguistics and the quote above must be 
seen as a decidedly conservative view of linguistics on the cusp of the 
twenty-first century. Croft’s (2011: 1) statement in (2) offers, I believe, 
a more accurate reflection of contemporary practice in linguistics and how 
linguistic structure is viewed in the twenty-first century.
(2) Language structure cannot be fully understood without 
situating it with respect to current theories of joint action, 
social cognition, conceptualization of experience, memory 
and learning, cultural transmission, and evolution, shared 
knowledge and practice in communities and demographic 
processes in human history.
In what follows I advocate two lines of research that reflect a more 
human-oriented kind of linguistics, in keeping with the larger trends in 
the field noted by Croft: (i) research that acknowledges the role of human 
experiential realities in the explication of language and (ii) a shift in 
research focus to the individual speaker and the agency of an individual.
2 . Human experiential realities
One can identify an ‘experientialist’ orientation in disciplines that study 
human behaviour. An experientialist orientation is one that tries to 
understand human behaviour in terms of the human experience, as opposed 
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to, say, understanding human behaviour in terms of abstract systems. One 
simple example of experientialist approaches in contemporary life would 
include the widespread acknowledgement that the ‘user experience’ is 
critical in evaluating and improving the delivery of modern technology. 
In academic fields such as anthropology and sociology, adopting the so-
called ‘insider’s perspective’, or an ‘emic’ perspective, may also be viewed 
as a type of experientialism.
An experientialist orientation in the study of human language can be 
seen in the writings of various linguists.2 For Lakoff (1987: xv, 266), the 
experientialist approach in linguistics represents an attempt ‘to characterize 
meaning in terms of the nature and experience of the organisms doing the 
thinking’, to be contrasted with an ‘objectivist’ approach in which meaning 
in human language is defined independently of the experience of humans. 
The label ‘embodiment’ is also applied to this kind of approach (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999: 16–44), albeit with a slightly different nuance through 
the presence of the ‘body’ morpheme in this label (see Rohrer 2005 and 
Bergen 2015 for further discussion of the varieties of experientialism and 
embodiment). The field of Cognitive Linguistics has provided a natural 
home for experientialist approaches like that espoused by Lakoff, though 
the field has developed over the years to give more weight to the larger goal 
of reconciling the facts of language with the study of human and social 
cognition more generally (cf. Dancygier 2017). The quote in (3) is taken 
from the writings of Anna Wierzbicka and is indicative of the Natural 
Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach to the study of language which 
can also be understood as a kind of experientialism, as I use that term:
(3) In natural language, meaning consists in human interpretation 
of the world. It is subjective, it is anthropocentric, it reflects 
predominant cultural concerns and culture-specific modes of 
social interaction as much as any objective features of the 
world ‘as such’. (Wierzbicka 1988: 2)
2  A reviewer has drawn my attention to the extensive and insightful analysis of the English word 
experience in Wierzbicka (2010: Chapter 2) in which the author elucidates the Anglocentric semantics 
of the word and its non-universality as a concept. The reviewer poses the question: ‘Can humans across 
the world be meaningfully studied through an English-specific keyword, and can we base a universal 
theory on untranslatable words such as “experience”?’ I accept that there is a vagueness associated with 
terms such as human experience and experientialist and that they are not necessarily easily or precisely 
translatable into other languages. One would need to consult the works of individual authors to gain 
a more precise understanding of the ways in which a particular linguistic theory or framework is 
‘experientialist’ (cf. in particular the discussion of varieties of experientialism in Rohrer 2005).
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The NSM approach undertakes semantic analysis through an analytical 
technique of reductive paraphrase that justifiably lays claim to ‘conceptual 
authenticity’ through its reliance on concepts that are familiar in the ordinary 
lives of speakers (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014: 82). The concepts that 
are the building blocks of meanings in the NSM methodology are claimed 
to be ‘simple, intelligible, and universally available words’ (Wierzbicka 
2010: 17) and are drawn from ordinary natural language. Relating aspects 
of language structure and use to culture is also very much in the spirit of 
an experientialist agenda and is something that Wierzbicka in particular 
has written about extensively (e.g. Wierzbicka 1992, 1997). In short, while 
Cognitive Linguistics and the NSM approach are clearly differentiated 
from each other and adopt quite different methods, they both see the 
human dimension as central to their cause and to their methods, in stark 
contrast to the position advocated by Lass and quoted above. While an 
experientialist orientation in contemporary linguistics is not confined to 
these two approaches, I have singled them out here since they have very 
explicitly acknowledged this element throughout their respective histories.
An additional way in which an experiential orientation may enter into the 
study of language is to seek out experientially salient aspects of human 
life as the object of study itself. In my own research I have chosen to 
make the verbs in (4), and their semantic equivalents in other languages, 
a focus of study and this is what I will elaborate on in what follows in this 
section. Clearly, these ‘basic’ verbs involve the human body in essential 
ways. The verbs are associated with a variety of body parts as elements that 
are salient in the semantics of the concept. Thus, we have the position of 
upper torso, buttocks and legs relevant to the semantics of sit, stand and 
lie; legs and even the body as a whole are relevant to come and go; eyes are 
relevant to see, just as ears are relevant to hear; the mouth and the digestive 
tract are relevant to eat and drink; hands and arms are relevant to give and 
take. The verbs make a linguistically satisfying set of concepts to study 
in the sense that they show a balance between being relatively static or 
dynamic in terms of their internal configuration.
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As verbs that encode quite basic aspects of our everyday lives, they can 
be  rewarding objects of study and for a variety of reasons. For a start, 
the verbs can be expected to function as key sources for conceptualising 
other aspects of our lives. In Euchee (Amerindian isolate, possibly 
Siouan), for example, the morphemes ci ‘sit, stay’, fa ‘stand’ and ‘e ‘lie’ 
function as the suffixed articles occurring with singular inanimate nouns, 
and form the basis of what has been called a three-way ‘gender’ system 
(Watkins 1976: 35–36; Linn 2000: 364–70). This reliance on the ‘sit/
stand/lie’ conceptual set as a classificatory basis of inanimate nouns is an 
indication of the cardinal role these concepts play in our lives. Another 
instance of how the basicness  of these concepts underlies unusual 
linguistic phenomena is the structural basicness associated with some of 
these verbs. The syntax associated with ‘give’ in some languages would be 
a case in point (cf. Newman 1996: 17–21). In Amele (Papuan, Roberts 
1987), for example, affixes that would normally attach to verb stems such 
as tense, aspect, mood, verb agreement etc., appear merely as a string 
of affixes without any verb root in the ‘give’ construction. Compare the 
Amele three-place predicate ‘show’ example in (5a) with the ‘give’ example 
in (5b):
(5) a. Jo eu ihac-i-ad-ig-en.
house that show-pred-2pl.io-1sg.subj-fut
‘I will show that house to you (plural).’ (Roberts 1987: 69)
b. Naus Dege ho ut-en.
Naus Dege pig 3sg.io-3sg.subj.past
‘Naus gave Dege the pig.’ (Roberts 1987: 34)
The concepts behind the basic verbs in (4) are typically productive 
sources for many kinds of semantic extensions in languages. As far as 
semantic extensions are concerned, ‘eat’ is particularly remarkable in 
its productivity and has attracted much attention (cf. Newman 2009). 
Welmers’ comments on the range of uses of Akan di ‘eat’ as shown in (6) 
point to something remarkable about this verb that even Welmers, writing 
as a structuralist linguist, found necessary to add to his description.
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(6) I have attempted to sum up its [the Akan ‘eat’ verb’s] uses 
under the general word for ‘eat’, but with other objects it 
refers among other things to using up or wasting money, 
taking a day off, having sexual relations with someone, 
accepting a bribe, inheriting goods, winning a victory, 
defeating an opponent, playing a game, holding an office, 
enduring suffering, making a bargain, living in some specified 
way, and so on at considerable length. A language has not 
been well studied until the nature of such semantic ranges, if not 
an exhaustive list of all recordable collocations, has been noted. 
(Welmers 1973: 477, emphasis added)
Grammaticalisation is another kind of extension that can be found among 
the basic verbs. Reference was already made to how ‘sit’, ‘stand’ and ‘lie’ can 
function as a three-way basis for a classificatory system in languages. These 
same verbs may also give rise to aspect markers. In Manam, for example, 
soaʔi ‘sit’ is extended to express the progressive aspect, referring to an event 
that is in progress at the time of the speech act or the time of another event, 
as in (7a) (Lichtenberk 1983: 197–98). The Manam verb eno ‘lie’ also 
functions as an auxiliary, but in this case to indicate persistive aspect; that is, 
indicating that the event is performed persistently, as in (7b).
(7) a. siresíre di-bulabula-í-be di-sóaʔi
grass 3pl.realis-set.rdp-3sg.obj-and 3pl.realis-sit
‘They are burning grass.’ (Lichtenberk 1983: 199)
b. i-pile-lá-be i-éno
3sg.realis-speak-limiter-and 3sg.realis-lie
‘He kept talking.’ (Lichtenberk 1983: 200)
The verb ’give’ is a rich source of grammaticalisations in the world’s 
languages, as illustrated in the examples in (8) (cf. Heine and Kuteva 
2002: 149–55 for a more complete overview). These examples illustrate 
extensions to manipulative/causative uses (8a), light verbs (8b), benefactive 
marker (8c), existential marker (8d), presentative marker (8e) and passive 
auxiliary (8f ).
(8) a. antaa jonkun korjata jokin
give person.gen repair.inf thing
‘to have a person repair something’ (Finnish)
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b. give the car a push/give it a try/give the ball a kick (English)
c. ʔo:pùk tèɲ siəʋphɤ̀u ʔaoy khɲom.
father buy books give me
‘Father buys books for me.’ (Cambodian, Jacob 1968: 141)
d. Es gibt viele Kinder in den Schulen.
it gives many children.acc in the schools.dat
‘There are many children in the schools.’ (German)
e. Si se da el caso …
if refl gives the event
‘If the circumstance should arise …’ (Spanish)
f. E gët pensionnéiert.
he gives pensioned
‘He’s going to be pensioned off.’ (Luxembourgish, Schanen 
1987: 38)
This has been a necessarily selective illustration of the potential value 
of making ordinary everyday human experiences a focus of linguistic 
research. Nevertheless, I believe that the data provided are sufficient to 
show the range and diversity of linguistic phenomena associated with 
basic human experiences. I contend that the basicness of the experiences 
encoded by the verbs in (4) is a reason for the proliferation of extensions 
in usage of these verbs and their counterparts in other languages. They 
constitute natural starting points for linguistic research.
3 . Individuals
Another direction for linguistics that leads to a more complete 
understanding of language and its use is to shift attention to language as 
experienced by individuals, as opposed to focusing only on the aggregate 
population.3 Linguistics has always acknowledged the shared social basis 
of language as essential to communication of course, as expressed by 
de  Saussure (1959: 13–14): ‘For Language [langue] is not complete in 
any speaker; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity’. A focus on the 
3  An individual experience of language is arguably also evident in the NSM approach where both 
‘I’ and ‘you’ perspectives (‘I think …’, ‘I feel …’ etc.) may occur alongside statements referring to 
what ‘(many) people’ say, do, etc.
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aggregate behaviour is especially common in the current digital age, where 
large amounts of data across many individuals (as in a typical corpus) 
are analysed to ascertain the typical behaviour, or central tendency, of 
the aggregate of language users. Without denying the importance of the 
collective, or aggregate, population in the study of language, I nevertheless 
believe that a shift of attention to individual users is a worthwhile 
complement to this practice (cf. Newman 2017). In the remainder of this 
section I offer some examples of this shift of attention within linguistics.
As a preliminary observation, we might note that a greater 
acknowledgement of individual linguistic realities of speakers has parallels 
outside of linguistics that may be helpful in approaching the linguistic 
equivalent. An obvious parallel is literature where it is commonplace to 
study the corpus of an individual’s output (e.g. John Keats), as well as the 
corpus of a selection of writers from a particular epoch (e.g. the Romantic 
period of English literature). The study of history has expanded from the 
study of whole societies or populations or eras (e.g. history of the First 
World War) to allow for the study of individuals participating in these 
events (e.g. tracking the life of an individual who experienced the First 
World War). Of most relevance in the present context, we see a shift of 
attention to individuals in the neighbouring discipline of psychology in 
the research agenda pursued most conscientiously in the pages of the 
Journal for Person-Oriented Research and summarised in (9), taken from 
the introductory article in the first issue of the journal:4
(9) It is the aim of this issue to present and discuss approaches 
for bringing the individual back into focus in developmental 
psychology, as well as other areas of psychology. As far as 
possible, findings should be interpretable at the level of the 
single individual and they should be informative of patterns 
of individual functioning. (Bergman and Lundh 2015: 2)
Specifically, the person-oriented focus advocated by Bergman and Lundh 
is characterised by three foci: a pattern focus, a focus on the individual, 
a process focus (Bergman and Lundh 2015: 3).
There are indeed pockets of research in linguistics where an individual 
corpus or subcorpus is a familiar kind of data. Where there is a serious 
interest in human agency, then it would seem inevitable that it must 
4  The Journal for Person-Oriented Research is freely available at: www.person-research.org/page3_1.php.
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be an individual, their personal circumstance and their particular 
personality that must be the object of study. Coupland’s (2002) research 
on the stylistics of individual language use is an example of this kind 
of research. First language acquisition also comes to mind, with data on 
individual children readily available. Studies of individual children have 
certainly played their part in the research on first language acquisition, 
extending back to the meticulous documentation by Werner F. Leopold 
of his two daughters’ simultaneous acquisition of German and English 
in the 1930s (cf. Lanza 2004: 18–23 for a summary and critical review 
of this work). Vihman, Ferguson and Elbert (1986: 29) offer a more 
contemporary opinion on the value of appreciating individual differences 
in language acquisition: ‘In each of the areas investigated—phonetic 
tendencies, consonant inventory, and word selection—the prevalence of 
individual variation was the strongest lesson to be learned.’ The extent 
of individual variation in language acquisition allows for, indeed points 
to the necessity of, thorough studies of individuals and their patterns of 
language acquisition (cf. the detailed case study of language acquisition in 
Theakston et al. 2012).
A more person-oriented agenda of research would include greater 
attention to documenting and attempting to explain changes over the 
lifespan of an individual, or at least phases of a lifespan, rather than just 
documenting the changes that are deemed to affect a whole community. 
Hinton (2015) studied the changes in a number of phonetic variables in 
the pronunciations over a lifetime of four public figures in British life: Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Baroness Thatcher, Sir David Attenborough 
and David Dimbleby. Interestingly, Hinton found that the diachronic 
accent changes of these individuals over their lifetimes (1950s onwards) 
did not simply mirror sound changes that are known to have occurred 
in the norms of Received Pronunciation in this period of time. Changes 
observable in the speech of these individuals are not reducible to the 
overall intergenerational changes. Although public figures and celebrities 
are an obvious focus of interest in lifespan studies, the lives of ordinary 
speakers are equally revealing. To take just one example of such research, 
Bowie (2010) tracked changes in the realisation of post-vocalic /r/ and 
the aspiration of syllable-initial /ʍ/ in 10 speakers (non-celebrities) across 
three to four decades of their lives. The data for this study came from 
a corpus of recorded religious addresses to conferences of The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church), with the earliest 
longitudinal data collected in the years 1940, 1950 and 1960, and the 
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latest data collected in the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. Bowie 
found that all 10 individuals exhibited some variation with respect to 
both of the variables investigated, but did not find any consistent pattern 
of change across all 10 speakers or from speaker to speaker. Once again, 
the variation in any one individual cannot be ascribed to simply ageing or 
changing community norms. Bowie suggests instead that the individual 
variation in this data reflects the reality of intra-speaker variation that 
exists in all phases of the lifespan:
(10) All sociolinguistically competent adults, no matter how old, 
have the ability to display different facets of their linguistic 
identities whenever a need to do so is perceived to arise. In a 
very real sense, we all possess the capacity to reinvent ourselves 
linguistically at any time, at any age. (Bowie 2010: 66)
Alongside such lifespan accounts are more personal, autobiographical 
accounts of specific life changes and accompanying linguistic changes. 
Jhumpa Lahiri’s (2015a, 2015b) writings about her experiences and 
feelings as she immersed herself more and more in an Italian-speaking 
world is a case in point. Lahiri’s personal circumstances are unusual: 
she considers Bengali her mother tongue; she is an accomplished 
and celebrated author of English language novels and short stories (and 
winner of the 2000  Pulitzer Prize for Fiction); and she takes it upon 
herself to become a speaker and writer of Italian, which includes moving 
to Italy to live. Not surprisingly, her account of becoming a speaker and 
writer of Italian is an intensely personal, artistic expression rather than any 
kind of objective documentation, but it is no less interesting on account 
of its literary flavour. Arguably it is all the more interesting to a general 
audience precisely because of the literary nature of the writing.
Beyond simply observing individual differences in language behaviour, it 
is natural to inquire into the factors determining these differences beyond 
the usual ones of gender, age and social class. Dąbrowska (2015) provides 
an overview of some of these broadly ‘experiential’ factors and the 
interesting findings from this line of research. She reports on a number 
of studies that show the influence of education, occupational status and 
general reading skills on performance in carrying out linguistic tasks. This 
line of research points to quite different linguistic realities for individuals 
who fall into the ‘low academic achievement’ category compared with 
those in the ‘high academic achievement’ category, comparing their 
performance on tasks involving passive sentences, for example.
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At the very least, we need to make provision for case studies of individuals 
within linguistics, whether synchronic or diachronic, as a way of probing 
the lived realities of language users, to better understand all the factors 
that come into play in language use. This would mean incorporating 
into linguistics the methodologies of case studies, as advocated for the 
whole field of social sciences by Gerring (2017), as well as incorporating 
experimental methodologies that yield dense data on individuals and 
their processing of language (e.g. eye-tracking and event-related potential 
(or ERP) methodologies).
4 . Conclusion
The suggestions offered here as directions for research in linguistics are 
unlikely to be considered as directions that all linguists would wish to 
make primary goals of their research. The allure of, and the undeniable 
intellectual rewards of, the intense study of language as an abstract system, 
far removed from the world of human speakers and writers, remains 
undeniably attractive to some linguists. Nevertheless, for some time now, 
the field of linguistics has been opening itself up to incorporate the study 
of language users, Lass’ remarks cited above notwithstanding, and the field 
is richer because of that. Ultimately, languages are the products of human 
societies and human needs, and the more we acknowledge that truth the 
more complete our understanding of languages and language will be.
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On defining parts of speech 
with Generative Grammar 
and NSM1
Avery D . Andrews
1 . Introduction
There is a long-standing controversy as to whether it makes sense to try 
to define parts of speech cross-linguistically, and if so, how to do it. The 
generativist position, advocated by Chomsky (1970), Baker (2003), 
Chung (2012a, 2012b), Panagiotidis (2015) and many others, has almost 
always assumed that it does, focusing on noun (N), verb (V) and adjective 
(A), applying a combination of syntactic and semantic ideas and concepts. 
On the other hand, functionally oriented typologists such as Dryer (1997), 
Croft (2001) and Haspelmath (2010, 2012) seem to have largely come to 
the conclusion that it does not; while Wierzbicka (2010) argues that it can 
be done, using the grammatical treatment of certain Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage (NSM) primes as universal exemplars. Here I will propose 
a different NSM-based approach, intended to be complementary to 
Wierzbicka’s, which uses NSM to define ‘semantic cores’, whose members 
are treated equivalently by certain kinds of grammatical phenomena, 
restricted in order to avoid the problem of ‘methodological opportunism’ 
discussed by Croft (2001). The goal is definitions that can be applied 
1  I would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers and Dominie Dessaix for helpful questions 
and suggestions.
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universally, and also in an empirically meaningful manner, so that it is 
possible, in principle, for them to yield the result that the defined part of 
speech does not exist in a given language, whether or not this happens in 
fact. We will find definitions for noun and verb that apply universally and 
always seem to find something, whereas this is not the case for adjectives. 
A major difference from Wierzbicka (2010) is that the approach can 
be applied without working out the prime set of the language being 
investigated, with its attendant complexities such as identifying allolexes, 
since the relevant NSM specifications will take the form of NSM formulas 
which can be stated in the NSM of any language, including that of the 
investigator. The present approach can therefore be applied at a much 
earlier stage of work on a language.
The approach can be seen as a development of that of Lyons (1968), 
Schachter and Shopen (2007) and Wierzbicka (1986), aspiring to meet 
the criticisms by the latter of the former two, although I won’t be able to 
go through this in detail. Since parts of speech are a complex problem, in 
section 2, I go through a number of preliminary issues for defining them, 
and then examine nouns in section  3. Then I will consider adjectives 
in section 4, verbs in 5 and some general conclusions in 6.
2 . Preliminaries
Generative syntacticians generally believe that ‘parts of speech’, however 
ultimately defined, involve labels or features of some kind that occur 
in syntactic structures, which have a degree of autonomy from both 
sound and meaning. There are various ways of accomplishing this, but 
for convenience I will adopt the approach used in Lexical Functional 
Grammar as well as original Transformational Grammar (TG) and various 
other approaches, where they are labels on the nodes of trees, either all 
levels (TG), or only overt c-structure (LFG).
But, given the labels, there is a further issue of labels vs classes of lexical 
items. It is possible, for example, that there are universal labels such as N or 
V for syntactic positions, determining aspects of the surrounding syntactic 
environment (e.g. ‘nominal’ vs ‘verbal’ projections), but no restrictions 
on what open class lexical items can occupy them. That is, there might 
be just one open class of ‘contentives’, capable of functioning as nouns, 
verbs, etc. depending on their position in the structure. Such a position 
has in fact been argued for certain languages, including Austronesian and 
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Salishan languages, and also Nootka and Mundari. However, as discussed 
by Panagiotidis (2015: 29–37), these arguments are not convincing; see 
Chung (2012a, 2012b) for discussion of nouns vs verbs in Chamorro 
(Austronesian), arguing that in spite of the existence of many stems that 
can function as either nouns or verbs, these are distinct parts of speech 
due to unpredictable meaning shifts between the uses of putative ‘noun’ 
or ‘verb’ stems in the different positions. See also Evans and Osada (2005) 
for similar points on Mundari from a non-generative point of view, and 
issue 41(2) of Studies in Language for a number of further relevant studies 
(brought to my attention by an anonymous reviewer). Therefore, the 
current preponderance of research seems to indicate that all languages 
have distinct classes of lexical items associated with what are normally 
analysed as nominal and verbal positions, even though in some languages 
there are many words that can appear in both.
Assuming that we regard parts of speech as classes of items rather than 
kinds of syntactic positions, there are at least two approaches to trying to 
give them a characterisation in universal terms, one in terms of structure, 
the other in terms of meaning. Purely structural approaches do not appear 
to have been worked out to any extent, while the traditional definitions 
took a meaning-based approach, although with shortcomings discussed 
by Wierzbicka (2010) and, previously, many others. Baker (2003) takes 
a mixed approach, arguing that verbs are characterised structurally by the 
property of projecting a specifier, while for nouns he draws on a proposal 
by Geach (1962) and Gupta (1980) that the meanings of nouns, but not 
members of other parts of speech, involve ‘criteria of identity’. Panagiotidis 
(2015) on the other hand proposes to differentiate nouns from verbs on 
the basis of their semantics, following Acquaviva (2009),2 but in a much 
more abstract way than Wierzbicka. I won’t claim that the approaches 
of Baker and Panagiotidis are wrong, only that they are somewhat 
abstract and theoretical; the present proposal aspires to more immediate 
applicability by people who don’t have much time to delve into complex 
theoretical and philosophical issues, as well as providing fewer potential 
loopholes for saving proposals that are in difficulty. Wierzbicka’s on the 
other hand requires working out the prime set of a language, making it 
difficult to apply at the early stages of work on a language.
2  References are to the version available through LingBuzz (ling.auf.net/lingbuzz).
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Parts of speech are sometimes defined in terms of the possibilities for 
substitution, along roughly the following lines:3
(1) A word class is a set of words that can be substituted for each other 
without affecting grammaticality
This definition depends on the concept of ‘word’, whose nature is another 
long-term controversy in linguistics; see Goddard (2011) for discussion 
with respect to NSM. I will not attempt to say anything substantial here 
about this controversy, but will merely note that words is an NSM prime 
(however this works out for formulating technical definitions), and, for 
all languages, some kind of reasonably satisfactory notion of ‘word’ seems 
to be available (even if it is coextensive with ‘formative’, or is somewhat 
arbitrary in certain respects), and that the way in which controversial 
issues of word-hood are resolved doesn’t seem to have much substantive 
effect on issues of what parts of speech are taken to exist in a language, and 
none on what open ones are to be accepted.
But (1) encounters a problem with inflection, in that different inflected 
forms of the same word are frequently not inter-substitutable in all 
environments, and in addition, a further problem, first discussed at length 
by Gross (1979), is that on a rigorous application of the criterion of (1), 
words fall into very large numbers of very small classes, and the traditional 
parts of speech would only be the highest divisions in the category system, 
and would not be very clearly defined. Mass and collective nouns, for 
example, have different substitutional properties than count or plural 
ones, and split into further subcategories on various grounds, as discussed 
by Goddard (2017: 256); would they be one part of speech as traditionally 
assumed, or two? In the opposite direction, adjectives and adverbs have 
certain things in common, so perhaps they should be combined into one 
part of speech, and, indeed, sometimes are.
The original definition of part of speech was, however, given in terms of 
inflection, and we do not wish to abandon that. What I suggest is the 
following: in each language, each part of speech has a system of inflectional 
categories, such that any form that belongs to that part of speech must 
3  Cf. the definition of ‘syntactic category’ in Culicover (1976: 13): ‘A syntactic category is a group 
of words or sequences of words in a given language that can replace one another in an sentence of the 
language whatsoever without affecting grammaticality’. This generalises the definition in (1) to cover 
phrases as well as single words.
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belong to at least one of the categories. For example, in English, a given 
noun might lack a singular or plural form, but must appear in one form 
or the other.
But in languages with little or no inflection, there needs to be more, 
which I suggest is based on word order. In English, for example, most 
adjectives come before the head noun in the noun phrase unless they 
have a prepositional complement, in which case they come after. What 
we do not want is the possibility or necessity of basing parts of speech 
distinctions on compatibility with certain kinds of complements or 
determiners, or phenomena of selection, such as the choice of unitisers 
with different kinds of mass nouns (Goddard 2009, 2017):
(2) I need several items of cutlery/?furniture/*water/*meat/*fork
I therefore propose a relatively ‘theoretical’ definition of the concept of 
part of speech, compatible with LFG works and other frameworks that 
give a relatively direct account of overt structure:
(3) A part of speech is a class of lexemes defined by:
(a) how it is involved in the phrase structure rules or equivalent, 
that is, with the constraints that are responsible for the overt 
structure of relative ordering of words in utterances, and
(b) the requirement that it has a system of inflectional categories 
such that the form of any word that is functioning as a member 
of that part of speech belongs to at least one of the categories 
(specified in all dimensions if there are multiple ones, such as 
gender, number and case, in German or Russian).
Observe that (3), a definition of the concept of part of speech, is 
a  ‘comparative’ concept as described by Haspelmath (2010), based on 
formal ideas, while the definitions of specific parts of speech to come have 
a semantic aspect, but will still be comparative concepts in Haspelmath’s 
sense. By limiting the criteria, we aspire to avoid, or at least reduce, 
methodological opportunism (Croft 2001).
With these preliminaries in hand, we can proceed to the problem 
of defining the part of speech ‘noun’.
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3 . Nouns
As discussed above, our strategy, essentially derived from Lyons and 
Schachter, will be to define a semantic core, such that everything or almost 
everything that falls into it will be a noun. A problem we wish to avoid, 
however, is to give the appearance of assuming that nouns will already be 
present (although that appears to be the case). Therefore we formulate 
the definition in two parts, an existential statement that is empirical, and 
might be falsified (but hopefully is not), and the definition itself, based on 
the empirical assertion. We state our assertion as follows, mostly now in 
NSM, but using ‘[T]’ to mark first use of technical terms which we have 
not and will not here attempt to explicate. The need for the ‘open[T]’ 
qualification will be discussed below:
(4) There is an open[T] part of speech[T] like this:
A word[T] is in this part of speech if one of these things are true:
This word says what kind of thing something is
This word says what kind of person someone is
This word says what kind of place some place is
This word says what kind of living thing some living thing is
Having made our empirical claim, we can then use it to define a part 
of speech:
(5) People can say what this part of speech is with the word ‘noun’
Although I’ve expressed (5) in something very close to NSM, the role 
of NSM is less essential here.
The empirical claim of (4) is that words that fall into the semantic 
core provided by (4) obey the requirement of belonging to one of the 
inflectional classes associated with some single part of speech, and will also 
not behave differently from each other under the principles determining 
relative order. That is, a word meaning ‘dog’ will not precede a definite 
article while one meaning ‘tree’ follows it. On the other hand, we can 
observe that this core is split in extremely random ways by grammatical 
gender classifications, which, however, do not appear to ever affect 
relative order, and so therefore do not distinguish parts of speech by our 
definition. A potential problem with this definition is exactly what a ‘kind’ 
is taken to be. Is a big dog a kind of dog, for example (Dominie Dessaix, 
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pers. comm.)? I propose not, on the basis that if somebody says ‘what kind 
of animal is that’, and somebody else answers ‘a (bloody) big one’, they are 
clearly indicating that they don’t know the answer to the question. But the 
issue of ‘core’ vs ‘extended’ uses of the primes, is nevertheless important.
A subtlety of this definition is that it does not preclude the existence 
of languages with only one part of speech, as discussed in the previous 
section. For this, we need a principle that requires the existence of at 
least one additional part of speech. The most obvious proposal for this 
is ‘verb’, for which we propose a definition in section 5. We do on the 
other hand have an effective safeguard against the problem of indefinite 
subdivisions of word classes; there can be subclasses of noun, such as 
proper names or mass nouns (not covered by (4)), but these will not be 
parts of speech according to the definition, since mass nouns do not obey 
different principles of ordering than those that fall under (4), in English 
or other languages known to me.
The proposal is not inconsistent with that of Wierzbicka (2010), but has 
somewhat different properties. She proposes that the primes thing(s) 
and people provide a grammatical prototype for nouns, which implies 
that there are at least two nouns, but not, actually, that there are any 
more, although one might be able to derive some expectations on the 
basis of further assumptions. A somewhat peculiar point is that (4–5) 
do not actually imply that the exponents of thing(s) and people are 
nouns, since they do not designate kinds of things and people, but rather 
the entire supercategories. The present proposal furthermore differs from 
Wierzbicka’s in that it does not require that the investigator find the 
exponents of these primes and ascertain their syntactic properties. Both 
approaches appear to do something useful, and there is more to be done 
to fit them together.
But an issue arises with the semantic core: what should really be in it? 
(4) provides for four kinds, but there are others that might plausibly be 
included. One is proper names, which often have some special properties, 
but appear to be nouns nevertheless according to our criteria. Another 
(pointed out by Martin Haspelmath, pers. comm.) is mass nouns. Both 
of these raise some puzzles, but they are not critical, because although it 
would be good to make the semantic core as large as it can be, (4) already 
asserts the existence of one big enough to provide the basis of a part of 
speech definition.
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Another problem that needs to be addressed is provided by classifiers, 
reviewed extensively by Aikhenvald (2000). These occur in a number 
of different types, sometimes together in a single language, occurring in 
combinations with nouns and other items, especially numerals and other 
quantifiers, in various environments. The classifier used with a nominal 
expression is normally determined by its meaning, sometimes also saying 
what kind of thing something is (along with other possibilities), in 
accordance with (4). But they are clearly different from nouns, in the 
languages that have them, appearing in different positions. For example, 
the ‘noun classifiers’ naj and no7 in Kanjobolan (Mayan, Craig 1992: 284)4 
apply to people and animals, respectively, occurring before the noun:
(6) xil [naj xuwan] [no7 lab’a]
saw cl:man John cl:animal snake
‘The man saw the snake.’
For this chapter, the important fact about classifiers is that there are a finite 
number of them, although the number can be reasonably large, up to 
several hundred (Aikhenvald 2000: 84). Classifiers are therefore a closed 
class in languages that have them, and where they are independent words.
For this reason we have included in (4) the specification that the class 
be open. A potential problem is presented by so-called ‘repeaters’, which 
are nouns that appear to be used as classifiers, appearing in classifier 
positions, often instead of the normal classifiers (Aikhenvald 2000: 361). 
But repeaters can be treated as nouns, since any noun can be a repeater. 
Classifiers are very intricate, and there may be more problems for our 
definition lurking within them; for example, Truquese with its ‘virtually 
open’ system of relational classifiers (which classify possessed nouns 
according to their properties and mode of possession; Aikhenvald 2000: 
187); is this really open, or not? However, I don’t think that this problem 
needs to be solved immediately.
4  Cited in Aikhenvald (2000: 82).
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4 . Adjectives
Adjectives are the most questionable of the three categories we are 
considering. Even ‘traditional’ adjectives (as recognised by the grammatical 
traditions of the languages in question) are sometimes difficult to 
distinguish from either nouns, verbs or both. In some languages, they 
arguably not distinct at all. And our conclusion will be that they are 
not a universal category, at least in the sense that nouns and verbs are. 
Familiar European languages clearly have an open ‘adjectival’ part of 
speech distinct from noun (arguably, in some cases, according to our 
criteria, two of them, as we shall see). In English, for example, they inflect 
differently from both nouns and verbs (showing neither tense nor number, 
but having limited comparative), and appear in a special position in the 
noun phrase (NP), between determiners and nouns. But ‘adjective’ fails as 
a universal category under our criteria, for a number of reasons, including 
lack of a reliable semantic core, failure in some languages to differentiate 
clearly from other categories such as noun and verb, and failure to have 
a consistent treatment in terms of principles of ordering.
The absence of a semantic core was in effect observed in the classic paper 
Dixon (1977), who discussed languages in which the apparent adjective 
class had as few as eight members (Igbo) or even seven (Mulluk-Mulluk) 
or, possibly, none at all (Samoan). Although the properties expressed by 
the closed adjective classes are similar (predominantly size and dimension, 
newness, colour, and quality), the only ones that actually appear on all the 
lists of supposed adjectives are ‘big/large’ and ‘small/little’. The semantic 
core would have to be ‘size’, but this is not enough to be useful, because 
a semantic core needs to contain a reasonable number of things in order 
for unsplittability to be an interesting property.
Then there are the various languages that have been claimed to have 
no adjective class at all. Warlpiri has, for example, been proposed to be 
a  language where putative adjectives are not distinct from nouns (with 
demonstratives also included in this category, which is sometimes called 
‘nominals’). One basis for this claim is that there appear to be no inflectional 
differences, and while there are differences in ordering tendencies between 
words translated into English as nouns vs adjectives, they are apparently 
not very strong. Some additional motivation is provided by the claimed 
interpretations of example (7), due ultimately to Ken Hale (Simpson 
1991: 265):
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(7) kurdu-ngku wita-ngku ka Wajilipi-nyi
child-erg small-erg pres chase-nonpast
‘The small child is chasing it.’
‘The childish small thing is chasing it.’
In the first, more standard-looking, gloss, ‘child’ plays the role of noun 
(in Simpson’s LFG analysis, supplying the pred-value for the NP), ‘small’ 
that of the modifier (within the adjunct attribute), while the second 
gloss has the roles reversed. But this is a rather subtle intuition due to Ken 
Hale (1973), and perhaps it is time to re-examine the situation. Consider 
for example the following two variants of (8):
(8) a. Kurdunkgu ka wajilipinyi
b. Witangku ka wajilipinyi
Can (8a) really mean ‘the childish thing’ is chasing it, as well as ‘the child 
is chasing it’? And can (8b) simply mean ‘the small thing is chasing it’, 
or ‘something small is chasing it’, or does it rather require a contextually 
determined understanding of what kind of thing is being described as 
small (child? dog? drone?), as would be the case for an English sentence 
such as ‘a/the small one is chasing it’? At this point, we don’t know, but 
a closer look seems warranted.
Stative verbs are the other category from which adjectives sometimes 
seem to not be distinct. As examples of this, Dixon cites Yurok and 
Samoan, neither refuted, and the latter supported by subsequent work 
(Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 73–74). Baker (2003) discusses these and 
additional cases in some detail, concluding that the languages do have 
adjectives after all, but this conclusion can be challenged on the basis 
that he doesn’t provide any criteria distinguishing the putative adjectives 
from stative verbs. We might consider postulating that languages can lack 
stative verbs, using only adjectives for this purpose, but as far as I know, 
whenever there is a clear distinction between adjectives and verbs, there 
are also some stative verbs alongside the adjectives, often with no very 
clear difference in meaning. For example, in Greek, we have the adjective 
kurazménos ‘tired’, which we can combine with the copula íme ‘I am’ to 
say íme kurazménos ‘I am tired’, as well as the verb kurázome ‘I am tired’. 
If the verb category always spills over to include some stative verbs when it 
is easily distinguishable from ‘adjectives’, then it is probably theoretically 
better to say that we have stative verbs but not adjectives when such 
a distinction does not appear to exist.
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A case that might be of this kind that has attracted substantial discussion 
is the Austronesian language Chamorro (Chung 2012a, 2012b). Chung 
argues that Chamorro has standard noun, verb and adjective categories, 
disagreeing with Topping (1973), who proposes that there are only two 
major categories, noun and verb, with ‘adjectives’ being (stative) verbs. 
Chung discusses a modification construction that putative adjectives can 
appear in but not verbs, but does not provide any worked out contrast 
between ‘adjectives’ on the one hand, and stative verbs on the other 
(although morphologically transitive but stative tungu’ ‘know’ appears 
as a verb (Chung 2012a: 14)). Topping (1973: 231–32) also notes that 
intransitive ‘verbs’ but not ‘adjectives’ can take manner adverbs, while the 
latter but not the former can take intensifiers. But the predicates shown as 
taking the manner adverbs are all non-stative, and those taking intensifiers 
stative; therefore, a distinction between stative verbs and adjectives is 
not established.
On the other hand, the nature of the modification construction that 
Chung discusses suggests that there is a structural role of ‘modifier’, 
distinct from relative clauses, and not available to non-stative verbs. This 
suggests that there is something real behind the label ‘adjective’, even if it 
does not meet the requirements to be a label for a universal part of speech 
in the present sense.
The opposite problem for a universal adjective category is too many 
arguably distinct word classes that are candidates for the title of ‘adjective’. 
The classic case is Japanese, with its ‘noun-like’ and ‘verb-like’ adjectives, 
but there is by now a fairly robust consensus that the differences between 
these are essentially a matter of morphological realisation of the same 
inflectional categories; furthermore, the positional criteria appear to be 
the same. Therefore, the two types can be regarded as the same part of 
speech. For further discussion, see Yamakido (2005).
But in Romance languages especially, and to a limited extent in English 
and Greek, the positional criteria don’t fully work. As is well known, 
in Romance languages, adjectives usually follow the head N, but there 
are some that can only precede, others that only follow, and many 
that can appear in either position, often with differences in meaning, 
including restrictive (postnominal) vs non-restrictive (prenominal), and 
various kinds of more idiosyncratic shifts, as discussed for example by 
Demonte (2008):
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(9) El hombre pobre
the man poor
‘The poor [not rich] man.’ (Demonte 2008: 80)
(10) El pobre hombre
the poor man
‘The poor man.’ (who evokes pity (cf. Demonte 2008: 76))
Nationality adjectives, on the other hand, appear only to follow 
(empresarios americanos/*americanos empresarios ‘American businessmen’), 
while modal adjectives can only precede (el presunto asesino/*el asesino 
presunto ‘the alleged murderer).
On the basis of positional criteria, the implication is that these two kinds 
of ‘adjectives’ are different parts of speech. This conclusion is strengthened 
by the fact that they differ (as in English) in the kinds of complements 
they can take. Postnominal adjectives can take prepositional phrase (PP) 
complements, while prenominal ones cannot:
(11) las condiciones buenas para nosotros prolongarán nostra vida
the conditions good for us will.prolong our life
‘Conditions good for us will prolong our lives.’ (this example found 
online has been lost, but searching for ‘condiciones buenas para’ will 
turn up more like it)
(12) *las buenas para nosotros condiciones
This cannot be due to some kind of universal restriction on adjective 
phrase structure inside NP, because in Greek, prenominal adjectives can 
take PP complements (and, according to my observations, do, at a rate 
of about 1 per 5,000 words of newspaper text5), and even sometimes 
in  spoken TV news. This is possible even for modal adjectives, which, 
as in English, cannot be used as predicate adjectives:
5  Based on a bit more than 50,000 words’ worth of articles from the online edition of To Bήμα 
(www.tovima.gr/), selected on the basis of being the leftmost three on the banner that used to appear at 
the top of the webpage, or fewer if the articles were long, on multiple days chosen on no systematic basis.
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(13) i ipotitheméni apo ton Iosíf apistía tis Marías
the suspected by the Joseph infidelity of(gen) Mary(gen)
‘Mary’s suspected/alleged infidelity according to Joseph.’ (Available 
at: www.sostis.gr/blog/item/490-h-gennhsh-sta-evaggelia.)
English and Greek lack a distinction between postnominal and 
prenominal  adjectives, but they have some comparable phenomena, 
concerning adjectives which occur prenominally but not as predicate 
adjectives, as well as, in Greek, in the ‘polydefinite’ construction (Alexiadou 
2001: 233). On the other hand, the traditional adjectives in Greek and 
Spanish have the same kind of agreement morphology, marking the 
nominal inflectional categories.
All in all, ‘adjectives’ make a rather poor showing as a universal category, 
at least by comparison with nouns:
(14) a. No semantic core.
b. Sometimes fall into multiple types by morphological criteria 
emphasising form.
c. Sometimes fall into multiple types under position-based criteria.
d. Sometimes putative adjectives are not clearly distinct from 
verbs or nouns
A property that does seem to unify different kinds of adjectives to some 
degree is degree modification, sometimes by specific words. In Spanish, 
for example, muy ‘very’ expresses extreme positive degree for both 
prenominal and postnominal adjectives, but not verbs, which use mucho. 
But adverbs also take muy, so if we want to use this as a criterion, we 
should be prepared to accept adverbs and adjectives as a single part of 
speech. This is in fact advocated by Baker (2003), but is not universally 
accepted, and arguably not a very useful position for people interested 
in the primary description of languages. Furthermore, there are many 
traditional adjectives that reject degree modification.
The overall conclusion is that ‘adjective’ is probably not best regarded 
as a universally present or even definable part of speech, at least by the 
general approach used here. On the other hand, it is plausible that there is 
a universal ‘modification’ construction, so that if there is a part of speech 
to which all of its fillers belong, we could call that ‘adjective’. But the 
distinctions between different kinds of adjectives in Spanish and Greek 
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above indicate that there might be more than one kind of ‘modification’ 
construction, with different kinds of fillers. This conclusion is supported 
by a great deal of additional work on adjectival constructions, going back 
to Siegel (1976), recently surveyed by Pfaff (2015), in the course of an 
extremely detailed treatment of adjectival modification in Icelandic.
5 . Verbs
Perhaps surprisingly, verbs do not submit to the kind of treatment that 
works for nouns. Suppose we try something like (15), where ‘…’ represents 
some kinds of things that happen that are only expressible by verbs:
(15) There is a part of speech into which a word falls if it says that 
something like this happens: …
Unfortunately, there doesn’t seem to be any such part of speech. The 
problem is primarily presented by what are often called ‘complex verb 
constructions’, which consist of two words, one, traditionally called 
a so-called ‘light verb’, that usually give some kind of generic information 
about the event, but sometimes very little, and another word, sometimes 
called a ‘coverb’, often an apparent noun, adjective, which provides more 
detailed information about the event. Constructions similar to these occur 
in most languages. In English, for example, we have a choice between 
(16a) and (16b):
(16) a. I went to the liquor store
b. I had/made/did a trip/run/dash to the liquor store
In (16a) we have a conventional verb that indeed says what kind of thing 
happens, but in (16b), the same information is conveyed by one of several 
possible nouns, with at least three possible choices of verb, none  of 
which provides significant information about the nature of the event, 
which comes from the nouns. In some languages making extensive use 
of such constructions, the traditional verb often makes a more substantial 
contribution to saying what kind of thing happened, but the noun usually 
says more.
In English, this kind of construction can be regarded as a minor pattern, 
but in Hindi (Mohanan 1994), Urdu (Butt 1995), Japanese (Matsumoto 
1996) and many other languages, they are more prominent, while in certain 
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other languages such as Kalam (Papua New Guinea, Pawley 2006) and 
Jaminjung (Australia, Schultze-Berndt 2002) they are the major technique 
for describing events. In fact, in both of these languages, the ‘verb’ category 
is closed, containing 125 members in Kalam, 25 in Jaminjung. A further 
difference is that in English, the ‘coverb’ is clearly a noun heading an 
NP, while in the latter two languages, its status as a part of speech is 
unclear, and it is very clear that it is not head of an NP. This is because of 
the extremely limited possibilities for modifying or otherwise extending 
the coverb, which are limited to certain morphological operations that 
can be regarded as derivational. (17) from Jaminjung illustrates a simple 
coverb, (18) a reduplicated one, reduplication of the coverb being ‘very 
frequent—almost obligatory—with coverbs representing repetitive events’ 
(Schultze-Berndt 2002: 77):
(17) yalumbarra [V marrug ga-jga-ny] yarrajgu, warnda-bina
King.Brown hidden 3sg-go-pst afraid grass-all
‘The King Brown snake went into hiding—being afraid—into the 
grass.’ (Schultze-Berndt 2002: 120)
(18) mang-mang ganu-ngg-m
rdp-move.knees.outward 3sg:3sg-say/do-prs
‘She is moving her knees in and out, dancing.’ (Schultze-Berndt 
2002: 77)
The normal order is coverb first and then light verb, although the opposite 
is possible, similarly with verbs and preverbs in Warlpiri.
Wierzbicka (2010: 294–95) suggests defining verbs via the protypes 
provided by the exponents of do and happen, and while this seems viable, 
it does not guarantee the existence of more than two verbs, and I think 
that it is useful to try to define an open class making a stronger claim. 
To enable this, I propose extending the notion of parts of speech to include 
what can be called ‘complex words’, which I will define as words that have 
a certain amount of internal structure, but arguably sit under a single 
lexical node, which we can call ‘V’ for combinations meeting a workable 
definition of ‘verb’. To cover Jaminjung, this internal structure must be 
sufficient to allow clitics to intervene, but not major categories (Schultze-
Berndt 2002: 120). Such ‘semipermeable V’ constructions are also found 
with Warlpiri preverb–verb combinations (Nash 1986: 51–52) and serial 
verbs in Tariana (Aikhenvald 2000), languages where the (traditional) verb 
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category is open. I suggest they would also be plausible for languages such 
as Romance ones and Standard Modern Greek, where object clitics attach 
to the verb, but show signs of syntactic autonomy (Preminger (2019) and 
previous work cited there).
With this adjustment, which is intriguingly not necessary for nouns, we 
can get a universal open category of verbs, corresponding reasonably well 
to what is found in linguistic descriptions, with a two-step definition, 
assuming a prior definition of noun:
(19) a. There is a single open, possibly complex, part of speech, 
different from ‘noun’, into which words saying what kind 
of thing happened can fall.
b. A word saying what kind of thing happened is in this part 
of speech if it is not in ‘noun’. We can call it ‘verb’.
This seems complex, but I think that the complexity is necessary, because 
it is clear that on the one hand nouns can provide sufficiently rich 
descriptions of events in order to count as ‘saying what kind of thing 
happened’, whereas other widely recognised parts of speech (adjectives, 
adverbs, prepositions) do not (setting aside some rather complex issues 
involving ‘mixed categories’, as discussed recently by Panagiotidis (2015)). 
The aspect of this where NSM is most critically relevant is ‘what kind of 
thing happened’, which includes things that people do.
Not so clear is the status of the parts of complex verbs, often ‘coverbs’. 
These are very diverse, and sometimes regarded as a heterogeneous 
collection of nouns, adjectives and adverbs, and the question of what part 
of speech they belong to is generally regarded as difficult (e.g. Pawley 2006: 
10). Schultze-Berndt (2002: 71–76) argues that they should be taken as 
a distinct part of speech, distinct from adverbs and nominals. Another 
possibility is that they might be regarded as essentially morphology rather 
than syntax, and have no category label at all. Adapting a somewhat similar 
proposal by Panagiotidis (2015: 18) within the framework of Distributed 
Morphology for Greek, we might propose this as the structure for ‘dive’ in 
Jaminjung (Schultze-Berndt 2002: 475):
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We want the second component as well as the whole thing to be a V 
because that is what the cross-reference and TAM (tense–aspect–mood) 
marking prefixes apply to, but, according to this idea, the first component 
has no category label at all. Regardless of the issue of what, if any, label 
coverbs have, it is clear that they do not project higher phrasal structure. 
So if they have a syntactic category label, it is a non-projecting one in the 
sense of Toivonen (2001).
A further complexity arises in certain languages such as the Germanic ones, 
whereby additional words such as idiomatically interpreted prepositions 
and particles may combine non-compositionally with the verb, such 
as in the numerous idiomatic and one compositional meaning of ‘put 
down’, or  the combination ‘put up with’. Unlike the components  of 
complex verbs, these ‘supplementary items’ are from closed rather than 
open classes, and therefore can provisionally be set aside. There is also 
a question of what percentage of the vocabulary they constitute, both in 
the lexicon and in actual use.
The main empirical claim made by (19) is that if a word describes what 
kind of thing happens, it has two choices of part of speech, one being 
‘noun’, the other being the additional one that we call ‘(possibly complex) 
verb’. Comparably to with nouns, we just do not seem to find words 
meeting the semantic criteria of (19) divided between three rather than 
just two parts of speech. For states, however, things are different: in many 
languages states can be expressed by a third part of speech, traditionally 
called ‘adjective’ (or maybe even by two or more additional parts of 
speech, depending on how we treat ‘nominal’ vs ‘verbal’ ‘adjectives’ in 
Japanese). Another interesting fact is that there doesn’t seem to be anything 
corresponding to nominal gender for verbs: one could imagine a language 
in which verbs were divided into semi-arbitrary classes calling for different 
forms of adverbs, but this does not seem to happen.
This proposal is not empirically contradictory to that of Wierzbicka 
(2010); indeed, it seems plausible that they could be integrated along the 
lines that the non-complex verbs might always include exponents of do 
and happen. However it can be hard to find these. In Jaminjung, the verb 
yu(nggu) ‘do/say’ seems plausible as an exponent for do (Schultze-Berndt 
2002: 355), but I have not yet been able to identify any exponent for 
happen. This of course does not mean that there isn’t any, but indicates 
that even extensive and careful descriptive semantic work can fail to 
identify the exponent(s) of a prime if that task is not specifically one of the 
research goals.
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6 . Conclusion
The main conclusions are as follows:
(21) a. There are at least two universally definable and universal parts 
of speech, which can be called noun (or ‘nominal’, when there is 
no contrast with adjectives or demonstratives), and verb.
b. These have semantic cores that can be stated using NSM, which 
do not split in ways indicative of a part of speech difference 
(evidence for different phrase structure rules or a  different 
inflectional system).
c. There is an asymmetry in that words in the semantic core of 
‘verb’ can be nouns or verbs, but those in the semantic core 
of ‘noun’ can only be nouns.
d. There is a further asymmetry in that we need a notion of 
‘complex word’ to deal with languages with (traditionally so-
called) coverb + verb constructions, but no such thing is needed 
for nouns.
e. The universality of adjectives is not established, and indeed, 
seems dubious, although there is plausibly universal 
‘modification’ construction restricted to states.
There are many areas wanting further investigation. Some of the ones 
closest to the topics I have discussed are:
(22) a. Can the definition of ‘noun’ be simplified to a single specification 
without lists that are essentially disjunctions (such as ‘things, 
living things, or  …’), or widened to include mass nouns and 
various kinds of collections, or, ideally, both?
b. Is there after all a distinction between ‘adjectives’ and ‘stative 
verbs’ in languages where this is not obvious from factors such 
as morphology and the use of copulas?
c. Given that ‘adjectives’ are dubious, what about ‘adverbs’?
d. Is there a universal asymmetry between nouns and verbs with 
respect to the closed class supplements?
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Although the existence of at least two universal parts of speech might 
be taken as evidence that there is an autonomously syntactic Universal 
Grammar that includes a list of categories, including required and perhaps 
possible ones, it also seems plausible that the apparently universal parts of 
speech are aspects of the interface between grammar and meaning, and are 
essentially cognitive and semantic rather than syntactic.6 The difference 
between kinds of things (living things, etc.), on the one hand, and kinds 
of things that can happen, on the other, is after all very important in life 
(for example, the former can be returned to, and often retain traces of 
what has happened to them, while the latter cannot be returned to, and 
so cannot retain traces of their history), so it would not be a surprise if this 
difference injected itself rather forcefully into the structure of language.
References
Acquaviva, Paolo (2009). The roots of nominality, the nominality of roots. 
LingBuzz. Available at: ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/000824.
Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. (2000). Classifiers: A Typology of Noun Classification. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alexiadou, Artemi (2001). Adjective syntax and noun raising: Word order 
asymmetries in the DP as the result of adjective distribution. Studia Linguistica 
55: 217–248.
Baker, Mark C. (2003). Lexical Categories: Verbs, Nouns, and Adjectives. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511615047.
Butt, Miriam (1995). The Structure of Complex Predicates in Urdu. Stanford, 
California: CSLI Publications.
Chomsky, Noam (1970). Remarks on nominalizations. In R.  Jacobs and 
P. Rosenbaum (eds), Readings in English Transformational Grammar. Waltham, 
Massachusetts: Ginn, 184–221.
Chung, Sandra (2012a). Are lexical categories universal? The view from 
Chamorro. Theoretical Linguistics 38: 1–56. doi.org/10.1515/tl-2012-0001.
6  Note, however, that it is perfectly possible to have a universal grammar (UG) that says nothing 
at all about specific categories, requiring these to be stated in the actual grammars provided by the 
theory of UG. The Xerox Linguistic Environment (XLE) is an example of this.
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
352
Chung, Sandra (2012b). Reply to the commentaries. Theoretical Linguistics 38: 
137–43.
Craig, Collette Grinewald (1992). Classifiers in a Functional Perspective. In R.E. 
Ascher (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Oxford: Pergamon 
Press. 565–69.
Croft, William (2001). Radical Construction Grammar. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Culicover, Peter (1976). Syntax. New York: Academic Press.
Demonte, Violeta (2008). Meaning–form correlations and adjective positions in 
Spanish. In Louise McNally and Christopher Kennedy (eds), Adjectives and 
Adverbs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 71–100.
Dixon, R.M.W. (1977). Where have all the adjectives gone? Studies in Language 
1: 19–80. doi.org/10.1075/sl.1.1.04dix
Dryer, Matthew S. (1997). Are grammatical relations universal? In Joan Bybee, 
John Haiman and Sandra Thompson  (eds), Essays on Language Function 
and Language Type. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 115–43.
Evans, Nicholas and Toshiki Osada (2005). Mundari: The myth of a language 
without word classes. Linguistic Typology 9: 351–90. doi.org/10.1515/lity. 
2005.9.3.351.
Geach, Peter (1962). Reference and Generality. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press.
Goddard, Cliff (2009). A piece of cheese, a grain of sand: The semantics of mass 
nouns and unitizers. In Francis Jeffrey Pelletier (ed.), Kinds, Things and Stuff. 
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 132–65. doi.org/10.1093/
acprof:oso/9780195382891.003.0008.
Goddard, Cliff (2011). The lexical semantics of ‘language’ (with special reference to 
‘words’). Language Sciences 33: 40–57. doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci. 2010. 03.003.
Goddard, Cliff (2017). Furniture, Vegetables, Weapons: Functional collective 
superordinates in the English lexicon. In Zhengdao Ye (ed.), The Semantics 
of Nouns. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 246–81. doi.org/10.1093/
oso/9780198736721.003.0010.
Gross, Maurice (1979). On the failure of generative grammar. Language 55: 
859–85.
Gupta, Anil (1980). The Logic of Common Nouns. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press.
353
18. ON DEFINING PARTS OF SPEECH WITH GENERATIVE GRAMMAR AND NSM
Hale, Kenneth L. (1973). Person marking in Warlpiri. In Stephen Anderson 
and Paul Kiparsky (eds), A Festschrift for Morris Halle. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 308–44.
Haspelmath, Martin (2010). Comparative concepts and descriptive 
categories in crosslinguistic studies. Language 86: 663–87. doi.org/10.1353/
lan.2010.0021.
Haspelmath, Martin (2012). Escaping ethnocentrism in the study of word-class 
universals. Theoretical Linguistics 38: 91–102. doi.org/10.1515/tl-2012-0004.
Lyons, John (1968). Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Matsumoto, Yo (1996). Complex Predicates in Japanese. Palo Alto, California: 
CSLI Publications.
Mohanan, Tara (1994). Argument Structure in Hindi. Stanford, California: 
Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Mosel, Ulrike and Even Hovdhaugen (1992). Samoan Reference Grammar. 
Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
Nash, David G. (1986). Topics in Warlpiri Grammar. New York: Garland Press.
Panagiotidis, Phoevos (2015). Categorial Features. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Pawley, Andrew (2006). Where have all the verbs gone: Remarks on the 
organisation of languages with small, closed verb classes. Paper presented at 
Eleventh Biennial Symposium on Intertheoretical Approaches to Complex Verb 
Constructions. Houston, Texas: Rice University.
Pfaff, Alexander Peter (2015). Adjectival and Genitival Modification in Definite 
Noun Phrases in Icelandic. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University 
of Tromsø.
Preminger, Omer (2019). What the PCC tells us about ‘abstract’ agreement, 
head movement, and locality. Glossa 13: 1–42. doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.315.
Schachter, Paul and Timothy Shopen (2007). Parts-of-speech systems. In Timothy 
Shopen (ed.), Language Typology and Syntactic Description. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1–60.
Schultze-Berndt, Eva (2000). Simple and Complex Verbs in Jaminjung: A Study of 
Event Categorization in an Australian Language. MPI Series in Psycholinguistics. 
Neimegen: MPI.
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
354
Siegel, Muffy (1976). Capturing the Russian adjective. In Barbara Partee (ed.), 
Montague Grammar. New York: Academic Press, 293–309. doi.org/10.1016/
b978-0-12-545850-4.50016-9.
Simpson, Jane H. (1991). Warlpiri Morpho-Syntax. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Toivonen, Ida (2001). The Syntax of Non-Projecting Words. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Stanford University.
Topping, Donald M. (1973). Chamorro Reference Grammar. Honolulu: University 
of Hawai‘i Press.
Wierzbicka, Anna (1986). What’s in a noun? (Or: How do nouns differ in meaning 
from adjectives?). Studies in Language 10 (2): 353–89. doi.org/10.1075/ 
sl.10.2.05wie.
Wierzbicka, Anna (2010). Lexical prototypes as a universal basis for cross-
linguistic identification of parts of speech. In Petra M. Vogel and Bernard 
Comrie (eds), Approaches to the Typology of Parts of Speech. Berlin/New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 285–317. doi.org/10.1515/9783110806120.285.
Yamakido, Hiroko (2005). The Nature of Adjectival Inflection in Japanese. 
Unpublished PhD thesis, Stony Brook University.
355
19
cuT-verbs of the Oceanic 
language Teop: A critical 
study of collecting and 




Teop is an Oceanic language spoken in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, 
and has been documented for more than two decades in close collaboration 
with a team of native speakers from coastal villages of the Tinputz region.1 
The present study of Teop cut-verbs was inspired by Anna Wierzbicka 
when she invited me to a workshop on endangered meanings held in 
Canberra in 2013. Having been a tutor for her courses in the ’90s, I soon 
realised that the English translation equivalents of Teop cut-verbs in 
the Teop Language Corpus do not provide sufficient information for a 
semantic analysis, because the translators (including myself ) have been 
‘imprisoned in English’ (Wierzbicka 2014). To understand the meanings 
of cut-verbs, we therefore need to complement the corpus data by 
1  The Teop language documentation has been funded by the Australian Research Council in 1994, 
the Volkswagen Stiftung 2000–07, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 2007–11 and the private 
sponsor Annemarie Dahlhaus 2011–14.
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observing what people are doing when cutting things, document what we 
see by videos or photographs and ask native speakers for explanations in 
their language.
The following sections start with a brief description of the compilation 
and content of the Teop Language Corpus in section 2. In section 3 I 
discuss my method of collecting the data for the analysis of cut-verbs 
and present a list of all cut-verbs that are analysed in section 4. This 
analysis shows that by syntactic and semantic criteria two general and 
17 specific cut-verbs can be distinguished, none of which correspond to 
English types of cut-verbs. The last section contains a summary and some 
thoughts about the compilation of dictionaries of endangered languages.
2 . The Teop Language Corpus
The Teop Language Corpus (Mosel et al. 2007) is compiled in ELAN, and 
currently consists of approximately 250,000 words. ELAN2 is a software 
tool that facilitates time-aligned transcriptions and further annotations 
such as translations on separate tiers. In ELAN, annotated corpora can 
be searched simultaneously on several tiers by using the query language 
regular expressions (see Friedl 2006; Mosel 2015, 2018: 260–61).
The corpus contains folk tales, personal histories, procedural texts of house 
building, canoe building, fishing and cooking, and descriptions of plants 
and animals. All texts are translated into English. We distinguish between 
three types of texts: (1) transcriptions of audio recordings, (2) edited 
versions of the transcriptions done by native speakers and (3) texts written 
by native speakers without previous recordings. The edited and written 
texts were checked by indigenous teachers who wanted to use them in 
school. In the abbreviations of the references for the examples given below 
these three text types are distinguished by R, E and W. In addition to 
these texts, the corpus contains collections of example sentences that were 
written by native speakers on the basis of Teop word lists.
2  ELAN is available through the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, The Language 
Archive, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Available at: archive.mpi.nl/tla/elan.
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Figure 19 .1 . Koro ‘carve the inside of a canoe’; taraha ‘carve the outside 
of a canoe’ .
Source: Photograph by the author .
For the documentation of the material culture we often took photographs, 
which were used as illustrations of previously produced texts or as stimuli 
for eliciting new texts. For example, I watched the butchering of a chicken 
and of a pig and took a series of photographs that depict every single 
activity of these complex events. Later the photographs were used for 
the elicitation of texts (Mosel 2014: 148–49). To get further examples 
of cutting events I simply observed people, asked them what they were 
doing, and if they didn’t mind, took photographs (Figure 19.1).
In contrast to Majid et al. (2007), I never used video clips or pictures 
made outside the fieldwork site for elicitation or elicited data by asking 
for translations from English or Tok Pisin into Teop (see Mosel 2012: 
81–82), but a weakness of our corpus is that it lacks data giving negative 
evidence (cf. Hellwig 2010: 817–19, 824).
3 . Data mining
I started my investigation of cut-verbs by searching the corpus for the 
English word forms cut, cuts, cutting on the free translation tier (f ) and 
their aligned Teop counterparts on the transcription tier (t). The former 
were searched for by the regular expression <cut(ting)?s?>, the latter by the 
so-called wild card <.*>. This first search found 18 different Teop words. 
Then, each of the 18 Teop words was searched for on the transcription tier 
to find more translation equivalents on the translation tier.
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The search for taraha, for instance, not only found Teop utterances 
in which taraha was translated by ‘cut’, but also utterances with the 
translation equivalents ‘carve’ and ‘shave’. When I then searched for carve 
and shave, I did not only find the expected word taraha, but also the word 
kamuru ‘shave’.
Table 19.1 shows all cut-verbs of the present study, including reduplicated 
forms, the number of tokens, meaning descriptions and the referents of 
the objects. The referents of the subjects are not included, because only 
the subject of the verb pee ‘cut’ occasionally occurs with a non-human 
subject referring (e.g.) to the thing that cuts.
(1) erau ta kehaa pee vai bona
so piece shell cut now 4sg.pron
‘(and) so a piece of shell cut her,’ (Pur 05R 105)
Table 19 .1 . Teop cuT-verbs .
Teop verb Tokens Meaning descriptions 
with translation equivalents 
in brackets




38 1) ‘cut the head off a person 
or animal’ (‘behead’)
2) ‘cut a person’s or animal’s 
head off’







3 ‘cut off a protruding part’ branch, fin of a shark
kaku, 
kaakaku
27 ‘cut an animal into pieces’ 
(‘butcher’)
pig, chicken, turtle, fish
kamuru 3 ‘shave a person’s head’ person
kaporo, 
kapokaporo
28 1) ‘cut something with 
scissors’






35 1) ‘cut a log into the shape of 
something’ (‘carve’)
2) ‘cut up (a log)’ (‘chop’)
1) canoe
2) stem of a tree or palm
kopaa, 
kopakopaa
69 1) ‘cut something lengthwise’
2) ‘cut something from top 
to bottom’
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Teop verb Tokens Meaning descriptions 
with translation equivalents 
in brackets
Referents of the object 
in the corpus
koro 37 1) ‘cut something out’ 
(‘carve out’)
2) ‘cut the inside of something 
out’
1) canoe, stem of a sago 
palm
2) inside of something
kosi, 
kookosi
28 1) ‘cut leaves off a tree, branch 
or frond’
2) ‘cut off the leaves’





63 1) ‘cut off something long’
2) ‘cut off a part of 
something long’
1) vines, string, 
dreadlocks
2) head of a pig, crown of 




217 ‘cut something with any kind 
of tool except scissors’
all kinds of things
pee, peepee 66 use a small knife or shell and
1) ‘make a cut into something’
2) ‘cut a part off a whole’




poana 10 ‘cut the upper part off a log 
resting horizontally when 
building a canoe’ (‘slice’)
canoe
papaesi 6 ‘cut the sides of a canoe into 
shape’ (‘chop’)
canoe
potaa 16 ‘cut something open’ chicken, pig,
bêche-de-mer
rapisi 4 ‘cut something with a bush 
knife’
grass, belly of pig
rom, 
romrom
34 ‘cut something long crosswise 
into pieces’ (‘slice’)
trunk of a pig, body of 
a person, stem of a tree, 
eggplant, greens
tagava 44 ‘cut a tree’ (‘fell’) tree, palm
taraha, 
tarataraha
46 1) ‘cut little parts off a wooden 
thing to make its surface 
smooth’ (‘chop, shave’) 
2) ‘cut something off’ (‘chop’)





Source: Author’s summary, based on Teop Language Corpus .
All CuT-words and multiword expressions containing CuT-words are documented with 
examples and pictures in A Multifunctional Teop–English Dictionary (Mosel 2019). When you 
search the semantic domain for cutting, you find 89 entries with examples and illustrations.
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4 . The meaning of cuT-words
4 .1 . Introduction
In accordance with my search methods, the term ‘Teop cut-verbs’ does 
not denote a Teop semantic domain. Before we have analysed the data, we 
don’t know if there is anything other than the translation equivalents that 
justifies grouping the words together (see Haviland (2006: 153) on ‘carry’ 
verbs in Chinese and Tsoltil). My analysis is largely based on Goddard and 
Wierzbicka’s (2009, 2016) parameters of the lexicosyntactic frame, the 
effect the cutting event has on the object, the instrument and the manner 
of using the instrument, but for reasons of space and time it does not 
employ the Natural Semantic Metalanguage. With respect to the corpus-
based analysis of cut-words and their collocations and constructions my 
approach is influenced by Hanks’ work (2012, 2013).
In the following I distinguish between 17 specific and 2 general cut-
verbs. Since the most obvious formal characteristic of the two general 
cut-verbs is that they can be modified by specific cut-verbs in serial verb 
constructions, the specific cut-verbs are analysed before the general ones.
In view of these considerations, this chapter is structured as follows: I will 
first describe the valency patterns of cut-verbs with a focus on verbs that 
encode cutting events that separate a part from its whole. In section 4.3, 
I identify several semantic characteristics that distinguish specific from 
general cut-verbs, and then analyse the semantics of two specific cut-
verbs in section 4.4 and of the two general cut-verbs in section 4.5 and 
section 4.6, and the origin of two modern cut-verbs in section 4.7.
4 .2 . Valency patterns of Teop cuT-verbs
All Teop cut-verbs are transitive verbs. Their subjects prototypically 
denote the person doing the action and the objects the person, animal or 
thing that is affected by the cutting event. With respect to their valency 
patterns, the verbs denoting events in which a part is cut off its whole 
form a special group. The object may either refer to the part that is cut off 
or to the whole that loses the part, which suggests that the kind of part 
that is cut off is implied in the meaning of the verb or the context.
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In the following example the verb kosi ‘cut leaves’ is used in the second 
type of construction in (2a) and in the first one in (2d). Note that the serial 
verb construction mosi hapehape ‘cut off branches’ in (2c) also represents 
the second type of construction.
(2) a. Be=an tau kosi o atovo,
When=2sg.pron tam cut.leaves art sago palm
‘When you are about to cut sago palm leaves,’
b. taba momohu toro paku an,
thing first must do 2sg.pron
‘the first thing you must do,’
ean toro tagava roho o atovo.
2sg.pron must fell before art sago palm
‘you must fell a sago palm.’
c. Ean  re= paa mosi hape-hape  o atovo.




‘Then you cut off the branches of the sago palm.’
d. Ean re= paa kosi a=maa  paka atovo
2sg.pron consec tam cut.leaves art=plm leaf sago 
palm
‘Then you cut the sago palm leaves’
kahi bono sinoo vaa tobina.
off art bone lnk middle
‘off the midrib.’ (Sii Joy 03W 007–009)
Table 19.2 lists all verbs that are attested in both construction types, the 
verb kaporo ‘cut with scissors’ will be discussed in section 4.3.
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Table 19 .2 . cuT-verbs with two kinds of object referents .
Teop verb Meaning descriptions 1)  Object referent: 
the whole
2)  Object referent: 
the part
govara ‘cut off a person’s or 
an animal’s head’
person; animal head
hape ‘cut off a protruding 
part’
palm branch, fin of 
a shark






kosi ‘cut the leaves off 
something’
tree, palm, branch leaves
koro ‘cut out the inside of 
something’
log, canoe the inside of 
something
taraha ‘shave something off’ log bark
Source: Author’s summary, based on Teop Language Corpus .
4 .3 . The meaning of cuT-verbs in context
As illustrated by the examples (3) and (4) and summarised in Table 19.3, 
most cutting events encoded by the specific cut-verbs and their 
constructions can be distinguished by one or more of the following 
characteristics:
1. a certain part that is cut off a whole; for example kosi ‘cut leaves’ (2), 
koro ‘cut out the inside of a log, a canoe, a mortar’ (3d)
2. the fact that something is cut off and removed from its original place; 
for example tagava ‘cut, fell a tree’ (2b, 3a, 3b)
3. the fact that something is cut into pieces (4)
4. the instrument used for the cutting; for example kaporo ‘cut with 
scissors’ (4)
5. the movement of the cutting instrument in relation to the dimensions 
of the thing that is cut (3b, 3c).
The citation (3) comes from a description of the sago palm, whereas (4) is 
said by a teacher of needlework in a personal oral narrative.
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‘We can fell (it),’
o atovo mee o manoto.
art sago.palm also art ready to be harvested
‘the sago palm is also ready to be harvested.’







‘They fell (it), and then they cut it crosswise into pieces.’





‘Then they cut them (the pieces) lengthwise.’
d. Matatopo vai tea koro bono koma atovo …
ready now compl carve.out art inside sago.
palm
‘Now (the people) are ready to carve out the inside of the sago 
palm …’
(Sii 17W 124–126)




‘(You keep watching) while I am cutting (the cloth for)’





‘your dress or your skirt (into size).’ (Nan 01R 099)
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Table 19 .3 . Types of cutting events .




govara ‘cut off a person’s or an animal’s head’
hape ‘cut off a protruding part (branch 
of a tree, the fin of a shark)’
kamuru ‘shave a person’s head’
kaporo ‘cut a person’s hair with scissors’
koro ‘cut out the inside of a log, a canoe, 
a mortar’
kosi ‘cut off the leaves of a tree, palm, 
branch or frond’
kurusu 1) ‘cut off something long’ (e.g. an 
animal’s tail)
2) ‘cut off a part of something long’ 
(e.g. the head of a pig, the crown of 
a felled tree)
poana ‘cut off the upper part of a log’
taraha ‘cut little parts off the surface of a 
wooden thing to make it smooth’
Cut-off-something-
from-its-place
kurusu ‘cut off something long’ (e.g. vines 
in the jungle)
tagava ‘cut a tree’ (‘fell’)
Cut-something-into-
pieces
kaku ‘cut an animal into many different 
parts’
kaporo ‘cut something into pieces with 
scissors’ (4)
kepo ‘cut up a log; cut a log into the shape 
of something’
kopaa ‘cut something lengthwise or from the 
top to the bottom’ (see §4.4)





kopaa ‘cut something lengthwise or from top 
to bottom’ (§4.4)
rom ‘cut something crosswise’ (see §4.4)
Cut-something-with-a-
specific-instrument
kaporo ‘cut something with scissors’ (4–6)
rapisi ‘cut something with a bush knife’
Source: Author’s summary, based on Teop Language Corpus .
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In Table  19.3, the specific cut-verbs are sorted according to the five 
characteristics of cutting events listed above. Due to the interaction of the 
meaning of cut-verbs and the meaning of their contexts, several verbs are 
listed in more than one field of the types of cutting events. A typical verb 
that can be used for the encoding of distinct cutting events is kaporo ‘cut 
something with scissors’. While the construction of kaporo in (4) belongs 
to the type Cut-something-into-pieces, the construction of kaporo in (5) 
belongs to the type Cut-off-a-part-from-its-whole.





2sg.ipfv art hair 3sg.poss=3sg.
pron
‘when you cut his hair’ (Sia 01E(Joy) 120)
In (5) the part, vunuu ‘hair’, and the whole, nae ‘his’, are explicitly 
mentioned, but hair-cutting events can also be encoded by clauses in 
which the object of kaporo ‘cut with scissors’ does not refer to the hair, 
but to the person who gets a haircut as in (6).
(6) Meve paa kaporo bene Sookara.
And.3sg.pron tam cut.with.scissors art Sookara
‘And she gave Sookara a haircut.’ (Sia 01E(Joy) 123)3
In (6) vunuu ‘hair’ is not mentioned but nevertheless the clause refers to 
a hair-cutting event and does not mean ‘she cut Sookara with scissors’. 
Since all 14 occurrences of kaporo with an object referring to a person mean 
that this person gets his or her hair cut with scissors, this construction can 
be regarded as a conventional phraseological pattern (Hanks 2012: 75, 
2013: 95).
4 .4 . Cutting lengthwise and crosswise
The meanings of the two verbs kopaa ‘cut something lengthwise or from 
top to bottom’ and rom ‘cut something crosswise’ are not evident 
from  their original translations in texts, because both verbs are simply 
translated by ‘cut’ or ‘cut up’. Occasionally kopaa is translated by ‘cut 
open’ and rom by ‘slice’.
3  Note that (5) and (6) refer to the same event in a personal narrative.
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Figure 19 .2 . Kopaa ‘cut something lengthwise’ .
Source: Photograph by the author .
That the two essential distinctive semantic features of kopaa and rom 
are ‘lengthwise or from top to bottom’ and ‘crosswise’, respectively, only 
became obvious to me when I observed cutting events and asked native 
speakers what they were doing.
The objects of rom and kopaa typically refer to long things like a bamboo 
or the trunk of a pig (Figure 19.2). But I also heard people using the verb 
kopaa when they showed me how they cut up citrus fruit and watermelons. 
In this case, the cut starts at the stalk and runs down to the bottom 
(Figure  19.3), while rom denotes a crosswise cut (Figure  19.4). These 
observations and the native speakers’ comments led me to the hypothesis 
that the distinctive feature between kopaa and rom is the movement of the 
cutting instrument in relation to the dimensional properties of the thing 
that is cut, though only very few of the original translations reflect this 
semantic characteristic.
Furthermore, with respect to the butchering of chickens and pigs, my 
interpretation is supported by the observation that in the context of 
butchering the cut called kopaa and translated by ‘cut open’ starts at 
the throat and runs down to the anus. Additional evidence is found in 
the descriptions of colourful fishes and the drawings by the Teop artist 
Neville Vitahi. Stripes that run from the head to the tail are called rahirahi 
kopaa ‘horizontal stripes’ and those that run crosswise rahirahi rom 
‘vertical stripes’.
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Figure 19 .3 . Kopaa ‘cut from top to bottom’ .
Source: Photograph by the author .
Figure 19 .4 . Rom ‘cut crosswise’ .
Source: Photograph by the author .
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Figure 19 .5 . Riivivi (an unidentified fish), koinia ‘Convict Surgeonfish’.
Source: Photograph by the author .
(7) A iana riirivi …,
art fish riivivi
‘The riirivi fish …,’
evehee a sii rahirahi kopaa a rom na=e.
but art dim stripes lengthwise art trunk 3sg.poss=3sg.
pron
‘but its trunk is a bit striped from the head to the tail.’ (Sii 11W 096)
(8) A koinia …  a rahirahi rom paru …
art Convict Surgeonfish …  art stripes crosswise black
‘The Convict Surgeonfish … has black vertical stripes …’  
(Vaa 09W 212)
Once I had discovered the essential semantic features ‘crosswise’ and 
‘lengthwise or from top to bottom’, I started revising the translations. 
The following revised example illustrates how confusing the earlier version 
was that translated romrom simply by ‘cut’ and kopaa by ‘cut open’.
(9) Be=ara rom-rom vakavara e,
When=1pl.in red-cut.crosswise finished 3sg.pron
‘When we have finished cutting it up crosswise,’ (i.e. the palm stem)
eara re=paa paku pete a kiu vaa tea kopaa.
1pl.
in.pron
consec= tamdo also art work lnk compl cut.
lengthwise
‘we also do the work of cutting lengthwise.’
Eara he toro kopaa e te=o hum buaku.
1pl.
in.pron
but must cut.lengthwise 3sg.pron prep=art piece two
‘But we must cut them lengthwise into two pieces.’ (Eno 04W 015)
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In other contexts, however, the translation of kopaa by ‘cut open’ can 
make sense for the reader of the English translation, as in the examples 
(3c) and (10):










‘After that we cut the pig open’. (Then we start pulling out the inside 
of the pig.)’
(Eno 10E(Eno) 028–029)
Events of cutting open a palm or an animal’s belly are also expressed by 
potaa ‘cut something open’, which in contrast to kopaa is not attested 
in any other contexts or with translation equivalents:
(11) Me=ori paa potaa bene guu,  …
And=3pl.pron tam cut.open art pig
‘And they cut the pig open (and put the intestines on a raft).’  
(Aro 15R 110–112)
These data suggest that the translation ‘open’ is not a semantic 
component of the word kopaa, but results from the word’s usage in 
particular contexts where a lengthwise cut has the effect that something 
is cut open.
In conclusion, the semantic analysis of words should not exclusively rely 
on translation equivalents, because the source and the target languages 
may differ in their selection of which specific features of events, things 
and properties they encode (cf. Hellwig 2010), so that subtle distinctive 
features of the source language may not surface in translation equivalents, 
and vice versa: translation equivalents may encode features that are 
absent in the words of the source language. While in Teop the meanings 
‘open’ and ‘into pieces’ are not encoded in the verb kopaa, the meaning 
‘lengthwise or from top to bottom’ is not encoded in English ‘cut’ (cf. the 
explications of ‘cut’ in Goddard and Wierzbicka 2009: 64, 2016: 224).
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4 .5 . The general cuT-verb mosi ‘cut’
The verb mosi ‘cut’ encodes various kinds of cutting events that are 
distinguished by specific cut-verbs, which leads to the assumption that 
mosi can be classified as a general cut-verb or even as a hypernym of 
several other cut-verbs. The actions denoted by mosi ‘cut’ can be carried 
out by knives and axes, but in contrast to English ‘cut’ not by scissors 
(see section 4.7).
There are three kinds of evidence for mosi being a general cut-verb:
1. its high frequency (see Table 19.1)
2. its use in the very same context as specific cut-verbs
3. its modification by specific cut-verbs in a serial verb construction.
The verb mosi ‘cut’ is used to refer to the same kind of cutting events as 
hape ‘cut off a protruding part’, koro ‘cut the inside out’, pee ‘cut with 
a knife or shell’ and tagava ‘fell a tree’. For example, in the legend of the 
origin of the coconut, mosi ‘cut’ and pee ‘cut with a knife or shell’ occur 
in exactly the same kind of context:
(12) Ean toro mosi  a moo-naa, …
2sg.pron must cut art leg-1sg.pron
‘You must cut off my leg, (and then throw it to him).’ (San 01R 042)
(13) Me keara teve paa pee bona moo-na=e
and brother prep.3sg.
pron
tam3 cut art leg-3sg.
poss=3sg.pron
‘And his brother cut his leg (and threw (it) to the spirit).’  
(San 01R 047)
Mosi may also be used in a context where someone cuts into something.
(14) E sumeke paa mosi bona moo-na=e me=paa rerevasin.
art old.man tam cut art leg-3sg.poss= 
3sg.pron
and=tam bleed
‘The old man cut his leg, and it bled.’ (Jub 01W 031)
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The distinction between the events of Cutting-off-something and 
Cutting-into-something is not lexicalised or encoded by conventional 
phraseological patterns, but only understood from the individual contexts 
of the verb mosi ‘cut’.
Similar to the pair of mosi ‘cut’ and pee ‘cut with a knife or shell’, the two 
verbs mosi ‘cut’ and koro ‘cut out the inside’ are found in the very same 
context.
(15) … mosi bata bona koma-n=o sinivi.
… cut for.a.while art inside-3sg.poss=art canoe
‘(then it is finished,) (and they) cut the inside of the canoe.’  
(Tah 02R 087)
(16) … a=re paa taneo tea koro a kom-a-n=o sinivi …
1pl.
in=consec
tam start compl carve art inside-3sg.
poss=art
canoe
‘… (and) we then start carving out the inside of the canoe, …’  
(Tah 02E(Eno).023)
The third kind of evidence, the modification of the verb mosi ‘cut’ by 
specific cut-verbs in a serial verb construction suggests that the semantic 
features of these modifying verbs are not part of the meaning of mosi 
(see Table 19.4).
Table 19 .4 . Mosi and modifying serial verbs .
Serial verbs Meaning descriptions of mosi and serial verbs Examples





cut off a protruding part
cut off protruding parts
17
2c
mosi kopaa cut cut lengthwise 18
mosi kurusu cut cut off something from something 
long




cut cut something crosswise
cut something into slices
Sii 41W 051, 
Jen 01R 073
Source: Author’s summary, based on Teop Language Corpus .
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(17) Be=an rake ta mosi hape to peho peana, …
if=2sg.
pron
want compl cut cut.off.
protruding.part
art some branch
‘If you want to cut off a branch, …’ (Sii 41W 037)
(18) me=paa mosi kopaa bene toa te=o buaku o hum
and= tam cut cut.
lengthwise
art chicken prep= 
art
two art part
‘… and he cut the chicken lengthwise into two parts.’  
(Pau 01E 019)
(19) A otei paa mosi kurusu bono kakarusu 
art man tam cut cut.something.long art claw
‘The man is cutting off the claws’
moo-n=e toa.
leg-3sg.poss=art chicken
‘from the chicken’s legs.’ (Joy 11W 018)4
Further evidence for the classification of mosi ‘cut’ as a general cut-verb is 
provided by the following quotation from a text about canoe building in 
which the author speaks of various kinds of cuts.
(20) Me=an antee nom tea mosi a=maa kaku mosi
and=2sg.
pron 
can 2sg.ipfv compl1 cut art=plm kind cut
‘And you can cut the kinds of cutting
tabae to paku nom=an
what rel do 2sg.ipfv=2sg.pron
‘whatever (it is) that you (want to) do’ (Mor 04R 44–47)
4  The text Joy 11W are captions that Joyce Maion wrote for 54 photographs showing the 
butchering of a chicken, see also (22–24).
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4 .6 . The cuT-verb pee ‘cut with a knife or shell’
Compared to mosi ‘cut’, the verb pee ‘cut with a knife or shell’ is a specific 
cut-verb as it only denotes cutting events that are carried out with a small 
instrument.







get again art small.knife
‘… we get the small knife again,’




‘we cut up the chicken.’ (Hel 13R 029–030)
But similar to mosi ‘cut’, it may be modified by a specific cut-verb 
in  a  serial verb constructions (10, 22–23) and does not function itself 
as a modifying serial verb (see Table 19.5). Therefore I also classify it as a 
general cut-verb.
(22) E toa paa pee potaa vaevuru a otei.
art rooster tam cut.with.
knife/shell
cut.open already art man
‘The rooster has already been cut open by the man.’ 
(Joy 11W 017)
(23) A otei na pee kopaa nana bene toa





‘The man is cutting the rooster’
te=o buaku hum
prep=art two piece
‘into two pieces.’ (Joy 011W 037)
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Table 19 .5 . Serial verb constructions headed by pee .
Serial verbs Meaning descriptions of mosi and serial verbs Example
pee kopaa cut with a knife/shell cut something lengthwise 10, 24
pee kurusu cut with a knife/shell cut off something long 23
pee potaa cut with a knife/shell cut something open 22
Source: Author’s summary, based on Teop Language Corpus .
Depending on its context, pee ‘cut with a knife or shell’ may be interpreted 
as ‘cut something into pieces’ (21) or ‘cut into something’ (24). In the 
following example, the cut denoted by pee marks the place where later the 
head of the pig is cut off.
(24) … e-ara re=paa taneo tea pee vakikiimana bana
… h-1pl.
in.pron 
consec=tam start compl cut mark again
‘… then we start to cut (and) mark again’
o hum to kahi mosi govara kaakoo ra=ara
art part rel tam cut behead as.directed 1pl.in.ipfv=1pl.
in.pron




4 .7 . cuT-verbs derived by semantic extensions
There are two cut-verbs that are derived by semantic extensions, namely 
kaporo ‘cut with scissors’ and rapisi ‘cut grass; cut with a long bush knife’. 
The original meaning of the verb kaporo is ‘remove the hot stones from 
the fire in the earth oven with tongs’, but with the introduction of scissors 
the meaning was obviously extended to ‘cut with scissors’. The word 
form kaporo is also a noun, meaning ‘tongs’ from which the noun kaporo 
‘scissors’ is derived. The colexification5 of tools and the actions done with 
tools is a common pattern in the Teop language. Scissors and tongs have 
similar shapes and also the movements of their two parts are similar.
5  The term colexification was coined by François (2008).
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Figure 19 .6 . Rapisi ‘cut with a bush knife’ .
Source: Photograph by the author .
The verb rapisi ‘cut with the bush knife’ originally means ‘whip’. Whipping 
and cutting, for example, the grass with a bush knife have in common 
that both activities are carried out by holding the stick or the knife in 
one hand, raising the arm behind one’s head and swinging it down. This 
characteristic also explains why rapisi does not cover the meaning of 
mowing the grass with a mower.
5 . Summary and concluding remarks
The Teop Language Corpus was systematically searched by three successive 
searches:
1. the search for ‘cut’ and its Teop counterparts
2. the search for the Teop words found in the first search (e.g. govara etc.), 
to find more English translation equivalents than ‘cut’ (e.g. ‘behead’)
3. the search for the new English translation equivalents to discover new 
Teop cut-words.
The corpus-based analysis and the observation of cutting events with 
subsequent explanations by native speakers show that in many aspects 
Teop cut-verbs are significantly different from their English translation 
equivalents:
1. The verb mosi ‘cut’ is a general cut-verb. First, it is used within the 
same context as more specific cut-verbs; second, it can be modified 
by specific cut-verbs; and third, the action denoted by mosi ‘cut’ can 
be carried out by any kind of instrument with one sharp edge. The 
third characteristic explains why the word kaporo ‘cut with scissors’ 
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was created when scissors were introduced into the Teop culture 
(see point 6, below). In contrast to the Teop word mosi, the English 
translation equivalent ‘cut’ includes the meaning ‘cut with scissors’ 
(see Goddard 2012: 713, 2015: 1692; Goddard and Wierzbicka 
2016: 2246).
2. The number of distinct Teop cut-verbs—19—exceeds the number of 
their 7 English translation equivalents ‘behead, butcher, carve, chop, 
fell, shave, slice’.
3. The specific cut-verbs distinguish between:
1. different kinds of objects that are cut (section 4.3);
2. different placements of the cut in relation to the dimensional 
properties of the thing or animal that is cut (section 4.4);  
3. different instruments (sections 4.6 and 4.7).
4. Although pee ‘cut with a small knife or shell’ is a specific cut-
verb, it can also be considered as a general cut-verb because like mosi 
‘cut’ it can be modified by other specific cut-verbs (section 4.6).
5. Specific cut-verbs meaning ‘cut a part off its whole’ show two 
alternating valency patterns that denote the same kind of cutting 
event. The object of these verbs may either refer to a part of the whole 
or to the whole; that is, a thing, a person or an animal (section 4.2).
6. The verb-object constructions of the three verbs kopaa ‘cut lengthwise 
or from top to bottom’, mosi ‘cut’ and pee ‘cut with a knife or a shell’ 
do not distinguish between ‘cut something into pieces’ and ‘cut into 
something’. The effect of the cutting event can only be understood 
from the wider context.
7. The verbs kaporo ‘cut with scissors’ and rapisi ‘cut something with 
a bush knife’, which denote cutting events with recently imported 
instruments, are derived by semantic extensions from traditional 
action verbs. In both cases, the motivation for the semantic extension 
seems to be the movement of the cutting instrument.
The findings of our analysis suggest that lexicographers in language 
documentation projects should be aware of the fact that translation 
equivalents do not render the meanings of words and that the senses of 
words depend on their contexts. Consequently, if the dictionary is meant 
6  In their explications of ‘cut’, Goddard and Wierzbicka give ‘paper’ as an example for the object of 
‘Someone is cutting something’. Since the cutting of paper is prototypically performed with scissors, 
their analysis of the English word ‘cut’ seems to include the cutting with scissors.
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to document the semantics of the lexicon rather than serving as a tool 
for rapid translations, the production of the dictionary requires time-
consuming semantic analyses (Haviland 2006; Mosel 2011). In any case, 
the dictionary entries should contain authentic translated examples that 
show the conventional use of the lemma (headword) and its different 
senses in context (Hanks 2013: 3–5; Mosel 2018: 262–63; Rehg 2018: 
319–21).
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The depiction of sensing 
events in English and Kalam
Andrew Pawley
1 . Introduction
Languages are designed for talking about events and situations (for brevity’s 
sake I will use ‘event’ to cover both).1 The quintessential means for 
constructing word-pictures of events are sentence-sized constructions in 
which acts, processes and states and their participants can be analytically 
specified—represented by words and phrases that are assigned grammatical 
roles, as verb, subject, direct object, etc. As the senses provide the basis of 
human experience of the world, it is of some interest to compare the way 
different languages represent sensing events and to consider explanations 
for the commonalities and the differences. This essay compares the way 
sensing events are depicted in English and in Kalam, a language of the 
Trans New Guinea family. Some striking differences in syntactic and 
semantic representations are found.
1  I am very pleased to dedicate this essay to Anna Wierzbicka, a great philosopher of language. Anna 
has written perceptively about understanding the senses, with reference to the semantic primitives of 
Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM), though she has not, as far as I know, focused squarely on 
the central concern of this chapter, which is cross-linguistic variation in ways of representing sensing 
events (but see Wierzbicka 1996:81–82 and 2010:78–82). For helpful comments on a draft, I am 
indebted to Andy Rogers, the editors and an anonymous referee.
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Neuroscientists accept the five primary senses distinguished by Aristotle—
sight, hearing, smell, taste and feeling by touch—but tell us that humans 
have other senses as well. Some, such as sensitivity to temperature and 
vibrations, and itching, are attributable to receptors in the skin, but 
others, such as awareness of balance/movement (where the body is in 
space), of various bodily needs and urges (hunger, thirst, needing to 
vomit, urinate, etc.) and of pain in an internal body part, occur by means 
of different receptors. For want of a better name I will refer to these other, 
non-primary senses as ‘body internal’ or ‘visceral’ senses.
All sensing events may be viewed as involving a stimulus or sensation 
(the thing that is sensed), an experiencer (a sentient being that is aware of 
the stimulus or sensation) and a sensing process or mechanism (the means by 
which the stimulus is received, e.g. by hearing, smelling, etc.). However, 
sensing events are otherwise quite diverse—the nature of the stimuli and 
the sensing mechanisms and their relation to the experiencer differ across 
the senses—and one might expect this diversity to be mirrored in the way 
different kinds of sensing events are represented linguistically.
The question arises how far the structural commonalities and differences 
that languages show in their representations of sensing events are 
predictable from common sense observations about the nature of these 
events. By ‘common sense observations’ I mean those that might be made 
by casual observation and reflection, without recourse to scientific study 
of human anatomy, physiology, perception, etc. For example, a common 
sense view of the mechanics of seeing is that we see things with our 
eyes, as opposed to the ‘scientific’ view that we see by using light in the 
visible spectrum reflected by objects in the environment, converting it 
into neuronal signals which travel from the retina to central ganglia in 
the brain.
There are many different logical possibilities for representing sensing 
processes linguistically. One is for each sense to be represented by a different 
verb, as with English see, hear, smell, taste and feel (by touch). Given that 
each of the five primary senses is associated with a  different sensory 
organ—the eyes, ears, nose, mouth and skin (or body), respectively—
another possibility is for a language to employ a single general verb 
of  sensing, gloss it perceive and to combine this verb with the name of 
each of the sensory organs, yielding a set of phrasal verbs along the lines 
of perceive with the eyes, perceive with the ears, etc.
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Another way of distinguishing sensing processes might be to combine 
a verb meaning ‘perceive’ with a verb denoting an act that is preparatory 
to the achievement of perception, such as look perceive, listen perceive, 
sniff perceive, consume perceive and touch perceive. This makes sense, at 
least for tasting and feeling by touch, because normally before you taste 
something you put it in your mouth and start to consume it, and before 
you feel an object you come into bodily contact with it. It fits less well 
with seeing, hearing and smelling, because while these sensing processes 
may be preceded by an act of looking, listening or sniffing, this need not 
be the case. The act of perception may be accidental.
Wierzbicka (1996, 2010) argues for a contrast between sense concepts 
that are ‘mental predicates’ and those that are ‘sensory predicates’. She 
regards ‘see’ and ‘hear’ as mental predicates on the grounds that we can 
conceive of ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ in a more abstract, less physical way 
than we can conceive of the ‘sensory predicates’, ‘smell’, ‘taste’ and ‘touch’ 
(Wierzbicka 1996: 82).
The five senses are different from one another in various respects. 
Some of them (smell, taste, and touch) refer to what a person feels 
in particular parts of the body. Others (sight and hearing) do not 
refer to any bodily feeling but to processes (seeing and hearing) 
which are conceptually distinct from ‘feeling’. This means that the 
notion of ‘senses’ in general cannot be reduced to what a person 
feels in particular parts of the body (as a source of knowledge about 
the environment). (Wierzbicka 2010: 157)
‘See’ and ‘hear’ are accorded the status of semantic primitives, which are 
undefinable. The notion that ‘see’ and ‘hear’ mean to know something by 
means of one’s eyes or ears is rejected. To accept such a definition would 
mean that we could not define eyes and ears via ‘see’ and ‘hear’ without 
circularity. She observes that of all the senses only seeing and hearing are 
grammaticised in the category of evidentials, reflecting their special status 
in human cognition.
The hypothesis that SEE is a universal semantic primitive is 
consistent with the view widespread across cultures that there 
is a special relationship between seeing and knowing, and that 
eyewitness evidence is more reliable than any other kind of 
evidence, and the hypothesized status of HEAR as universal 
semantic primitive tallies well with the special role of vocal speech 
in human communication. (Wierzbicka 1996: 81)
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I am not entirely convinced that the senses of seeing and hearing are 
universally viewed as more mental and less physical than the others.2 But 
if such a distinction is valid we might expect some languages to have 
distinct verbs for seeing and hearing but a single verb for smelling, tasting 
and feeling by touch, relying on naming the sensory organ or the stimulus 
to make distinctions between the latter three senses. Indeed, The Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary (vol.  1: 736) records Middle English feel as 
meaning to perceive by smell, taste or touch.
However, various other groupings occur. Tariana, an Arawak language of 
Brazil, has a single verb covering both sight and hearing. The hearing 
sense of this verb is distinguished by taking a direct object with ‘auditory’ 
properties (‘words’, ‘sounds’, ‘language’, ‘voice’, etc.) (Aikhenvald pers. 
comm., cited by Wierzbicka 2010: 80). Samoan, a Polynesian language, 
has a single verb, lagona (with variant logo), for hearing, smelling, perceiving 
by taste and feeling by touch, as opposed to a verb for seeing, va’ai (Milner 
1966). Hausa, a Chadic language, is reported to have one term for sight 
and another for the other four primary senses (Classen 1993, cited by 
Wierzbicka 1996: 81).
Representations of visual, hearing and smelling events might differ in the 
way the stimulus is viewed. Whereas one sees an object, one does not hear 
an object; one hears a sound. The occurrence of a sound requires a sound-
making event (someone calling, a falling tree crashing, waves splashing on 
rocks). It is not the source of the sound that we hear but the sound that 
comes from it. We can hear a call without perceiving the caller.
Smelling something is parallel to hearing in that what we smell is not 
an object but, in this case, an odour. One can smell an odour without 
being aware of its source. In the case of hearing and smelling one might 
conceivably represent the relation between stimulus and experiencer not 
in terms of the experiencer performing a sensing act (in the grammatical 
role of subject) but in terms of a sound or odour moving to or affecting the 
experiencer (in the role of direct object or dative object).
2  I readily concede that English see and hear are polysemous, having ‘mental’ meanings such as 
‘know’ and ‘understand’ in some contexts (Do you see what I mean?, I hear what you’re saying), but 
would argue that their primary senses belong to the domain of physical perception, by means of the 
eyes and ears, respectively. Smell also has mental senses. Andy Rogers (pers. comm.) suggests that if 
dogs could talk, perhaps smell would be taken as a mental predicate, given the efficiency and accuracy 
of their sense of smell.
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Let us now look at how sensing events are represented in English and 
Kalam. I will be concerned with the most routine or common ways 
of depicting sensing events in these languages, rather than with highly 
marked alternatives; for example, compare I heard a screeching sound with 
the highly marked A screeching sound assaulted my ears.
2 . English constructions for depicting 
the senses
2 .1 . Verbs of sensing
Besides the basic sense verbs see, hear, etc. English has two other sets of 
verbs that refer to the senses. Let us call the three sets ‘cognitive’, ‘active’ 
and ‘affective’, after their distinct semantic functions, discussed below.3 
Each set has at least five members, representing the five primary senses, 
though some of the same forms occur in each of the sets. Visceral feeling 
is represented in the cognitive and affective sets but not the active.
Table 20 .1 . Verbs of sensing .
Cognitive Active Affective
see look (at) look + adj.
hear listen (to) sound + adj.
smell smell smell + adj.
taste taste taste + adj.
feel (by touch) feel feel + adj.
feel (viscerally) – feel + adj.
Source: Author’s summary .
2 .2 . Constructions with cognitive verbs of sensing
The cognitive verbs of sensing are labelled ‘cognitive’ rather than ‘active’ 
because they depict an experiencer subject as being cognisant of the 
sensory data but are neutral with regard to intentionality. The experiencer 
notices the sensory data but may do so accidentally. Cognitive sensing 
3  Rogers (1971), Viberg (1984) and I independently arrived at the same three-way classification 
of English perception verbs. I subsequently adopted two of Rogers’ class labels: ‘cognitive’ and ‘active’. 
I use ‘affective’ for the set he called ‘descriptive’. Viberg’s labels for the three classes are ‘experience’, 
‘activity’ and ‘copulative’, respectively.
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events associated with the five primary senses differ from each other both 
in the nature of the sensory data received and with respect to the body 
part with which the data are received. The Macquarie Dictionary gives the 
following definitions: see ‘to perceive with the eyes’, hear ‘to perceive by 
the ear’, smell ‘to perceive through the nose, inhale the odour of ’, taste 
‘to perceive or distinguish the flavour of ’. Arguably, there are two feel 
verbs: (i) ‘perceive by touch’ (I felt the wind in my face) and (ii) ‘become 
conscious of ’ (he felt the hot sun/a surge of anger). However, a case can 
be made for treating (i) and (ii) as a single verb whose basic meaning is 
‘experience a sensation other than by sight, hearing, smell or taste’.4
The cognitive verbs of sensing can each be used as transitive verbs (see 
something, hear something, etc.) and as intransitives (Can you see (clearly)?, 
Can you hear (well)?, I can no longer smell, taste or feel).
Besides the primary cognitive sensing verbs, English has other simple and 
phrasal verbs that refer to perception by means of one of the senses with 
added information: for example, about manner, such as glimpse, (take in 
a) view, catch sight of, watch, overhear, catch a whiff of. There are verbs 
that denote awareness without specifying a particular sense, such as notice, 
perceive, be conscious of, and sense itself.
To depict a cognitive sensing event, English speakers commonly use an 
SVO (subject–verb–object) clause structure:




I felt something soft
These SVO constructions are formally parallel to canonical transitive 
sentences such as I captured/killed/sold a pig. This is a typical example 
of  a  language economising in its range of constructions, in this case 
taking a  construction type that prototypically depicts an actor wilfully 
performing  an activity that affects another entity and using this 
construction to depict events in which an experiencer perceives a stimulus.
4  This last option is preferred in a number of English dictionaries but here I separate the two uses 
of feel.
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The direct object of hear and smell may be a noun phrase that refers not 
to a sound or odour but to an object that is the source of the sound or 
odour. That is, one speaks as if the experiencer hears or smells the object 
itself, just as one sees an object. Hear and smell can, however, also take 
a direct object that refers to the sound or odour or to an event that creates 
the sound or odour.
(2) Do you hear the sound of the bell?
Do you smell something burning?
Visceral sensory experiences can also be expressed by an SVO construction, 
where the sensation is represented by a noun phrase, answering the 
question What did X feel?
(3) She felt a dull pain/an itch/pangs of hunger/a surge of anger/jealousy/
dizziness
However, they are often expressed by an SVAdj (subject–verb–adjective) 
construction, where the sensation is represented by an adjectival phrase, 
answering the question How did X feel?
(4) She felt cold/itchy/hungry/angry/dizzy/as if she would burst
The latter construction, with quasi-copular use of feel, shows some 
resemblance to one with an affective verb of sensing, discussed in 
section 2.4, the difference being that in the latter the experiencer is coded 
as dative object whereas in (4) the experiencer is the subject.
2 .3 . Constructions with active verbs of sensing
Each of the five primary cognitive verbs of sensing has an active counterpart, 
in which an actor-experiencer pays attention by means of a particular 
sense in order to perceive. Look and listen are the active counterparts of 
see and hear.5 A distinction must be made between smell, taste and feel 
(by  touch) as cognitive verbs, which are neutral with respect to intent, 
and the same forms as active verbs. Active verbs of sensing can all be used 
intransitively, without overt reference to a stimulus, and transitively, but 
to be made transitive look and listen require a following particle, as look at, 
listen to. Visceral feel does not have an active counterpart.
5  In colloquial usage, see and hear can also be used as active verbs in imperative constructions: See 
that man there!, Hear what she has to say!
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
388
To depict an active sensing event directed at a target or stimulus English 
speakers commonly use an SVO clause structure, in which the actor is the 
subject and the target-stimulus is the direct object:
(5) We looked and looked at the photo but could not see the cat.
2.4. Constructions with affective verbs of sensing
Affective verbs of sensing, together with a modifier, refer to the impression 
a particular stimulus makes on the perceiver by means of a particular 
sense: look (appear to the eye), sound (be heard, appear to the ear), smell 
(give off an odour), taste (have a certain flavour), feel (have a sensation 
induced by touch) and visceral feel (have a sensation felt body-internally).
Affective verbs of sensing occur in dative experiencer constructions, in 
which the sensing experience is depicted as happening to an experiencer. 
The stimulus is the grammatical subject and the experiencer is the dative 
object, represented by an oblique case phrase introduced by  the 
preposition  to. The verb cannot stand alone (*The beer tasted to me, 
*The cloth felt to her) but must be followed by a modifier, describing the 
effect associated with the stimulus. Reference to the experiencer may 
be omitted if it is recoverable from the context.
(6) The flowers looked beautiful (to him)
The singing sounded off key (to us)
The eggs smelled rotten (to them)
The beer tasted bitter (to me)
The cloth felt like silk (to her)
The pain felt excruciating (to me)
The affective verb serves as a quasi-copular verb, linking the subject with 
the adjectival predicate. Compare the use of be and seem in The flowers 
were beautiful (to him), The singing seemed off key (to us).
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3 . Kalam constructions for depicting 
sensing events
Kalam belongs to the Madang branch of the Trans New Guinea family.6 
It has upwards of 20,000 speakers, most of them living in the Simbai, 
Kaironk and Asai Valleys near the junction of the Bismarck and Schrader 
Ranges. There are two main dialects, Etp Mnm and Ti Mnm, which 
in morphology differ about as much as Spanish and Portuguese. Data 
cited here are in the Etp Mnm dialect. There is a large dictionary (Pawley 
and Bulmer 2011) and a fairly extensive literature on Kalam phonology, 
grammar, ethnobiology and social organisation.7
In grammatical structure, Kalam is a fairly typical Trans New Guinea 
language. Verbs carry suffixes marking person and number of subjects, and 
tense, aspect and mood. Inflected verbs may be dependent or independent. 
Dependent verbs carry a suffix indicating whether their subject is the same 
as or different from that of the following clause and marking tense (prior, 
simultaneous or prospective) relative to the next verb. Kalam has only 
about 130 verb roots but has a large stock of phrasal verbs consisting either 
of a series of verb roots or of verb adjunct + verb. Verb adjuncts are words 
with noun-like properties that always occur in partnership with a verb to 
form a complex predicate; for example, si ag (crying say) ‘cry’, guglum ag 
(snoring say) ‘snore’, suk ag (laughing say) ‘laugh’. In canonical transitive 
constructions the preferred order of constituents is SOV (subject–object–
verb). To depict involuntary sensations and bodily conditions much use 
is made of impersonal subject constructions. In these the verb is always 
marked for a third person singular subject, the noun phrase (NP) denoting 
the condition or sensation is (in at least some cases) the subject, and the 
experiencer is the grammatical object.
6  Trans New Guinea, containing between 350 and 500 languages, is by far the largest of the 
more than 20 non-Austronesian language families found in Melanesia (Palmer 2017; Pawley and 
Hammarstroem 2017). Trans New Guinea languages occupy most of the mountain chain that runs 
for more than 2,000 km east–west along the centre of New Guinea. They also dominate many of the 
lowland areas to the south of the central cordillera and patches of the lowlands to the north.
7  The Kalam orthography used here is phonemic but phonetically opaque. /b, d, j, g/ are 
prenasalised, occurring as [mb, nd, ɲdʒ, ŋg] word initially and medially and as [mp, nt, ɲtʃ, ŋk] word 
finally. /p, t, c, k/ occur as [ɸ, t, tʃ, k] word initially, as [β, r, tʃ, ɣ] medially and as [b or p, r, tʃ, k] word 
finally. A predictable vowel, most commonly very short [ɨ], occurs between contiguous consonant 
phonemes within a phonological word, e.g. /mdp/ is [mɨndɨp], /wsb/ is [wusɨmp], /nŋnk/ is [nɨŋɨnɨk].
The following abbreviations occur in interlinear glosses: dl dual, ds different subject from the next 
verb, imp imperative, pf perfective (today’s past or present habitual), pl plural, prior prior to the next 
verb, prog present progressive, rp recent past, sg singular, sim simultaneous with the next verb, ss 
same subject as the next verb.
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3 .1 . A single verb of perception: nŋ
Kalam has only one verb root denoting perception and cognition: nŋ. 
The dictionary treats nŋ as highly polysemous, listing some 22 different 
senses, distinguishable in context. English glosses for these senses include 
perceive, sense, know, be aware, be awake, be conscious, notice, realise, 
understand, learn, see, look, hear, listen, smell, feel by touch, feel emotionally, 
try or test, be familiar with or used to, believe, think that (something is the 
case). In interlinear glosses of sentences cited below, nŋ will be glossed 
‘perceive’—a compromise rather than an ideal gloss.
In the following sentence nŋ can be understood either as an intransitive 
verb or as a transitive verb with direct object omitted.
(7) Mñi nŋ-sp-an?
now perceive-prog-2sg
‘Now do you notice/see/hear/smell/feel/understand (it)?’
In terms of the tripartite classification of English verbs of sensing outlined 
in section 2.1, nŋ can serve both as a cognitive verb, denoting an act of 
perception which may be accidental, and an active verb, where an actor 
pays attention in order to perceive. However, nŋ is not used alone as a 
cognitive verb meaning ‘(experience a) taste’. To express the experience of 
tasting Kalam uses a construction which depicts different kinds of taste 
sensations as ‘acting on’ the experiencer; see section 3.5). Furthermore, 
while nŋ is commonly used as an active verb meaning ‘look’ or ‘listen’, it 
is not by itself used for the active senses of ‘smell’, ‘taste’ or ‘feel by touch’. 
Each of these three active senses is represented by a lexicalised series of 
verb roots with nŋ as the final verb.
Table 20 .2 . Kalam sensing verbs .
Cognitive Active
nŋ ‘see’ nŋ ‘look (at)’
nŋ ‘hear’ nŋ ‘listen (to)’
nŋ ‘smell’ pug nŋ ‘smell’ (lit. ‘sniff perceive’)
– ‘taste’ ñb nŋ ‘taste’ (lit. ‘consume perceive’)
nŋ ‘feel (by touch)’ d nŋ ‘feel (by touch) (lit. ‘touch perceive’)
nŋ ‘feel (viscerally)’ –
Source: Author’s summary .
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Although Kalam has only a single verb root for all the cognitive senses, these 
senses are distinguished by occurring in different syntactic constructions, 
which are discussed below, in sections 3.2 to 3.7.
3 .2 . Seeing
Seeing something is expressed by a canonical transitive clause, headed by 
the verb nŋ, with the experiencer as subject and the stimulus as object. The 
direct object can be a minimal NP, such as a noun or pronoun, denoting 
the thing seen, as in (8) or a sentential NP, denoting an event, as in the 
second clause of (9).
(8) Yad kaj koŋay nŋ-n-k.
I pig many perceive-1sg-past
‘I saw many pigs.’
(9) Ygen tap-nonm ma-nŋ-b-un,
wind substance not-perceive-pf-1pl
pen ykop kawn a-nep mon d-ab nŋ-b-un,
but just swaying precisely tree catch-rp:3sg perceive-pf-1pl
wak ak takl ap d-e-k nŋ-b-un.
skin the cold come touch-ds:3sg-past perceive-pf-1pl
‘We can’t see the actual substance of the wind, but we can see it makes 
the trees sway when it catches them, and when the cold touches our 
skin we can feel it.’
Seeing can be distinguished from other senses by using the phrasal 
expressions wdn nŋ, literally ‘eye perceive’, and wdn-magi nŋ ‘eyeball 
perceive’.
(10) Tk jak-i, mñi nep wdn nŋ-sp-in.
start arise-ss:prior now only eye perceive-prog-1sg
‘I’ve just woken up, (my) eyes are only now starting to see.’
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The body part nominal wdn ‘eye’ or wdn-magi ‘eyeball’ is often 
accompanied by a possessive pronoun, and when combined with nŋ often 
emphasises that someone saw something with their own eyes, rather than 
hearing about it from others. Another conventional expression is wdn nŋ 
tep g (lit. eye perceive well do) ‘have good eyesight, see well’.
3 .3 . Hearing
Hearing something is also expressed by a canonical transitive construction, 
with the experiencer as subject. However, unlike seeing, to speak of hearing 
something minimally requires a two-clause construction, the object being 
expressed by a verbal clause. In Kalam you cannot simply hear a sound 
(I heard thunder/an explosion) or an object that is the source of a sound 
(I heard you/a plane). You can only hear something make a sound. Sound-
making is expressed by the verb ag ‘make a sound, say, utter’, often in 
combination with a noun or verb adjunct denoting a particular kind 
of sound (speech, calling, snoring, rattling, etc.).
(11) Nad ag-e-na-k nŋ-n-k.
you say-ds-2sg-past perceive-1sg-past
‘I heard what you said.’
(12) Yad tumuk ag-e-k nŋ-n-k.
I thunder say-ds:3sg-past perceive-1sg-past
‘I heard thunder.’ (lit. ‘I thunder sounded I heard.’)
(13) Yad kaj way ag-e-k nŋ-n-k.
I pig squealing say-ds:3sg-past perceive-1sg-past
‘I heard a pig squeal.’ (lit. ‘I pig squealed I heard’)
In (12), tumuk ‘thunder’ is a noun and is the subject of ag. In (13) way 
‘squealing’ is a verb adjunct, not a verb; it is always partnered by the 
verb ag.
A phrasal expression used to distinguish hearing from other senses is tmud 
nŋ, literally ‘ear perceive’.
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3 .4 . Smelling
In Kalam one cannot speak of smelling an object. One can only smell 
an odour. Two alternative constructions are available for describing the 
smelling of an odour. Most commonly, an impersonal subject construction 
is used in which an odour (the subject) is depicted as ‘coming to’ the 
perceiver. To translate ‘I smelled a pig’ one would usually say:
(14) Yp kaj kuy ow-a-k.8
me pig odour come-3sg:past
(lit. ‘pig odour came to me.’)
The act of perception is not mentioned but is implied. In this context ap 
‘come’ is understood as implying ‘come to the experiencer’s attention’. 
The experiencer is represented by a pronoun or noun phrase that is 
grammatically an object.9
Constructions with impersonal subject are not canonical transitive 
constructions in that they usually show OSV (object–subject–verb) 
order, whereas the preferred order in canonical transitives is SOV. What 
shows that impersonal subject constructions are transitive is the choice 
of personal pronoun denoting the experiencer. Kalam has two sets of 
free-form personal pronouns: one marking the grammatical subject 
(and  possessor of a noun which is the subject) and the other marking 
object (and possessor of a noun which is the object).











Source: Author’s summary .
8  Kalam born after about 1970 say ki for kuy. uy > i is a sound change in progress.
9  One might call this a dative object because the object is the receiver but in Kalam there is no 
formal distinction between direct objects and dative objects.
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The second option is to use an experiencer subject construction, in which 
the experiencer perceives an odour, as in (15) and (16). Here the first 
clause describes an odour as rising towards the experiencer and the second 
clause describes the experiencer’s act of smelling it.
(15) Mñi kuy ap tan-b nŋ-sp-an?
now odour come rise-pf-3sg perceive-prog-2sg
‘Now do you smell the odour coming up?’
(16) Pakam gutgut kuy ak ow-pnŋ, nŋ-b-ay.
bandicoot stench odour this come-ds:sim perceive-pf-3pl
‘When this rank odour of bandicoot comes they smell it.’
A deliberate act of smelling something is expressed by a sequence of verb 
roots: pug nŋ (sniff perceive), or in the case of a dog picking up a scent and 
following it, pug d am nŋ (sniff hold go perceive). The verbs share an actor 
subject and take as object kuy ‘odour’.
(17) Kayn sgaw kuy ak pug d am nŋ-sp-ay. 
dog wallaby odour the sniff hold go perceive-prog-3pl
‘The dogs are following the scent of a wallaby’
3 .5 . Tasting
Experiencing a tasting sensation is depicted by an impersonal subject 
construction; that is, a taste happens to one. But whereas Kalam has 
a noun meaning ‘odour, smell’ it does not have a noun with the general 
meaning ‘taste, flavour’. Instead it has a few terms for particular kinds of 
taste or feeling in the mouth, which serve as adjectives and, marginally, 
as nouns; for example, ydk ‘tasty, delicious, tastiness’, km ‘bitter, 
bitterness’, slk ‘pungent, spicy, hot-tasting, itchy’. These select the verb g 
‘do, make, happen’.
(18) Yad kaj ak ñb-e-n-k, yp ydk g-a-k.
I pig the eat-ds-1sg-past me tasty do-3sg-past
‘When I ate the pork, it tasted delicious to me.’
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(19) Snb ñb-e-n, yp joŋb slk g-p.
ginger eat-ds-1sg me mouth pungent do-pf:3sg
‘When I eat ginger, it gives my mouth a pungent sensation.’
Deliberate tasting is expressed by a sequence of two verbs that share an 
actor subject: ñb nŋ ‘consume perceive’ and an object, the thing consumed.
(20) Nad sup ak ñb nŋ-an!
you soup the consume perceive-2sg:imp
‘Taste the soup!/Try eating the soup!’
3 .6 . Feeling by touch
Experiencing a particular tactile sensation, like experiencing a taste 
or smell, is usually depicted as something that happens to one. Tactile 
sensations are represented by adjectives; for example, dlob ‘slimy’, deg 
‘slippery, smooth’, gac ‘dirty’, kd ‘sharp’, kls ‘firm, hard’, sayn ‘soft’. 
The verb that partners these is g ‘do, make, happen’. The experiencer is the 
object of the verb. The construction can be analysed as having a dummy 
subject, represented only by the third person singular subject-marking on 
the verb.
(21) Yad kaj wak d nŋ-e-n-k, yp gac g-a-k.
I pig skin touch perceive-ds-
1sg-past
me dirty do-3sg-past
‘When I touched the pig’s skin, it felt dirty to me.’
However, feeling a sensation by touch can also be expressed by an 
experiencer subject construction headed by nŋ ‘perceive’, as in (22) (= (9), 
repeated here for convenience), where nŋ-b-un in the final clause can be 
interpreted as ‘we (habitually) feel (the cold)’ because the preceding clause 
means ‘the cold comes and touches the skin’:
(22) Ygen tap-nonm ma-nŋ-b-un,
wind substance not-perceive-pf-1pl
pen ykop kawn a-nep mon d-ab nŋ-b-un,
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wak ak takl ap d-e-k nŋ-b-un.
skin the cold come touch-ds: 
3sg-past 
perceive-pf-1pl
‘We can’t see the actual substance of the wind, but we can see it 
makes the trees sway when it catches them, and when the cold 
touches our skin we can feel it.’
Deliberate touching, as opposed to experiencing a tactile sensation, is 
expressed by a sequence of two verbs sharing an actor subject: d nŋ ‘touch 
perceive’.
(23) Yad waknaŋ ak d nŋ-n-k.
I eel the touch perceive-1sg-past
‘I felt the eel.’
3 .7 . Body internal feelings
Body internal or visceral feelings, with a few exceptions, are treated like 
sensations of smelling (option 1, see section 3.4), tasting and feeling by 
touch: they happen to one. The thing felt (bodily sensation, emotion, 
etc.) is encoded as a noun, serving as the subject, the experiencer is the 
object and the verb specifies the manner in which the stimulus acts on/
relates to the experiencer. The same construction is used to denote all 
involuntary bodily conditions, such as shivering, shuddering, hiccupping, 
sweating, having boils, pimples, ringworm, scabies or warts, being numb 
or paralysed, or feeling angry, nauseated or sleepy.
Some sensations or conditions, such as sleepiness, salivating or wanting 
to laugh, ‘come to’ the experiencer:
(24) Yp wsn ow-p.
me sleep come-pf:3sg
‘I feel sleepy.’
(25) Yp suk ow-p.
me laughter come-pf:3sg
‘I feel like laughing.’
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(26) Yp kuñk ow-p.
me saliva come-pf:3sg
‘I feel a craving (esp. for food).’/‘I am salivating.’
yap, yow ‘fall’ expresses a sensation in which something is felt to fall in the 
experiencer.
(27) Yp ss yow-p.
me urine fall-pf:3sg
‘I feel like urinating.’
(28) Yp sb yow-p.
me faeces fall-pf:3sg
‘I feel like defecating.’
(29) Yp mluk yow-p.
me nose fall-pf:3sg
‘I feel upset/annoyed.’ (cf. English ‘his face fell’, ‘his nose is out 
of joint.’)
g ‘do, act, happen, make’ depicts a sensation, such as shame, pain, hunger, 
itching, as acting on the experiencer:
(30) Yp nabŋ g-p.
me shame do-pf:3sg
‘I feel shame/shy.’/‘I am ashamed/shy.’
(31) Yp yuwt g-p.
me pain do-pf:3sg
‘I feel pain.’/‘I’m in pain.’
(32) Yp yuan g-p.
me hunger do-pf:3sg
‘I feel hungry.’/‘I’m hungry.’
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(33) Yp slk g-p.
me itch do-pf:3sg
‘I feel itchy.’/‘I am itchy.’
pk ‘hit, strike, contact’ occurs in a construction where the subject noun 
denotes a body part and pk denotes a throbbing sensation:
(34) Yp jun pk-p.
me head hit-3sg:pf
‘I have a headache.’
There are a very few exceptions to the generalisation that body internal 
sensations are depicted by impersonal subject constructions. The exceptions 
are cases where an internal organ (mapn ‘liver’, sb ‘bowels’) is viewed as the 
seat of the emotions and the experiencer is cast as the subject of the verb.
(35) Yad nup mapn nŋ-b-in.
I him liver perceive-pf-1sg
‘I feel sorry/affection for him.’
3 .8 . ‘Be like’ construction
Kalam lacks a set of affective verbs of sensing, corresponding to English 
look, sound, etc., where the verb plus modifier describes the impression the 
stimulus makes on the experiencer, as in Jane sounded elated, Jake looked as 
if he’d seen a ghost, Did that feel like an earthquake?
The nearest Kalam has to a functional equivalent of such a construction 
is an impersonal subject construction in which a noun X modified by the 
clitic tek ‘like, similar, as if, seem like’ combines with a verb to describe 
a resemblance between X and the subject.
(36) Wak yp mon=tek yn-b. 
skin my fire-like burn-pf:3sg
‘My skin feels like it’s on fire.’
The verb is often ay- ‘become in a certain condition or state, take the form 
of, form, put, stabilise’.
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(37) Sofia jomluk no-nm =tek ay-a-k.
Sofia face her-mother like form-3sg-past
‘Sofia looks like her mother.’ (lit. ‘Sofia face like her mother it formed.’)
(38) Yp kum-eb =tek ay-p.
me dying like form-pf:3sg
‘I feel as if I’m dying.’ (lit. ‘like dying forms me.’)
However, this construction is sense-neutral: it does not say whether the 
resemblance is in look, sound, smell, etc.
4 . Conclusion
It is through data provided by the senses that we perceive and construct 
models of the world. This applies to the linguistic modelling of sensing 
events themselves. We noted earlier that there are various logical 
possibilities for representing particular kinds of sensing events, each being 
compatible with common sense understandings of how these events 
work—of the nature of the stimuli and the sensing processes and their 
relation to the experiencer. One might expect this diversity to be mirrored 
in the syntactic and semantic representations of different kinds of sensing 
events across languages. This expectation is confirmed by differences in 
the way sensing events are depicted in English and in Kalam.
i. English has three sets of verbs of sensing with distinct semantic 
functions: ‘cognitive’, ‘active’ and ‘affective’. Kalam distinguishes 
cognitive and active verbs of sensing but lacks an exact equivalent 
of affective verbs.
ii. English has a separate verb root for each of the five primary senses 
in each of the three sets. A sixth verb representing the visceral senses 
occurs in the cognitive and affective sets. Kalam has a single verb 
root, nŋ, which alone can refer to any of the cognitive senses with one 
exception: taste. To distinguish between the senses Kalam speakers 
specify the nature of the stimulus: one perceives (sees) a scene or 
object, one perceives (hears) a sound-making event, one perceives 
(smells) an odour and one perceives (feels) an object touched. There 
is no single cognitive verb of tasting. Instead, particular tasting 
sensations happen to the experiencer.
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iii. Kalam speakers can also distinguish between seeing and hearing by 
placing the term for ‘eye’ or ‘ear’ before nŋ, although this is only 
done for emphasis. This analytic strategy is available to English 
speakers—it is reflected in English dictionary definitions of sensing 
verbs that use the verb ‘perceive’ and identify the sensory organ and/
or the nature of the stimulus associated with each sense—but for 
English speakers it is a highly marked strategy.
iv. Kalam also provides a more analytic representation of active sensing 
verbs than English. Deliberate acts of smelling, tasting and feeling 
by touch are each represented by a sequence of two verb roots literally 
meaning, respectively, ‘sniff perceive’, ‘consume perceive’ and ‘touch 
perceive’.
v. Another difference between the two languages concerns the handling 
of control or intentionality in sensing events. In English each of the 
six kinds of cognitive sensing events is normally represented by a 
canonical transitive construction, in which the experiencer appears 
as the subject of the verb and the stimulus as the object. Canonical 
transitive constructions treat the experiencer as if he/she exercises 
a measure of control over the sensing process. Such a uniform 
treatment of the cognitive senses masks differences in the degree of 
control that the experiencer typically has over the sensing experience.
Kalam treats seeing and hearing differently from the other senses. 
Whereas seeing and hearing are represented, as in English, by canonical 
transitive constructions, smelling and feeling by touch (as cognitive 
senses) are usually represented by impersonal subject constructions, 
in which the sensing experience is depicted as something that happens 
to the experiencer. Tasting and nearly all visceral sensations are always 
depicted by impersonal subject constructions.
vi. A further difference resides in the representation of what it is that 
we hear and smell. English allows us to say that we can hear an 
object such as a pig or a gun, whereas common sense tells us that 
what we hear is the sound made by the object. The interlocutor 
is expected to make the logical connection between object and a 
sound-making event. Kalam does not allow this sort of metaphor, 
in which an object stands for an event; it must specify the event. 
Similarly, English allows us to say that we smell an object whereas 
in Kalam one must speak of smelling an odour associated with or 
coming from an object.
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specific words in the light 
of parallel corpora
Alexei Shmelev
The starting point for this chapter is the hypothesis that one may regard 
translation equivalents and paraphrases of a linguistic unit extracted 
from real translated texts as a source of information about its semantics 
(cf. the approach developed in Anderman and Rogers 2008). This may 
be especially useful for the so-called language-specific words since the 
great variety of possible translations is an indicator of the high language 
specificity of a word. The multiplicity of translations may be used as 
a  quantitative measure of language specificity: the greater the number 
of different translations of a single lexical unit in existing translations, 
the higher its language specificity (Shmelev 2015: 562–63). As is known, 
language-specific linguistic expressions are often culture-specific as well 
and can be linked to the notion of ‘cultural keywords’ (Wierzbicka 1997); 
therefore, one may assume that culture-specific words often have several 
translations and their translation counterparts may emphasise different 
aspects of their meaning. In what follows, I will concentrate on Russian 
words that are language-specific with respect to English.1 I will pay 
special attention to some Russian discourse markers—that is, words or 
1  For a discussion of language specificity as a relative notion, see Shmelev (2015).
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a phrases that play a role in managing the flow and structure of discourse 
(in particular, ešče, že, razve, neuželi, avos’ and nebos’ ) as well as the specific 
‘Russian’ emotion toska.
Russian linguists traditionally employ language data taken from original 
Russian texts or artificial examples specially created by native speakers 
(usually the linguist themselves). Examples taken from translated texts 
are usually viewed with distrust, and, when I cited such texts in my 
publications of the 1980s, some colleagues asserted that these examples 
were not indicative of Russian usage, as they were created under the 
influence of a foreign language. I believe, in contrast, that translated texts 
provide highly valuable material for studying the specifics of the target 
language (Russian in this case). When Russian is the source language, 
the choice of translation may depend on the translator’s metalinguistic 
reflection, while an occurrence of a Russian language–specific expression 
in the target text, more often than not, reflects a ‘naïve’ choice of words. 
These translations are usually (although not invariably) produced by 
native target language speakers who should understand the original text; 
that is, they encode the semantic representation given in the original text 
into a text in the target language, which may be treated as a model of 
‘natural’ linguistic activity.
Translated texts are especially useful for studying the semantics of 
language-specific words and expressions that have no direct equivalents 
in other languages. The very appearance of such words in translated 
texts may seem paradoxical. Indeed, if a word or expression expresses 
a configuration of meanings that is specific to the target language, then 
one may ask what aspects of the original text made the translator use 
this expression. The answer to this question often helps to describe the 
semantics of the language-specific word or expression.
The development of corpus linguistics and the appearance of electronic 
parallel corpora of the Russian language have made it possible to study 
the usage of language-specific words and expressions in translated texts 
in a systematic fashion. The identification of elements of original texts 
that incite translators to use language-specific expressions in the target 
language helps not only to verify the descriptions of these words obtained 
without the use of electronic corpora but also, in some cases, to take a new 
look at certain language-specific words. In this respect, translations into 
Russian tend to be even more revealing than translations from Russian. 
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However, the study of different ways of translating language-specific 
words in the original text may also prove interesting, and so let us begin 
by looking at them.
1. Language-specific expressions in the 
Russian original and their translations
When Russian is the original language, the translation of language-specific 
words poses a problem that is solved differently by different translators. 
One of the biggest difficulties is the translation of expressions of the original 
language whose ‘presumptions’ or ‘hidden meanings’ (presuppositions, 
connotations, background aspects of meaning, etc.) contain notions that 
do not lie in the ‘presumptions’ of the expressions of the target language 
(indeed, these semantic and pragmatic elements are precisely what 
constitutes the language specificity of a word). These elements are taken 
for granted by native speakers of the original language but not of the 
target language. Such linguistic expressions often create the impression of 
‘untranslatability’. Indeed, if we try to make such presumptions explicit 
in the target language, they will lose their ‘presumptive’ status; however, 
if we fail to do so, the underlying meaning will not be expressed. As a 
rule, the translator tries first and foremost to bring across the aspects of 
meaning that are the focus of attention. They often do not notice the 
background aspects at all or, if they do, are frequently ready to sacrifice 
them. At the same time, if they try to express such expressions in the 
target language, they almost always attract attention to them, shifting 
them from the quasi-invisible ‘background’ into the focus of attention, 
which is also a distortion of the original semantic task.
However, individual translator solutions with respect to language-specific 
words may be based on different considerations depending on the goals 
that the translator sets. Generally speaking, one can distinguish between 
two approaches (and, correspondingly, two strategies) of translation. One 
is predominantly source-oriented and tries to bring across everything 
that the author ‘meant’ (‘had in mind’, ‘wanted to say’). To this end, 
a translator may insert notes, commentaries, etc. Such a translation gives 
the readers a more or less complete understanding of the semantic content 
of the original yet does not give them a direct impression of the text. 
The other approach is predominantly oriented towards the reader, and 
strives to make the translation create the same impression on the foreign-
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language speaker that the original has on the native speaker. The dynamic 
approach is used by certain translators of fiction (yet not only of fiction: 
also drama, verse, non-fiction and many non-literary genres).
The choice of strategy is determined by the translator’s aims, and there 
is no universal strategy that is applicable in all cases. This is particularly 
true of literary translations. When a translator comes across a language-
specific expression, they can try to select an equivalent that will best bring 
across the meaning of the original in a given context (‘meaning strategy’), 
or they can choose a single equivalent of the expression and try to use it 
in all contexts (‘form strategy’). In the case of the meaning strategy, there 
often arises a variety of different translations of a single language-specific 
word, as the latter has no single equivalent in the target language, and 
the translator must choose each time an equivalent that best expresses, 
in their opinion, the aspects of meaning that are the most significant in 
the given context.
For example, the Russian language-specific word avos’ 2 has a considerable 
variation of translation in the principal European languages. The range of 
translations of avos’ in those languages shows its high language specificity 
with respect to the target languages and helps to verify its semantic analysis. 
The inevitable loss of meaning during the translation of this word leads 
to the emphasis of specific aspects of meaning. The fact that this word is 
usually translated by a word with the meaning ‘maybe, possibly’ indicates 
that avos’ marks a hypothesis that is made without sufficient grounds 
(with the exception of the speaker’s desire for it to be true). The use of 
words and expressions with the meaning ‘hope’ in some cases reflects the 
relation of utterances with the word avos’ to the future, the desire for the 
corresponding situation to occur, and the lack of guarantees that it will 
indeed do so. The addition of words with the meaning ‘luck’ emphasises 
the aspect ‘X wants the situation to occur yet cannot influence it in any 
way’; the lack of guarantees that the desirable will occur is emphasised by 
the addition of expressions with the meaning ‘no one knows ahead of time 
whether the situation will occur’.
Wierzbicka (1992: 169–74) has also made a subtle analysis of the Russian 
language–specific word toska. As expected, translations of this word into 
the principal European languages also vary greatly—often within a single 
2  Anna Wierzbicka (1992: 435) has proposed an explication of this word, which was subsequently 
made more precise in Shmelev (1996).
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translation. This shows that translators follow the meaning strategy, 
and provides additional evidence for the high language specificity of 
the word toska. Let us take a look at English translations in the Russian 
National Corpus (RNC); in particular, Constance Garnett’s translations 
of Dostoyevsky’s works.3 Her translation of White Nights contains the 
equivalents ‘despondency’, ‘anguish’, ‘misery’, ‘depression’. Her translation 
of Crime and Punishment (a novel in which the motif of toska plays a major 
role) also makes use of different equivalents. The most common equivalent 
in this translation (used 5 times out of the 22 occurrences of the word toska 
in the original) is ‘misery’; at other times, ‘wretchedness’ is used. Another 
equivalent used by Garnett is ‘anguish’. However, she also employs other 
equivalents in this translation: ‘dismay’, ‘depression’, ‘dejection’, ‘distress’, 
‘agony’, ‘restlessness’, ‘misgivings’. The novel Demons is also represented 
in the RNC by Garnett’s translation (under the title The Possessed or 
The Devils), which contains a similar variety of translations. The words 
‘yearning’ and, most often, ‘distress’ are repeatedly used as translations, yet 
other equivalents also occur: ‘trouble’, ‘anguish’, ‘misery’. It should be said 
that in the novel The Possessed the word toska is sometimes used with the 
non-standard meaning ‘grief, suffering’ (as in the phrase v ètu nesčastnuju 
nedelju ja vynes mnogo toski, which Garnett translates as ‘I suffered a great 
deal during that unhappy week’). This leads to such translations as ‘grief ’ 
and ‘woe’. For the collocation bajronovskaja toska, which occurs in The 
Possessed, the translation is ‘Byronic spleen’, as expected.
Let us consider how Wierzbicka defines the word toska. In a nutshell, 
toska means that a person wants something without knowing exactly 
what. At the same time, s/he has a feeling that it cannot be attained and 
feels something (bad) as a result.4 In different cases, one of these aspects 
may predominate: the desire for something (‘yearning’), the lack of a 
precise idea of what it is (this aspect is absent in Constance Garnett’s 
3  The Russian National Corpus is available at: www.ruscorpora.ru/en/.
4  Consider the explication in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM):
toska
X thinks something like this
I want something good to happen
I don’t know what
I know: it cannot happen
Because of this, X feels something (Wierzbicka 1992: 172).
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translations, as a rule), the impossibility of attaining it, and the ensuing 
feeling that something bad has happened or is happening now5 (this 
aspect predominates in most translation equivalents used by Garnett).
The Brothers Karamazov is also represented in the RNC by Constance 
Garnett’s translation. Just as in The Possessed, the word toska in The Brothers 
Karamazov sometimes has the predominant connotation of grief or 
suffering, and Garnett uses precisely these words (in addition to other 
equivalents such as ‘anguish’ that we already know from her translations 
of Crime and Punishment and The Possessed). However, the most common 
translation of toska in this work is the word ‘depression’. One sometimes 
even gets the impression that Garnett overuses it in her translation. The 
following example shows a clear predominance of the aspect ‘the subject 
wants something very much yet does not know what exactly’ (as can be 
seen from the context):
(1) Toska do tošnoty, a opredelit’ ne v silax, čego xoču.
I feel sick with depression and yet I can’t tell what I want.
Garnett’s use of the word ‘depression’ in her translation is not entirely 
equivalent to the meaning of toska here: the latter points to a strong desire, 
while ‘depression’, as Anna Wierzbicka (1999: 309) notes, presupposes 
that all desires have already waned (‘one is already past wanting’, as 
she puts it). The translation of the word toska by ‘depression’ in the 
following example, in which Ivan Karamazov wants to embark on a new 
and totally unknown path, experiencing a great feeling of hope without 
knowing where precisely he is heading, subsequently leads Garnett to 
translate the word toska in the expression toska novogo i nevedomogo by 
the word ‘apprehension’, replacing the original meaning by almost its 
opposite: Dostoyevsky speaks of Ivan’s strong desire for something new 
and unknown to occur, while the word ‘apprehension’ points to a fear 
or presentiment of something dangerous; hence the translation may be 
confusing:6
5  Some English words with the aspect ‘something bad occurred’ (‘sadness’, ‘unhappiness’, ‘distress’, 
‘sorrow’, ‘grief,’ ‘despair’) were analysed and interpreted in (Wierzbicka 1999: 60–70).
6  The English word ‘apprehension’ is described in (Wierzbicka 1999: 86–87). As one of the 
reviewers of this chapter pointed out, older senses of this word don’t necessarily imply fear or danger.
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(2) No strannoe delo, na nego napala vdrug toska nesterpimaja i, glavnoe, 
s každym šagom, po mere približenija k domu, vsё bolee i bolee 
narastavšaja. Ne v toske byla strannost’, a v tom, čto Ivan Fedorovič nikak 
ne mog opredelit’, v čem toska sostojala. Toskovat’ emu slučalos’ často i 
prežde  …  I vse-taki v ètu minutu, xotja toska novogo i nevedomogo 
dejstvitel’no byla v duše ego, mučilo ego vovse ne to.
But, strange to say, he was overcome by insufferable depression, 
which grew greater at every step he took towards the house. There 
was nothing strange in his being depressed; what was strange was that 
Ivan could not have said what was the cause of it. He had often been 
depressed before … Yet at that moment, though the apprehension of 
the new and unknown certainly found place in his heart, what was 
worrying him was something quite different.
However, when the word toska unambiguously signifies a striving or 
strong desire for contentment, Garnett translates it as ‘craving’ (rather 
than even ‘yearning’).
The translation ‘depression’ is also clearly impossible with regard to the 
following words of the Elder addressed to the visiting lady: Ja vpolne 
veruju v iskrennost’ vašej toski. Here the key parameter is iskrennost’, which 
is poorly compatible with ‘depression’. Garnett translates this expression 
as ‘the sincerity of your suffering’.7
Of course, one may say that Garnett’s translations are far from perfect and 
even contain numerous misleading literalisms. However, this does not 
contradict the thesis that the variety of translations serves as an indicator 
of language specificity. Indeed, the presence of calques may show that 
the translator is taking the formal equivalence approach,8 at least in part. 
If one and the same linguistic expression is, nevertheless, translated in 
different ways, one can conclude that there is no clear equivalent to the 
original expression in the target language and thus that it is language-
specific at least with respect to the target language.
A study of translations of other Russian texts made by different translators 
shows an even greater variety of equivalents: ‘sadness’, ‘yearning’, 
‘depression’, ‘restlessness’, ‘wretchedness’, ‘despondency’, ‘anguish’, 
‘misery’, ‘distress’, ‘dismay’, ‘dejection’, etc.
7  The Russian word iskrennost’ and the English word ‘sincerit’y do not have the same meaning 
either (Wierzbicka 2002: 25–27).
8  Formal equivalence approach, a term coined by Eugene Nida, tends to emphasise fidelity to the 
lexical details and grammatical structure of the original language (Nida and Taber 1969: 200).
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Let us also note that translators often change parts of speech and the 
sentence structure, as the following translation by Constance Garnett 
of an excerpt from The Possessed shows: v ètu nesčastnuju nedelju ja vynes 
mnogo toski—’I suffered a great deal during that unhappy week’. When 
making such changes, they can use words such as ‘sadly’, ‘depressed’, 
‘dejectedly’, ‘worried’, ‘miserable’, etc.
A case apart is special types of usage (possibly, special lexical meanings) 
of the word toska in such expressions as toska po rodine or toska po ušedšim 
godam molodosti and also in cases when the connotation of skuka9 
comes to the fore. The expression toska po rodine is usually translated by 
‘homesickness’, while the word skuka is rendered with the word ‘boredom’ 
or the verb ‘to bore’.
At the same time, some translators choose unusual equivalents, and this 
may be considered their individual stylistic trait. For example, Franklin 
Abbott in his translation of Ivan Turgenev’s short story Asya renders 
the expression toska po rodine as ‘enthusiasm towards my country’, where 
the connotation of strong desire comes to the fore (such a translation may 
seem odd to some speakers of English though).
Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky’s translation of Mikhail 
Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita (also included in the RNC) is 
particularly interesting in this context. The word toska is one of the key 
words of this novel (with 17 occurrences). The translators, sticking to 
the formal equivalence approach, and as hardliners of this approach, 
consistently render it as ‘anguish’, although its meaning clearly shifts in 
some cases. The word ‘anguish’ is a fairly imprecise equivalent of toska. 
It is no coincidence that in the English–Russian subcorpus of the RNC, 
Russian translators seldom translate ‘anguish’ by toska, preferring words 
with the connotation ‘pain, torment, suffering’.10
9  Note that toska may be directly opposed to skuka. As a character in Dostoyevsky’s The Possessed 
said, Toska ne skuka (in Constance Garnett’s translation, ‘Sadness is not dullness’).
10  Note that, in one of her translations, Garnett renders the word toska by the same word 
throughout. I am referring to Chekhov’s short story Toska (included in the RNC). Here, this emotion 
is at the centre of attention (in this short work, the word occurs six times, not counting the title), and 
a variation of translations would have disrupted the author’s intentions. Garnett translated the story’s 
title as Misery, and this is also the translation that she gives in five cases out of six. In the remaining 
case, she slightly changes the syntactic structure and uses the related adjective ‘miserable’.
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It should be said that small shifts also occur when translators take the 
meaning approach. In each individual case, they have to decide (assuming 
that they correctly understand the original text) what implicit aspects of 
meaning can be sacrificed and what aspects are important for the meaning 
of the phrase or the text as a whole. These shifts help us to see where the 
specificity of the language-specific expression lies.
2. Language-specific expressions 
in translations into Russian
The appearance of language-specific expressions in translations may seem 
paradoxical. After all, if a text is translated, then it should express only 
the meanings that were present in the original text, whereas language-
specific expressions, as we know, express a configuration of meanings that 
are specific to a given language (in our case, the target language, that is, 
Russian). Language-specific expressions used in translated texts may be 
separated into two classes: discourse markers, for which there are usually 
no immediate equivalents in the original text and which seem to arise 
‘out of nowhere’; and autosemantic units that usually formally correspond 
to some expressions in the original text yet contain additional meaning 
components that are implicitly present in the original text. Let us examine 
these cases separately.
2 .1 . Discourse markers in the target text
Speaking of discourse markers that can be used in the target text, it is 
useful to distinguish between cases in which the discourse marker has 
to be employed in the Russian translation of a foreign text and cases 
in which the use of the discourse marker in the Russian translation is 
at the translator’s discretion. In the former case, one must identify the 
characteristics that make it necessary to use a given discourse marker; in 
the latter, one should examine the characteristics that incited the translator 
to use a given discourse marker, although it was possible to do without it.
In Levontina and Shmelev (2005), we introduced the notion of the 
‘pragmatic necessity’ of a particle. We are referring to a situation in which 
the absence of a certain discourse expression engenders a false implicature 
or violates the coherence of the text without leading to grammatical error. 
For example, the particle ešče that is described in the aforementioned article 
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is pragmatically obligatory in one of its meanings that is implemented 
in the future context: Ja ešče vernus’ (this—and not simply Ja vernus’—
would be the most natural translation into Russian of the Terminator’s 
phrase ‘I’ll be back’). Depending on the context, this meaning may be 
implemented as a threat or, conversely, as a consolation.
Here are a few conditions for the use of the particle ešče in this sense:
1. There exists a different hypothesis about how things will turn out; in 
many cases, the phrase containing the particle ešče begins with the 
conjunction ‘no’.
2. The event that one is speaking about will not occur immediately after 
the moment of speech (the phrase My ešče pogovorim ob ètom is often 
used to cut short a conversation on a given subject).
3. At the time of speaking, the situation is developing in such a fashion 
that it does not suggest the predicted outcome in any way.
The use of the particle ešče is necessary if a person is obliged to refrain 
from doing something at the present time (or if they were unable to do 
what they wanted) and consoles themselves by the fact that this is not 
definitive and that the situation may change some time in the (possibly 
distant) future.
On the other hand, the use of ešče is impossible if the utterance specifies 
a  condition for a situation to occur, as this contradicts the meaning 
implied  by ešče that ‘at the present time, nothing indicates that this 
situation will occur’: Stučite, i (*ešče) otvorjat vam ‘Knock, and it shall be 
opened unto you’.
When the conditions for the use of the particle ešče with the meaning 
considered here are fulfilled, it almost inevitably appears in Russian 
translation, although it has no equivalent in the original text 
(some examples are given in Shmelev and Zalizniak (2017)).
Another example of a pragmatically necessary particle that is quasi-
automatically (and, most likely, unconsciously) used by translators is the 
‘emphatic’ particle že. Examples of the usage of že in Russian translation 
are quite numerous (I should emphasise that I am not speaking here of 
the particle že in an ‘identifying’ sense, i.e. in such collocations as tot že, 
takoj že, tam že, etc.).
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The interrogative particles razve and neuželi are also close to being 
pragmatically necessary; they have been examined by numerous linguists 
(e.g. Apresjan 1980: 51–52; Bulygina and Shmelev 1982, 1987; Baranov 
1986). Bulygina and Shmelev (1982, 1987) described the particles razve 
and neuželi as follows:
Razve p?
I previously thought that not p
Now I see or hear something that could not be true if not p
I want you to tell me whether p or not p
Neuželi p?
I thought that p is impossible
Something makes me think that perhaps p
I’m telling you that I have trouble believing that p
I want you to tell me whether p or not p
The material of the English subcorpus of the RNC confirms this 
description on the whole: the particles in question are used with a high 
degree of likelihood in Russian translations of questions in which the 
aforementioned conditions are met, although the original texts contain 
only general questions without particles of any kind (some examples are 
cited in Shmelev 2015).
An example of discourse markers that are used in Russian translations 
at the translator’s discretion is the aforementioned particle avos’ (and 
also nebos’). With regard to avos’, one should say that it seldom occurs in 
translation, which is undoubtedly linked to the fact that it is gradually 
disappearing from the Russian language and that most native speakers 
disapprove of the attitude that it conveys. Nevertheless, certain translators 
use it occasionally. In particular, it is sometimes used when the original 
contains a word that indicates hope (this word itself may be omitted in 
the translation).
The word nebos’ occurs a lot more frequently in Russian translation. 
However, the use of nebos’ is never the only possible solution: one can 
always use a different modal marker, even if it is not entirely identical 
stylistically: naverno, dolžno byt’, dumaju, verojatno, etc. All the 
occurrences of the discourse word nebos’ in translation pertain to informal 
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speech. In literary translations, the word nebos’ occurs almost exclusively 
in direct or free indirect speech. However, informal speech is a necessary 
yet not a sufficient incentive for using nebos’. The parallel subcorpora of 
the RNC show that nebos’ is used in contemporary Russian in situations 
when a  speaker voices a confident assumption (usually with a note of 
familiarity or contempt) based on their experience that allows them to pass 
a judgement on things about which they have no direct information. The 
word nebos’ also has a parallel usage in which the speaker mentions reliably 
known facts that show that someone’s behaviour was silly, inconsistent 
or hypocritical. On the whole, these data make it possible to formulate 
a more precise description of the conditions that allow the appearance of 
the word nebos’ in contemporary Russian discourse.11
An example of an autosemantic language-specific expression used in 
Russian translations is the word toska, which was examined in the first 
part of this chapter. It turns out that this word is not all that rare in 
translations into Russian. This naturally leads us to ask about the factors 
responsible for the appearance of the word toska in Russian translations, 
as we know that the English language has no word or expression for which 
this word would be a precise equivalent.
The list of words and expressions that are translated as toska partially 
coincides with the list of English translations of this Russian word: 
‘distress’, ‘depression’, ‘despair’, ‘anguish’, ‘grief ’, ‘agony’, etc., as well as 
‘sadness’; however, the word toska often corresponds to other words as 
well.12 For example, some translators regularly use it to translate the word 
‘melancholy’ (which also occurs in English translations of Russian texts, 
yet more often as the equivalent of grust’, pečal’ or even melanxolija). In 
some cases, toska corresponds to ‘nostalgia’ although the Russian word 
nostagia is a more common equivalent.
The study of the incentives that lead Russian translators to use the word 
toska often reveals important aspects of the semantics of this word; indeed, 
the most important aspect is often the overall context in which one speaks 
about this emotion.
11  For a further discussion of the words avos’ and nebos’ in the parallel subcorpora of the NRC, see 
Shmelev (2017).
12  In a few (rare) cases, the word toska is used to translate the word boredom.
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The word toska often appears when the original speaks about a strong 
desire for something. It can be used as an equivalent not only of the word 
‘yearning’ but also (no surprise) of the word ‘longing’, for example:
(3) the world of longing and baffled common-sense
mir nastojčivoj toski i nedoumevajuščego rassudka
The object of desire is sometimes well defined, yet this is not the most 
typical context of the usage of the word toska in translation:
(4) I don’t think I ever in my life, before or since, felt I wanted mustard 
as badly as I felt I wanted it then.
Nikogda v žizni, ni prežde, ni potom, ja ne ispytyval takoj toski po 
gorčice, kak v tu minutu.
The word toska is most often used when the desire is vague and poorly 
defined (the subject has trouble saying exactly what they want). This is the 
most common context of the use of the word toska in translation:
(5) A sort of undefined longing crept upon them.
Kakaja-to smutnaja toska napala na nix.
(6) It caused him to feel a vague, sweet gladness, and he was aware of 
wild yearnings and stirrings for he knew not what.
Bèk ispytyval kakuju-to smutnuju radost’, i bespokojstvo, i bujnuju tosku 
nevedomo o čem.
In certain cases, the object of desire turns out to be variable, while the 
feeling of toska stays constant:
(7) She longed and longed and longed. It was now for the old cottage 
room in Columbia City, now the mansion upon the Shore Drive, 
now the fine dress of some lady, now the elegance of some scene.
Ee snedala toska, toska, toska. Ona toskovala to po staromu domiku 
v Kolumbii-siti, to po osobnjakam na naberežnoj, to po izyskannomu 
plat’ju, zamečennomu na kakoj-to dame, to po krasivomu pejzažu, 
brosivšemusja ej v glaza dnem.
In addition, the word toska often corresponds to a vague and ill-defined 
emotion that can be designated by such words as languor.
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Toska frequently implies that the subject feels lonely:
(8) I felt so lonesome I most wished I was dead.
Takaja napala toska, xot’ pomiraj.
(9) … Dorothy built a splendid fire that warmed her and made her feel 
less lonely.
… Doroti razožgla bol’šoj koster, vozle kotorogo bystro sogrelas’ i zabyla 
uže podstupivšuju k serdcu tosku.
(10) He wanted to be alone—to be lonely.
Emu xotelos’ byt’ odnomu, otdat’sja svoej toske.
(11) During these days he got immensely lonely.
V èti dni ego gryzla toska.
(12) But he felt lonely.
No na duše u nego byla toska.
(13) fear and loneliness goaded him.
podstreknuli strax i toska.
This emotion is sometimes not even explicitly designated in the English 
original, which uses descriptive constructions such as broken heart, sinking 
heart or sinking of heart:
(14) Jane will die of a broken heart
Džejn umret ot toski
(15) … I felt a sinking in my heart.
… toska snova sžimala mne serdce.
When the original speaks of a morose or despondent state of mind (e.g. it 
uses such words as gloom, mope or simply excruciating feelings), translators 
tend to describe this state with the word toska:
(16) The gloom which had oppressed him on the previous night had 
disappeared …
Toska, ugnetavšaja ego noč’ju, rassejalas’ …
(17) I gazed on it with gloom and pain.
Ja smotrela na nego s nevyrazimoj toskoj.
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In general, when the original describes some bad feelings, Russian 
translators often use the word toska. The latter often appears when the 
original speaks of a subject’s unsatisfied desire. This desire may be vague 
and not well understood and, in any case, it usually cannot be satisfied. 
We see that this largely conforms to the description of the semantics of 
toska given by Anna Wierzbicka. Data from the parallel English–Russian 
subcorpus of the RNC show that another aspect may be added to this 
description: the subject is unable to tell anyone about what they feel. 
This impossibility may stem from the vague and ill-defined nature of the 
emotion itself or from the solitude of the subject.
In most cases, the choice of the word toska is not the sole possible solution. 
Nevertheless, its usage by translators seems indicative.
With regard to the word toska and its English equivalents, one should 
also mention V. Apresjan’s incisive article (2011), which conjectures that 
the closest English equivalent of the Russian word toska is ‘blues’ (it even 
formulates a semantic invariant of toska and ‘blues’). Nevertheless, it is 
notable that real translations (in particular, the translations included in 
the RNC) virtually never use the word ‘blues’ for toska,13 while ‘blues’, 
even when it is an emotion rather than a shade of colour or a musical 
genre, is rarely translated as toska (Nadezhda Volpin in her translation 
of Galsworthy renders ‘blues’ by zelenaja toska, changing the colour, 
amusingly enough: ‘… this country will give me the blues’—… èta strana 
nagonit na menja zelenuju tosku).
As we see, the analysis of the occurrence of such words as toska in Russian 
translations helps to verify their descriptions or make the latter more precise 
and is thus an effective research tool. The translation of language-specific 
words is a problem that the translator, as a rule, reflects on, and thus the 
translator’s individual preferences play a great role in the solution of such 
problems. Moreover, the translator’s grounds for choosing a  particular 
solution may be superficial understanding, the influence of bilingual 
dictionaries or even the desire to give the translated text a  veneer of 
‘foreignness’ to make the reader perceive the text as a translation (Mihailov 
2005: 381); consider the notion of foreignisation in Venuti (2008). 
Thus, when the original language is Russian, the parallel corpus often 
gives us insufficient information about the semantic specificity of Russian 
13  In general, its frequency with reference to an emotion is much lower than that of toska, and this 
itself reduces its serviceability as a translation.
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language-specific lexical units. In contrast, the appearance of language-
specific words in a translation most often results from an unconscious 
decision of the translator that reflects their spontaneous speech activity. 
By studying why a translator uses a given language-specific word, we are 
often able to uncover some of the latter’s semantic characteristics that 
went unnoticed during the analysis of original texts.
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‘Sense of privacy’ and 
‘sense of elbow’: English 




As Anna Wierzbicka repeatedly pointed out, in different societies people 
not only speak different languages, they use them in different ways 
(Goddard and Wierzbicka 1997; Wierzbicka 2003). These differences 
have the potential to cause many problems in mutual comprehension, 
and create breaks and even conflicts in intercultural communication. 
To  understand and explain these, it is necessary to explore the links 
between particular ways of speaking and culture.
There are hundreds of possible definitions of culture. Hofstede suggests 
a metaphorical one, defining it as ‘the collective programming of the 
mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people 
from others’ (Hofstede et al. 2010: 6). Every person carries within him/
herself patterns of thinking, feeling and acting that are acquired through 
socialisation. These patterns are encoded in language, which is the most 
concrete constituent of culture, and made manifest in communication.
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
422
To see the logic of culture-specific modes of linguistic interaction and the 
systematic interconnectedness of language, culture, cognition  and 
communication, it is important to look deeper at semantics, which 
contains rich information about culture and its values. Vocabulary is 
a very sensitive index of a culture. As Sapir stated, ‘no two languages are 
ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same reality’ 
(Sapir 1929: 214). Goddard and Wierzbicka (1995) note that ‘there are 
enormous differences in the semantic structuring of different languages 
and these linguistic differences greatly influence how people think’ 
(1995:  37). They call culture-specific words ‘conceptual tools which 
reflect a society’s past experience of doing, and thinking about things in 
certain ways; and they help to perpetuate these ways’ (ibid.: 58).
To identify, and account for, differences in cultural logic that are encoded 
in language, the study of words denoting social categories and types of 
relationships in a society is particularly important, as through them one 
can understand how people interact (e.g. Ye 2004, 2013; Gladkova 2013). 
In this chapter, the focus is on the notions of distance and closeness in 
Russian and English languages and cultures, and their manifestations 
in language and communication.
Accepting the fact that neither culture nor language represent a completely 
homogeneous structure, I believe that in comparative studies it is legitimate, 
indeed unavoidable, to speak of certain generalised characteristics of 
a  culture, and identify dominant features of the communicative style 
of its representatives. Following Wierzbicka (2006a), for the English 
language and culture the term Anglo is used, which comprises the main 
varieties of English, though the data refer mostly to British English and 
British culture.
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how knowledge of cultural values, 
key words and cultural scripts methodology developed by Goddard and 
Wierzbicka (Goddard 2006; Goddard and Wierzbicka 1995, 1997, 2004; 
Wierzbicka 1992, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2003, 2006a, 2006b; see Gladkova 
and Larina 2018 for a recent discussion of the approach) enables us to 
observe the systematic interconnectedness of language, culture, cognition 
and communication, and see the logic of culture-specific modes of 
linguistic interaction. The focus is limited to Anglo values of distance 
and privacy (Paxman 1999; Fox 2003; Wierzbicka 2006a, 2006b) and 
Russian values of closeness and solidarity (Larina, Mustajoki et al. 2017; 
Wierzbicka 1997, 2002, among many others). The chapter gives a brief 
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overview of manifestations of these values at different linguistic levels, 
and illustrates their impact on communicative styles. For data collection, 
both primary and secondary sources were used. The primary data were 
obtained through observations, questionnaires, interviews and the parallel 
corpora of the Russian National Corpus (RNC).1
Summing up the results of the previous comparative studies of British and 
Russian politeness and communicative styles (Larina 2009, 2013, 2015), 
as well as observations of other scholars (Wierzbicka 1997, 1999, 2002, 
2006a, 2006b; Paxman 1999; Shmelev 2002; Fox 2003; Belyaeva-Standen 
2004; Gladkova 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Visson 2013; Zalizniak et al. 
2012; Zalizniak 2013 among others), the chapter attempts to show that the 
idea of closeness/unity/association is encoded in the Russian language at 
different levels, and forms the ‘we-identity’ of its speakers, while the English 
language, in contrast to Russian, emphasises the idea of individuality and 
contributes to shaping ‘I-identity’ (Larina and Ozyumenko 2016; Larina, 
Ozyumenko et al. 2017). These preferences in individual- vs group-
orientation are observed in communication: they define an understanding 
of (im)politeness, explain a lot of features of the modes of interaction and 
shape communicative ethnostyles (Larina 2009, 2015).
2 . Distance vs closeness in Russian 
and English languages
In different cultures, the notions of ‘distance’ and ‘closeness’ vary. 
As Wierzbicka notes, ‘in Anglo-Saxon culture distance is a positive cultural 
value, associated with respect for autonomy of the individual. By contrast, 
in Polish it is associated with hostility and alienation’ (Wierzbicka 1985: 
156). The same could be said about Russian culture, where distance is 
often perceived as indifference. The value of distance in Anglo cultures, 
and the value of closeness in Russian culture, can be observed in English 
and Russian languages at all levels.
1  The Russian National Corpus is available at: www.ruscorpora.ru/en/.
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2 .1 . Lexicophraseological level
At the lexical level, the English word privacy is a vivid example. Privacy 
is a quintessentially English notion that Paxman (1999) calls ‘one of the 
defining characteristics of the English, one of the country’s informing 
principles’ (1999: 117–18). A truly comparable word for ‘privacy’ doesn’t 
exist in other European languages such as French, Italian or Polish 
(Paxman 1999: 118; Wierzbicka 2003: 47), nor does Russian have one. 
Nowadays, young people have started using the expression lichnoye 
prostranstvo (‘personal space’). However, what the size of this space is, who 
can enter it and who cannot, differ a lot in Russian and Anglo cultures.
In the Russian language and culture, where proximity, solidarity and 
interdependence are traditionally valued, privacy is a lexical and ideological 
lacuna that creates difficulties in translation. Depending on the context it 
can be translated in different ways. The adjective private, in many contexts, 
also lacks absolute equivalents. Even when there might appear to be a similar 
word in Russian, the words can differ in connotative meaning. Consider, 
for example, the phrase private person. While in English, this is a neutral 
expression that denotes a person who ‘likes being alone, and does not talk 
much about his thoughts or feelings although he spends a  lot of time in 
the public eye’ (as per Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English), its 
Russian translation equivalents—zamknutyy, zakrytyy, skrytnyy, nelyudimyy, 
neobshchitel’nyy—carry a negative connotation, which indicates that 
Russians prefer openness, company, interaction and contact.
The notice Private (No admittance) on doors is translated into Russian 
as Postoronnim vhod vospreschion (according to the New English–Russian 
Dictionary) ‘Strangers are forbidden to enter’.2 As a cultural concept, 
Privacy can be viewed as lichnoye prostranstvo ‘personal space’—a personal 
zone where nobody is allowed to intrude, but in other contexts privacy 
and private are translated into Russian descriptively. The fact that there 
is no equivalent for privacy in Russian and other languages is significant. 
As Triandis (1994) claimed:
For important values all cultures have one word. When you see 
that many words are needed to express an idea in one language 
while only one word is used in another, you can bet that the idea 
is indigenous to the one-word culture. (Triandis 1994: 6)
2  Nowadays it has been gradually replaced by Tol’ko dlia personala ‘Staff only’.
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Wierzbicka, who in many of her works calls privacy the most important 
feature of modern Anglo society (Wierzbicka 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 
2006c), emphasises that, in modern usage, privacy is not ‘a descriptive 
but an ideological term’ (2006c: 26). Indeed, it is symptomatic of an 
ideology, a world view, a way of life or type of relationship; it establishes 
norms and rules of behaviour, shows how people relate to each other and 
how they interact.
A memorable example, which shows that communication between 
members of Anglo culture is based on the observance of distance and 
demonstration of respect to privacy, is the expression ‘sense of privacy’:
(1) He was conscious of her in every respect, yet she was not an intrusion 
on him or his inbred sense of privacy, and there was no awkwardness 
between them. (B. Bradford)3
Russians would normally struggle to understand what sense of privacy might 
be. It is difficult to translate it into Russian, and that is not surprising as 
instead of sense of privacy, Russians have a sense of elbow, which means that 
there is always someone by your side eager to support.4 Examples (2–3) 
illustrate its importance in Russian culture:
(2) … postoyannoye chuvstvo loktya—blizost’ vernogo tovarishcha, krepkiy 
druzhnyy kollektiv.
… a constant sense of elbow—the closeness of a faithful companion, 
a strong friendly team. (RNC)
(3) … yey nuzhno chuvstvo loktya, oshchushcheniye, chto ona ne odinoka, 
chto ryadom yest’ podderzhka i pomoshch’, togda ona gory svernet 
i nichego boyat’sya ne budet
… she needs a sense of elbow, the feeling that she is not alone, that there 
is support and help next, then she will turn mountains and nothing she 
will not be afraid of. (RNC)
These two opposite senses—sense of privacy and sense of elbow—
manifest differences in the distance characteristic of the cultures in 
question, different types of social relations and modes of interaction. 
3  It is worth noting that example (1), taken from the novel by B. Bradford To Be the Best, describes 
the relations between husband and wife.
4  In English ‘a sense of elbow’ has a different connotation. It would refer to using one’s elbows to 
create a space around oneself.
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These expressions testify to the importance of observing distance in Anglo 
culture and the admissibility, even the desirability of closeness and contact 
in Russian culture (see section 3, below).
The idea of closeness and community in Russian can be observed in the 
semantics of the words obscheniye ‘communication’, iskrennost’ ‘sincerity’, 
sochuvstviye ‘sympathy’, sostradaniye ‘compassion’, dusha ‘soul’, gosti ‘guests’ 
and zastolye and their derivatives that do not have absolute equivalents 
in English (Wierzbicka 1992, 2002; Shmelev 2002; Gladkova 2010a, 
2010b; Zalizniak et al. 2012; Zalizniak 2013).
Gladkova (2007) gives some interesting examples, pointing out:
Russian seems to be able to conceptualise the idea of common 
activity much more readily than English. One needs just one word 
to say how many people are doing something together as a whole. 
(2007: 142)
Hence, it is possible to do something vdvoem ‘two people together’, 
vtroem ‘three people together’, etc. On the other hand, the typical Russian 
expression delat’ chto-to za kompaniyu (lit. ‘to do something for the sake of 
the company’) can be perceived by the English-speaking world as a lack 
of initiative and overdependence (cf. Gladkova 2007: 142).
It is interesting to note that different types of relations between friends 
and different expectations in Russian and Anglo cultures can be 
explained through the semantics of the words friend and drug and their 
derivatives (see e.g. Wierzbicka 1992; Richmond 2009; Zalizniak et al. 
2012; Gladkova 2013; Visson 2013; Ponton 2014; Ozyumenko and 
Larina 2018). Evidence supports Wierzbicka’s semantic model for the 
explication of drug ‘friend’ in the Russian language (1999: 350), which 
shows that druzya (friends) are people who know each other very well, 
spend (or want to spend) a lot of time together, talk a lot with each other, 
can say anything to each other, share their thoughts and feelings, trust and 
help each other if needed. In English only the phrases ‘true friend’ or ‘best 
friend’ carry these connotations.
Numerous proverbs also testify to differences in the conceptualisation of 
friendship in Russian and Anglo cultures and different levels of closeness 
between friends (e.g. Ozyumenko and Larina 2018).
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2 .2 . Morphosyntactic level
The morphosyntactic level also provides numerous instances of how 
language can either ‘associate’ or ‘dissociate’ people. For reasons of space, 
these must be limited to a few examples.
The prefix so- (co-) serves for the formation of nouns and verbs, denoting 
a common or joint participation in something. Not many of them have 
English equivalents: sozhitel’ ‘room-mate’, souchastvovat’ ‘participate’, 
sochuvstvovat’ ‘sympathise’, sostradaniye ‘compassion’, sozhalet’ ‘feel sorrow’. 
The prefix obsche is another example. It carries the general meaning of 
association and collectivity: obshcheizvestniy fakt ‘a well-known fact’, 
obshcheprinyatyye normy ‘generally accepted norms’ (for more details see 
Larina 2009: 84–85; Larina, Ozyumenko et al. 2017: 116).
The pronoun everybody is an example showing that the English language, 
in contrast to Russian, tends to emphasise individuality. In English 
it is singular, while in Russian everybody has two equivalents: kazhdiy 
(singular), while most often it is vse, which is plural and corresponds to 
the English pronoun all:
(4) Everybody is here –
Vse zdes’ (lit.: All are here)
(5) Hello everybody
Vsem privet (lit.: Hello to all)
There is a number of set phrases commonly used in daily interaction that 
demonstrate the preference for the use of we in Russian phrases and I in 
their English equivalents, although this is not exclusively the case (see 
Larina, Ozyumenko et al. 2017).
Some examples:
(6) My znakomy? (‘Are we acquainted?’)
Do I know you? (personal observation)
(7) Uvidimsia (‘We will see each other’)
(I shall) See you. (personal observation)
(8) My s drugom khodili vchera v teatr
(lit.: ‘We with a friend went to the theatre yesterday’)
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As one can see in (6–8), the Russian ‘I’ and the other (you or s/he) can be 
transformed into ‘we’, while the English language emphasises a person’s 
individuality, and the ‘I’ and ‘you’ or s/he do not turn into ‘we’.
The same idea of unification can be seen in the expression u nas (preposition 
u + pronoun we in Genitive case):
(9) My brother and I have similar tastes. 
U nas s bratom pokhozhiye vkusy. (RNC)
It has also the meaning of place (lit. ‘at us’), and lacks a literal equivalent 
in English. Depending on the context, it can mean ‘in our family/flat/
school/university/workplace/city/country’ and even ‘on our planet’. 
The analysis of the Parallel Corpus shows that u nas ‘at us’ correlates with 
English here/in this place/in this country:
(10) Do you think you’ll like it here? 
Vy uvereny, chto vam ponravitsya u nas?
(11) It was long ago, very long ago, but the tale is still remembered, and not 
only in this place. 
Eto bylo davno, ochen’ davno, no istoriyu etu pomnyat, i ne tol’ko u nas.
Referring to what is happening in Russia, the Russians would say u nas 
‘at  our place’ or v nashey strane ‘in our country’ associating themselves 
with  it. In English, in a similar situation, the expression in this country 
would be used, which construes some distance. Recently, some Russian 
politicians and public figures have also started using in this country, 
referring to Russia. However, this is not just a borrowing from the 
English language, but an ideological expression marking those who 
oppose themselves to their country. Wierzbicka observed an identical 
peculiarity in the Polish language, saying that the Polish expression ten 
kray ‘this country’ used with reference to one’s own country ‘would mark 
the speaker as a psychological émigré’ (Wierzbicka 2003: 49).
The examples given in this section, among many others (e.g. Larina 
and Ozyumenko 2016; Larina, Ozyumenko et al. 2017), show that 
manifestations of the values of closeness in Russian and distance in 
English can be observed at different linguistic levels.
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3 . Distance and closeness 
in communication
To shift the focus to communication I shall now provide some illustrations 
of how the values, discussed above, impact modes of interaction and 
shape communicative ethno-styles. Before we consider the manifestation 
of distance and closeness in communication, it is worth noting that there 
is a clear relationship between verbal and non-verbal communication; 
cultural values, as has been said, manifest themselves in a variety of ways. 
Richmond (2009), among others, observes that closeness and physical 
contact with other people are much more common in Russia than in the 
West. Russians stand very close when conversing, ‘they do not hesitate to 
make physical contact—touching another person and invading another 
person’s space’ (Richmond 2009: 118). As argued by Brosnahan (1998), 
Russians are closer in all of the four parameters of distance suggested by 
Hall (1959)—intimate, personal, casual and public. Too much contact or 
proximity, typical of Russian culture, is viewed by Americans as intruding 
on a person’s privacy or even as a threat (Visson 2013).
Given the insignificant spatial distance maintained by Russians, the 
absence of a zone of personal autonomy—privacy (or its minimal, in 
comparison with the English counterpart)—largely determines the 
Russian style of verbal communication. In many contexts, Russians put 
pressure on their interlocutor, give advice even when this is not asked 
for, defend their opinions, argue, ask private questions, feel free to 
interrupt, interfere with the conversation, and so on (cf. Larina 2009, 
2013; Visson 2013). In other words, they demonstrate a significant 
degree of closeness in verbal contact. In many contexts, such behaviour 
is completely permissible and is considered not as a violation of the rules 
of politeness, but rather as demonstration of involvement and interest. 
In Anglo culture, the most influential social and communicative rules are 
those concerned with the maintenance of distance—that is, privacy. The 
value of privacy encourages people to follow strict norms to protect their 
right to autonomy, and demonstrate respect for the independence and 
personal space of every individual.
The norms involved in these processes have been described in terms of 
maxims (Leech 1983) and politeness strategies with the claim of their 
universality (Brown and Levinson 1987). Wierzbicka and Goddard 
propose a new methodology—cultural scripts—for articulating cultural 
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norms, values and practices. They do so in terms which are ‘clear, 
precise, and accessible to cultural insiders and to cultural outsiders alike’ 
(Goddard  and Wierzbicka 2004: 153). The scripts are formulated in 
simple language and, as my teaching experience confirms, are extremely 
useful in cross-cultural education and intercultural communication.
Here I will confine discussion to the script that refers to privacy and 
personal autonomy in English, and demonstrate its importance in 
explaining English vs Russian communicative differences.
[people think like this:]
when a person is doing something
it is good if this person can think about it like this:
‘I am doing this because I want to do it
not because someone else wants me to do it’. (Goddard and 
Wierzbicka 1997: 156)
These four lines express the essence of Anglo communicative culture, and 
explain many culture-specific characteristics and dominant communicative 
features. The script shows that Anglo emphasis on personal autonomy 
prevents anyone saying, directly, what another person should do. Instead 
of direct imperatives, addressee-oriented whimperatives Could you/would 
you/would you like, etc. are used to avoid putting pressure on others 
(Wierzbicka 2006b). These restrictions not only apply to requests but 
to all speech acts with the meaning ‘I want you to do this’. Even when 
the speaker urges the addressee to act in his own interest (in invitation 
or advice), the indirect expression of motivation is preferable in English 
communication.
In the next section, I provide a brief comparative analysis of the speech 
acts of invitation and advice based on the results of the previous study 
of English and Russian politeness and communicative styles using the 
Discourse-Completion Task (DCT) method (Larina 2009, 2013), and 
thus contextualise the above discussion.
3 .1 . Invitation
The speech act of invitation exhibits clear tendencies towards either group 
orientation (in a Russian context) or individuality (in Anglo) that cause 
serious misunderstandings in intercultural interaction. A typical invitation 
in the Anglo culture tends to be expressed in the form of a  question 
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focused on the willingness of the addressee to accept it. This shows respect 
to the addressee’s personal autonomy and his/her right to make a choice 
independently.
Some examples (from personal observation):
(12) Why don’t you join me for lunch?
(13) I’m just going to the cinema. Would you like to come along?
(14) I was wondering if you’d like to come over for dinner next Sunday. 
If you have other plans, please don’t worry.
We can observe here, once more, the emphasis on the individuality 
of both parties in the interaction: inviter and invitee.
However, in the Russian linguacultural context such invitations would 
not be appreciated, for two reasons: (a) they lack any evidence that the 
inviter sincerely wishes the invited to accept the invitation, especially 
when an option is given (see example (14)); (b) there is no real evidence 
of the desire to ‘do something together’.
The appropriate formula for (12–13) in Russian would be a direct 
invitation with the imperative form and an emphasis on common activity 
(15–16):
(15) Davay poobedayem vmeste (‘Let’s have lunch together’)
(16) Davay skhodim v kino. (‘Let’s go to the cinema’)
Interrogative invitations are also possible, though they may sound more 
like a suggestion and, in the case of rejection, another option would be 
suggested:
(17) Mozhet, skhodim v kino? (lit. ‘Perhaps, we shall go to the cinema?’)
In the comparative study (Larina 2009) in the situation ‘inviting a friend 
for a birthday’, none of the English informants (out of 70) used the 
imperative, while among Russians (of the same number), imperative 
statements amounted to 24 per cent:
(18) Prikhodi ko mne na den’ rozhdeniya (‘Come to my birthday party’)
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The results of the study showed that the most frequent conventional 
invitation in English (60 per cent) features the willingness of the addressee 
to accept the invitation:
(19) Would you like to come to my birthday party?
(20) How do you fancy coming out on Saturday night for my birthday?
Russian speakers preferred declarative utterances (56  per cent) with 
a performative verb ptiglashayu ‘I invite’ (21), or expression of positive 
attitude towards the expected acceptance of the invitation (22):
(21) U menia v subbotu den’ rozhdeniya. Ya tebia priglashayu. (‘I have 
a birthday on Saturday. I’m inviting you.’)
(22) U menia v subbotu den’ rozhdeniya. Ya budu rad, yesli ty pridesh’. 
(‘I have a birthday on Saturday. I’ll be glad if you come.’)
Interestingly, while English speakers focus on the desire of the invitee, 
Russian invitees may be faced with a fait accompli, or pushed to come, 
which in Russian sounds quite normal when people are in a close 
relationship:
(23) U menya v subbotu den’ rozhdeniya. Zhdu. Otkazy ne prinimayutsya. 
(‘I have a birthday on Saturday. I expect you to come. Refusals are 
not accepted.’)
Although some of the Russian informants (20 per cent) used the question 
form for an invitation, it was mostly not a question of the willingness 
or ability of the addressee to accept the invitation—Ty smozhesh priyty? 
(‘Can you come?’), but rather whether s/he would come or not: Ty pridiosh? 
(‘Are you coming?’)
3 .2 . Advice
Advice is another speech act that demonstrates the importance of keeping 
distance in Anglo culture and the acceptability of contact and solidarity 
in Russian communication.
Despite the fact that advice is mostly aimed at the interests of the addressee, 
in Anglo culture generally it can be regarded as violation of the interlocutor’s 
independence and personal autonomy, and the imposition of the speaker’s 
will. The most ‘dangerous’ type of advice, in this respect, is unsolicited 
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advice, which is given by a speaker on his/her own initiative, without any 
request from the listener. The old English proverbs say: Give not counsel or 
salt till you are asked and Keep (save) your breath to cool your porridge.
In Russian culture, advice is traditionally perceived not as an invasion of 
personal life, but as involvement and desire to help. It is given out of the 
best of motives, without fear of infringing the interests and freedom of 
the interlocutor, who normally understands the good intentions of the 
adviser. This is reflected in Russian proverbs and sayings that urge careful 
listening to advice and following it: Vsyakiy sovet k razumu khorosh (‘Every 
piece of advice is good’), Lyudey ne slushat’ – v dobre ne zhit’ (‘If one does 
not listen to what people say, one will not live well’), Odin um khorosho, 
a dva luchshe (‘One mind is good, but two minds are better’). It should be 
noted that nowadays the attitude of Russians towards advice, especially on 
the part of young people who want to be more independent, is becoming 
less tolerant, yet the traditional views still prevail in many cases.
The results of the studies show that attitudes to unsolicited advice in 
Russian culture are quite positive. As argued by Belyaeva-Standen (2004), 
who studied this speech act in Russia and the USA, 75 per cent of Russian 
informants in her study noted that they are ready to listen to unsolicited 
advice if it is useful, expressed in a friendly manner and offers a convincing 
solution to the problem (2004: 313). By contrast, the overwhelming 
majority of Americans believe that ‘it is not good to give unsolicited 
advice’, ‘this must be avoided under any circumstances’ and that it might 
be acceptable only if it was necessary to warn the listener of a real danger 
or unpredictable mishap (ibid.: 315). The British also consider unsolicited 
advice unacceptable particularly when offered to a  stranger, while the 
Russians in some situations give advice willingly and quite directly. In the 
situation used in our experiment (‘It’s very cold. A strong wind is blowing. 
There is a child without a hat at the bus stop.’), 90 per cent of the British 
informants (out of 70) replied that they would not say anything: None of 
my business/It’s not acceptable to advise unknown people, even a child, while 
95 per cent of Russian informants considered it permissible to advise a 
child to put on a hat, raise a hood, and some of them were eager to offer 
their scarf (Larina 2013: 203).
A few examples of these situations from personal observation:
(24) Vy zachem sumki v rukakh derzhite. Postav’te na skameyku. Tyazhelo 
ved’. (lit: ‘Why are you holding the bags in your hands? Put them on 
the bench. It’s hard to hold them.’) (at the bus stop)
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(25) Zaydite pod naves. Promoknite. (lit: ‘Go under the awning. You may 
get wet.’) (at the bus stop)
(26) U vas shnurok razvyazalsya. Zavyazhite. Mozhete upast’ (lit: ‘Your 
string is untied. Tie it. You could fall over.’) (in the street).
It is important to note that, though all these instances of advice were given 
imperatively, they do not sound as imposing as their English translations 
do, as the speaker used a polite vy-form addressing the hearer.
Although unsolicited advice to strangers is not a conventional practice in 
Russia, especially in big cities, it is not uncommon to be a recipient of such 
advice in everyday situations, which demonstrates that Russians are not 
very vigilant in guarding personal autonomy and may very easily shorten 
distance, and which shows their involvement with other people’s affairs 
and willingness to help. The perception of advice and its appropriateness 
greatly depend on various contextual factors including the situation, 
gender, age of the advice-giver and its recipient as well as intonation and 
other verbal and non-verbal characteristics. Nevertheless, even if they 
sound intrusive they are normally accepted by Russians with tolerance, 
if not with gratitude, as the positive motive of the speaker is obvious.
The results of the comparative analysis (Larina 2009) as well as personal 
observations show that, in conversation with friends and family members, 
giving advice is also much more typical of Russian culture in comparison 
with Anglo culture, where there are significant restrictions on this speech 
act. It is performed rarely, with numerous softeners and mostly in the 
form of opinions (27–28). The Russians give advice to those whom they 
know more willingly and in many cases quite directly (29–30).
(27) You look tired. I think you should go to bed.
(28) If you’re fed up with your job, perhaps you should change it.
(29) Ty vyglyadish’ ustavshey. Idi spat’. (‘You look tired. Go to bed’).
(30) Yesli tebe nadoyela tvoya rabota, pomenyay yeyo. (‘If you’re fed up with 
your job, change it.’)
These differences are not surprising, and again it is possible to find 
a  semantic explanation. Analysis of the definitions of the words advice 
and sovet ‘advice’ reveals their cultural specificities. In English, advice 
is ‘an  opinion that someone gives you about the best thing to do in 
a particular situation’; advise is ‘to give your opinion to someone about 
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the best thing to do’ (as per the Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced 
Learners). In Russian, sovet ‘advice’ is defined as ‘nastavleniye, ukazaniye, 
kak postupit’ ’ (‘instruction, direction of how to proceed’) (in Ozhegov’s 
Russian Language Dictionary). Accordingly, sovetovat’ ‘to advise’ means 
‘to instruct, direct how to proceed’ (‘ukazyvat’, kak postupat’). Thus, in 
English, advising means giving opinion, without inducing the interlocutor 
to follow it; in other words, keeping distance and showing respect to the 
personal autonomy of the addressee. In the Russian language, advising 
means giving instructions how to proceed, showing involvement 
and solidarity.
4 . Discussion and conclusion
Through a brief analysis of some communicative differences of Anglo and 
Russian speakers, this chapter has attempted to give some more evidence 
in support of Wierzbicka’s statement that in different cultures people 
not only speak different languages, but also use them in different ways. 
These differences are not random but systematic, prescribed by cultural 
values and corroborated by cultural logic. Cultural values that guide the 
communicative behaviour of the speakers and shape their communicative 
styles saturate language, and are manifested at all linguistic levels.
The chapter has shown that the prime Anglo values that impact 
communicative style—personal autonomy, privacy, independence—are 
based on keeping distance. They encourage speakers to keep their distance 
physically, psychologically and verbally. Dominant Russian values—
involvement, solidarity, interdependence—in contrast, are based on 
closeness and make people more available. As a result, the representatives of 
these cultures have different understandings of politeness and appropriate 
modes of interaction (for details see Larina 2009, 2015). Anglo politeness 
(at least a part of it, called Negative politeness) (Brown and Levinson 
1987) is distance-oriented. One needs to have a ‘sense of privacy’, not to 
intrude on another person’s zone of autonomy and demonstrate respect 
for it. Russian speakers, who prefer closeness to distance, instead of ‘sense 
of privacy’ possess a ‘sense of elbow’ (chuvstvo loktia); they are less vigilant 
in guarding personal autonomy and tend to express their communicative 
intention in a more direct way, which in many cases does not interfere 
with politeness. The general closeness of interpersonal relations, in the 
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Russian context, guards against this possibility. Thus the study shows that 
politeness is also a culture-specific phenomenon and people interact in 
accordance with their understanding of politeness shaped by their values.
The chapter has demonstrated that cultural values, which guide 
communicative behaviour, are embedded in language, and showed 
that manifestations of closeness in Russian, vs distance in English, 
are systematic, and can be observed in lexis, phraseology, syntax and 
communicative styles. This confirms, once again, that language is an 
ideological phenomenon, which shapes different types of identity.
The chapter has also shown that knowledge of cultural values, key words 
and cultural scripts enables us to observe the systematic interconnectedness 
of language, culture, cognition and communication, and to see the logic of 
culture-specific modes of linguistic interaction.
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On the semantics of cup
Keith Allan
Like any language, a metalanguage for semantics consists of a set of 
symbols, a set of axioms and rules for combining them into syntactically 
well-formed structures, along with a set of interpretations for these 
structures and for the individual symbols in isolation.1 Human languages 
are the objects studied in semantics, consequently, the language under 
investigation is known as the ‘object language’. The language that a linguist 
uses to describe and analyse the object language is called the ‘metalanguage’. 
The basic requirement for a metalanguage is to satisfactorily communicate 
the meaning of item eOL—that is, any expression in the object language, 
whether it is a word, a phrase, a sentence, or (perhaps) a longer text—in 
terms of an expression ‘eM’ in the metalanguage. A metalanguage is just 
another language, often an artificial and not a natural one. One important 
practical constraint on a metalanguage is that it needs to be understood 
by human beings who normally communicate in a natural language of 
which they have fluent command. If you understood neither Polish nor 
Swahili there is little point in my using Swahili as a metalanguage for 
the semantic analysis of Polish (or vice versa); for example, to say To jest 
pies means ‘Ni mbwa’ will not help you at all. Readers of this chapter 
must, perforce, know English, so we can use English as a metalanguage 
1  Anna Wierzbicka is an exceptionally brilliant scholar who, during the last half-century, has 
generated a vast quantity of excellent published work on semantics for several languages. Furthermore, 
as this volume demonstrates, she has inspired an impressive number of followers who are fine scholars 
in their own right. Although my essay is critical of some aspects of Anna’s semantic theory, it is an 
argument for a different point of view and assuredly not an attack on the high esteem with which 
Anna Wierzbicka is very properly held.
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and say To jest pies (in Polish) means ‘It’s a dog’; or we can say To jest 
pies means ‘Ni mbwa’ in Swahili, which means ‘It’s a dog’—here using 
English as a meta-metalanguage. As we see, the metalanguage is in effect 
a translation of the object language (cf. Carnap 1937: 228); in order for 
the metalanguage to be understood and used by human beings it must 
be communicable, and hence translate into a natural language. We 
must conclude that a metalanguage expression ‘eM’ used in the semantic 
definition of a natural language expression eOL will always be equivalent to 
the natural language expression through which it is interpreted.
The metalanguage is the language of a semantic theory. The principal 
function of the theory is to explain data (words, sentences) from natural 
language. The goal of the theory is to explain all the data that it was 
constructed to explain; therefore, limitations on its range need to be 
clearly stated. A theory should have predictive power insofar as it raises 
expectations about data that have not yet come to light. It is absolutely 
necessary that a theory be internally consistent. But what about its 
external relations? No theory of semantics can completely ignore syntax 
and phonology, and the ideal semantic theory will integrate with theories 
of both these components of a grammar. Semantic theory should also 
integrate with theories of pragmatics that seek to explain meaning in social 
and cultural contexts and with theories of discourse structure. A semantic 
theory should not only make useful revelations about the nature of 
human language but also about human cognition because meaning is 
often a reflex of human perception and conception. All theories, without 
exception, are abstractions from reality; so the relation of theory to reality 
‘is not analogous to that of soup to beef but rather of check number and 
overcoat’ (Einstein 1973: 294). Like any other kind of theory, semantic 
theory is developed by applying the analyst’s experience and intuitions 
to inferences drawn from occurrences of actual speech events to create 
a demonstrably rational account of their structures and causes.
‘Semantic primitives’, more recently called ‘semantic primes’, are 
the primitive symbols in a metalanguage for semantics, and their 
interpretations constitute the vocabulary of the semantic metalanguage. 
There was the search for semantic primes by Bishop John Wilkins (1668) 
in his Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language. His 
contemporaries, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole in La logique, ou 
l’art de penser (1662) (Arnauld and Nicole 1965), recognised that the 
meanings of most words can be defined in terms of others, but that 
ultimately there are some undefinable semantically primitive words. 
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In more recent times, Uriel Weinreich (1980: 50, 161, 300, 308–09) 
identified a three-step discovery procedure for a semantic metalanguage 
built upon natural language: (a) Stratify the language into a central core 
of semantic primitives whose members are definable only circularly and 
by ostensive definition such as ‘colour of the sky’ in the entry for blue. 
(b) The next stratum out uses items whose definitions contain only core 
items without (further) circularity. (c) Each more peripheral stratum uses 
items from the preceding strata without circularity. This is a goal that has 
not yet been achieved by anyone, though it is probably worth striving for.
Since before 1972, Anna Wierzbicka (see Wierzbicka 1972), influenced 
by Russian semanticists such as Apresjan (1974, 2000), has been carrying 
out this program in a cross-language context, searching for a universal set 
of semantic primitives expressed principally through the vocabulary of 
English (though see e.g. Peeters 2006).2 Goddard (1994: 12) (Principle VI) 
claims that ‘any simple proposition’ expressed in Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage (NSM) using any one natural language (e.g. English) will 
be expressible in NSM using any other language (e.g. Japanese). This 
embodies a claim that NSM is linguistically and culturally unbiased and 
that there is a heuristic or algorithm for translation, although in fact none 
has been published. The aims of NSM are consistent with what has been 
described above:
all languages share a universal core, both in their lexicon and in 
their grammar; a core which constitutes the bedrock of human 
understanding, communication, and translation. This shared core 
is like a mini-language, which can be used as a culturally neutral 
semantic metalanguage for the description of all languages, for 
the study of cultural diversity as well as the psychological unity 
of humankind, and also for applied purposes, in education and 
cross-cultural communication. (Wierzbicka 2006: 1)
Wierzbicka’s search for semantic primitives recalls the ‘Swadesh list’ 
of basic vocabulary created to plot diachronic relationships between 
unwritten languages in Africa, the Americas and elsewhere. The purpose 
of the Swadesh list was to take a pair of languages and compare 100–215 
basic lexemes to see how many are cognates (see Swadesh 1955); hence, 
one name for the program is ‘lexico-statistics’. In making the comparisons, 
2  A reviewer has commented that s/he has heard Wierzbicka remark that her original semantic 
primitives were founded on her native Polish, the language in which what became Wierzbicka (1972) 
was first composed.
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literal meanings are preferred to semantic extensions; for example, the 
body-part sense of English tongue is preferred to the sense ‘language’. 
Assuming that two languages being compared are in fact related, the 
time of divergence from a common mother language is estimated from 
the proportion of vocabulary common to both. The scale of vocabulary 
differentiation derives from studies of Indo-European languages for 
which there are historical records. The procedure is sometimes called 
‘glottochronology’. Words in the Swadesh list are basic in the sense that 
they name things likely to be common to the experience of all human 
communities, hence they fall into categories such as personal pronouns, 
interrogatives, connectives (and, if, because), locatives and locations, 
position and movement, manipulations (wash, hit, scratch), time periods, 
numerals, quantifiers, size, natural objects and phenomena, plants, animals, 
persons, body parts and substances, bodily sensations and activities, 
colours, kin and cultural objects and activities. There is clearly some 
similarity with the sets of semantic primes regularly set out in most works 
on NSM. However, the studies of semantic and lexical universals reported 
in Goddard and Wierzbicka (1994), Wierzbicka (1996), Goddard (1998) 
and many later works are not concerned with diachronic relationships, 
but with the different differential values that listemes have both within 
and across languages (a ‘listeme’ is a language expression whose meaning 
is not determinable from the meanings (if any) of its constituent forms 
and which, therefore, a language user must memorise as a combination 
of form and meaning: cf. Di Sciullo and Williams 1987).
The number of semantic primitives identified by Wierzbicka grew from 
14 in 1972 to nearly 20 in 1985, 37 in 1994, 57 in 1998 and about 
65 today.3 In addition, ‘allolexes’ of these primitives are permitted: for 
example, me for i, who and what for someone and something, thing 
for something, could for can, for for because, place for where. 
Exactly what constrains the proliferation of allolexes remains to be 
defined. And although NSM is sometimes said to be ‘language-neutral’ 
(Goddard 2001: 659), it is not. There are about 65 semantic primes 
in every language, such that there is an English NSM, a French NSM, 
a Mandarin NSM, a Tamil NSM, etc. It is claimed that the primes from 
one language correspond to those from any other language: ‘they are 
isomorphic and constitute, in effect, different variants of one language-
3  See further discussion available at: intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-
semantic-metalanguage/what-is-nsm. This informative website is maintained by Cliff Goddard and 
colleagues.
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independent conceptual system’ (Wierzbicka 2006: 3). However, NSM 
primes are compositionally and often semantically different across 
languages. Like most translated terms, the meanings show partial overlap 
rather than complete identity; for example, for NSM researchers, English 
some = French il y a … qui; English there is = French il y a. Yet French 
il y a un X qui is not equivalent to English there is some X which, 
where there is apparent translation equivalence between un and some. 
Given that French il y a occurs within two primes, surely un, the French 
equivalent to English prime one, could appear twice as well (cf. Peeters 
et al. 2006). Add to this that, in NSM, allolexes are not only tolerated but 
necessary, which makes the so-called ‘semantic primes’ more like meaning 
clusters than true primes; for example, English i and me; do, does, did; 
French tu, toi, vous; Italian tu, voi, lei, etc. Furthermore, primes are 
not independent of one another, there are several complementary pairs 
such as good~bad, big~small, near~far, above~below, before~after, 
live~die. If NSM researchers were to stick rigidly to the notion of primes, 
such opposed pairs could each be reduced by one prime (the other being 
its negation) without thereby distorting natural language any more than 
is normal for the mini-language that is NSM.4 Indeed, until around 1990, 
Wierzbicka’s meaning descriptions used a lot of other items besides the 
primes (cf. Wierzbicka 1972: 22, 26, 106). Most recent semantic analyses 
stick more closely to the primes.
Today, many NSM analyses contain ‘semantic molecules’, marked by 
a subsequent [m] (see (80–120) below for instances).
These are non-primitive meanings (hence, ultimately 
decomposable into semantic primes) that can function as units 
in  the semantic structure of other, yet more complex words …   
[S]emantic molecules must be meanings of lexical units in the 
language concerned.
From a conceptual point of view, the NSM claim is that some 
complex concepts are semantically dependent on other less 
complex, but still non-primitive, concepts. For example, semantic 
explications for words like sparrow and eagle include ‘bird’ as 
a  semantic molecule; the cognitive claim is that the concept of 
4  A reviewer disputes this, citing objections in Wierzbicka (1996). I don’t believe that there can 
be a restricted set of semantic primes such as those proposed in NSM; in my view, the number of 
semantic elements in any language is more or less the same size as its vocabulary. Furthermore, the 
proposed primes of NSM are rarely (if ever) monosemic. For instance, above is no more monosemic 
than is over in Brugman (1983), Dewell (1994), Lakoff (1987).
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sparrow includes and depends on the concept of ‘bird’. In this case, 
the relationship is taxonomic: sparrows and eagles are both ‘birds 
[m] of one kind’ (molecules are marked in explications with the 
notation [m]). (Goddard 2010: 124)
Although it is said that all semantic molecules are reducible to semantic 
primes, this has only been demonstrated for a few (e.g. Goddard 2010: 
125–130).
How do Anna Wierzbicka’s semantic analyses compare to those of scholars 
using other metalanguages? In this essay I limit myself to critiquing her 
semantics for cup in Wierzbicka (1984). The expressions used in a semantic 
representation in NSM are supposed to match those that (a) children 
acquire early and (b) have counterparts in all languages (Goddard 1994: 
12). In her definitions, Wierzbicka is deliberately anthropocentric and 
subjective, referring to the natural world of sensory experience rather than 
intellectualised abstractions. Thus, she prefers to describe red as the colour 
of blood (Wierzbicka 1980, 1990) or fire (Wierzbicka 1990, 1992a) than 
as an electromagnetic wave focally around 695 nanometres in length.
If we are trying to understand and to elucidate the intuitions of 
ordinary speakers, we cannot use in our definitions anything which 
is not independently attested to be accessible to that intuition. 
Translating colour terms into information about wavelength may 
tell us something about physiological and neurological processes 
but obviously it cannot tell us anything about the intuitive 
connections between different everyday concepts. (Wierzbicka 
1984: 235)
I propose that blue involves more than one point of reference: not 
only the sky but also water—not water from the tap, but naturally 
occurring water, that is, the water of seas, lakes, rivers, and so on. 
Roughly:
X is blue
when one sees things like X
one can think of the sky
or of places (not made by people)
where there is water
(Wierzbicka 1992b: 222–23)
This is a characteristic of cognitive semantics which I fully endorse.
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In the remainder of this essay I discuss Anna Wierzbicka’s definition of 
cup from Wierzbicka (1984: 222–24). But, because this was published 
some 35 years ago I shall also briefly discuss Cliff Goddard’s rather similar 
definition from Goddard (2011: 228–29) before considering alternatives. 
First, Wierzbicka’s semantics from 1984, to which I have added paragraph 
numbers for the convenience of discussion.
(1) cup
(2) A KIND OF THING MADE BY PEOPLE
(3) IMAGINING THINGS OF THIS KIND PEOPLE WOULD SAY 
THESE THINGS ABOUT THEM:
(4) [Purpose]
(5) they are made for people to use repeatedly for drinking hot liquids 
from, such as tea or coffee
(6) one person from one thing of this kind
(7) being able to put them down on something else
(8) [Material]
(9) they are made of something rigid, smooth and easy to wash
(10) which liquids can’t go into or pass through
(11) and which doesn’t break easily in contact with hot liquid
(12) [Appearance: top]
(13) they are rounded and open at the top
(14) so that one can drink easily from them by tipping the top part 
slightly towards the mouth
(15) without any of the liquid going outside, where one doesn’t want it 
to go
(16) [Appearance: bottom]
(17) the bottom is the same shape as the top
(18) so that they are not more difficult to make than they have to be and 
it is flat
(19) so that things of this kind can be put down on something else that 
is flat
(20) [Appearance: proportions]
(21) they cannot be much wider than they are high
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(22) so that the liquid inside doesn’t cease to be hot before one can drink 
it all
(23) they cannot be much higher than they are wide
(24) so that they don’t overturn easily when one puts them down somewhere
(25) [Size]
(26) they have to be big enough to be able to have not less hot liquid in
(27) than a person would be expected to want to drink of that kind of 
liquid at one time
(28) they cannot be too big for people to be able to raise them easily to 
the mouth full of liquid, with one hand
(29) IMAGINING THINGS OF THIS KIND PEOPLE COULD 
ALSO SAY THESE THINGS ABOUT THEM:
(30) [Use]
(31) people drink from them when sitting at a table
(32) [Use: sets]
(33) they are made and used in groups of things which look the same
(34) so that they look nice together
(35) [Use: saucers]
(36) they are made and used together with some other things
(37) made of the same stuff
(38) made for putting these things on
(39) one thing for a person to drink from, on one thing for putting such 
things on
(40) so that people can raise the things to drink from to the mouth to 
drink a little
(41) and then put them down on those other things which can be put 
down on the table
(42) those other things are similar to them in some ways so that they look 
nice together
(43) those other things are made in such a way that there can be some parts 
of them all around the bottom of the things that people drink from
(44) so that if any liquid goes down over the top of the things people 
drink from
(45) it will come onto and remain on those other things
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(46) and will not get elsewhere, where one doesn’t want it to go
(47) [Material]
(48) things of this kind are made of something thin so that they are nice 
to look at and to drink from
(49) and of something that one can’t see through
(50) so that things made of it can have pictures and patterns on them
(51) making them nice to look at,
(52) such as china
(53) [Appearance: sides]
(54) the sides are rounded, not flat
(55) so that all the sides look the same and one can’t say where one side 
ends and another begins
(56) so that one can easily hold things of this kind around with a hand 
when they don’t have any hot liquid inside
(57) the sides are not straight but roundish
(58) so that looked at from the side the opposite sides, or their upper 
parts, look like rounded lines
(59) whose middle parts are further away from one another than their 
tops or bottoms
(60) [Appearance: proportions]
(61) the bottom is smaller than the top
(62) so that if some of the liquid goes down along the outer surface of the 
thing one is drinking from
(63) it will come to the middle of the thing it is on
(64) and will not go outside that thing to where one doesn’t want it to go
(65) [Appearance: handle]
(66) things of this kind have a thin looped part for holding
(67) which sticks out from one side
(68) which doesn’t get hot
(69) because it is not in contact with the hot liquid inside
(70) this part is attached at its top and its bottom to one side
(71) so that by holding it one can prevent one part of the top from being 
above the others when one is not drinking
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(72) and so prevent any of the liquid from getting out over the top and 
going where one doesn’t want it to go
(73) this part has to be big enough and to stick out far enough for people 
to be able to raise things of this kind full of liquid for a short time
(74) holding that part with a thumb and two fingers
(75) without any parts of the hand touching the sides, which are hot
(76) it can’t be much bigger or stick out much further than necessary for 
that. (Wierzbicka 1984: 222–24)
One of the most striking things about this definition of cup is its detail and 
consequently its length (about 830 words). A second is that it includes far 
more than a vocabulary of primes. I will discuss first the detail and length 
and turn to the exoticism after exemplifying Goddard’s version, which 
sticks more closely to semantic primes and marks semantic molecules.
(2) identifies a cup as a manufactured, not natural, object. 
(3)  anthropocentrically identifies the content as cognitively real. It is 
unclear to me why (29) is needed, but apparently characteristics (30–76) 
are seen as secondary elaborations on (2–28) and, in fact, many of them 
do seem redundant. A cup’s purpose, (4–7), and the function ((30–46)) 
for which this artefact is manufactured will (at least partially) determine 
the material from which it is made, (8–11, 47–52), and its configuration, 
(12–28, 53–76). With respect to function: although it is true that cups 
are primarily for the drinking of hot liquids (which is probably why they 
typically have handles, (65–76)), cups are also used for cool and cold 
liquids and for measuring dry goods such as flour and sugar; given the 
amount of detail in Wierzbicka’s description it is surprising that such 
secondary uses are disregarded.
(8–11) identify a material necessary for containing potentially hot liquid. 
There is no mention of semantic extensions such as single use paper and 
plastic cups (which typically lack handles).
Cups are very possibly modelled on a human’s cupped hands. A typical 
cup5 holds around 250  millilitres, which is similar to the capacity of 
adult male cupped hands. A single hand cupped holds around 125 mL, 
roughly equivalent to the amount of liquid held by an espresso coffee cup 
5  I prefer the term typical to prototypical or stereotypical for reasons explained in Allan (2001: 
334–36).
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or a Middle Eastern tea or coffee cup—which is bowl-like (i.e. handle-
less). Thus, a typical cup is a hollow oblate hemispheroid6 container 
(i.e.  a  squashed half-sphere) with a flat base at the pole (its base or 
bottom) so that it can easily stand alone, open at the wide end for easy 
access by human lips to the liquid it contains. It is designed to be readily 
manipulated by the thumb and fingers of a single human hand. These 
matters of configuration are over-elaborated in (12–28). A rectangular 
cup would be atypical because impracticable, but nonetheless it could 
function as a cup, because the essential criterion for a cup is that it be 
a container for liquid with a capacity of around 250 ml.
Consequently, (31) seems to me to be irrelevant: what’s criterial for a cup 
is that it is a container that serves as a drinking vessel which can be handled 
by children as well as adults, so it must be lightweight. Whether the user is 
sitting, standing or lying in bed, is irrelevant. It is also as irrelevant to the 
meaning of cup that cups often come in sets, (32–34), as that they come 
in a variety of colours and designs—and there is (correctly) nothing said 
about those characteristics in (1–76).
(35–46) over-elaborate the significance of saucers. Typically cups in the 
West are accompanied by saucers—though Middle-Eastern cups typically 
are not. The saucer is a practical stand for a cup, etiquette favours their 
use as practical protectors of clothing and furniture from hot cups and 
dribbled liquid; they may also be used to park a teaspoon or used tea-bag. 
Mugs are typically cylindrical drinking vessels that don’t have saucers.7
(47–52) are a matter of aesthetics irrelevant to the meaning of cup. (53–64) 
are unnecessary aspects of the configuration of cups that has already been 
adequately covered in (12–28).
(65–76) identify a significant characteristic of (Western) cups: typically, 
they sport handles, (66, 67, 70, 76), to facilitate the conveyance of a cup 
of hot liquid to the mouth without discomforting the hand, (69, 75). 
Normally only the thumb and one or two fingers manipulate the handle, 
6  Both cupped hands and a single cupped hand are similar in shape to a hollow oblate hemispheroid 
(if we ignore the attached arm). A tapered mug might be described as a hollow prolate hemispheroid, 
though most mugs are cylindrical. 
7  Wierzbicka (1984) and Goddard (1998, 2011), written in response to Labov (1973), specifically 
contrast cups with mugs, which there is no space to do here, though I have done so in Allan 
(1986/2014, 2001).
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(74). Typical Middle Eastern tea and coffee cups are small enough to 
be held by the thumb and first finger, often around a rim that does not 
overheat. Typical single-use paper or plastic cups lack handles and saucers.
Let me now introduce Cliff Goddard’s semantics for cup. In Goddard 
(1998: 233) he offered a somewhat shorter version than in his revised 




(79) a. something of one kind
(80) at many times people do something with something of this 
kind when they are drinking [m] something hot [m]
(81) when someone is drinking [m] something like this, before it 
is inside this someone’s mouth [m], it is for some time inside 
something of this kind
(82) size
(83) b. things of this kind are like this:
(84) – they are not big
(85) – someone can hold [m] one in one hand [m]
(86) part for holding
(87) many things of this kind have a small thin [m] part on one side
(88) when someone is drinking [m], this someone can hold [m] this 
part with the fingers [m] of one hand [m]
(89) other parts
(90) the other parts are like this:
(91) – the sides [m] are like the sides [m] of something round [m]
(92) – they are thin [m]
(93) – the top [m] part of the sides has a smooth [m] round [m] 
edge [m]
(94) – the bottom [m] part of something of this kind is flat [m]
(95) – someone can think that the bottom [m] part is small, if this 
someone thinks about the top [m] part at the same time
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(96) material
(97) things of this kind are made of [m] something hard [m]
(98) this something is smooth [m]
(99) use sequence
(100) c. when someone is doing something with something of this kind 
because this someone is drinking [m] something hot [m], it 
happens like this:
(101) – at some time this something is in one place for some time, at 
this time the bottom [m] part is touching something flat [m]
(102) – at this time there is something like hot [m] water [m] inside 
this thing
(103) – it can be tea [m], it can be coffee [m], it can be something of 
another kind
(104) – it is inside this thing because some time before someone did 
some things because this someone wanted it to be like this
(105) – after this, someone picks up [m] this something with the 
fingers [m] of one hand [m]
(106) – after this, this someone does something else to it with the 
hand [m]
(107) – after this, because of this, part of the edge [m] at the top [m] 
of this thing touches one of this someone’s lips [m] for a short 
time, as this someone wants
(108) – during this time, this someone’s fingers [m] move as this 
someone wants
(109) – because of this, a little bit of something like hot [m] water [m] 
moves, as this someone wants
(110) – because of this, after this it is not inside this thing anymore, it 
is inside this someone’s mouth [m]
(111) – after this, this someone puts [m] this thing down [m] on 
something flat [m]
(112) – after this, this someone can do this a few more times
(113) saucer
(114) sometimes when someone is drinking [m] something in this way, 
this someone wants not to hold [m] this thing for a short time
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(115) when it is like this, this someone can put [m] this thing down [m] 
on something of another kind, in the middle [m] of this other kind 
of thing
(116) these other things are made of [m] the same hard [m], smooth [m] 
stuff
(117) they are round [m], they are flat [m]
(118) the edge [m] of something or this kind is above the middle [m]
(119) artefact status
(120) d.  many people want to drink [m] things of some kinds like this 
at many times because of this, some people make [m] things of 
this kind. (Goddard 2011: 228–29)
A few general remarks: the principal contrast with Wierzbicka’s account is 
that Goddard’s sticks much more closely to semantic primes, despite the 
extensive employment of ‘semantic molecules’ marked by a subsequent 
[m]. It is also a little shorter, 66 paragraphs instead of 76. In my view it 
is still far too long because it includes some extraneous information while 
omitting some criterial information. It is sectioned into four parts: (a), 
(78–81), identifies a cup’s primary function; (b), (82–98), describes the 
configuration of a typical cup and the material from which it is made; (c), 
(99–118), describes how a cup is used and what it is used for, then brings 
in saucers; and (d), (119–120), says the cups are in wide use and many 
are manufactured.
(78–81) identify a cup as, primarily, a vessel for containing hot liquid. 
(82–95) identify the typical configuration: a cup can be held by the 
fingers of one hand, for which reason it has a handle; it is a hollow 
oblate hemispheroid with a flat bottom. (96–98) describe the material 
from which a cup is made as smooth and hard—which doesn’t absolutely 
exclude single-use paper or plastic cups, and does recognise the character 
of a typical cup. (99–112) describes the use of cup for the drinking of 
hot liquid, mentioning that a cup is several times raised to the lips and 
lowered onto a flat surface; although commonly true, this is superfluous 
information because it has no part in defining what a cup is. (113–118) 
describes the configuration and constituency of a saucer but doesn’t offer 
a satisfactory account of its function. Finally, (119–120) says that because 
people like drinking hot liquids, cups are manufactured to that purpose.
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So, the Goddard (2011) semantics for cup is inspired by his mentor 
Wierzbicka’s earlier account and, as an exercise in NSM, greatly improves 
on it by sticking quite closely to the use of semantic primes while 
marking digressions into semantic molecules that stray from primes by 
invoking complexes of primes, though no explication of these complexes 
is presented. Wierzbicka (1984) was explicitly a refutation of Labov’s 
denotation conditions for cup (Labov 1973: 366f ), on the grounds that 
they ‘need the help of a mathematician to understand’ them and do not 
give the lexicographic meaning (Wierzbicka 1984: 207). She claims ‘the 
denotation conditions can be deduced from the meaning’ (1984: 209). 
So, let’s review Labov’s denotation conditions:
The term cup is regularly used to denote round containers with a 
ratio of width to depth of 1 ± r where r ≤ rb, and rb = α1 + α2+ … αυ 
and α1 is a positive quantity when the feature i is present and 0 
otherwise.
feature 1 = with one handle
2 = made of opaque vitreous material
3 = used for consumption of food
4 = used for consumption of liquid food




Cup is used variably to denote such containers with ratios of width 
to depth of 1 ± r where rb ≤ r ≤ rt with a probability of rt–r/rt–rb. 
The quantity r ± rb expresses the distance from the modal value of 
width to height. (Labov 1973: 366f, quoted in Wierzbicka 1984: 
206f )
Labov’s is notably succinct by comparison with the versions of Wierzbicka 
(1–76) and Goddard (77–120) and I do not find it more troublesome to 
read through than the NSM versions. An important question arises about 
the playoff between the effectiveness of a definition and its accuracy. What 
is the purpose of the semantic analysis? Who or what is the semantic 
specification that results from the analysis designed for? Wierzbicka’s 
semantic definitions are not designed to be used by machines that simulate 
language understanding. She intends them to be easily accessible to a non-
native speaker of the language. But every such reader will already know 
what a cup is, so a brief description would be sufficient. In my experience, 
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
456
students find Wierzbicka’s two-page definition of cup just as challenging 
as Labov’s denotation conditions. Consider the following ‘dictionary 





Height about equal to top diameter
Top diameter greater than bottom diameter
Artefact
Made to serve as a container from which to drink liquid. (Katz 
1977: 49)
Katz’s description is adequate, very much simpler than Labov’s ‘denotation 
conditions’, and much more succinct than Wierzbicka’s ‘semantic 
definition’ of c. 830 words.
If anything, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) is simpler still:
1. A small open vessel for liquids, usually of hemispherical or 
hemi-spheroidal shape, with or without a handle; a drinking-
vessel. The common form of cup (e.g. a tea-cup or coffee-cup) has 
no stem; but the larger and more ornamental forms (e.g. a wine-
cup or chalice) may have a stem and foot, as also a lid or cover; in 
such case cup is sometimes applied specifically to the concave part 
that receives the liquid.
But as will be seen in (121), I believe that even this august lexical entry 
does not fully specify what a cup is.
Wierzbicka and Goddard might object that the terms Katz and the OED 
use are more difficult than cup itself (which is arguably equally true for 
the semantics of cup in Wierzbicka 1984 and Goddard 1998, 2011); this 
however is irrelevant to proper statement of the meaning. The purpose of 
semantic representations is to make useful revelations about the nature 
of human language and/or human cognition. Wierzbicka has written:
An adequate definition must show fully what the word in question 
means, not what it doesn’t mean or how it differs in meaning from 
some other words which we happen to compare it with. … [A]n 
adequate definition of a word must constitute a faithful ‘portrait’ 
of the concept encoded in it. (Wierzbicka 1984: 227)
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This is inconsistent with her semantic definition of tiger (Wierzbicka 
1985: 164), where she compared tigers with cats because we see tigers 
as a kind of cat. In different terms, what Wierzbicka seems to be saying 
is that an adequate definition of what a listeme means will capture 
the intension of the listeme—which is exactly my own view. And the 
complexity of explication is unimportant provided it is accurate and 
revealing—as should be obvious from perusal of entries in the OED.
At this point it behoves me to offer my own version of the semantics for 
cup (and, like Wierzbicka and Goddard, I restrict this to the drinking 
vessel, ignoring such similarly shaped objects as acorn cups and bra cups). 
On this occasion, I use English as an informal metalanguage.
(121) cup
Hollow oblate hemispheroid vessel, flat at its pole, with a capacity 
≈ 250 ml (≈ the capacity of cupped human hands) and a vertical 
handle to facilitate drinking when held by a human’s thumb and 
one or two fingers in order to raise the vessel to the lips. Typically 
used for hot liquids. Often accompanied by a saucer to stand on. 
Middle Eastern cups typically have half the capacity of Western 
cups and, like single-use paper and plastic cups, they typically lack 
handles and saucers.
The prolixity of Wierzbicka’s and Goddard’s semantic definitions for cup 
is unjustified. Although NSM authors do not specifically create lexicon 
entries, such seem an appropriate application for the lexical analyses on 
offer—especially given that Goddard (2010: 124) writes of developing 
‘our picture of the overall structure of the lexicon’. As Alan Cruse (1990: 
396) wrote: ‘For dictionary purposes, the concept has only to be identified, 
not fully specified.’ Nonetheless, (121) is a fuller specification than in 
any of the other semantics presented for cup that I have exemplified and 
discussed, and it clearly identifies the concept of a cup. Hopefully, you, 
the reader, will agree.
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Where we ParT from NSM: 
Understanding Warlpiri 
yangka and the Warlpiri 
expression of part-hood
David Nash and David P . Wilkins
1 . Introduction
As Wierzbicka and Goddard (2018: 31) (W&G) observe, ‘NSM 
researchers have long maintained that part(s) is a universal semantic 
prime, i.e. an indefinable meaning expressible by words or phrases in 
all human languages’. In fact, ‘be a part of ’ was among the original list 
of fourteen semantic primes published in Wierzbicka’s seminal work 
Semantic Primitives (1972), and it remains among the current list of 65 
primes as a ‘relational substantive’ represented as part ~ have parts. NSM 
(Natural Semantic Metalanguage) has a strong position that all conceptual 
semantic primes of the lingua mentalis must have a corresponding lexical 
exponent in every natural language. If there were a natural language 
where part was not one of the senses of at least one word, morpheme or 
phrase of the language, then part would need to be removed from the set 
of universal semantic primes. Alternatively, NSM would need to allow 
that some conceptual primes do not have basic lexical expression in all 
languages, but are still part of the lingua mentalis.
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W&G’s search for lexification in the Australian language Warlpiri of the 
concept part has led them to the controversial conclusion that it is one 
of the senses of the non-spatial (evocative/recognitional) demonstrative 
yangka ‘that one, you know the one, the one in question’, the most common 
form in the Warlpiri corpus. W&G started from the English translations 
of Warlpiri examples relating to body parts in resources produced by the 
Warlpiri Dictionary project. They believed they could uncover the Warlpiri 
exponent of part by matching the English translations—particularly those 
that included the word ‘part’—with the Warlpiri originals. We present our 
objections to their method and analysis, situated in a discussion of how 
yangka is used in vernacular definitions in the Warlpiri Dictionary, the 
meaning of yangka and how Warlpiri does express the concept part.
W&G’s general point is this:
We seek to interrogate the material included in the Warlpiri 
Dictionary (both Warlpiri sentences and their English translations) 
to make the case that Warlpiri speakers can and do talk about 
‘parts of the body’. (W&G 2018: 32)
We agree: it hardly needs stating that Warlpiri speakers can and do talk 
about parts of the body. Our divergent view is that this obtains without 
the language having a word-for-word equivalent of ‘part of someone’s 
body’, and that the meaning part is not expressed by a Warlpiri lexeme. 
We further hold that yangka is basically monosemous, and that the 
cooperative interactional expectation encoded in its meaning licenses 
context-dependent pragmatic inferences that convey all manner of 
variously translatable concepts, of which part is just one.
W&G (2018: 32–37) provide the background to the treatment of the 
concept part within NSM studies, including previous disagreement 
concerning Warlpiri (Nash 2014). It is fair to state, however, that 
their and our joint inquiry is of wider import and does not depend on 
particulars of the NSM approach.1
1  At least since the publication of her seminal Semantic Primitives in 1972, Anna Wierzbicka has 
been indefatigable in the development and promulgation of what has become known as the NSM 
approach to semantics. We each recall fondly our encounter with Anna in her semantics classes when 
we were students at ANU, in 1974 and 1978 respectively, and share her interest in comparative 
semantics. Anyone who knows Anna knows she is up for an argument and would rather have people 
engage critically and seriously with NSM rather than ignore it. We choose to honour her and her 
achievements through just such a critical engagement.
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2. Methodological flaws in W&G’s approach
As already noted, W&G’s study is based on a correlation they noticed in 
the Warlpiri Dictionary between illustrative Warlpiri sentences about body 
parts (especially the occurrence of ‘part’ in their English free translation) 
and the word yangka. (W&G apparently did not study the other Warlpiri 
sentences whose English free translation also contains ‘part’.) Note that, 
in general, the English translations were not provided by the Warlpiri 
speakers, so ‘part’ was introduced by native English speakers in their best 
effort translation of the sense of a Warlpiri example, not as an attempt to 
reflect Warlpiri semantics.
2 .1 . Problems with purported examples of ‘part’ 
sense of yangka
Consider (1), W&G’s (2018: 12) prime example of the supposed part 
sense of yangka:2
(1) Kantumi, ngula kuyu yangka marlu. Kantumi manu yardipi
hip that animal part kangaroo hip or hip
yi-ka-rlipa ngarri-rni
aux.comp-prs-1pl.incl.sbj call-npst
‘Kantumi is what we call that part of the kangaroo which is its hip.’
(W&G’s glosses)
This example and free translation has been taken from the dictionary 
entry for yardipi ‘hip’, with interlinear supplied by W&G. The dictionary 
took the illustration lightly edited from Hale’s (1966–67: 0215) original 
transcription shown in (2) (and note our closer translation). The speaker 
uses equivalents of the word he is explaining:3
2  Abbreviations: 1 first person, 12 first person inclusive, 2 second person, 3 third person, aux 
auxiliary, comp complementiser, du dual, erg ergative, evoc evocative, incl inclusive, loc locative, 
nomic nomic, npst non-past, obj object, pl plural, poss possessive, prs present, rel relative, sbj 
subject, top topic.
3  See Appendix 24.1 for source and context.
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(2) Kantumu, kantumu ngula kuyu yangka marlu. Wawirri.
rump rump that animal/meat evoc kangaroo kangaroo
Kantumi manu yardipi yi-ka-rlipa ngarri-rni
rump or hip aux.comp-prs-1pl.incl.sbj call-npst
Kantumu, kantumu that is [used for] game animals, say, kangaroos.
‘Kangaroo. We call it kantumu (‘rump’) or yardipi (‘hip’).’
W&G comment that ‘[c]learly, this vernacular definition does not refer to 
“that kangaroo” but to “part of a kangaroo” (i.e. the hip)’ (2018: 42–43). 
But it is not clear, for two reasons: (a) kuyu yangka marlu is a prosodic 
and syntactic unit (as apparent in the audio recording), and semantically 
yangka can be construed with kuyu ‘game animal, meat’; (b) if yangka is 
construed with marlu, it can indeed mean ‘that (evoc) kangaroo’, and 
kuyu ‘meat’ could be in a part–whole apposition with marlu, so it either 
means ‘meat of the/that kangaroo’ or ‘game animals, say, kangaroos’ 
(similar to the Arrernte construction discussed by Wilkins 2000). 
As part of understanding this passage, it helps to realise that it appears 
that kantumu only applies to (game) animals and is better glossed ‘hind 
quarter’ or ‘rump’, and that the speaker isn’t defining kantumu but rather 
is distinguishing it from yardipi (and yarlipiri) as used for the analogous 
part on humans; he apparently intuits the less-common word kantumu 
is new to the interviewer (Hale). One clearly needs to understand the 
broader context of dictionary examples (and their interpretation and 
unedited origin) if they are to be used as data for other analysis.
2.2. PPJ’s definitional style not allowed for
With regard to the Warlpiri vernacular definitions of body parts that 
they are working with, W&G (2018: 38) acknowledge ‘that almost all 
these vernacular definitions are the work of a single indigenous Warlpiri 
lexicographer, the late Paddy Patrick Jangala (henceforth: PPJ)’. A key 
point is what to make of the expression ngulaji yangka, of which W&G 
claim: (i) it is not simply a definitional formula commonly used by 
indigenous Warlpiri lexicographers; (ii) though used extensively in body 
part definitions, it is not widely used in definitions of nouns of all kinds, 
being largely absent from fauna and artefact definitions; and (iii) ‘its use 
in the definitions of body-parts is sui generis, and supports the hypothesis 
of “part” as a distinct meaning of yangka’ (2018: 49).
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One of us (Wilkins) has made a close inspection of a corpus of more than 
1,500 of PPJ’s vernacular definitions, which undermines the position 
W&G take with respect to the significance of the sequence ngulaji 
yangka in PPJ’s definitions. The study reveals that it is part of an opening 
definitional formula heavily favoured by PPJ, occurring in nearly 80 per 
cent of PPJ’s 943 nominal definitions.
Two different (non-overlapping) corpora were taken from the total set of 
PPJ’s vernacular definitions for the variety of Warlpiri spoken at Lajamanu. 
The first is a corpus of 943 vernacular definitions of Warlpiri nominals, 
and the second is a corpus of 581 definitions of verbs (including basic 
verbs, preverb–verb combinations, verbs derived from nominals, etc).
PPJ’s definitions have a discernible format. To begin with, 99.5 per cent 
of all PPJ’s vernacular definitions begin:
[Definiendum] (,) ngula=ji …
[definiendum] (,) that (discourse topic)=top
So, almost all definitions begin with something translatable as 
‘[Definiendum], that’s  …’, where the word being defined is clearly in 
mention function and is being treated as the topic of the definitional 
textlet that follows.
By far the most common word to follow ngulaji in the definitional 
opener is yangka. The string ‘[Definiendum](,) ngulaji yangka …’ opens 
749 (79  per cent) of PPJ’s nominal definitions and 567 (98  per cent) 
of PPJ’s verb definitions. (Yangka is the most frequently occurring word in 
PPJ’s corpus of vernacular definitions, occurring 3,044 times.)
Clearly, ngulaji yangka is very widely used in nominal definitions, and 
body part definitions with ngulaji yangka are simply among the roughly 
80 per cent of PPJ’s nominal definitions that contain it. It is the roughly 
20  per cent of nominal definitions which don’t include yangka in the 
opening that may need explanation.
2.2.1. PPJ Definitions without yangka
There are two relevant factors which are highly predictive of the non-
occurrence of yangka in the opening of PPJ’s nominal definitions.
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First, PPJ’s earliest definitions, particularly those from 1985, are generally 
briefer relative to later definitions and have relatively fewer instances of 
ngulaji yangka in the opening. Two body part examples are his definitions 
of rdaka ‘hand; forepaw of bipedal’ and of lampurnu ‘breasts’, both from 
October 1985.
(3) Rdaka ngula=ji ka-rlipa marda-rni kardiya-rlu,
Rdaka that=top prs-1pl.incl.s have-npst whitefella-erg
yapa-ngku, marlu-ngku rdaka-jarra=ji.
person-erg kangaroo-erg rdaka-du=top
‘Rdaka, that’s what we all (inclusive) have—White people, Aboriginal 
people, kangaroos—a pair of rdaka.’
(4) Lampurnu ngula=ji ka=lu marda-rni karnta-ngku jirrama kamparru 
rdukurduku. Kuja-ka=lu=jana yi-nyi kurdu-ku wita-wita-ku 
lampurnu=ju. Ngapurlu waja.
‘Lampurnu are the two things that women have in front on their 
chests. That they feed babies milk with breasts. (Literally, Lampurnu, 
that’s what they have, women, two on (their) chest front. They give 
them to babies—that’s lampurnu, it’s the same as ngapurlu.)4’
Second, and consistent with W&G’s observation of fewer instances of 
ngulaji yangka in vernacular definitions of fauna terms (see section 2.3), 
is the fact that nominals that are hyponyms of a labelled superordinate 
are relatively more likely to have definitions in which the superordinate 
nominal appears immediately after ngulaji. For example, the 26 nominal 
definitions that begin ‘[Definiendum](,) ngulaji jurlpu  …’ all define 
kinds of jurlpu ‘birds’ (24 species terms and 2 bird life stage terms). 
Similarly, the 18 definitions that begin ‘[Definiendum](,) ngulaji 
watiya …’ overwhelmingly define terms for kinds of watiya ‘tree, bush, 
shrub’ (15  species of wooded plant; 2 descriptor or part of wooded 
plant; 1 artefact made of wood). All such cases are definitions of Warlpiri 
nominals that are concrete, non-relational, non-descriptive/predicative. 
As a corollary, nominals that are relational or non-descriptive/predicative 
or non-concrete or for which there is no obvious genus level superordinate 
terms are more likely to have definitions that include ngulaji yangka. So, 
4  Compare with PPJ’s later, parallel definition of the synonym ngapurlu, which appears as example 
(17) in W&G and opens Ngapurlu ngula-ji yangka kuja-ka-lu marda-rni karnta-ngku …
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as relational terms, it is not surprising that ‘body part terms’ are more 
likely to include yangka after ngulaji, but, as we see below, they are also 
more likely to include kujaka after yangka.
The non-occurrence of yangka after ngulaji in the opening of such 
‘taxonomic’ definitions is merely a tendency in PPJ’s corpus. For example, 
there are 15 nominal definitions that open with ‘[Definiendum](,) ngulaji 
yangka watiya …’ and 8 of these define species or types of wooded plant, 
4 define parts of a wooded plant and 3 define artefacts made from wood. 
The following examples show parallel openings for definitions of fauna 
and flora terms without and with yangka.
(5) Rdukurduku-tiri-tiri ngulaji jurlpu wita manangkarra-ngawurrpa. …
‘Rdukurduku-tiri-tiri are little birds that are found in the open grass 
lands. …[PPJ 10/85]’
(6) Lirra-lirra, ngulaji yangka jurlpu wita ngapa-ngawurrpa, …
‘Lirra-lirra is a small water bird … [PPJ 6/87]’
(7) Ngarlurrpu ngulaji watiya wita, …
‘Ngarlurrpu is a small bush … [PPJ <9/86]’
(8) Pinamparli ngulaji yangka watiya wita …
‘Sturt’s Desert Rose is a small bush … [PPJ <9/86]’
In the above examples, the translations do not show any distinction 
between definitions with and without yangka. We might propose that those 
with yangka could instead be rendered as a something like ‘X is that little 
bird which …’ or ‘X is the small bush which …’. More literally, examples 
without yangka might be rendered as ‘X, that’s a Y that …’, and those with 
yangka might be rendered as ‘X, that’s that Y which …’ (or, perhaps even 
‘X, that’s the Y which …’ or ‘X, that’s that one, a Y which …’). The critical 
thing is that the propositional meaning is not different.
2.2.2. Aside on Arrernte
It is useful to here compare vernacular definitions by Arrernte native 
speakers. These often begin ‘[Definiendum] apele nhenge  …’ The first 
element of the Arrernte opening, the particle apele, is ‘commonly used 
in identifying something or explaining what a word means’ and ‘[s]hows 
that the speaker wants to make a point of something so that the listener 
will take special note of it’ (Henderson and Dobson 1994: 179). The 
second element of the opening is the non-spatial demonstrative nhenge. 
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This demonstrative overlaps with many of the functions of Warlpiri 
yangka, including having an ‘evocative’ function. In describing the use 
of nhenge as it appears in the definitional opener Henderson and Dobson 
(1994: 501) write that it:
5a. Introduces some more information about something; (the 
one) that  …, (those ones) which  …, (the time) when  …, (the 
place) where …
Akaperte aheye-aheye apele nhenge akaperte mepepele nhenge 
atyetele aneme re.
The fontanelle is that (thing) which is in the middle of the head, 
that (thing) which is soft.
Perlape apele nhenge annge urrperle akweke mape akeme arleke-
arleke.
Conkerberries are those small dark fruit which you get from a bush.
In definitional openings, Warlpiri yangka could be interpreted as 
functioning in a way very similar to that described for Arrernte nhenge. 
As with nhenge, whether yangka is taken to be referring to a person, place, 
thing, time or event is dependent upon context (in this case, provided 
by the co-text of the definition). Ennever (pers. comm.) notes a similar 
formulaic use of the Ngardi recognitional/evocative demonstrative jangu 
in the openings of vernacular definitions.
2.2.3. Further properties of PPJ definitions
Of the 52 vernacular definitions PPJ provided for human and animal 
body parts, 34 (65 per cent) contain ngulaji yangka and 13 (25 per cent) 
contain no yangka at all. However, this does not fully represent the 
relevant opening formula. W&G neglect the fact that the openings of 
many definitions, including body part definitions, tend to include the 
auxiliary complex kuja-ka- ‘rel-prs’ after ngulaji, and following yangka 
if it occurs. In the Warlpiri Dictionary, kuja, the first element of the 
auxiliary complex, is identified as a ‘sentential complementiser’ and given 
the English glossing of ‘that, when, where, which, who, what’.
This fuller definitional opener—‘[Definiendum](,) ngula-ji yangka kuja-
ka (-pronominal enclitics)  …’—occurs in 586 (62  per cent) of PPJ’s 
nominal definitions and 555 (96 per cent) of verb definitions. It is this 
fuller construction that may more closely parallel the Arrernte opener 
discussed above. It introduces the definitional information that will allow 
the addressee to identify the unique concept/sense that PPJ is defining. 
We see ngula as referring to the word form (definiendum), yangka as 
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referring to the specific concept associated with the word form and kuja-
ka- marking a kind of ‘relative clause’ that introduces the critical elements 
for narrowing in on that concept. This opening construction basically 
says ‘attend to the following information and you’ll know the one 
I mean’. Close translations of the opener would include ‘X, that’s that one 
which …’; ‘that’s that thing that’; ‘that’s that time when’; ‘that’s that person 
who’; ‘that’s that  action which’; ‘that’s the place where’; ‘that’s the way 
(it is) when’; etc. (The exact construal is not coded in the opener but is 
dependent on the following co-text and context.)
Of PPJ’s 52 body part definitions, 30 (58  per cent) include kuja-ka 
(-pronominal enclitics) in the definitional opener, and, of these, 25 (48 per 
cent) include the full definitional opener ‘[Definiendum](,) ngula-ji 
yangka kuja-ka (-pronominal enclitics)’. As noted for yangka, kuja- in 
definitional openers occurs less in the earliest definitions. Note that the 
body part definitions of rdaka and lampurnu above don’t have kuja- but 
simply have the auxiliary base ka- in the definitional opener.
Again, the more predicative or relational a nominal is, the more likely 
a nominal will contain this full opener. More than 50 per cent of PPJ’s 
definitions of kin term nominals contain this full construction, and the 
vast majority of Warlpiri adjectival nominals contain this construction. 
Nominals that tend to have a default adjectival function (or a more 
predicational focus) typically have a stance verb in non-past tense 
immediately following kuja-ka-ø. In fact, 251 (27  per cent) of PPJ’s 
nominal definitions begin: ‘[definiendum], ngula=ji yangka kuja-ka-ø 
stance.verb-npst  …’ (‘[definiendum], that=top evoc rel-prs-3sg.s 
stance.verb-npst’) and more than 80 per cent of these definitions are of 
nominals with adjectival function. Thus, the more predicative a nominal 
is, the more it has the same kind of definitional opener as verbs.
One of PPJ’s body part definitions deviates from the standard definitional 
opening in an instructive way—it substitutes the demonstrative nyampu 
‘this; here’ where the demonstrative yangka would be expected.
(9) Pirlkiri ngula=ji nyampu kuja-ka=rlipa mardarni jimanta-rla kankarlu 
yapa-ngku manu kardiya-rlu, pirlkiri=ji. [Source: PPJ 6/87]
‘Pirlkiri is the upper part of our shoulders, what we have on top—
both Aboriginal people and whites. [Literally, Pirlkiri that’s this (one) 
that we all have at the top of our shoulder(s), Aboriginal and white 
people, that’s pirlkiri.]’
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W&G don’t discuss this example, but presumably they don’t attribute the 
‘part’ reading to the use of nyampu, which they already include among their 
Warlpiri exponents of NSM. While ‘part’ makes sense in the translation, 
it is merely deducible from the deployment of the demonstrative in 
context. Here we might expect that PPJ touched the top of his shoulder 
when dictating the definition. We have no doubt that yangka could sit in 
place of nyampu in this definition and it would literally mean something 
like ‘Pirlkiri that’s that one that we all (inclusive) have at the top of our 
shoulder(s), Aboriginal and white people, that’s pirlkiri’. Its construal as 
a ‘part’ is part of the mental deictic work which yangka contributes to.
For now, we are working on the assumption that the meaning of the 
definitional opener that includes yangka is compositional, rather than 
being an idiomatic construction. Only work with native speakers can fully 
clarify the situation.
While variations in the typical deployment of definitional openings:
from [Definiendum], ngula=ji …;
through [Definiendum], ngula=ji yangka …;
to [Definiendum], ngula=ji yangka kuja-ka …
are broadly indicative of a cline from more concrete object concepts 
through to more relational and predicative concepts, they are not 
diagnostic of semantic classes at the level of ‘body parts’ or ‘birds’. It is 
the elements that follow these formulas that get us into the territory of 
semantic fields.
Looking at PPJ’s corpus of vernacular definitions, we undertook an 
examination of statistically significant collocation relations at the sentence 
level of all the morphemes which jointly occur in at least 5 definitions, 
within at least 8 positions in either direction of one another. This allows 
us to determine any significant patterns of co-occurrence that could be 
diagnostic of semantic classes. Not surprisingly, given its high frequency, 
the occurrence of yangka does not significantly predict the occurrence 
of any other morphemes within the same sentence in PPJ’s definitions 
(not even ngula-ji or kuja-ka-).
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However, there are two significant collocations that are uniquely associated 
with body part definitions in PPJ’s corpus, both involving marda-rni ‘have-
npst’. In the first, the elements ka-rlipa ‘prs-1pl.incl.s’ and marda-rni 
‘have-npst’ occur jointly 27 times (ka-rlipa always preceding marda-rni, 
typically with nothing occurring in between). These 27 co-occurrences 
appear in 23 different definitions, all of which define body part terms. 
So, PPJ’s use of these two elements together is unambiguously linked to 
a single semantic class: ‘parts that we all (inclusive) have’.
In the second, ka-lu ‘prs-3pl.s’ and marda-rni ‘have-npst’ occur jointly 
16  times (ka-lu always preceding marda-rni, typically with nothing 
occurring in between). These 16 co-occurrences appear in 15 different 
definitions, 12 of which are definitions of either gender-specific or animal-
specific body part terms—parts that they have.
Recognising the importance of marda-rni ‘have’ in the Warlpiri definitions 
of body parts, W&G (2018: 46) propose two similar exponents of part 
for Warlpiri NSM: yangka ~ yangka mardarni ‘part ~ have parts’. 
They argue that mardarni ‘to have’ ‘is one of the formal features which can 
help distinguish yangka “part” from yangka “that, the one”’ (2018: 46). 
However, we take it as instructive that PPJ’s earliest definitions of body 
parts did not use yangka or kuja-, but did use the pronominal clitics -rlipa 
‘1pl.incl.subj’ or -lu ‘3pl.subj’ on the auxiliary base ka- along with the 
verb marda-rni ‘to have’. He had not fully developed his opening formula, 
but he had identified his criterial features for the genus-level statement of 
the class: ‘that which we all (inclusive) have’ and ‘that which they have’. 
It is these collocations that are truly sui generis for body part terms. Nearly 
one-third of PPJ’s body part definitions that include marda-rni do not 
include yangka, and since PPJ did not define body parts one after another 
(unlike W&G’s false suggestion), there is no reason to believe there was 
any particular local discourse factors that would predict omission.
We can summarise our observations regarding PPJ’s dominant pattern 
for starting definitions for the body part domain in the diagram in 
Figure 24.1.
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Opening formula:
[Definiendum](,) ngula=ji (yangka) (kuja-) ka- 









pirlirrpa ‘spirit; life force’
rdaka ‘hand’
‘that’s (that one) (which) 
we all have’ [identifies parts all 





ngirnti ‘1. tail; 2. penis’
‘that’s (that one) (which) they 
have’ [identifies gender-, age-, 
and animal-specific parts]
Figure 24.1. Dominant pattern for starting body part definitions in PPJ.
Source: Authors’ summary .
The diagram only accounts for the beginning of body part definitions: 
the definitional opening formula followed by the semantic field identifier. 
Following this are the statements of differentiae that identify individual 
parts. These may include specifying particular possessors, localising the 
part with respect to other parts, identifying the function of the part and/
or quantifying and describing the size of the part. Our main purpose, 
however, has been to show that W&G’s claims regarding yangka (more 
specifically ngulaji yangka) do not hold for the extensive corpus of PPJ’s 
vernacular definitions. Our claim, therefore, is that PPJ does not use 
anything that immediately translates as ‘part’; instead he makes a possession 
statement using ka-rlipa or ka-lu with mardarni ‘have’ which, along with 
specific spatial location and/or function statements, define referents in 
the so-called ‘body part’ domain. More precisely, PPJ uses mardarni to 
indicate the possessive relation between humans and/or animals and any 
of their immediate subparts.
2.3. Flaw when comparing definitions across 
semantic domains
W&G (2018: 46, note 9) do recognise that definitions have been 
contributed by Warlpiri people other than PPJ:
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Since so many of the vernacular definitions originate with PPJ, 
it is possible that other Warlpiri speakers may have alternative 
definitional strategies, or different preferences so far as the balance 
between the two yangka constructions described in Sections 6 
and 7 are concerned.
W&G could have applied this cautionary note later when considering 
how the use of yangka in definitions varies across semantic domains:
the sequence ngulaji yangka is not widely used in the definitions 
of nouns of all kinds. When we inspected 50 randomly selected 
entries in the Warlpiri Dictionary’s ‘fauna domain’ we found that 
only two of them used ngulaji yangka. Of these, one was clearly 
used in the sense of ‘like’ and the other in the sense of ‘that, the one’. 
By contrast, in our collection of 64 body-part entries as many as 
19 include the sequence ngulaji yangka, with yangka almost always 
indicating a particular part of the body. A similar sampling exercise 
with words from the ‘manufacture domain’ produced parallel 
results, i.e. in most of these definitions an opening yangka had the 
sense either of ‘like (when)’ or ‘that, the one’. (W&G 2018: 48)
The correlation is more with PPJ as definition author: definitions in the 
fauna and manufacture domains were mostly created by other Warlpiri 
speakers. Hence we disagree with W&G’s (2018: 49) inference that
while the sequence ngulaji yangka can indeed be found in many 
parts of the Warlpiri Dictionary, its use in the definitions of body-
parts is sui generis, and supports the hypothesis of ‘part’ as a 
distinct meaning of yangka.
As shown above (section 2.2), the sequence ngulaji yangka is part of an 
opening definitional formula heavily favoured by PPJ and its use in body 
part definitions is not sui generis.
In the version of the dictionary consulted by W&G, there are 385 entries 
in the ‘Fauna: kuyu’ domain. Of these, 205 entries contain one or more 
vernacular definitions which define a species or kind (of ‘fleshy fauna’). 
Of these 205, PPJ provides vernacular definitions for 46 (22 per cent), 
a much smaller proportion than in the domain of body parts, and his 
definitions all begin, ‘[Definiendum], ngulaji …’ and 9 of these include 
yangka after ngulaji. That is, 20 per cent of PPJ’s fauna definitions begin 
‘[Definiendum], ngulaji yangka …’. Only one other definition of a species 
or kind in this domain contains ngulaji yangka [yilyinkarri, HN0279]. 
Only two further vernacular definitions for species or kind in this domain 
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contain ngulaju yangka, unsourced. So, of definitions not sourced to PPJ, 
only about 2 per cent contain ngulaji yangka or ngulaju yangka. Thus, 
while PPJ does (for reasons explained) use ngulaji yangka less in vernacular 
definitions for ‘Fauna: kuyu’, he still uses it much more than the other 
contributors to the domain. W&G’s methodological error in their fauna 
study was to not distinguish PPJ’s definitions and to presume that other 
definers use the same locution. In non-PPJ fauna definitions, the most 
common opener includes karnalu ngarrirni (prs-1pl.excl.sbj tell-npast 
‘we call it’) (49 examples, with the most common being ‘[Definiendum], 
karnalu ngarrirni …’).
Another misapprehension is about the order in which PPJ chose words 
to define:
The word palka ‘body’ occurs in some definitions, but it is mostly 
omitted since the indigenous lexicographer is, presumably, 
composing several definitions one after another so it is understood 
that the context is about parts of the body. (W&G 2018: 46)
Actually, PPJ usually proceeded with groups of phonologically similar 
words, often from alphabetical lists of words beginning with a particular 
sound; and even when defining words from the same semantic domain 
he would repeat the parts of the definition in common, so that each 
definition could stand alone.
2 .4 . Spurious correlation
As Wierzbicka (2008) has observed, the concept colour is not lexicalised 
in Warlpiri. Inspection of the vernacular definitions of particular Warlpiri 
colour terms often include yangka, and their English translation of the 
definition uses the word colour, as in these examples:
(10) Tiri-tiri ngulaji yangka yalyu-yalyu, kujaka ngunami  yurlpu
red that evoc red which lies red.ochre
manu karrku yalyu-yalyuju, tiri-tiriji. [PPJ 10/85]
and red.ochre red red
‘Tiri-tiri is like red, like the colour of red ochres. (or, Tiri-tiri that’s 
that red, how yurlpu and karrku ochres are red, (that’s) tiri-tiri.)’
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and
(11) Puyurr-puyurrpa, ngulaji yangka kujaka nyinami warna
grey that evoc which sits snake
kunjuru-kunjuru, yangka kunjuru-piya. [PPJ 6/87]
smoke-smoke(grey) evoc smoke-like
‘Puyurr-puyurrpa is like a grey snake, one that is (coloured) like 
smoke.’
By a reasoning parallel to that used by W&G to infer that yangka has 
a  sense part, one could also infer that yangka has a sense colour. 
Instead W&G (2018: 41–43) use such examples to claim that yangka has 
yet another sense, ‘like’, and so take yangka to also be a Warlpiri exponent 
of NSM’s prime like.
2.5. Poor fit with NSM theory
The NSM framework includes these standard combinatorial possibilities 
of part:5
part of someone’s body; this part, the same part, another part, this 
other part; this something has two/many parts
Apart from the first of these, W&G do not show how yangka could be 
used to express these phrases. If they had been right about yangka, then 
it would only have been in one context of use, and until a demonstration 
is made about the exponents (allolexes) that are used for the other 
combinatorial contexts, Warlpiri stands as a language for which the NSM 
equivalent of part ~ have parts is to be discovered. One allolex in one 
context does not make an NSM prime.
The wide range in Warlpiri of contextual translation equivalents for the 
part meaning is to be measured against NSM’s Strong Lexicalization 
Hypothesis (Goddard 1994a: 13), which has from its inception been 
compromised in its application by allolexy and purported polysemy. 
5  Chart of NSM semantic primes, version 19 (12 April 2017). Available at: intranet.secure. griffith.
edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/346033/NSM_Chart_ENGLISH_v19_April _12_2017_
Greyscale.pdf.
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W&G postulate polysemy of yangka in particular to meet the requirement 
for lexical expression of part. We prefer the monosemic bias (until forced 
to polysemy), following Ruhl (1989), and indeed another NSM tradition:
One assumes to begin with that there is but a single meaning, and 
attempts to state it in a clear and predictive fashion, in the form of 
a translatable reductive paraphrase. Only if persistent efforts to do 
this fail is polysemy posited. (Goddard 2000: 132)
3. Other difficulties for W&G’s account
This section describes some hurdles for W&G’s account; these are not 
complete obstacles, but rather are considerations which should give pause.
First, it is significant that a part sense has remained unnoticed by 
lexicographers and translators. No Warlpiri wordlist or dictionary has 
associated yangka with a sense of part, including the two lexicons compiled 
independently of the main dictionary used by W&G.6 Further, yangka has 
not been used to express part in published translations (see section 5).
Next, consider the equivalent of yangka in related languages. Ennever 
(2018: 177) discusses recognitional/evocative demonstrative jangu (and 
yangka) in Ngardi, a western neighbour of Warlpiri. McConvell (2006: 
112, 117) mentioned Warlpiri yangka in his comparative discussion of 
demonstratives as complementisers. He pointed out parallels in other central 
Australian languages: Arrernte nhenge (Henderson and Dobson 1994) and 
Pitjantjatjara/Yankunytjatjara panya (Goddard 1996: 124–25);7 there is 
also Anmatyerr nheng (Green 2010: 447–48) and Kaytetye wenhe (Turpin 
and Ross 2011: 633). Their detailed dictionary entries of these equivalents 
6  The Swartz lexicon (available at: ausil.org/Dictionary/Warlpiri/lexicon/index.htm) has yangka 
‘aforementioned one, same one mentioned before’; Reece (1975) has yangkaṛi ‘another time, another, 
other one’, yangkakurra ‘to the same place’.
7  ‘1. that, “you know the one”. Calls the listener’s attention to the fact that he or she is already 
familiar with the thing being referred to (generally something not explicitly referred to so far) … 2. 
Used as an introductory particle to present the following clause as an explanatory comment; can 
often be translated as “because”  …  3. Used as a hesitation particle while groping for something 
to say’; and Goddard (1983; quoted by Himmelmann 1996): ‘It is not usually used about things 
which are fully topical— ie already being talked about, but rather to re-introduce something into 
the conversation … Actually, panya ANAPH does not presuppose an explicit mention in previous 
discourse, but simply that the addressee be able to call to mind the intended referent’.
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give no hint of a part sense, nor a plausible bridging context that would 
semantically link part and a non-spatial recognitional demonstrative sense. 
McConvell (2006: 116) observed a parallel with Walmajarri yangka:
GMSCs [general modifying subordinate clauses] appear to be 
formed mainly with the complementizers yangka in Eastern 
Walmajarri and with yangkakaji in other dialects. Yangka is also 
a demonstrative which is both evocative and anaphoric—‘that 
one known to both speaker and hearer or previously referred 
to’ and the related complementizer also retains at least part of 
that meaning according to the Walmajarri dictionary—‘when 
(something we both know about happens)’ (Richards & Hudson 
1990: 307). … The meaning of the demonstrative yangka is similar 
to Nash’s ‘evocative’ and Himmelmann’s ‘recognitional’ previously 
referred to.
More broadly, consider that a lexical gap for part has been noted in some 
other languages. Generally, Enfield et al. (2006) observe that an equivalent 
to part was not immediately available in several of the 10 languages they 
examined, and that instead various kinds of possession and location 
constructions were used in place of partonomy statements. Significantly, 
in Casagrande and Hale’s (1967) seminal work on Papago folk definitions, 
not one of the 800 definitions specifically encoded a part–whole relation 
and the authors merely suggested it as a potential semantic relation despite 
its absence from their data.
W&G cite two languages that seem at first to lack a word with the sense 
part, but in which, on a closer look, part has been found as a sense 
of a word with other senses. First, Goddard (1994b: 255–56) discerned 
have parts as a sense of the Yankunytjatjara nominal suffix -tjara ‘having’8 
(and made no suggestion of the panya mentioned above). Second, W&G 
(2018: 50–51) claim a precedent in the Papuan language Koromu, citing 
Priestley (2017):
8  Goddard (1994b: 256) associates the suffix with the nominal stem tjara, which he also glosses 
as ‘part (of )’, but it is not clear that tjara has the sense part required to be an exponent of the NSM 
prime. The entries in his dictionary (Goddard 1992: 147) have the stem tjara with a somewhat 
different meaning ‘divided, apart, spatially separated’. In Pintupi/Luritja, another dialect of the 
Western Desert Language, Hansen and Hansen (1991: 141) define tjarra as ‘forked stick; divided; the 
fork where branches protrude from the trunk or other branches’, and the combination tjarra kutjupa 
‘branch; another subject; lit. “another fork”; can be used literally to refer to the fork of a tree branch 
or creek tributary; can be used figuratively of a change in subject matter under discussion’.
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What is particularly interesting in the present context is that one 
of the main exponents of part in Koromu is a demonstrative, 
somewhat like the situation in Warlpiri. (W&G 2018: 51)
We would agree with the parallel with Warlpiri, but for a different reason: 
in our view the demonstrative does not have a second sense but rather it 
can function pragmatically to convey the part concept. Note that earlier, 
Priestley (2008: 173, 149) had described the demonstrative mo ‘this/here’ 
and the quantifier asao ‘some (some others) [also ‘part’]’ without polysemy.
4 . The meaning of yangka
Warlpiri yangka has been taken to be a recognitional demonstrative, of 
the type described by Himmelmann (1996: 230), though as we elaborate 
below, this does not capture the range of uses. Yangka, the most common 
word in the Warlpiri corpus, mostly occurs absolutely; the next most 
common occurrence is with some enclitic (notably focal -ju) or suffix, 
and there are relatively few occurrences with a nominal suffix. It seems 
that (absolute) yangka can be omitted from (most?) utterances without 
a  change in the ‘coded’ or ‘propositional’ meaning, as exemplified in 
section 2.2.1. Also, note the various paradigmatic/non-co-occurring sets 
that involve yangka: it rarely occurs in the same noun phrase as nyampu 
‘this’, yali ‘that’, or other demonstratives (see example (9), in section 2.2.3).
The recognitional component of the meaning of yangka is well-suited for 
use in interaction. However, yangka is also not uncommon in written 
Warlpiri, as witness its occurrence in nearly a hundred of the Warlpiri 
booklets in the Living Archive of Aboriginal Languages (LAAL).9 Here is 
one example in the middle of a written story (Napaljarri and Jakamarra 
1976: 5):
(12a) Yuka-ja karnta yangka=ju janganpa-jangka=ju.
enter-pst woman evoc=top possum-from=top
(12b) Karnta nyanungu=ju yuntardi nyayirni.
woman he/she/it=top beautiful very
9  Available at: laal.cdu.edu.au/search/?q=all:yangka&f[]=language:450808&o=dd&amp;mode=.
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The first sentence refers to a woman who has been mentioned in preceding 
sentences. In (12b), the referent of yangka is taken up (after a direct speech 
clause) by the determiner nyanungu, pronominally definite and translated 
by ‘the’.
In interactional contexts, yangka could colloquially be glossed ‘you know’, 
as when the speaker is searching for a word or talking about something 
for which there is not an easy expression. Bromhead (2009: 217–19) 
shows how this English expression has arisen in the last few centuries. 
The meaning of the English near-equivalent you-know-what has been 
explicated by Enfield (2003: 107) as:10
you-know-whaT
something
I don’t want to say the word for this thing now
I don’t say it now because I know I don’t have to
by saying you-know-whaT I think you’ll know what I’m thinking of
An explication of Warlpiri yangka can be based on the last line of Enfield’s 
explication. We can allow that, depending on further contextualising 
information, the concept that would be called up by yangka could be 
part, with the conceptual primitive nevertheless still not lexicalised. There 
is a close equivalence also with Cutfield’s (2012: 383) analysis of Dalabon 
kanh: ‘what the speaker is appealing to is not a prior mention or shared 
knowledge per se, but the addressee’s deductive capacity … the speaker is 
not merely saying “you know what I’m talking about”, but rather “you can 
work out what I’m talking about”.’
5 . Expressing ‘part’ in Warlpiri
Warlpiri has various ways of expressing the part concept or translating 
English part (of ), including: the part–whole construction (Hale 1981), 
the use of coverb quantifier puta ‘incompletely’ and nominals such as 
10  Note the Lao near-equivalent (Enfield 2003: 110) shares with Warlpiri yangka the possible lack 
of an expression for the relevant notion:
qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’
something (happens/is the case)
I don’t know how to say what I’m thinking of
by saying qan0-nan4 (‘that thing’) I think you’ll know what I’m thinking of
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ngalya-kari (which W&G 2018: 21 mention in relation to some), and 
in some contexts rdilyki-kari ‘a broken-off bit’, or larrakari ‘piece, split 
off bit’ (‘part, half ’, Reece 1979: 120). The verb marda-rni ‘to have, 
hold’ has a wide range, which can translate ‘have as a part’ and many 
other concepts, but not as a distinguishable sense as far as we can discern 
(see section 2.2.3 and footnote 11). And, as for Yankunytjatjara -tjara, it 
would have to be demonstrated as a polysemous sense of the form, since 
expressions for ‘with’ (comitatives) could be proposed to have have parts 
as a sense, although, (for example) a person with brothers or sisters is ‘with 
something’ but a sibling is not a part of a person. Nash (2014: 84–85) 
discusses part and side in defining certain Warlpiri kinship meanings.
It is instructive to consider how English part has been translated into 
Warlpiri. Several substantial texts have been translated into Warlpiri in 
collaboration with trained Warlpiri translators. The largest of these is the 
Warlpiri Bible, two key passages of which are presented in Appendix 24.2, 
to which the reader is referred for the circumlocutions around part, and 
also the absence of yangka as its translation. Two other translations we 
have checked are that of the short children’s novel Storm Boy (Thiele 
1963) and of a manual on troubleshooting ignition systems (Granites and 
Shopen 1987). The former has no instance of part but has a few instances 
of bit in a sense like part. The only one clearly translated is
(13) It had a dirt floor, two blurry bits of glass for windows 
(Kindle Location 31)
Kaninjarniji kala ngunaja walyajuku kanunjuju purluwu-wangu. 
Wintawu-kuju ngulaju kirlajijarra ‘Inside there was no floor just dirt 
on the bottom. For windows two bits of glass’ (our back-translation)
The addition of -jarra ‘two’ on kirlaji ‘glass’ favours the countable entity 
reading, whereas the unmarked sense of Warlpiri nouns covers mass or 
property readings, consistent with their ability to be predicates as well 
as forming individual referring expressions.11
11  We thank Mary Laughren for helpful discussion of this point.
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The English original of the troubleshooting manual has several instances 
of part, as one would expect in instructions about mechanisms. A couple 
do show a potential translation equivalent of part, notably jintakari 
jintakari ‘one by one’ construed with the plural pronominal enclitic =jana 
object of mardarni ‘have’ in:12
(14) 24. The primary circuit has the following parts, starting with 
the battery:
24. Wirlinyi parnka-ngu jinta-ngku ka=jana
24. day.trip run-nomic one-erg aux.prs=3.pl.obj
marda-rni jinta-kari jinta-kari, pirilyi-ngirli:
have-npst one-other one-other charcoal-from
6 . Conclusion
W&G went looking for ‘part’ quite literally, presuming that the uses of 
the English word part in translations of Warlpiri sentences in the Warlpiri 
Dictionary would yield a Warlpiri counterpart of the NSM prime 
part. They thought they had found it in the form of the demonstrative 
yangka, used primarily in the vernacular definitions of the native Warlpiri 
lexicographer, Paddy Patrick Jangala. We have shown that a close look at 
PPJ’s definitions and definitional style doesn’t support their hypothesis. 
Keeping to a monosemic bias (until forced to polysemy), we argue that 
uses of yangka in definitions is consistent with its use as a demonstrative 
elsewhere—directing the addressee to use context and co-text to bring the 
speaker’s intended referent to mind. In section 4, we suggested directions 
an NSM-style definition of yangka might take, indicating that a ‘part’ 
interpretation is a consistent pragmatic deduction by the addressee in 
certain contexts, but is not what yangka is coding. However, we also 
12  This use of mardarni ‘have’ to predicate an entity’s possession of an inherent corporeal or non-
corporeal part also occurs in definitions of terms for birds and for meat animals and elsewhere. In fact, 
more than half of the 91 occurrences of mardarni across PPJ’s 943 nominal definitions are in this 
function, despite it being listed as the fifth, and last, sense of the verb in the Warlpiri Dictionary. 
Though still glossing this function as ‘have’, the dictionary states for this sense: ‘Definition: Y is part 
of X’. However, it appears that X can only be a term for the complete being of which Y is a part, 
it cannot itself be a part. This is consistent with the dictionary’s example sentences for this sense. It is 
not that mardarni ‘have’ is the Warlpiri reflex of part; possession is clearly the relevant notion.
MeANiNG, LiFe AND CULTURe
482
identified the more widespread and consistent resources Warlpiri speakers 
use when discussing part-relations. In the process, we hope we have helped 
NSM refine some of its methodological assumptions and approaches.
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Appendix 24 .1
The source of W&G’s example in (1), equivalent to our (2), derives from 
Hale (1966–67: 0215) in a ‘Check on Lander River vocabulary vis à vis 
Yurntumu’; field tape 2.32, 1:00:57 to 1:01:29 of AIATSIS (Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies) archive recording 
Hale_K01 499A. The corresponding audio excerpt (SJJ-kantumu.wav) 
is available at: cloudstor.aarnet.edu.au/plus/s/BemyHVBPfXvuwk3/
download. The speaker, Sam Johnson Japangardi, has used kantumu in 
the immediately preceding part of the interview (defining palkarni ‘scarce, 
last supplies of, precious, indispensable’), in this context:
Kuyu yalumpu—wanarri jinta, ngulalu panungku muurlpa 
pajika—palkarni. Yapangka panungka yangka. Panupuru yapapuru. 
Kultu kajilpajana panukariki yungkarla, manu yangka wanarrikari 
jintakari, o jurrurlangu, ngurljurlangu, manu kantumu, yardipi 
yangka kantumu karlipa ngarrini, muurlparlulu nganja palkarni. 
Panukurnajana muku-yungu, kala yalumpu wanarri jinta, ngulalu 
nyurrurlapaturlu palkarni nganja. Wiyarrparlu. Jintajuku. Jipirri 
yangka panungku. Ngulajuku.
‘That meat—one upper leg, you lot cut it carefully—it’s the last 
one. That’s for many people. (Shared) among many people. He 
would give the ribs to many others, and that other upper leg, or 
the head for example, the ribs too, and the rump, the hip we call 
kantumu, you lot eat the last one carefully. I gave it to all of them, 
but that one upper leg, you lot eat that one, it’s the last. Poor 
things. Just one. Many (people) jointly. That’s it.’
Sam continues his explanation of kantumu:
Jirrimaja. Kala yapa yardipi, ngulaji yardipi. Yarlipiri. Jirrima. 
Karlipanyanu ngarrini jirrimayijala. Yardipi, yarlipiri. Ngulajuku.
‘We have two names for it. As for people, it (hip) is (called) yardipi 
or yarlipiri. We call that part of ourselves by two names as well: 
yardipi and yarlipiri.’ (translation in dictionary)
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Appendix 24 .2 . ‘ParT’ in the Warlpiri Bible
There are two passages in the Warlpiri Bible where the concept of part 
is central to the message. Consider how the Warlpiri Bible translation 
expresses these two passages (Matthew 5:28–30 and 1 Corinthians 12:12–
27; from The Bible in Warlpiri, with our back-translation).13 In short, there 
is no particular lexeme expressing the notion of body part, but rather it is 
evoked in context by listing a few. Yangka doesn’t appear in these Warlpiri 
translations, but the comitative -kurlu and the verb mardarni variously 
predicate the relation between the body and its parts (and the privative is 
used to predicate part absence).
Matthew 5:28
(King James version) But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh 
on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her 
already in his heart. 29. And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it 
out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of 
thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should 
be cast into hell. 30. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut if off, 
and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy 
members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be 
cast into hell.14
29 Yuwayi, ngaka kajikanpa marda karnta-kari lirlki-nyanyi milpa-
jarrarlu. Kuja-kujakuju-nyanu milpa-jarra wilypi-manta jurnta, 
kajikangku Kaaturlu kijirni milpa-jarra-kurlu-juku warlu wiri-kirra 
kuja-ka jankami tarnnga-juku.
Yes, if you might look lustfully at another woman with both eyes. 
To avoid that, pluck away your eyes, or God will throw you still with 
both eyes into the big fire which burns forever.
13  The Walpiri Bible is a project of the Australian Society for Indigenous Languages (2001), 
available at: aboriginalbibles.org.au/Warlpiri/.
14  Matthew 5:28 available at: ebible.org/study/?w1=bible&t1=local:wbp&v1=JN1_1.
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30 Ngaka kajikanpa marda majungka-jarrimi, kajikanpa marda 
nyiyarlangu purungku-mani rdaka-jarrarlu. Kuja-kujakuju-
nyanu rdaka-jarra mururl-pajika jurnta, kajikangku Kaaturlu 
kijirni rdaka-jarra-kurlu-juku warlu wiri-kirra kuja-ka jankami 
tarnnga-juku.
Yes, if you might do bad, you might steal something with both 
hands. To avoid that, chop off both hands, or God will throw you 
still with both hands into the big fire which burns forever.
Kajilpangku Kaaturlu kijikarla nguru yali-kirra palka 
wanapi-jiki, ngulaju maju-nyayirni nyuntukuju. Kala kajinpa 
yukamirra Kaatu-kurlangu-kurra nguru-nyayirni-wangu-kurra 
rdaka-jarra-wangu manu marda milpa-jarra-wangu, ngulaju 
ngulajuku. Kapunpa nyanungu-kurlu nyina tarnnga-juku.
If God were to throw your whole body into that region, that is very 
bad for you. But when you enter God’s special area without both 
hands and maybe without both eyes, then alright. You will be with 
him forever.
1 Corinthians 12:12–27
(King James version) 12  For as the body is one and has many 
members, but all the members of that one body, being many, are 
one body, so also is Christ. … 14 For the body is not one member 
but many. 15 If the foot should say, ‘Because I am not hand, I am 
not of the body,’ is it therefore not of the body? … 18 But now 
hath God set the members every one of them in the body, as it 
hath pleased him … 23 And those members of the body, which we 
think to be less honourable, upon these we bestow more abundant 
honour; and our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness. 
24 For our comely parts have no need: but God hath tempered the 
body together, having given more abundant honour to that part 
which lacked:15
15  Available at: ebible.org/study/?w1=bible&t1=local:wbp&v1=JN1_1.



































Literally: ‘A person’s body has a head, two hands, two feet and many 
other (things). While they are many they are one in a person’s one body. 
So like that too is Jesus Christ and we his people.’ (our interlinearisation 
and back-translation)
14 Yapa-kurlangurlu palkangku-ka mardarni jurru, rdaka-jarra, wirliya-
jarra manu panu-kari. Panu-juku kalu jinta-jarrimi yapangka palkangka 
jintangka-juku.
Literally: ‘A person’s body has a head, two hands, two feet and many 
others. The many are united in a person’s single body.’
18 God-rlu-ngalpa palka kardu-manu jurru-kurlu, rdaka-jarra-kurlu, 
wirliya-jarra-kurlu manu panu-kari-kirli, ngulaku-ngarntiji kamparru-
juku jirringi-yirrarnu-wiyi nyarrparlu yungu-ngalpa jinta-maninjarla 
yirrarni palkangka jintangka ngalipa-nyangurla jurru, rdaka-jarra, 
wirliya-jarra manu panu-karirlangu.
Literally: ‘God made our body(/bodies) with a head, with two hands/
arms, with two feet and with many others, ready for that he first 
decided how, having made us one, to put us in our one body a head, 
two hands/arms, two feet and many others too.’
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23 Yapangku marda kajika manngu-nyanyi pinti ngulaju nganta 
nyirntinyirnti nganta. Kujarlaju kajika-nyanu maparni jarangku 
karalypa-kardalku. Manu kajika-nyanu marda ngarntapiri nyanjarla 
kurntaku ngurrju-mani. Ngula-kujaku kanyanu parnta-yirrarni 
wawarda kurntangka yapa-patu-kari-kijakurlangu. 24 Yinngirri manu 
jurru wakurlu, ngulaju marda kajika-nyanu miimii-nyanyi yuntardi 
nganta. Kujarlaju, kula kanyanu parnta-yirrarni. Jijaji Kiraji-kirlangu 
yapa, ngulaju karlipa nyina turnu jintangka-juku. Kujarlaju kajilpa-
nyanu nganangku-puka Kirijinirli ngurrju-pajikarla Kirijini-kari-
piya-wangu nganta, ngulaju jarrwara-nyayirni! Kaaturlu kangalpa 
turnu-maninjarla jinta-kurra-mani, ngula-jangkarluju yungurlipa-jana 
warrawarra-kanyi Kirijini-kariyi-nyanu yangka rampaku.
Literally: 23 ‘A person might perceive skin as rough. So he might rub 
himself smooth with fat. And on seeing his groin he might perhaps 
make himself ashamed. To avoid that he covers himself with clothes 
out of shame so that others can’t (see it) either.’ 24 ‘His face and head 
hair, he might take a long look at thinking how good-looking he is. 
So he doesn’t cover (that part of ) himself. Jesus Christ’s people, we are 
together in one. Thus whatever Christian calls himself “good” thinking 
he’s not like other Christians, that is very wrong! God gathers and 






Kevin Windle and Mary Besemeres
Anna Wierzbicka’s early life, like that of most of her generation in Poland, 
was dominated by war and Nazi occupation, with all that that entailed. 
Born Anna Smoleńska in Warsaw in 1938, she was one year old when 
Poland was invaded, and the family would spend the next five years in the 
occupied city, which meant that her childhood vocabulary was enriched 
by terms such as łapać (to catch, round up) and the related noun łapanka 
(round-up, mass arrest). After the failure of the Warsaw Rising in the 
autumn of 1944, the Germans razed most of the remaining buildings 
and deported the surviving non-combatants to forced labour in Germany. 
Anna’s father Tadeusz and mother Maria were separated, and Maria, Anna 
and her elder sister Marta taken to Hamelin, where the women were 
put to work sewing blankets for the Wehrmacht at a local factory. The 
children spent their time chasing the rats that abounded along the Weser 
and in the barrack huts in which they lived—this being the home town 
of the Pied Piper—and (in some cases) roasting their captives on bonfires. 
The labour camp food was turnip soup, which Anna liked.
On 14 March 1945 an allied daylight bombing raid destroyed much of 
the city and caused many casualties. As Anna recalled: ‘Everything was on 
fire and the roofs were falling in.’ She sought refuge under the doubtful 
protection of a bush, but was soon found unharmed by her very relieved 
mother. A few hours later, soldiers of the US Army reached Hamelin. 
‘They gave chewing gum and chocolate to us children,’ Anna remembers.1
The war over, the Smoleński family was reunited and returned to Poland, 
first to Bytom in Silesia, then to the ruined capital in 1947.
1  Anna Goc, ‘Przekładanie siebie’ [Translating oneself ], Tygodnik powszechny, 31 August, 2015. 
Available at: www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/przekladanie-siebie-29914.
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From an early age, Anna was fascinated by dictionaries and the Polish 
language, encouraged by her father, an engineer by training, with a great 
interest in language. With her father’s help she composed humorous 
poems about their family.
Poland was now firmly under Soviet control and Marxist ideology 
increasingly dominated every sphere of life. Popular resistance could only 
be of the passive and sullen variety.
In 1954, at the age of only 16, on the strength of an outstanding school 
record, Anna was admitted to Warsaw University to study Polish philology, 
although she had refused to join the regime-run League of Polish 
Youth—a  requirement for university entry. Stalin had died in March 
1953, but remained the object of compulsory posthumous reverence 
as ‘the coryphaeus of all the sciences’, in the words of a satirical song. 
Linguistics was not exempt: he had published his views on the subject 
in Pravda under the title ‘Marxism and problems of linguistics’ (Pravda, 
2  August, 1950). However, Marxism had made only limited inroads 
into the field of Anna’s interest at the time: historical linguistics, the 
history of Polish grammar, the Slavonic languages and Polish literature, 
in particular poetry. These were taught by distinguished scholars who 
managed to protect the integrity of their disciplines and resist ideological 
contamination. She recalls them with much affection and gratitude, in 
particular Maria Renata Mayenowa, a specialist in poetry, and Zofia 
Szmydtowa, who introduced her to classics of world literature, from 
Homer to Cervantes.
Anna was never one to fear speaking her mind. Friends recall that she 
took the part of students who were being harassed by the authorities, and 
openly opposed the anti-Semitic campaigns that characterised the period. 
Always uncompromising in matters of conviction, she did not hide her 
devotion to Catholicism, even at times when discretion made it advisable.
During her studies she met Piotr Wierzbicki, a budding writer and scholar, 
whom she would marry immediately after graduation.
Anna was in her third year of university when the country was shaken 
by something resembling a revolution, later to be known as the Polish 
October, in 1956. This was a direct consequence of Khrushchev’s exposure 
of Stalin’s crimes in the Soviet Union, and the onset of the ensuing cultural 
‘Thaw’. The result in Poland, to an even greater extent than in the USSR, 
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was a period of increased intellectual ferment and relative freedom. In the 
universities, the official ideology seemed to be in retreat, and scholars who 
had been banished from Academe were permitted to return.
After graduating from the university, Anna took up an offer of academic 
work in the Institute of Literary Studies, in the section headed by 
Professor Mayenowa, studying language and literary genres. Under 
Professor Mayenowa’s supervision, she defended a doctoral thesis that 
drew together literary study and linguistics in a study of the syntactic and 
stylistic system of Polish Renaissance prose. She would go on to a higher 
doctorate, known in Poland as habilitacja, awarded on the basis of her 
book Dociekania semantyczne (Semantic Investigations), which laid out her 
new linguistic interest. Some of her colleagues and lifelong friends from 
this period were Lucylla Pszczołowska, Elżbieta Janus, Teresa Dobrzyńska, 
Jadwiga Wajszczuk and Zofia Zaron.
It was Professor Mayenowa who introduced Anna to academic life and 
the intellectual and scholarly environment of Warsaw and other centres, 
and arranged for her to spend six months in Moscow in 1964–65. There 
she met some of the pioneers of a new school of Russian linguistics, 
in particular Igor Melčuk and Juri Apresjan, who were then becoming 
known for their work in the field of semantics. Their friendship and 
companionship in linguistic research she sees as one of the greatest gifts 
life has given her. A fluent speaker of Russian, she would later say of this 
period: ‘My time in Moscow also awakened an interest in Russian culture 
and language, which has stayed with me all my life.’
The friendships from her time in Moscow also endured throughout her 
life. Igor Melčuk recalls her preparing to fly to Moscow in 1977, laden 
with gifts of food, books and presents for children:
The suitcases were already full, and she went on hanging all kinds 
of bags on her shoulders, round her neck, on her arms—that left 
only her teeth free—and she ran to the plane weighed down by an 
extra 15 kilograms.
A pivotal moment in Anna’s development as a linguist came in 1964 when 
Andrzej Bogusławski, whom she described as ‘the most original thinker 
I had ever met’, delivered a lecture at Warsaw University with the title 
‘On the foundations of semantics’. His central idea came as a revelation, 
contained in the word ‘indefinibilia’, the hypothesis of the existence of 
a few dozen basic concepts, innate and universal, on which the meanings 
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of all words in all languages and all human thought are built. This idea 
was to become the principal focus of her subsequent scholarly work. 
As she related:
Bogusławski’s hypothesis was in tune with an idea of Leibniz’s, the 
idea of an ‘alphabet of human thoughts’ (alphabetum cogitationum 
humanorum). To Leibniz, however, this was a purely theoretical 
and speculative idea. Bogusławski, on the other hand, was 
proposing to make it the basis of modern semantics.
From these ideas sprang the current of thought that would define Anna’s 
future research. As she has said: ‘Everything I’ve done since has been 
based on the key idea of that lecture.’ Her aim would be to reconstruct 
Leibniz’s ‘alphabet of human thought’. Her aim in doing so reached 
beyond philosophy and scholarship: the understanding to be obtained 
held potential benefits for human society as a whole. As she puts it:
Simple indefinable concepts form the basis of simple, broadly 
comprehensible explanations in every sphere of life, as well as a 
basis for improved communication among people from different 
cultures. In my view, an innate and universal alphabet of human 
thought also gives us a tool with which to understand, and above 
all to think in any field, be it ethics, discussion of values, law, 
psychology, cultural research, international relations etc.
In 1966, Anna secured a post-doctoral stipend to spend a year at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), with the support of the 
Russian linguist and literary theorist Roman Jakobson. At MIT she 
familiarised herself with the work of Noam Chomsky, whose generative 
grammar was then causing much excitement in the world of linguistics. 
As she tells it, this gave her
a year in which to confirm to myself that I did not want to do 
what the Chomskyans proposed … The generativists focused on 
linguistic form, whereas I was also interested in the people who use 
language, and the meanings they impart to the words they utter.
She was confirmed in her intention of engaging with semantics and 
seeking fundamental human concepts.
On her way home to Poland, she was able to spend a few weeks in Oxford, 
thanks to the support of the renowned philosopher and historian Isaiah 
Berlin, and there she met John Besemeres, an Australian postgraduate 
working in Slavonic studies, with whom she remained in touch, despite 
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obstacles imposed by censorship and what Anna would remember as 
‘the political events of the terrible year 1968’. That was the year of student 
demonstrations in Poland, a virulent anti-Semitic campaign in response, 
and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. At the end of August, 
while ‘fraternal assistance’ was suppressing opposition in Prague, the 
International Semiotic Symposium was held in Warsaw. Anna delivered 
her paper wearing a red blouse, white skirt and blue stockings, the colours 
of the state flag of Czechoslovakia, and in her paper examined alternative 
terms that define a speaker’s point of view, such as ‘spy’ vs ‘intelligence 
agent’, and ‘fraternal assistance’ vs ‘invasion’.
In 1970, by which time Anna was divorced from Piotr Wierzbicki, she 
and John Besemeres were able to marry in a civil ceremony in Belgrade, 
where John was then working as a translator. They returned to Poland 
together, and a church wedding was held in the Franciscan chapel in 
Laski, a unique centre of Catholic intellectual and spiritual life known 
in communist times as a refuge for dissidents. Two years later, their 
daughter Mary was born in Warsaw, and in December 1972 all three 
moved to Canberra, where Anna and John’s second daughter Clare was 
born in 1975.
As Anna herself puts it in a piece for the Polish Science Foundation that 
awarded her a prize in 2010, she identifies Warsaw with the first half of 
her life and Canberra with the second. In 1973 she was appointed lecturer 
at The Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra, where she 
would soon become a pillar of the very strong linguistics team and remain 
until her retirement in 2016, maintaining a steady output of scholarly 
work throughout those years and not ceasing in retirement. The position 
opened up to her a whole new world of unfamiliar languages—Indigenous 
Australian languages through the work of her colleagues, such as Jane 
Simpson and Harold Koch, as well as Chinese, Japanese, Korean and 
Malay among others—the mother tongues of many of her international 
students. Some of those students, over the years, have included Rie 
Hasada, Yuko Asano, Ryo Stanwood, Kyung-Joo Yoon, Adrian Tien, Gian 
Marco Farese and Rui Shen.
In Canberra, Anna and John made close friends among the local Polish 
community, including Ola and Jerzy Zubrzycki, Irena Żywczak, Nina and 
Krzysztof Zagórski, Grażyna Żurkowska, Maciej Ciołek and Irena Golc, 
Marysia and Krzysztof Tarłowski and Maria Sikorska. In 1982, with Peter 
Hill, John co-founded the department of Slavonic Studies at Macquarie 
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University, and taught Polish Studies there until 1985, commuting 
between Sydney and Canberra. In 1983, Anna, Mary and Clare joined 
him in Sydney for six months. In 1996, Anna was appointed a Humboldt 
Fellow at Cologne in Germany, and John, Mary and Clare accompanied 
her there for six months.
Perhaps the most significant element of Anna’s professional life in Australia 
has been her collaborative work with Cliff Goddard, who, as she writes in 
her piece for the Polish Science Foundation, was her student and, initially, 
an ‘opponent’ in the 1970s but from the 1980s her frequent co-author 
and the co-founder of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) 
approach, which posits a core set of basic, indefinable and universal human 
concepts. Together with Cliff and other colleagues (many of them also 
former students) such as Deborah Hill, Felix Ameka, Jean Harkins, Carol 
Priestley, Bert Peeters, Jock Onn Wong, Anna Gladkova, Zhengdao Ye, 
Helen Bromhead, Zuzanna Bułat Silva and Sandy Habib, Anna has 
conducted research across a wide range of languages into the cross-
translatability of NSM, continually updating and refining it accordingly.
In 2004, with her daughter Mary, Anna convened a symposium at 
Curtin University, which led to the publication of their co-edited volume 
Translating Lives: Living with Two Languages and Cultures (University 
of Queensland Press, 2007), a collection of personal essays by bilingual 
Australian authors, including the writers Kim Scott and Eva Sallis, and 
the linguists Michael Clyne and Zhengdao Ye. Anna’s own contribution, 
entitled ‘Two languages, two cultures, one (?) self: Between Polish and 
English’, reports on her experience of struggling to translate her Polish 
emotional world into English. She gives the example of being asked by 
Australian friends about her baby granddaughter Elżbietka (who at that 
time lived in Perth), and being lost for words: English terms like ‘cute’ 
and ‘adorable’ had no emotional resonance for her and felt fake, while the 
diminutives she would naturally use in Polish (e.g. ‘loczki’, little curls) 
were unavailable in English.
Two of Anna’s particular passions over the past two decades have been the 




Her work on English probes the cultural assumptions that (she argues) 
underpin key concepts like ‘evidence’, and the dangers of ethnocentrism, 
given the global status of English. To date, she has published, in addition 
to numerous articles, three major works in this field: English: Meaning 
and Culture (2006); Experience, Evidence, and Sense: The Hidden Cultural 
Legacy of English (2010) and Imprisoned in English: The Hazards of English 
as a Default Language (2014).
Anna’s work in theology combines her love of semantics with her Christian 
faith. In 2001, she published What did Jesus Mean? Explaining the Sermon 
on the Mount and the Parables in Simple and Universal Human Concepts 
(Oxford University Press). Drawing on biblical studies, including the 
work of Jewish scholars, the book interprets Jesus’s sayings in the Sermon 
on the Mount and the parables, and translates them from the original 
Greek of the Gospels into NSM. Anna’s latest book is What Christians 
Believe: A Story of God and People (Oxford University Press, 2019; Polish 
edition: Znak, 2017). It consists of a retelling—using ‘Minimal English’—
of key episodes in the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament, which 
together, Anna argues, convey the central meanings of Christianity.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Anna returned every couple of years 
to Poland to visit her mother Maria and sister Marta, and Marta’s family 
(husband Adam and children Ania, Michał, and Asia), in Miedzeszyn, 
outside Warsaw. On two occasions, Anna’s mother (‘Babcia Marysia’ 
to her grandchildren) came out to Australia to stay with her for several 
months. If home alone, Babcia Marysia would invariably answer the 
phone in French, as she spoke no English. She died in 1999, aged 100.
Anna is herself a loving and intensely devoted grandmother to six 
grandchildren: (in chronological order) Elizabeth (born in 2002, and 
named for Anna’s childhood friend Elżbieta Galewska), Nicholas (2005), 
Catherine (2008), Therese (2010) and twins John and Benedict (2015). 
While Mary was living with her husband Nigel in Perth, Anna visited 
frequently for weeks at a time to help look after their children Lizzie and 
Nick. She taught both of them to read, using the Bible, and has read 
countless books with them and Clare and Phil’s daughters Catherine and 
Therese, most recently, with Nick, Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Drawing on sayings 
of Clare and Phil’s toddlers John and Ben, she has provisionally outlined 
five stages of how young children think, in NSM. For example: ‘I can be 
there, I want this’—would be John or Ben gazing purposefully through 
the baby-gate blocking their entrance to the kitchen.
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Since 2016, Anna has been a Professor Emerita in the School of Literature, 
Languages and Linguistics at ANU. Although formally retired, she 
continues to research and publish, to supervise graduate students and give 
guest lectures in undergraduate linguistics courses, and leads a weekly 
open seminar in semantics and theology.
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morriña analysis, 220–221
speech markers, 292–293
Speech Stage, 293–294, 295
Stalin, Joseph, 494




subject–verb–object (SVO) structure, 
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T-V pronouns, 85, 86, 87
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